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International cooperation in weapons technology projects has long been a feature of alliance 
politics; and, there are many advantages to both international technology transfer and 
standardisation within military alliances. International collaboration between national defence 
industries has produced successful weapon systems from technologically advanced fighter 
aircraft to anti-tank missiles. Given the success of many joint defence projects, one 
unresolved question is why there have been no successful collaborative international main 
battle tank (MBT) projects since 1945. This thesis seeks to answer this question by 
considering four case studies of failed attempts to produce an MBT through an international 
collaborative tank project: first and second, the Franco-German efforts to produce a standard 
European tank, or Euro-Panzer (represented by two separate projects in 1957-63 and 1977-
83); third, the US-German MBT-70 project (1963-70); and, fourth, the Anglo-German Future 
Main Battle Tank, or KPz3 (1971-77). In order to provide an explanation of the causes of 
failure on four separate occasions, the analysis includes reference to other high-technology 
civilian and military joint projects which either succeeded, or which cannot be classified as 
international MBT collaborative projects (such as the KNDS demonstration tank and the 
MBT-2000 developed by China and Pakistan). In addition to identifying the multiple causes 
of failure and providing an analysis of the most significant factor(s) in each case, it will be 
argued that the pattern which emerged during the Cold War does not necessarily provide an 
‘absolute principle’ for future collaborative MBT projects: financial and other pressures may 
yet create conditions conducive to the completion of a successful collaborative MBT high-
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The idea for this study came about after examining the newly donated Ogorkiewicz Papers at 
the Tank Museum archives and library, Bovington, and reading about the abortive MBT-70 
collaboration between the USA and the FRG. It became apparent that no in-depth study had 
been made into international collaboration in MBT development, and Professor Alaric Searle 
encouraged me to tackle this subject. It has been his advice, encouragement and badgering, 
alongside that of my co-supervisor, Dr. Brian Hall, that have ensured that this thesis emerged 
without the errors and oversights that it originally contained. 
I could not have begun delving into the subject of armour development without the 
outstanding help of Stuart Wheeler and the rest of the archive staff at the Tank Museum, 
Bovington, where I spent many enjoyable weeks. It was also Stuart who arranged an 
interview with Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, whose papers originally sparked the whole 
study, and whose unparalleled knowledge and experience in the field of tank development 
gave my future research direction and structure. The National Archives at Kew and the 
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau provided the bulk of the remaining 
archival material, and the efficiency of the staff there ensured that my days in those archives 
were as productive as they could have been. 
None of the research would have been possible without the generous help of The 
Lady Monica Cockfield Memorial Trust, whose sponsorship made it financially possible for 
me to undertake a full-time doctoral degree in the first place. I hope that the Trust’s aim to 
further educational opportunities for those who would otherwise miss out, particularly in the 
field of European studies, has been met to their satisfaction. It most certainly has in my 
opinion and the completion of this thesis stands testament to the Trust’s impact and success. 
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Finally, I must acknowledge the support that my family have given to me over the 
years of this PhD study and the preceding years of University education as a mature student. 
The support and pride expressed by both of my parents has encouraged me to keep going 
through some dark times. My brothers, in their own ways as only brothers can, have also 
made it clear that they are proud of my achievements. I also like to believe that my sons, 
although being teenagers they would never dream of saying so, are proud of their old dad. 
That my eldest son wants to be a military historian suggests that at least a little of my 
enthusiasm for the subject has rubbed off on him. My younger son wants a more technical job 
so will likely end up in a career that can support the poverty-stricken historians of the family. 
Most importantly, my wife, Janet, has stood by me through the high and low times, 
supporting me financially, emotionally and practically through illness, injury and those times 
when I felt like giving up. Without her, I doubt that I would have returned to university and 
begun this academic journey later in life than most. I hope that she appreciates just how much 
her love and support have contributed to this study. 
v 
 
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ABCT Armoured Brigade Combat Team 
AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle 
APC Armoured Personnel Carrier 
APDS Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot 
APFSDS Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot 
APDSFS Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot Fin-Stabilised, an alternative name for 
APFSDS ammunition  
ARCOV US Army’s Armament for Future Tanks and Similar Combat Vehicles 
Committee 
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile. See also ATGW (below). 
ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon, often an alternative usage to ATGM 
AUS(IP) Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Intellectual Property) 
AUS(Ord) Assistant Under-Secretary of State (Ordnance) 
BAOR British Army on the Rhine 
BEF British Expeditionary Force 
CE Chemical Energy 
CENTAG (NATO) Central Army Group 
CGS Chief of the General Staff 
CSA Chief Scientific Advisor 
CTR Casemate Test Rig 
DCA(PN) Deputy Chief Advisor (Projects and Nuclear) 
DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
DEPC Defence Equipment Procurement Committee 
DMGO Deputy Master General of the Ordnance 
DRAC Director of the Royal Armoured Corps 
DRDS Defence Research and Development Staff (UK) 
Dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (UK) 
DUS(P)  Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Policy and Programmes) 
EDA European Defence Agency 
EDC European Defence Community 
EEC European Economic Community 
ERA Explosive Reactive Armour 
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FINABEL A European group set up to promote greater intra-European military 
cooperation 
FMBT Future Main Battle Tank 
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FRG  Federal Republic of Germany 
FVRDE Fighting Vehicle Research and Development Establishment 
GSR General Service Requirement 
GST General Staff Target 
HDS Head of Defence Sales 
HEAT High Explosive Anti-tank 
HESH High Explosive Squash Head 
HEP High Explosive Plastic, the US term for HESH 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IEPG Independent European Programme Group 
ISD In-Service Date 
KE Kinetic Energy 
LP Liquid Propellant 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MC Military Characteristics 
MG Machine-gun 
MGO Master General of the Ordnance 
MICV Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle 
MLC Military Load Classification 
MOD Ministry of Defence 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MVEE Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment  
NBC Nuclear-Biological-Chemical 
NORTHAG (NATO) Northern Army Group 
NWPA NATO Weapons Procurement Agency 
PD/CE Parametric Design and Cost Effectiveness. 
PS Private Secretary 
PUS Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
QDG Queen’s Dragoon Guards 
QMR Qualitative Materiel Requirement  
RARDE Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment 
RHA Rolled Homogenous Armour 
RHAe Rolled Homogenous Armour equivalent 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
RPG Rocket-propelled Grenade 
RSI Rationalisation, Standardisation and Interoperability 
WEAG Western European Armaments Group 
WEU  Western European Union 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 




Assumptions and Definition of Terms 
Diplomacy. Potentially referring to any interactions between people; unless otherwise stated 
in the text, this study will use the term ‘diplomacy’ to describe the management of 
international relations between national governments. 
Politics. The term ‘politics’ might refer to activities related to the wielding of power within 
any organisation, but in this study, unless otherwise stated, it will be used to refer to the 
activities within a nation’s government and between the governments of different nations. 
Superiority of Tank Design. The study does not seek to come to a conclusion on what design 
of tank is superior to another. Designers and users have always sought to employ designs best 
suited to their own philosophy of armoured warfare, and thus two different designs may be 
superior to one another in their own particular method of employment.1 
Tank. What exactly defines a ‘tank’ (as opposed to, for example, a self-propelled artillery 
gun or mechanised infantry fighting vehicle), varies by commentator.2 For the purposes of 
this study, a main battle tank (MBT) will be defined as being self-propelled, tracked, carrying 
a medium-calibre direct-fire gun in a revolving turret, and having armour sufficient to protect 
it in the battlefield’s front line.3 
                                                
1 Chapter 1, below, explains the various philosophies of tank design and how they originated. 
2 This is covered in more detail in Chapter 1, below. 
3 It is acknowledged that some fighting vehicles either fit this category but are not usually defined or employed 
as tanks, for example turreted tank destroyers of the Second World War, or are generally defined as tanks but do 
not meet the definition given, for example the earliest tanks which often had no turret, or infantry support tanks 




Cooperation in defence has been a feature of diplomacy throughout the twentieth century and 
there are obvious advantages to both international technology transfer and standardisation 
within military alliances, from operational organisation and logistics through to strengthening 
diplomatic ties, to economic savings in both development and production.1 International 
collaboration in the defence industry has, since the foundation of NATO, produced many 
successful weapon systems, from technologically advanced strike and fighter aircraft to 
artillery pieces and missiles. Despite these successes, one weapons system has appeared to be 
almost resistant to international collaboration – the main battle tank. Attempts to create joint 
tank projects have illustrated more than any other weapon the problems surrounding NATO 
standardisation. Given the success of many joint defence projects such as the Alphajet, 
Jaguar, Tornado and Eurofighter aircraft, and of the AS-30, Kormoran, Roland and 
Brimstone missile systems, the question arises as to why there have been no successful 
collaborative international main battle tank projects.2 
The quest for a standard tank design within NATO began with the ‘FINABEL’ 
Franco-German ‘European Standard Tank’, ‘Standard Panzer, or ‘Europanzer’ project in 
1957, and the USA and European NATO countries have since made several further attempts 
towards a joint main battle tank (MBT) design.3 At the time of writing, there is talk of yet 
                                                
1 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Armaments Among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985’, in Peter 
Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds.), International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-
Edged Diplomacy (London, 1993), p. 128; and, Matthew Ford and Alex Gould, ‘Military Identities, 
Conventional Capability and the Politics of NATO Standardisation at the Beginning of the Second Cold War’, 
International History Review, 41:4 (2019), p. 779. 
2 Alexander H. Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production 
by the NATO Allies: Ten Years Later - And Beyond (The Hague, 1981), pp. 36-45. Note that Cornell’s book 
predates both Eurofighter and Brimstone. 
3 See, for example: Richard Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution (Oxford, 2015), p. 194; Cornell, 
International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO Allies, p. 
47; Richard E. Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London, 1979), p. 
208; and, Movavcsik, ‘Armaments Among Allies’, pp. 143-150. 
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another potential joint European tank project, this time between France, Germany and 
possibly Poland.4 To date, there has been only one successful truly collaborative main battle 
tank design, and that was the Anglo-American Mark VIII ‘International’ in 1917/18.5 Whilst 
the failure of NATO nations to produce a standardised main battle tank is frequently 
mentioned in passing, it nevertheless remains a subject on which very little has been written. 
It is the aim of this thesis to consider this question, with particular reference to the fact that 
this issue is of relevance not simply for research into the NATO Alliance, but also in relation 
to the continuing controversies around European defence integration. Before considering, 
however, some of the broader research issues, it is necessary to begin with a survey of the 
literature most relevant to this study. 
Relevant Literature 
A huge quantity of literature has appeared on the history of the tank since its first appearance 
on the battlefield in 1916.6 These works concentrate on the employment of tanks and their 
supporting arms within the context of a particular battle, campaign, or war; or, their 
development in periods of peace, including the question of the theory of armoured warfare.7 
                                                
4 The Franco-German conglomerate KNDS revealed a collaborative MBT venture at the Eurosatory Defence 
and Security Exhibition on 15 June 2018, although no Polish involvement has yet materialised in that project. 
Jane’s 360, ‘EU Tank Breaks Cover’, <https://www.janes.com/article/81083/eu-tank-breaks-cover-es18d5>, 
accessed 2 August 2018; Defence News, ‘Poland Wants to Play in Franco-German Tank Program’, 
<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2016/08/03/poland-wants-play-franco-
german-tank-program/87929202/>, accessed 17 August 2016; Jane’s 360, ‘Poland Reinforces Armour’ 
<http://www.janes.com/article/72245/poland-reinforces-armour>, accessed 14 July 2017. 
5 The Mark VIII project was initiated in 1917 and the first vehicle was produced in late 1918. TNA, MUN 
4/5194, 1918 Sept. 30-1919 Apr. 5, Mechanical Warfare: Mark VIII Tanks: miscellaneous departmental 
minutes. 
6 For general studies, which cut across countries and historical epochs, see: J. P. Harris and F. N. Toase (eds.), 
Armoured Warfare (London, 1990); George F. Hofmann, and Donn A. Starry (eds.), Camp Colt to Desert 
Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, 1999); Bruce Gudmundsson, On Armor (Westport, CT, 
2004); and, Alaric Searle, Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History (London, 2017). 
7 For simply a cross-section of the literature, see the bibliographies and references in the general works in fn.6 
immediately above. Considering the most recent research, Kursk provides an indication of the way in which one 
battle can generate several extremely well-researched studies, such as: David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, 
The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence, KS, 1999); Valeriy Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth. The Tank Battle at 
Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative, trans. Stuart Britton (Solihull, 2011); Roman 
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Other historical studies explore a variety of themes, such as the history of tank production, 
tactics, anti-tank warfare, or attempts to elucidate particular military lessons based on case 
studies from different conflicts.8 This historical literature is so vast – and includes thousands 
of articles in scholarly and military journals – that it would be inappropriate here to attempt to 
outline even a cross-section of this research. What is relevant, though, is to outline four areas 
in the literature which are pertinent to the issue of international collaborative tank projects. 
Firstly, there are some studies which do refer to, or at least mention, the question of 
international collaboration in tank design; while there is no study of the subject that examines 
more than one design in any depth, existing treatment of the subject requires reference. 
Secondly, it is obviously of considerable importance to make some comment on the body of 
work which examines tank technology.9 Thirdly, there is some literature which falls within 
the discipline of Security Studies, and which considers cooperation between nations in 
defence, weapons projects and other forms of infrastructure planning; most of these discuss 
the business of diplomatic and military collaboration through technology transfer and 
jointinternational projects.10 Fourthly, there is literature which deals with the subject of 
weapons technology with a broader focus than just tanks or armour, and examines the 
question of technological determinism; whether military technology drives military history or 
                                                                                                                                                  
Toeppel, Kursk 1943: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War (Solihull, 2018). On interwar 
developments, important works are: J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured 
Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester, 1995); Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored 
Warfare, 1918-1940 (London and Toronto, 1984); Mary R. Habek, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor 
Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939 (New York, 2014); Azar Gat, British Armour Theory 
and the Rise of the Panzer Arm: Revising the Revisionists (London, 2000); and, also Williamson Murray, 
‘Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences’, in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett 
(eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 6-49. 
8 Examples are: Benjamin Coombs, British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934-1945 (London, 2013); 
Rudolf Steiger, Panzertaktikim Spiegel deutscherKriegstagebücher 1939-1941 (Freiburg i.Br., 1973); John 
Weeks, Men against Tanks: A History of Anti-Tank Warfare (London, 1975); Kendall D. Gott, Breaking the 
Mold: Tanks in the Cities (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006). 
9 See, for instance: Richard Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks (Coulsdon, 1991); Peter Gudgin, Armoured 
Firepower: The Development of Tank Armament 1939-45 (Stroud, 1997); Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Main 
Battle Tanks (Second Edition) (London, 1986).  
10 See, for example: Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in Internal 
Relations (Princeton, 2009); Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds.), International Bargaining 
and Domestic Politics: Double-Edged Diplomacy (London, 1993); Karl Kaiser and John Roper, British-German 
Defence Co-operation: Partners Within the Alliance (London 1988). 
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vice-versa. As the subject of joint tank projects cuts across a range of different types of 
literature, it is necessary to consider these four areas separately. 
Collaboration in Tank Design 
Nations have collaborated in their employment of armour almost since the invention of the 
tank. During the First World War, for example, the USA had no sovereign tank design and 
exclusively used French and British production models.11 Secondary works dealing 
principally with collaboration in tank design are limited to a handful of journal articles and 
conference papers, although short passages may be found in books more generally 
concerning tank design or defence collaboration.12 Of those articles and papers which largely 
or specifically concern tank collaboration, those by Rolf Hilmes and Thomas McNaugher 
stand out as dealing with the subject in detail, with McNaugher in particular covering the 
MBT-70 project comprehensively.13 
Collaboration in tank design has been mentioned by a number of authors looking at 
both the history of the tank and the technology of tanks. Elizabeth Greenhalgh and Tim Gale 
both examine the early development of tank designs, and how nations such as the USA were 
forced to use the designs of Britain and France for want of an alternative.14 Dale Wilson, John 
                                                
11 Dale E. Wilson, ‘World War I: The Birth of American Armor’, in Hofmann and Starry (eds.), Camp Colt to 
Desert Storm, p. 1. 
12 See, for example: Hofmann and Starry (eds.), Camp Colt to Desert Storm; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of 
Evolution; Simpkin, Tank Warfare; Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots. 
13 Rolf Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, Armor, 110:1 (Jan-Feb 2001), pp. 16-21; 
Thomas L. McNaugher, ‘Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks: Lessons from the U.S.-German 
Experience, 1963-1978’, Rand Note (Rand Corporation, August 1981); and, ‘Problem of Collaborative Weapons 
Development: The MBT-70’, Armed Forces and Society, 10:1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 123-145. 
14 Elizabeth Greenhalgh, ‘Technology Development in Coalition: The Case of the First World War Tank’, 
International History Review, 22:4 (2000), pp. 806-836; Tim Gale, ‘ “A Charming Toy”: The Surprisingly Long 
Life of the Renault Light Tank, 1917-1940’, in Alaric Searle (ed.), Genesis, Employment, Aftermath (Solihull, 
2015), p. 194; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 44-45. 
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Glanfield and Richard Ogorkiewicz expand upon this and refer to the first, and to date the 
only, successful collaborative tank design, the Anglo-American Mark VIII.15 
Among the various post-1945 attempts at international tank collaboration, none are 
covered in detail in the literature and, even when mentioned, they generally receive little in-
depth attention. The 1957 Franco-German ‘Standard Panzer’ receives passing mention from 
Ogorkiewicz, Rolf Hilmes, and Stephen Kocs, especially in relation to the Leopard 1 and 
AMX-30 tanks that emerged from that unsuccessful project.16Amongst the NATO MBT 
collaborations, the US-German MBT-70 is something of a special case, receiving in-depth 
coverage by Thomas McNaugher who produced a RAND Note on the project.17 The subject 
is also covered is far less detail in an article for the US Armor journal by Hilmes, and is also 
referred to by Ogorkiewicz.18 The Anglo-German Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) is more 
typical, receiving a brief acknowledgement from Ogorkiewicz.19 Finally, the Franco-German 
‘Tank 90/Napoleon’ project is once more covered only briefly by Kocs, Hilmes and 
Ogorkiewicz.20 
Beyond the specifics of the NATO collaborative tank projects, the subject of NATO 
standardisation of MBTs is linked to collaboration, with collaboration on a design implicitly 
suggesting standardisation. The literature is once more sparse on the topic, but it is covered 
obliquely by Richard Simpkin, who examines the differing philosophies of British, French 
                                                
15 Wilson, ‘World War I: The Birth of American Armor’, pp. 8-9; Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, pp. 216-218; 
Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 53-54. 
16 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 190, 194; Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 
1956-2000’, p. 17; Stephen A. Kocs, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe’s 
Strategic Choices, 1955-1995 (Westport, 1995), pp. 17-21, 69-76, 87. 
17 McNaugher, ‘Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks’; idem, ‘Problem of Collaborative Weapons 
Development: The MBT-70’, Armed Forces and Society, 10:1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 123-145. This second article 
is drawn from the original RAND Note. 
18 Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, pp. 123-145; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of 
Evolution, pp. 169-170, 195-196. 
19 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 181-182, 196-197. 
20 Kocs, Autonomy or Power? pp. 159-163; Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, pp. 123-
145; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 192. 
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and US tank design.21 McNaugher also looks at this area with more focus in his RAND Note 
on the MBT-70, as do Timm Meyer and Keith Hartley who concern themselves with the 
political and national reasons behind a lack of successful collaborative MBT projects.22 
Literature on Tank Technology  
Whilst there are numerous books that list the technical details of tanks (and most works on 
armoured warfare provide at least an overview of the principles of tank technology and 
design),23 there are few writers who tackle in depth the technology of tanks in anything other 
than short articles in engineering and armour journals. Simpkin and Ogorkiewicz stand out as 
having authored the most important books on the subject in the English language, with 
Hilmes, Spielberger, and von Senger und Etterlin making significant contributions in 
German.24 The debates on armoured vehicle design date back to the interwar period, and 
centre on the balance between firepower, mobility and protection, and on how much 
emphasis should be given to each significant element of the design. A subject of further 
debate is how the tank should be armed, with not only the types of gun under the spotlight but 
also whether main guns should be replaced by missiles. 
The inter-relationship of tank protection and anti-tank weapons has long influenced 
tank design and the significance of the conflict between offence and defence in relation to 
                                                
21 Simpkin, Tank Warfare, p. 213. 
22 Timm R. Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, in Karl Kaiser and John Roper (eds.), 
British-German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance (London, 1988), p. 252; Keith Hartley, 
‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A British View’, in Kaiser and Roper (eds.), British-German Defence Co-
operation: Partners within the Alliance, pp. 265, 282. 
23 See, for example: Foss, Main Battle Tanks; idem, Jane’s Tank Recognition Guide (Glasgow, 1996); Marsh 
Gelbart, Tank: Main Battle and Light Tanks (London, 1996); Ray Bonds, An Illustrated Guide to Modern Tanks 
and Fighting Vehicles, (London, 1980); and, B. T. White, Tanks and Other Tracked Vehicles in Service, (Poole, 
1978). Examples of works on armoured warfare include: Harris and Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare; and, 
Searle, Armoured Warfare. 
24 See, for example: Rolf Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945, trans. Richard 
Simpkin (London, 1987); Walter J. Spielberger, Die Kampfpanzer Leopard und ihreAbarten. Militärfahrzeuge, 
Band. 1 (Stuttgart, 1988); Walter J. Spielberger, Von der Zugmaschinezum Leopard 2. Geschichte der 
Wehrtechnikbei Krauss-Maffei (München,1979); F. M. von Senger und Etterlin, The World’s Armoured 
Fighting Vehicles, trans. R. M. Ogorkiewicz (London, 1962). 
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tank technology is discussed by authors such as Clifford Bradley, David Fletcher, John Stone, 
and P.G. Griffith.25 By the end of the Second World War, the tank appeared to be firmly 
established as a major battlefield weapon, yet Ogorkiewicz notes that even in 1949 influential 
figures were again proclaiming that the era of the tank had passed, this time due to the 
development of effective shaped-charge weapons such as the US 3.5” ‘bazooka’ and 
recoilless rifles.26 Whilst tank design still currently emphasises frontal protection, the impact 
of improved offensive systems and munitions on the race between firepower and protection is 
widely covered by authors such as C. Raja Mohan, Stone, Simpkin, Ogorkiewicz, and 
Bradley, with each new weapons system leading to improvements in armour or other forms 
of protection such as active defences.27 
In discussing the tank/anti-tank debate, Simpkin, Toase, Anker and Ogorkiewicz all 
address the seminal experience of the Israeli tank force in 1973, when General A.A. 
Mandler’s armoured division lost nearly two-thirds of its tanks to an Egyptian infantry force 
heavily armed with RPG-7s and AT-3 SAGGER anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). This 
incident, possibly one of the most significant in terms of steering post-1945 design thinking, 
was another example of the assertion that tanks had become too vulnerable, this time pointing 
to conventional armour, and therefore conventional tanks, being rendered almost worthless in 
the face of modern ATGMs.28 Despite most informed observers concluding that the Israeli 
experience was the result of poor tactical use of armour and a failure to use a combined arms 
                                                
25 See, for example: Clifford Bradley, ‘Historical Military Cycles’, Armor,42:1 (Jan-Feb 1983), pp. 21-25; D. J. 
Fletcher, ‘The Origins of Armour’, in Harris and Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare, p. 24; Stone, The Tank 
Debate, p. 57; P. G. Griffith, ‘British Armoured Warfare in the Western Desert 1940-43’, in Harris and Toase 
(eds.), Armoured Warfare, p. 71. 
26 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, p. 150. 
27 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Precision Guided Munitions in Anti-Tank Warfare’, Strategic Analysis, 7:9 (1983), pp. 730-
750; Stone, The Tank Debate, pp. 169-174; Bradley, ‘Historical Military Cycles’, pp. 21-25. 
28 See, for example: Stone, The Tank Debate, p. 76; Simpkin, Tank Warfare, p.71; F. H. Toase, ‘The Israeli 
Experience of Armoured Warfare’, in Harris and Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare, pp. 180-181; Richard 
Ogorkiewicz, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, in Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (eds.), Cold War, Hot Science: 
Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990 (London, 2002), p. 133; Clinton J. Ancker III, 
‘Whither Armor’, Journal of Military Operations, 1:2 (Autumn 2012), pp. 4-8. 
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approach, the recurring argument that the tank was obsolete nevertheless continued well into 
the Cold War,29 and is still under debate at the time of writing.30 
The debate over values of direct protection (for example, heavier armour) versus 
indirect protection (for example, greater speed and mobility) is covered in some detail by 
Simpkin, Ogorkiewicz and Joseph E. Backhofen, Jr., including an explanation of how 
modern armour can defeat shaped-charge (HEAT) rounds.31 Backhofen also offers insight 
into how beyond-armour effects (the effect on the tank interior) are at least as dangerous to a 
tank and crew as the initial penetration,32 whilst Ogorkiewicz describes how ATGMs may be 
countered by the use of more active protection systems, such as electronic jamming, the firing 
of fragmentation warheads at any detected incoming missile and smoke grenade projectors 
that create a smoke screen to blind laser-guided missiles.33 
NATO Standardisation, Collaboration and Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer of armour dates back to the First World War, when the USA accepted 
British and French designs for their nascent armoured force, and collaborative design began 
when Britain and the USA collaborated on the Mark VIII ‘International’ or ‘Liberty’ in late 
1917.34 The interwar years and Second World saw much technology transfer in the form of 
                                                
29 See for instance: Stone, The Tank Debate; idem, ‘The Future of Armoured Warfare: Prospects for the Tank’, 
The RUSI Journal, 141:3 (1996), pp. 39-43; Ancker, ‘Whither Armor’; and, Stanley C. Crist, ‘The M1A2 
Abrams: The Last Main Battle Tank?’, Armor, 106:4 (Jul-Aug 1997), pp. 14-16.  
30 See for example: Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, press release 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-century-after-the-first-use-of-the-tank-what-does-the-future-hold>, 
accessed 26 September 2016; Defence of the Realm, ‘Is the Main Battle Tank Obsolete?’ 
<https://defenceoftherealm.wordpress.com/2016/03/18/is-the-main-battle-tank-obsolete/>, accessed 12 July 
2016; Wealth Daily, ‘21st Warfare Renders the Tank Obsolete’ <http://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/21st-
century-warfare-renders-the-tank-obsolete/5017>, accessed 26 August 2016. 
31 Simpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 67, 75, 110, 114-115; Joseph E. Backhofen, Jr., ‘Armor Technology, (Part III)’, 
Armor, 42:2 (March-April 1983), pp. 18-19; idem, ‘Armor Technology, (Part IV)’, Armor, 42:3 (May-Jun 
1983), p. 38; idem, ‘Armor Technology, (Part V)’, Armor, 43:1 (Jan-Feb 1984), pp. 21-22; and, Ogorkiewicz, 
Tanks; 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 268-276. 
32 Backhofen, Jr., ‘Armor Technology, (Part III)’, pp. 18-20. 
33 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks; 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 268-276. 
34 Dale E. Wilson, ‘World War I’, in George F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry (eds.), Camp Colt to Desert 
Storm: The History of US Armored Forces (Lexington, 1999), pp. 3, 8. For a discussion on the missed potential 
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tank exports and imports, and also licensed design and Lend-Lease, most notably by the 
Allies. With the establishment of NATO came calls for standardisation in weapons design, 
calls that have become more immediate in recent years with shrinking national defence 
budgets and a rise in world tension.35 
Although there are undoubted benefits to interoperability (the ability to share logistics 
such as fuel and ammunition), there is less agreement on the benefits of standardisation and 
collaboration. The arguments for standardisation within NATO are given by authors such as 
Alexander H. Cornell, Andrew Moravcsik, Matthew Ford and Alex Gould, and Timm Meyer, 
citing political unity, economic savings and military homogenisation.36 By contrast, Mark 
DeVore and Robert A. Bitzinger suggest that standardisation may actually result in a less 
effective military force and that any theoretical savings may be illusionary, with Bitzinger in 
particular noting that trans-Atlantic collaboration attempts are particular problematic due to 
the USA’s reluctance to look overseas for its defence technology or to share their own.37 
Defence collaboration projects do not exist in isolation, and many of the principles 
behind the collaborative design and development of a main battle tank are equally valid in the 
context of a non-military project. Given the main focus of this thesis, it is important that 
literature on general project management be taken into account. Nonetheless, Terry Adler, 
Thomas Pittz, and Jack Meredith have suggested that defence projects are something of a 
special case due to the domination of innovation in defence requirements.38 Frinsdorf, et al., 
                                                                                                                                                  
for tank design collaboration between France and the UK, see Elizabeth Greenhalgh ‘Technology Development 
in Coalition: The Case of the First World War Tank’, International History Review, 22:4 (2000), pp. 806-836. 
35 Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, p. 246. 
36 Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO 
Allies, pp. 30-34; Moravcsik, ‘Armaments Among Allies’, p. 128; Ford and Gould, ‘Military Identities’, p. 779; 
Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, p. 246. 
37 Marc R. DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 25:4 (2014), p. 416; idem, ‘The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics 
and Collective Action Problems’, Security Studies, 20:4 (2011), pp. 625-626; Richard A. Bitzinger, 
‘Overcoming Impediments to Transatlantic Armaments Collaboration’, International Spectator, 39:1 (2004), 
passim. 
38 Terry R. Adler, Thomas G. Pittz, and Jack Meredith, ‘An Analysis of Risk Sharing in Strategic R&D and 
New Product Development Projects’, International Journal of Project Management, 34 (2016), p. 915. 
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and Philip Scranton provide rare insights into the problems surrounding collaboration in 
defence projects,39 but, overall, most of the available literature is necessarily broad in scope 
and is rarely defence-specific. Many aspects of project management as a discipline do allow, 
however, an application of the basic principles to defence projects, and more general project 
management studies by authors such as Mazur, et al., and Dirk Klimkeit are equally valid for 
defence applications.40 
Literature on Technological Determinism and RMA 
The question as to whether technology drives, or is driven by, history does not form a large 
part of this study because the study does not examine the tank as a weapons system within 
history, but instead looks at particular iterations and developments of that weapon. To do 
otherwise, to examine the tank as weapon and its impact on historical military thinking, 
would be an interesting prospect but is outside the aims of this work. Nonetheless, it might be 
considered to be an important enough question in the wider context of weapons development 
to warrant a brief overview at the literature. George Raudzens looks at how previous authors 
have examined the impact that military technology has on warfare.41 He highlights that 
problems arise in attempting to analyse the impact of weapons on warfare, and in isolating 
weapon technology from all the other factors involved, such as training, numbers, culture, 
and even simple luck. Using the tank’s emergence as a ‘war-winning weapon’ in the First 
World War as just one example, Raudzens concludes that tank technology was simply one of 
                                                
39 Olivia Frinsdorf, Jian Zuo and Bo Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), pp. 803-814; Philip Scranton, ‘The Challenge of 
Technological Uncertainty’, Technology and Culture, 50:2 (April 2009), pp. 513-518. 
40 Alicia Mazur, et al., ‘Rating Defence Major Project Success: The Role of Personal Attributes and Stakeholder 
Relationships’, International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), pp. 944-957; Dirk Klimkeit, 
‘Organizational Context and Collaboration on International Projects: The Case of a Professional Service Film’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 31 (2013), pp. 366-377. 
41 George Raudzens, ‘War-Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military 
Technology’, The Journal of Military History, 54:4 (1990), pp. 403-434. 
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many advances of an industrial war which changed the shape of warfare for the future.42 
Gervase Phillips goes further, concluding that reliance on such hastily-employed technology, 
often seen as an answer to stubborn military problems, might actually be counter-productive 
if it leads to neglect of existing military tactics.43 Smith and Marx present several essays on 
the question of technological determinism,44 and although not all cover military technology, 
they present a view that culture is as much as deterministic factor in technological change as 
the technology itself. Indeed, the essays taken as a whole suggest that society chooses which 
technology to adopt and that any technology ‘ahead of its time’ is unlikely to become 
common until social attitudes have reached the appropriate level. Bruce Bimber looks at the 
processes behind analysing technological determinism and concludes that, whilst no existing 
terminology or strict definition are useful in attempting to make a normative analysis of the 
topic, nonetheless studying technological determinism can be useful in its own right because 
it allows the possibility of such determinism to be excluded from any study of technology in 
history.45 
The question of tanks being part of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is 
intimately connected with the concept of new military technology altering the face of future 
warfare. Adam Grissom looks at how military innovation is studied empirically, listing four 
schools of thought: the Civil-Military Model, the Interservice Model, the Intraservice Model, 
and the Cultural Model.46 Grissom offers a definition of innovation as being, ‘a change in 
                                                
42 Raudzens, ‘War-Winning Weapons’, pp. 422-424. 
43 Gervase Phillips, ‘The Obsolescence of the “Arme Blanche” and Technological Determinism in British 
Military History’, War in History, 9:1 (2002), pp. 39-59. 
44 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds.), Does Technology Drive History? (Massachusetts, 1994).  
45 B. Bimber, ‘Three Faces of Technological Determinism’, in Smith and Marx (eds.). Does Technology Drive 
History?, pp. 79-100. 




operational praxis that produces a significant increase in military effectiveness’, with such 
change being measured through increases in battlefield results.47 
How closely we can apply the theories of military innovation and RMA to the 
development of tanks is surely something that is open to debate, to say nothing of how 
relevant it is to an examination of replacement tank models rather than the introduction of a 
revolutionary new weapons system. Innovative though some components of the tank designs 
to be studied might have been, James Fitzsimmons and Jan M. Van Tol make the case that 
simple technological innovation is not enough to announce an RMA, rather that it also takes 
doctrinal change and organisational adaption.48 The German employment of the tank in 
1939/40 in the so-called ‘Blitzkrieg’ is certainly a case for being classed military innovation, 
if not indeed, an RMA,49 but this study does not seek to examine the effect of tanks on 
military doctrine in any real depth.  
If the development of improved tank models is classed as military innovation under 
Grissom’s definitions then it surely falls into the category of a ‘top-down’ interservice 
innovation,50 with the national government and army chiefs making decisions on what is to 
developed and when. However, given that most new tank models are merely linear 
progressions (whatever the designers may advertise), it is hard to classify such developments 
as military innovation in the sense of making a significant impact on the battlefield because 
they are simply incremental advances on existing technology. A tank such as the Chieftain 
would certainly be a hugely significant weapon on a 1940 battlefield, but was far less 
                                                
47 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, p. 907.  
48 J. R. Fitzsimmons and J. M. Van Tol, ‘Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Forces Quarterly, (1994), pp. 
25, 26.  
49 The invention of tanks failed to significantly alter military doctrine, despite much theorising about the future 
possibilities of tank warfare, until Germany demonstrated how armoured vehicles could be employed in fast-
moving ‘lightning’ war in 1939/40. See, for example: A. Searle, Armoured Warfare, (London, 2017), pp. 52-53; 
J. Stone, The Tank Debate, (London, 2000), pp. 60-61; C. J. Rogers, ‘ “Military Revolution” and “Revolutions 
in Military Affairs”: A Historian’s Perspective’, in T. Gongora and H. von Riekhoff (eds.), Toward a Revolution 
in Military Affairs?(Westport, 2000), p.27. 
50 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, pp. 910, 919. 
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significant in Cold War terms, and whilst each tank model is best suited to a given tactical 
employment, wider battlefield doctrine rarely changes to a substantial degree according to 
which particular model of tank is employed. 
 
A brief survey of the vast range of available literature demonstrates that, whilst many aspects 
of the history of armour technology have been examined – historical dimensions to 
collaboration, tank technology and NATO standardisation – very few authors have devoted 
attention to the major issue of why international tank projects ‘invariably’ seem to fail. There 
are several reasons why this subject has been ignored. Firstly, there are obvious questions of 
commercial sensitivities, which make access to primary source material difficult. Secondly, 
the international political dimensions to arms sales have proved to be especially problematic 
for national governments. Thirdly, any researcher attempting to explore this subject matter in 
more detail will quickly realise that it cuts across many disciplines, including history, 
technology, international defence diplomacy, and project management. Thus, any 
investigation into this question must necessarily be an interdisciplinary undertaking, falling 
within the fields of defence technology, military history, strategic studies, international and 
NATO Alliance politics. 
Research Issues 
NATO members are the countries which feature most prominently in this thesis. NATO was 
founded in 1949 at a time when the Cold War with the Soviet Union appeared to threaten the 
security of the West. This date also marked a realisation that individual NATO members 
would increasingly need to cooperate in both weapons’ development and strategy in order to 
face up to the Soviet Union. The USA was the primary source of weapons for many NATO 
members in the immediate post-1945 era, but European nations were already planning and 
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developing their own. With increasing improvements in technology comes increasing cost, 
both at the development and the production stage. Nuclear weapons initially appeared to 
make conventional battlefield weapons somewhat redundant, yet large conventional wars in 
Korea, the Middle East and Vietnam demonstrated that this was not the case.51 
The topic of international collaboration within NATO is reasonably well covered in 
the secondary literature. For the most part, this is tied to the desire for standardisation and its 
advantages within a military alliance.52 However, not all commentators agree that it is 
possible or desirable to standardise across NATO.53 Given the differing requirements for 
MBTs even within NATO, with nations emphasising different aspects of the firepower-
mobility-protection trinity and having different ideas about the best way to arm a tank,54 it is 
difficult to see how standardisation might be agreed upon without some of the participants 
feeling that they have been called upon to make unacceptable compromises. 
As technology becomes ever more expensive, nations are increasingly forced to 
compromise in the search for a future main battle tank. The design and construction costs 
limit the end result far more than the available technological possibilities.55 Sophisticated 
compound armour, integrated command and control, local active protection systems, and 
automated fire systems all allow the main battle tank to remain arguably the single-most 
effective land weapon in a nation’s armoury. However, modern defence budgets are 
                                                
51 See, for example: Simpkin, Tank Warfare; and, Stone, The Tank Debate, pp. 40-46. 
52 See, for example: Gardiner L. Tucker, ‘Standardisation and Defence in NATO’, RUSI Journal, 121:1 (1976), 
p. 7; Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the 
NATO Allies, pp. 71-93; Phillip Taylor, ‘Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collective Security or Economic 
Competition?’, International Organisation, 36:1 (Winter 1982), p. 95; and, Ford and Gould, ‘Military 
Identities’, pp. 775-792. 
53 See, for example: Robert W. Dean, ‘The Future of Collaborative Weapons Acquisition’, Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy, 21:4 (1979), pp. 159-161; Keith Hartley, ‘NATO, Standardisation and Nationalism: An 
Economist’s View’, RUSI Journal, 123:3 (1978), p. 58; and, C. J. Davidson, ‘NATO Standardisation - A New 
Approach’, RUSI Journal, 122:3 (1977), p. 78. 
54 The optimal balance of firepower, mobility and protection will differ between nations where each has a 
different armoured doctrine and different thinking around the best tactical use of armour. See, for example: 
Simpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 74-75; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks; 100 Years of Evolution, p. 259; and,Ogorkiewicz, 
Technology of Tanks, pp. 48-50, 53-55. 
55 Stone, The Tank Debate, pp. 169-174. 
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becoming increasingly tightened and, at a time when the financially-squeezed British Army, 
for example, once more has more horses than tanks,56 the production of large numbers of 
non-collaborative domestically developed forefront-technology weapon systems such as 
super-powerful main battle tanks is an unlikely future, even for relatively rich nations such as 
the USA, UK, Germany and France.57 
The latest Russian main battle tank, the T-14 Armata from Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) is 
a case in point. Its reported capability is impressive indeed, boasting a 125mm gun with 
autoloader, modular composite armour, automatic fire suppression systems and the Afghanit 
active protection system, and yet it remains reportedly capable of a 90km/h road speed with a 
500km cruising range.58 The cost of this undoubtedly remarkable specification is a reported 
unit cost of between 400 and 500 million roubles ($6.5 million), although the CEO of 
Uralvagonzavod estimated that the unit cost would fall by as much as half once full 
production got underway.59 Whilst by no means the most expensive new generation main 
battle tank (the Japanese Type 90 is reported to cost $9.4 million per tank and the South 
Korean XK-2 $8.5 million),60 it is a significant financial burden for a nation struggling with 
its economy yet reportedly planning to field up to 2,300 new tanks within the next four years, 
especially one seeking to simultaneously modernise its nuclear weapons and their control 
                                                
56 In July 2012, the MoD reported that the British Army had 334 tanks and 501 horses (operating in ceremonial 
roles). BBC News, ‘Why Does the British Army Have More Horses Than Tanks?’ 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-22951548>, accessed 08 July 2017. See also, The 
Independent, ‘British Army Reduced to One Single Tank Regiment’ 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-army-reduced-to-one-single-tank-regiment-
9644238.html>, accessed 10 July 2017. 
57 See for example: Crist, ‘The M1A2 Abrams: The Last Main Battle Tank?’, pp. 14-16; Stone, The Tank 
Debate, p. 174; and, Jordi Molas-Gallart, ‘Which Way To Go? Defence Technology and the Diversity of “Dual 
Use” Technology Transfer’, Research Policy, 26 (1997), p. 367. 
58 Army Technology, ‘<http://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-14-armata-main-battle-tank/>, accessed 24 
April 2016. At the time of writing in 2019, it is salutary to note that the T-14 is still not in service with the 
Russian Army. 
59 Russia Beyond the Headlines, ‘Cost of Russia’s Armata T-14 Tank to Fall by Half’ 
<http://rbth.com/defence/2015/09/25/cost_of_russias_armata_t-14_tank_to_fall_by_half_49585.html>, accessed 




systems.61 The final purchase cost of the Armata, even if the unit cost should fall to an 
optimistic half of the current price per unit, will be around $7.5 billion before replacement, 
training and running costs are taken into account. For comparison, the Moscow Times 
reported that Russia’s total 2015 defence budget was to be $81 billion, or 4.2% of Russia’s 
gross domestic product (GDP),62 although a report by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) suggested that the 2015/16 defence budget was closer to $66.4 
billion,63and a 2017 report put it at 5.9% GDP or $69.2bn.64 Admittedly, the cost of Armata 
was intended to be spread over four years, but even so the proposed equipping of the Russian 
Army with so many Armata tanks represents a huge proportion of the defence budget for any 
country, let alone one with economic difficulties. It is important to note that, apart from the 
report by SIPRI and the 2017 UK Defence Journal, all information on the Armata MBT and 
the Russian defence budget originally came from Russian official sources and should be 
viewed with that in mind. 
Joint investment seems an obvious solution to the financial burden of developing and 
building new main battle tanks. Meyer suggested in 1988 that, ‘Large-scale projects, as a 
rule, can now only be carried out co-operatively in Europe’.65 The theory of joint enterprise 
suggests that the high expense of development and production can be split between all 
interested parties. Despite delivering neither the financial savings nor the technological 
                                                
61 The Telegraph, ‘Russia “Dominated” Global Defence Budget Increases in 2015, Says Think 
Tank’<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12148687/Russia-dominated-global-defence-
budget-increases-in-2015-says-think-tank.html>, accessed 24 April 2016. 
62 Moscow Times, ‘Russian Defense Budget to Hit Record $81 Billion in 2015’  
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-defense-budget-to-hit-record-81bln-in-
2015/509536.html>, accessed 24 April 2016. 
63 Global Security, ‘Russian Military Budget’ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-
budget.htm>, accessed 24 April 2016. 
64 UK Defence Journal, ‘Is Russia Still a Threat? NATO Seems to Think So.’ 
<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/is-russia-still-a-threat-nato-seems-to-think-so/>, accessed 15 July 2017. Jane’s 
reported in March 2017 that Russia had announced a cut to its defence budget from RUB3.8 trillion (US $65.4 
billion) to RUB2.8 trillion (US $ 42.5 billion), see Jane’s 360, ‘Russia Announces Deepest Defence Budget Cuts 
Since 1990s’, <http://www.janes.com/article/68766/russia-announces-deepest-defence-budget-cuts-since-
1990s>, accessed 28 November 2017. 
65 Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, p. 256. 
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advances the theory of cooperative development promises, it has worked for other advanced 
technology defence systems and there is no obvious practical reason why it should not work 
for main battle tanks. Yet for whatever reason, joint MBT development has failed in all but 
one instance. If the reasons for these failures can be recognised and overcome, the future 
possibility for joint development of MBTs should have a greater chance of success. 
DeVore highlights the rise in international collaboration within the arms industry and 
points out that collaboration is an increasingly attractive option in the face of shrinking 
defence budgets.66 International cooperation in defence is of obvious importance for defence 
organisations such as NATO, theoretically strengthening political bonds and multinational 
organisations within that alliance.67 Allies working together can operate more efficiently if 
they have commonality of equipment, simplifying logistics, joint operational planning and 
tactical integration. Rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability (RSI) are bywords 
for efficiency in industry, and the principles are equally as valid for a military operating in 
the field as for industrial development. In addition, by sharing design and development costs, 
nations can develop weapon systems that they might otherwise be unable to afford. 
Moravcsik suggested that an estimated 27 percent, or $35 billion, was wasted in redundant 
military research and development within European NATO member states in 1987.68 By 
involving other nations and companies, there is also the chance that a design will benefit from 
an increase in insights and ideas gained by widening the pool of designers working on the 
project. 
In the main, nations clearly embark on collaborative projects seeking benefits for 
themselves. Each government has, after all, a duty to their own country which must outweigh 
                                                
66 Marc DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 25:4 (2014), p. 415. 
67 Phillip Taylor, ‘Weapons standardization in NATO: Collective Security or Economic Competition?’, 
International Organisation, 36:1 (Winter 1982), p. 95. 
68 Movavcsik, ‘Armaments Among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985’, p. 128. 
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any philanthropic motivations, whether this is to the population as a whole, the military or to 
domestic industry. Meyer suggests four main reasons behind why nations collaborate on 
weapons systems: military, economic, technological, and diplomatic.69 Clearly, standardising 
NATO equipment makes sense from a logistical and interoperability standpoint. In theory, 
such joint projects should also be cheaper due to the splitting of development costs and a final 
saving on unit costs through larger orders. The standardisation of logistics and training should 
also bring savings. The theoretical technological advantages of joint projects come from 
shared knowledge and a greater efficiency of effort through pooling that knowledge. Finally, 
diplomatic advantages are seen in creating stronger ties between the involved nations. 
The importance of private corporate involvement in technology transfer between 
democratic nations should be emphasised. Unless the nation state controls the corporations, 
any arms development will be done primarily by private companies with all the caveats and 
economic considerations that that entails. Any international project would therefore require 
the application of a business model. Joint collaborations require agreements on many issues 
such as allocation of responsibilities and workload, acceptable costs and integration of the 
workforce, as well as agreements on where construction and assembly take place. It appears 
however that in practice, many such international defence projects are more concerned with 
securing diplomatic relationships than with actually saving money. Where actual military 
requirements enter the equation and what weight military necessity carries in the failed 
collaborative MBT projects is something that needs to be examined. For a military project, 
there might also be the issue of secrecy and whilst compartmentalisation of information is an 
effective way to maintain security, it might also lead to problems of cooperation between 
departments. On an international level, language and cultural barriers and physical distance 
                                                
69 Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, p. 259.  
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between those departments can only increase such problems. Cornell lists four management 
principles that may be applied to international weapons development: 
1. Coordination: Coordination at the development stage leads to better coordination at 
the production stage, and possibly to better success in future projects. 
2. Standardisation and Economies of Scale: Interchangeable components make repair 
and replacement far easier, and a large number of units leads to the cost of each unit 
falling. 
3. Cooperation in Production: If each weapon system fits a niche within alliance 
defence planning, it is more efficient to have each member state working on the same 
system rather than dispersing effort on different systems which fill the same niche. 
4.  Common Logistical Support: Most armies depend on their logistical trail, and 
standardisation simplifies and streamlines the logistical requirement.70 
Obviously, each project member nation expects to take away a positive cost-benefit related to 
the investment of that nation, and disputes might occur when one or more members perceive 
that they are not doing so. In the case of the recent F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, for example, 
there were disputes regarding securing assembly facilities within member nations, the sharing 
of technology within the member nations, and the number of aircraft that each member nation 
was prepared to commit to buying.71 
Ernst B. Haas suggests that, ‘The need for collaboration arises from the recognition 
that the costs of national self-reliance are usually excessive.’72 A report in 2015 showed that, 
overall, NATO member state defence budgets in 2014 were still short of NATO’s target of 
                                                
70 Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO 
Allies, pp. 15-16. 
71 Jeremiah Gertler, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program (Washington DC, 16th February 2012), pp. 16-17, 
accessed online via. 
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2% of GDP, with many countries struggling to rectify the long decline in defence spending.73 
If nations decide that main battle tanks are worth pursuing, it could be that a way to reduce 
the cost of the tank for individual governments is going to be needed and international 
collaboration seems on the surface to offer a solution.  
Given the choice and opportunity, a nation’s indigenous MBT design will naturally 
reflect their own design philosophy, which encompasses a range of attitudes and experience, 
including specific historic approaches to doctrine for land warfare, positive and negative 
experiences with certain aspects of armour technology, and national defence priorities. For 
any potential Cold War engagement with the Soviet Union, the UK, for example, envisaged 
its tanks defending linear obstacles by using long-range firepower against numerically 
superior but technologically inferior Soviet tanks. By contrast, the FRG were wedded to 
using mobility to bring massed firepower to bear.74 This led to different priorities in the 
triumvirate of firepower-mobility-protection, with the UK emphasising armour at the expense 
of mobility, and the FRG putting mobility above protection.75 To supply the military with 
tanks that meet their doctrinal requirements, a nation must either collaborate with a nation 
that shares its doctrine, design and build the tank themselves, find a nation which has an 
existing design that meets the requirements, or give another nation the specifications and 
have them build the tank. 
Of course, nations have been purchasing designs from other countries since the birth 
of the tank itself.76 Yet purchasing existing designs from other countries or manufacturing 
those designs under licence is not the same as joint development. Collaboration usually 
means compromise, but not as great a compromise as purchasing a design drawn to another 
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74Simpkin, Tank Warfare, p. 66. 
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nation’s specifications. In addition, unless the rights to manufacture are secured, buying 
foreign systems has little obvious and immediate benefit to domestic industry. 
Research Question 
Given that the existing literature on main battle tank technology often refers to the question 
of standardisation in passing, but rarely offers any further explanation as to why several 
attempts at collaboration failed, the research question which this thesis will seek to answer is 
as follows: Why have repeated attempts since 1945 to create an international production-
ready MBT failed? This question seems all the more worth pursuing when it is considered 
that the same European nations which failed to agree on a unified tank design were able to 
collaborate successfully on large-scale and complex engineering projects, such as Concorde, 
Jaguar, Tornado and Eurofighter.77 The tank at its heart is simply a specialist fighting vehicle, 
and if international collaboration has been able to solve technical challenges in airliners, 
helicopters and fighter aircraft, designing a ground-based vehicle would seem to be not any 
more challenging.78 The pan-European missile manufacturer, MBDA Group, reported €2.9 
billion sales for 2015, with a €15.1 billion order book so clearly, joint international defence 
development projects can work economically as well as militarily.79 Yet despite several 
proposals and projects initiated, aside from the Mark VIII back in 1917/18, there have been 
no examples of a main battle tank being successfully designed by international collaboration.  
                                                
77 Donald Alfred Nelson, ‘Concorde: International Cooperation in Aviation’, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 17:3 (Summer, 1969), pp. 452-467; M. Verdant and G. H. Schwehm, ‘The International Rosetta Mission’, 
ESA Bulletin, 93 (February 1998), pp. 39-50. 
78 Keith Hayward, ‘Airbus: Twenty Years of European Collaboration’, International Affairs, 64:1 (December 
1987), pp. 11-26; J. C. Barker, ‘Merlin to 2000’, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part 
G: Journal of Aerospace Engineering (1 April 1998); Markus N. Heinrich, ‘The Eurofighter Typhoon 
Programme: Economic and Industrial Implications of Collaborative Defence Manufacturing’, Defence Studies, 
15:4 (2015), pp. 341-360.See also DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, 
pp. 423-425, 430-437. 
79 MBDA website <http://www.mbda-systems.com/about-us/>, accessed 04 April 2016. 
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What is even more surprising about the failure of joint MBT projects is that these 
failures have occurred against a background of an increasing drive for collaboration within 
NATO. DeVore, for example, noted in 2011 that the European Defence Agency (EDA) was 
committed to increasing European armaments collaboration from 22% to 35%, and that in 
1985 the USA had set aside funds for collaborative armaments projects.80 Cornell sets out 
several approaches suggested within NATO for closer standardisation, including options such 
as creating a single NATO Weapons Procurement Agency (NWPA), a common research and 
development (R&D) programme from which all members could benefit, and a restructuring 
of member states’ military procurement and R&D to allow better integration with the 
rearmament cycles of other NATO members.81 Yet, despite this high-level political impetus, 
not one NATO member state has successfully collaborated on an MBT programme.  
The central question will be approached by taking a broad look at international inter-
NATO defence industry cooperation as a whole and examining four case studies of joint main 
battle tank projects within the NATO Alliance. A case-study led approach allows each project 
to be examined in isolation, with particular emphasis on how and why the project was 
initiated, what benefits the project promised the participants, what challenges were 
encountered and how they were dealt with, and under what circumstances the project finally 
failed. It is hoped that a comparison of the four case studies will improve our understanding 
of the difficulties faced in international collaboration in tank design, and thereby establish 
whether such hurdles may be overcome in any future project. 
The arguments surrounding tank design and employment are relevant only in relation 
to how they affect the design proposals and, whilst they will be covered in Chapter One, it is 
not intended to look at them in any great detail. Similarly, the ‘hard’ engineering aspects of 
                                                
80 Marc R. DeVore, ‘The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective 
Action Problems’, Security Studies, 20:4 (2011), p. 625. 
81 Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO 
Allies, pp. 101-103. 
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tank design are outside the scope of this work, and will be addressed in only passing detail as 
they influence the decision-making processes involved. The time frame chosen, 1949 
onwards, covers the formation of NATO and subsequent cooperation in defence by its 
member states, in essence up to the end of the Cold War. The conclusions which can be 
drawn from the case studies are applicable, however, to the current state of affairs in 
European defence cooperation. 
Source Material 
The key source material for this thesis is drawn from four main areas: first, archives in 
Europe and the USA; second, academic, military and defence industry journals, covering 
technical and other subject areas; third, printed material, such as company reports and 
specialist studies; fourth, newspapers and media sources.The sources of information available 
on the subject of international tank projects can be found scattered across these four broad 
types of source material. Beyond the disparate range of published and limited circulation 
material, which is now much more easily available via the world-wide-web, the archival 
material used for this study has to a considerable degree created the basis for this study. 
Several file series held at the National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, have 
been drawn upon for this work, the files originating in several different government 
departments. DEFE 13/- (Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all 
Ministers)) contains the diplomatic exchanges between Britain and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) regarding cancellation of the proposed Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) 
project between the two countries. Closer examination of the files suggests that one reason 
for the project’s failure was a difference in mobility and protection priorities between the two 
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countries, and also a suggestion that the main reason for the project’s failure was a difference 
in deadline priorities between the two countries.82 
The T225/- series (Treasury: Defence Policy and Materiel Division: Registered Files, 
DM and 2DM Series) gives valuable insights into the financial aspects of co-operative 
development, as well as highlighting areas of disagreement.83 The Foreign Office series, FO 
371/- (Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906-1966), 
contains material regarding Britain’s experiences with international co-operation, with some 
files more relevant than others.84 In particular, the FO 371 series contains correspondence 
regarding Foreign Office assessments of foreign economies and defence capabilities as well 
as international trade and technology sharing agreements. 
At the Bovington Tank Museum archives, the as-yet uncatalogued papers of Professor 
Richard Ogorkiewicz provide first-hand insights through a variety of correspondence and 
documents into many aspects of both the Franco-German MBT project and the US-German 
MBT-70. The Ogorkiewicz papers include correspondence between the author and 
international figures involved in tank development projects, as well as copies of papers that 
Ogorkiewicz has presented at seminars for bodies such as the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and articles relating to the 
technology of tank development since 1945. This unique collection of correspondence and 
papers contains a wealth of technical information as well as charting decision-making 
processes which are difficult to identify in official documentation. 
                                                
82 See, for example, TNA, DEFE 13/1045, Tanks and tank guns: proposals and developments, DEFE 13/1153, 
International co-operation and collaboration on equipment procurement, DEFE 13/1211, International 
collaboration in defence areas, meetings with French and German Defence Ministers, DEFE 13/1065, FMBT 
and associated weapons systems, 1974-7, and DEFE 13/1225, FMBT and associated weapon systems, 1977-78. 
83 See, for example, TNA, T225/85, Co-ordination of production, UK and other signatory countries, 1950, 
T225/101, Agreements with USA on standardisation of equipment and exchange of information on inventions 
and patents, 1947-1951and, T225/1571, Anglo-German co-operation in tank development, 1959-1960. 
84 See, for example, TNA, FO 371/172114, Political relations of FRG: US, 1963, FO 371/172180, FRG air 
force: collaboration with UK on VTOL research aircraft, 1963, and FO 371/177965, UK/FRG/US cooperation 
in tank development, 1964. 
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Beyond the United Kingdom, the Donovan Research Library at the Fort Benning 
Armor School in the United States holds material relating to American tank development, 
including projects planned and undertaken in cooperation with other nations. The US 
National Archives, in particular the Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, likewise 
provide information relating to the USA’s collaborative defence projects. The Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv at Freiburg im Breisgau in Germany holds important files and information on 
projects relating to the FRG’s involvement in collaborative projects. Given that the Federal 
Republic features in all four central case studies, this material is of particular value and cuts 
across each of the chapters. Additional archival material relating to the FRG’s involvement 
can be found in the papers of two former Wehrmacht tank generals, General der 
Panzertruppe Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg and General der Panzertruppe Gerhard 
Graf von Schwerin, both sets of papers held at the Institute for Contemporary History in 
Munich. 
The archives of the various companies involved in collaborative programmes hold 
valuable documentation relating to those programmes although access to such archival 
material is restricted for commercial reasons.85 Commercial sensitivity surrounding failed 
projects, commercial confidence and the fact that many firms have been absorbed by larger 
consortia make using such records for a publicly available academic work highly 
problematic. As an example, whilst not falling under the usual restrictions,86 the archives for 
those surviving companies which comprised Britain’s tank industry are now merged into 
BAE Land Systems, and the BAE archivists report that individual company archives have 
                                                
85 Specifically, relevant for the purposes of this study are the legacy archives of tank manufacturing companies 
now held by BAE Systems in the UK, Lockheed in the USA, and the four consortium members of the German 
MBT-70 Joint Design Team, Krauss-Maffei, Daimler-Benz, Porsche, and Rheinmetall. Unfortunately, access to 
relevant private company records is extremely difficult to obtain and access could not be obtained for this study. 
86 On the issue of the sensitivity of some archives, see Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton, and Anthony Seldon, The 
Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester, 1996), pp. 223-224. 
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been destroyed or scattered throughout the constituent parts of BAE Systems.87 Fortunately, 
there is ample material in other archives to allow a reconstruction of the course, and causes of 
failure, of each of the four MBT joint projects which represent each case study. 
The question of international collaboration in tank design is at least as technical in 
nature as it is historical, with the international dimension bringing in the discipline of 
international politics and the developmental aspect encompassing project management and 
economics. The inter-disciplinary nature of this work means that a wide variety of source 
material has been referenced. Although still fundamentally historical in nature, this study 
includes news reports and other material, which is on occasion as useful as the primary 
material held in archives. In order to answer the main research question, sources from 
disciplines ranging from engineering, economics, international politics, to project 
management, have been as important as the historical documents used. 
Research Design 
In order to answer the research question as to why no international collaborative main battle 
tank design has succeeded since 1918, the thesis will begin with a chapter explaining key 
aspects of tank technology; this will be followed by the three chapters covering four 
international collaborative tank projects, and a fifth chapter offering an overview of other 
international arms and technology collaboration projects. 
Framework of Analysis 
In order that a qualitative comparison may be made between the four case studies featured, a 
framework of analysis will be used. In creating this framework, it is acknowledged that any 
                                                
87 Following a query to BAE Systems Heritage on 9 December 2016, the author was informed that information 
regarding commercial collaboration within BAE legacy companies such as Vickers was very unlikely to be 
available; this subsequently proved to be case. 
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such analysis framework for comparing projects is troublesome. As discussed by Todorović 
et al., creating a unified model for project analysis is hindered by the subjective nature of 
determining what constitutes success.88 Many analysis models have consequently been 
developed in the field of project management, and choosing a suitable one for this study is 
problematic due to the specific subject area. However, one framework that is suitable was 
developed by Joyce Fortune and Diana White in 2006, and sets out a list of 27 Critical 
Success Factors (CSFs) which they identify through a detailed study of the literature. These 
CSFs are, in turn, mapped onto a Formal System Model (FSM) which was developed to 
identify and predict possible failures within a project. By mapping the CSFs against the FSM, 
Fortune and White create a framework against which projects may be measured and thus 
compared. Their framework of analysis will be used in this study: 
Component of FSM  Critical success factors from literature 
Goals and objectives.  Clear, realistic objectives; strong business 
case/sound basis for project. 
Performance monitoring.  Effective monitoring/control; planned close 
down/review/acceptance of possible failure.  
Decision-maker(s).  Support from senior management; competent 
project manager; strong/detailed plan kept up to 
date; realistic schedule; good leadership; correct 
choice/past experience of project management 
methodology/tools.  
Transformations.  Skilled/suitably qualified/sufficient staff/team.  
Communication.  Good communication/feedback.  
Environment.  Political stability; environmental influences; past 
experience (learning from); organisational 
adaptation/culture/structure.  
Boundaries. Project size/level of complexity/number of people 
involved/duration.  
Resources.  Adequate budget; sufficient/well allocated 
resources; training provision; proven/familiar 
                                                
88 Marija Lj. Todorović, et al., ‘Project Success Analysis Framework: A Knowledge-Based Approach in Project 
Management’, International Journal of Project Management, 33:4 (May 2015), p. 774. 
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technology; good performance by 
suppliers/contractors/consultants. 
Continuity.  Risks addressed/assessed/managed; user/client 
involvement; different viewpoints (appreciating); 
project sponsor/champion; effective change 
management.89 
 
Inevitably, some of the CSFs appear more appropriate to a national defence scenario 
than others, but the framework is surprising robust nonetheless. 
The Chapters 
Chapter 1 sketches the background necessary for an understanding of the key design and 
technical concepts employed in later chapters. The first part is an overview of how tanks 
evolved and how the tank design philosophy differs between nations within NATO. Second is 
an overview if the technological challenges behind MBT design, in particular addressing the 
triumvirate of firepower, mobility and protection. Third is an examination of how 
standardisation and interoperability benefit military allies, and the debates surrounding 
whether or not standardisation is, in, fact the best approach even within an alliance. Fourth is 
a treatment of the various forms of technology transfer, highlighting the differences between 
collaborative design and Lend-Lease, licence-building and the purchase of foreign designs. In 
this section is established what a collaboration means for the purpose of this study. Fifth and 
finally comes a brief overview of how relevant the main battle tank is for modern warfare, 
and thus whether it is worthwhile considering developing successors to our current models. 
Chapter 2 will cover the first two case studies, the ‘FINABEL’ NATO Standard Tank 
and Tank 90/’Napoleon’. Despite the first study commencing in 1957 and the second 
beginning in 1979, these two Franco-German projects will be dealt with together as there are 
                                                
89 Joyce Fortune and Diana White, ‘Framing of Project Critical Success Factors by a Systems Model’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 24 (2006), p. 57.  
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obvious advantages to comparing the background and progress of two collaborations between 
the same nations. Problems arose in differences of opinion over the priority of the protection 
and weight, but the problems that ended both projects before production tanks were 
developed were mainly political in nature. 
Chapter 3 will cover the US-German MBT-70 collaboration of the early 1960s that 
neither country pursued to the production stage. This study will form a major element in 
providing an answer to the main research question. The MBT-70 was a project initiated by 
Robert McNamara while he was the US Secretary of Defense but which ran hugely over-
budget and was ultimately abandoned by both nations. With early disagreement over both the 
tank’s armament and the priority given to each of the tank’s three fundamental qualities 
(firepower, mobility and protection), a specification that was overly complex, and problems 
of communications, it will be shown how political enthusiasm for collaboration on the 
diplomatic level failed to translate into designs that satisfied the intended military customers. 
Chapter 4 will cover the 1971 Anglo-German Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT). 
Britain and the FRG began the collaborative FMBT project looking to replace their Chieftain 
and Leopard 1 designs respectively. The project was cancelled in March 1977 without 
producing a working tank design, the official blame for the failure being attributed to 
different timescale priorities. However, it will be shown how priority differences in the 
triumvirate of firepower-mobility-protection and a failure to agree on the main armament led 
to a reduction of interest in the project, and how a failure to agree on the fundamental design 
at an early stage, resulted in a lack of focus and consequent dissipation of true collaboration. 
Once again, the FMBT project demonstrated that political desire for diplomatic alliances does 
not necessarily translate to agreement in military requirements. 
Chapter 5 will look at collaborative international projects that do not fit the main 
criteria for the case studies thesis but are nevertheless useful as a form of contextualisation. 
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Included will be the SP-70 self-propelled gun, the Eurofighter, plus a variety of other aircraft 
and missile designs, both successful and unsuccessful. Covering a wide spectrum of 
international collaborative weapon systems, no single project will receive in-depth attention. 
Rather, the intention is to demonstrate the dynamics of such projects and to highlight any 
similarities or major differences between them and the main battle tank projects covered in 
the case studies. 
The main aim of the case studies is to look at why the countries in question felt the 
need to enter into a joint project, what they wanted from the tank under development and to 
what extent the project achieved at least some of its goals. NATO countries have long 
professed themselves eager to develop standardised NATO military equipment. Successful 
aircraft such as the Sepecat Jaguar, Panavia Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon have all been 
developed jointly by two or more European NATO partners, and there are more examples of 
successful joint projects in helicopters and missiles. By examining the collaborative 
programmes of non-MBT weapon systems, comparisons can be made with those programmes 
involving tanks. In order that a consistent analysis may be made of each study, the wider 
topic of international arms collaboration will be divided into several areas, looking at: the 
political atmosphere and interest; the technical and logistical innovations and limitations; the 
military reaction and how well the designs covered met the militaries’ operational needs; the 
economic and business ramifications; and how the proposed design met (or failed to meet) 
the strategic requirements of the nations involved. 
As far as possible these six areas of international collaboration and technology 
transfer will form the skeleton of the examination for all the case studies and their 
significance on the project will be covered. Whilst it is not intended to use a rigid system of 
comparison between or within the case studies, examination of these areas within the studies 
will allow consistency in interpreting how significant each of the different factors were 
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within each project.90 Each case study will be concluded by showing the final results of the 
project and the consequences thereof. None of the projects covered in the four case studies 
resulted in a successful production tank, and in each case the countries involved went on to 
independently design and build their own MBT shortly after the project’s failure. This said, it 
should not be assumed at the outset that the lessons to be drawn from the case studies mean 
that a future international joint MBT project must necessarily fail. Indeed, from failed 
projects came interesting ideas and useful developments that were later used on indigenous 
tank designs (an example being the Rheinmetall 120mm gun developed for the US-German 
MBT-70 and later fitted to Germany’s own Leopard 2). However, this study focuses on the 
projects as a whole and not the individual components or ideas developed for them, and thus 
it highlights the failure to design and develop a production MBT in each case rather than any 
side-benefits that resulted from those projects. 
 
 
                                                




Technology, Main Battle Tanks and Collaboration: 
Concepts and Theories 
In addressing the question of why no international collaborative main battle tank (MBT) 
development projects have succeeded since 1945, it is necessary to draw from several 
different disciplines in order to examine various concepts and theories relevant to the study. 
While this thesis is intended as a contribution to the history of tank technology, the fact that 
international collaboration is the main focus of this study means that it is also essential that 
international politics, defence standardisation and technology transfer are addressed as key 
concepts. An in-depth study of international MBT collaboration could concentrate on any one 
of these fields; however, this chapter aims to provide a broad overview of key concepts 
surrounding tank design, the benefits and drawbacks of NATO standardisation, the question 
of technology transfer and the way in which the main battle tank is perceived in the 
contemporary defence environment in terms of its future viability. 
To establish a conceptual framework for the thesis, various theories must be outlined 
to provide the necessary background for the subsequent case study chapters. Although this 
study is not in the first instance a history of aspects of tank warfare, understanding the 
relevance of historical background is important in order to frame the later failed efforts 
towards international tank collaboration. The different philosophies behind key NATO 
nations’ tank designs will be examined briefly to explain why nations develop different 
design requirements for their tanks. Such variation in requirements makes standardisation 
more difficult and the quest for standardisation within NATO underpins many attempts for 
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collaboration in weapons design within the Atlantic Alliance. With technology transfer at the 
heart of this study, it becomes important to differentiate between the most common forms of 
technology transfer: ‘lend-lease’, licensed production, cooperative production, and 
collaboration. Underlying this study is an important assumption that tanks are a core weapon 
for modern military forces and we will therefore finish by looking at the relevance of the 
main battle tank on the modern battlefield and its wider political importance. Needless to say, 
any study which focuses on tank technology must pay some attention to the evolution of that 
technology and, in particular, include some explanation of the three corners of tank design: 
firepower, mobility and protection.1 
1.1. The Evolution of Tank Design: An Overview 
Rolf Hilmes defines the primary purpose of a main battle tank as being ‘to provide a flat-
trajectory weapon with cross-country mobility, while at the same time allowing the weapon 
to be used under a specified level of built-in protection.’2 Richard Ogorkiewicz contends that 
tanks are ‘[a]utomotive, tracked, armoured carriers of heavy direct-fire weapons.’3 F. M. von 
Senger und Etterlin defines the tank as: ‘A well-armoured vehicle, with its main armament 
mounted in a revolving turret, which is capable of fulfilling all the main tasks of the 
armoured troops on the battlefield.’4 Although there have been variations on these 
definitions,5 the modern tank is expected to be self-propelled, tracked, carry a medium-
                                                
1 The key design characteristics of firepower, mobility and protection are fundamental to examining how 
different nations design tanks.  See, for example: Richard Simpkin, Tank Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and 
NATO Tank Philosophy (London, 1979), pp. 81-83; British Army website, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, 
<http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/23206.aspx>, accessed 06 October 2017. 
2 Rolf Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945, trans. Richard Simpkin (London, 1987), 
p. 9. 
3 Richard Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks, Vol. 1 (Coulsdon, 1991), p. 1. 
4 F. M. von Senger und Etterlin, The World’s Armoured Fighting Vehicles, trans. R. M. Ogorkiewicz (London, 
1962). 
5 Although the first to be labelled as ‘tanks’, and therefore theoretically the blueprint for all tanks thereafter, the 
early British, French and German tanks lacked turrets. Later designs might only be armed with machine-guns 
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calibre direct-fire gun in a revolving turret, and have armour sufficient to protect it in the 
front line of a battlefield. Debates and arguments over the optimum balance between the three 
design elements have long accompanied arguments over how best to employ tanks on the 
battlefield.6 To understand different philosophies in tank design, therefore, some 
consideration should be given as to how different nations expect to employ their main battle 
tanks. 
Any tank or other armoured vehicle is a compromise between the three design 
elements of firepower, mobility and protection.7 Maximum weight, cost, and the physical 
dimensions available to designers mean that a decision has to be made as to which of the 
elements receives priority. This trinity can be represented as a triangle with a different design 
element at each point, so that moving the design philosophy towards additional firepower and 
a larger gun, for example, means that the tank must sacrifice mobility and protection if it is to 
retain the same weight and cost. This is necessarily a simplification and Gerald A. Halbert 
offers a wider set of design elements, setting out eleven principles that a tank designer needs 
to consider: dimensions, ground pressure and weight, armour, survivability, tank layout, 
armament, ammunition, crew, power plant, suspension, and human engineering (crew 
ergonomics).8 
For the purposes of investigating the major philosophical design factors impacting on 
international collaboration in tank design, however, Halbert’s list of eleven principles can be 
simplified into the three elements of firepower, mobility and protection. Within these 
elements are broad design categories; the armament and ammunition affect firepower; the 
                                                                                                                                                  
(e.g. MG version of the French Renault FT-17, British Matilda I, German Panzer I) or a low-velocity howitzer 
(the British close-support versions of their cruiser tanks, for example). 
6Simpkin, Tank Warfare, p. 74. See also: John Stone, The Tank Debate (Abingdon, 2013), p. 75; Hilmes, Main 
Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945, pp. 94-99; Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, ‘Is 
There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets’, International Security, 13:1 (Summer, 
1988), pp. 27-28. 
7 The firepower-mobility-protection design trinity is dealt with in more detail in section 1.2 below. 
8 Gerald A. Halbert, ‘Elements of Tank Design’, Armor, 42:6 (Nov-Dec 1983), pp. 36-42. 
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dimensions, power plant, suspension and weight affect mobility; and armour and 
survivability combine for protection. The internal layout, crew and human engineering 
aspects will obviously influence the overall efficiency of a tank, but do not comfortably fit 
any of the three categories and are largely design choices detached from considerations of 
cost and compromise of the three key elements.9 Just how much emphasis each of the three 
elements has on the final tank design depends to a large extent on the doctrinal requirements 
of the nation involved in setting out the specification. A tank designed for fast manoeuvre 
warfare, for example, will emphasise mobility whereas a tank expected to fire from static 
defensive positions may compromise mobility for additional armour.  
The debate over how to best use tanks has evolved alongside technology. Official 
military thinking was slow to change following the introduction of tanks in 1916. John Stone, 
for example, notes that Colonel Ernst Swinton, one of Britain’s foremost proponents of the 
use of tanks, wrote in 1916 that tanks would be auxiliary to the infantry and would be 
employed primarily in breaking through the enemy defences.10 In addition, Brigadier-General 
L. E. Kiggell, the BEF’s Chief of General Staff wrote in 1916 that tanks were, ‘Merely 
accessory to the combined action of infantry and artillery’.11 In this both were correct in so 
far as the First World War was concerned, with mechanical and technological restrictions 
meaning that tanks were used primarily to support infantry attacks rather than in more 
autonomous mobile roles, but the potential for a more dynamic and independent employment 
of tanks was already being considered. New weapons always stimulate new visions of how 
future warfare will develop, but Bryn Hammond makes the point that the limited capabilities 
of those early tanks mitigated against being used as anything more than assault vehicles tied 
                                                
9 It is acknowledged that crew ergonomics may be affected by wider considerations such as the height of the 
tank hull, the size of the turret and the type of suspension fitted. In the main, such considerations appear to have 
had little overall impact in design choices during the post-1945 period, with low hulls in tanks such as the 
British Chieftain and Russian T-64 coming from decisions over protection, and with crew comfort being 
secondary to this. Halbert, ‘Elements of Tank Design’, p. 36. 
10 Stone, The Tank Debate, p. 27. 
11 TNA, WO 158/832, “Notes on the Use of Tanks”, L. E. Kiggell, Advanced HQ, 5 October 1916. 
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to the infantry they supported, even while theoretical thinkers such as J.F.C. Fuller visualised 
an all-tank army exploiting deep breakthrough penetrations using fast manoeuvre in a similar 
fashion to ships at sea.12 
The idea of manoeuvre warfare was certainly not new and might be traced back to 
ancient armies firing missiles from fast-moving chariots or, more recently, cavalry during the 
American Civil War employed on deep raids behind enemy lines. Yet tanks came at a time of 
increasing mechanisation and advances in weaponry which embraced improved explosive 
fillers for artillery, the use of accurate indirect fire from long-range guns, smokeless powder 
for small arms, and automatic weapons.13 In the face of these advances it was no longer 
enough to instil soldiers with a high morale and aggressive élan and expect them to carry the 
day. David French argues that the First World War changed the doctrine of the British Army 
by demonstrating that an approach calling for purely human solutions to tactical problems 
was impractical in the face of modern weapons.14 Born in the First World War, it was during 
the Second World War that the tank might be said to have come of age, and the armoured 
philosophies of all of the major nations evolved alongside that combat experience. In 
particular, by the end of the war the concept of the ‘universal tank’, or ‘main battle tank’, had 
largely replaced the various Infantry and Cruiser designs that had prevailed,15 as well as the 
separate turreted tank destroyer concept, although parallel medium and heavy tank designs 
                                                
12 Bryn Hammond, ‘Practical Considerations in British Tank Operations’, in Alaric Searle (ed.), Genesis, 
Employment, Aftermath (Solihull, 2015), pp. 36-38. See also J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks (Manchester, 
1995), pp. 205-207. 
13 Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray (eds.), Changing War (London, 2015), pp. 2-3, 6-8. 
14 David French, ‘Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919–1932’, The Historical Journal, 44:2 
(2001), pp. 505-506. 
15 The ‘Infantry Tank’ concept continued thinking from the First World War that tanks should closely 
accompany the infantry advance in order to provide protected fire support against bunkers or other strongpoints. 
These tanks were consequently slow but usually well armoured against anti-tank fire. The ‘Cruiser Tank’ 
concept, by contrast, required tanks that could operate in mobile operations and independently against the 
enemy’s rear areas in a manner akin the light cavalry of the previous century. Such tanks were usually relative 
fast, had a wide range of operation and carried a gun capable of tackling enemy armour. 
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lasted until the 1970s when the main armament of ‘medium’ tanks became as powerful as 
those on the more expensive and less mobile ‘heavy’ cousins.16 
While firepower is obviously central to any main battle tank’s design, its expected 
role may determine the type of gun fitted. Experience during the Second World War had 
influenced the thinking of NATO armoured warfare analysts and thus how the tanks of 
different NATO nations would be used, with such thinking falling into two different schools 
of thought. A typical Cold War scenario was predicted by NATO at the time to involve the 
Warsaw Pact invading Western Europe through Northern Germany with greater numerical 
strength but technologically inferior tanks manned by conscripts trained to a basic level. With 
their nations expected to be on the front line and reducing Warsaw Pact strength as they 
advanced against prepared positions, British and US thinkers advocating using tanks 
primarily using superior firepower from defensive positions at a numerically superior enemy 
at long range. Consequently, there was an emphasis within those nations on a tank gun that 
could hit hard and accurately even at long range.17 The French and Germans, however, 
wanted to use their tanks to manoeuvre into positions for counter-attacks against moving 
Warsaw Pact formations, wearing them down and hindering their freedom of manoeuvre, and 
thus required tanks with greater mobility and did not require that the guns of those tanks be 
effective at such long-ranges as those of the UK and USA. Simpkin relates that in 1977 Field 
Marshal Lord Carver rated the design emphasis of the major tank producing countries as 
follows: the British and Israelis advocated protection over mobility, the Soviets sought a 
middle ground, and the French, Germans and USA (in that descending order of emphasis) 
stressed mobility over protection. As Simpkin notes, the USA might perhaps be better 
envisaged as holding a middle ground in 1977, but the point stands that in the 1970s different 
                                                
16 See, for example: Richard Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution (Oxford, 2015), pp. 153, 167, 177-
178; and Simpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 29-31.  
17 M. Nicklas-Carter, ‘NATO’s Central Front’, in. J. P. Harris and F. N. Toase (eds.), Armoured Warfare 
(London, 1990), p. 218; Stone, The Tank Debate, p. 48. 
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nations had, and indeed still have to a lesser extent, different requirements and design 
philosophies for their main battle tanks.18 
A change in UK and US military thinking occurred in the 1980s. The static and linear 
defensive warfare doctrines designed to reduce attacking forces through the use of long-range 
firepower gradually altered to become a doctrine based on a more fluid battle of manoeuvre.19 
At the same time as the UK and US were moving towards more mobile employment of their 
MBTs, the protection and weight of the German Leopard 2 increased, with a consequent 
reduction in the power-to-weight ratio and thus mobility. Although still highly mobile thanks 
to its powerful 1500hp engine, the requirement for better armour protection added to the large 
and heavy engine saw Leopard 2 briefly becoming the heaviest tank in service in the world, a 
dubious achievement only superseded by the introduction of the better-protected British 
Challenger.20 At the time of writing, the three current major NATO tank designs, Challenger 
2, M1 Abrams and Leopard 2, are all so similar in external appearance and design philosophy 
that it requires examination of details to tell them apart. Yet despite this, while not as 
pronounced as it had been in the in the 1970s, the underlying and historical design 
philosophies are still different. 
1.2. Tank Technology: Firepower, Mobility and Protection 
As important as addressing how and why collaboration is seen as desirable in the modern 
world, is an overview of the technology involved in main battle tank design. Changes in 
firepower, in particular, have acted as a catalyst to tank designers who attempt to create a 
tank which can survive on the battlefield in the face of weapons specifically designed to 
                                                
18 Simpkin, Tank Warfare, pp. 66-67. 
19 Stone, The Tank Debate, pp. 111, 129. 
20 Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945, p. 99. 
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destroy it. The ongoing struggle between offence and defence, between weapon systems and 
protection, is an area of particular interest to any study on tank design and development. 
From its introduction in 1916, the tank has proven to be a versatile and potent weapon 
that can operate in every terrain, from Arctic to desert and from swamp to jungle.21 Its 
combination of firepower, mobility and armour are unique on the battlefield. While the basic 
shape may be altered, the Challenger 2s and M1A1 Abrams of the 2003 Gulf War remained 
fundamentally the same concept of a medium calibre direct-fire gun mounted on an armoured 
tracked and self-propelled body that rumbled to the front line at Flers-Courcellete during the 
Battle of the Somme in September 1916.  
The important developments of those early tanks were firepower to support attacks, 
mobility to carry that firepower to the point where it was required, and armour sufficient to 
protect the crew and to enable the vehicle to take its firepower safely over the battlefield. The 
early developers had little or no practical experience of armoured warfare with which to work 
and so mistakes were inevitably made.22 They were also limited by the available technology. 
The mobility of tanks, for example, depends on powerful reliable engines, transmissions and 
efficient running gear, none of which had had time to mature by the time of the First World 
War. The only armour available in quantity was the face-hardened steel manufactured for 
military shipbuilding and it was heavy and difficult to work, limiting the shapes available to 
the designers. Although modified naval and field guns provided adequate firepower, the best 
method of mounting them had yet to be developed. Rotating turrets had been considered on 
the first designs but the high-tracked rhomboidal shape of the Mark I was deemed unsuited to 
a turret and the tank instead carried side sponsons, a feature that carried through all of 
                                                
21 Alaric Searle, Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History(London, 2017), pp. 93-112. 
22 Examples of early mistakes are seen in the French CA1 Schneider tank, introduced in 1916 and the first 
French design put into production. The tank had its single 75mm gun mounted on a right-side hull sponson 
which meant that it had a very limited field of fire and could not engage targets outside of its right-side arc. In 
addition, a long overhanging forward superstructure, intended to tackle belts of barbed wire, meant that the 
nose-heavy machine would often get stuck in heavily undulating terrain or when crossing obstacles. 
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Britain’s early rhomboidal tank designs, and it was the small French FT-17 with its 
proportionally small revolving turret that pioneered such turrets to became standard for future 
tank designs. In the last 100 years, firepower, mobility and armour have all advanced by a 
phenomenal degree and the way that they have been used tactically has evolved and altered, 
yet it can surely be argued that the tank has remained, at its heart, the same basic concept and 
design - an armoured vehicle designed to carry heavy direct fire weapons to the crucial point 
on the battlefield.23 
What the tank is primarily intended to engage was the cause of much debate up until, 
and during, the Second World War. The tank’s role in the First World War was necessarily 
that of infantry support, its low speed, short range of action and poor contemporary 
communications making it unsuited to anything more independent, whatever its proponents 
might envisage for the future.24 All tank-producing countries designed tanks to fulfil this 
infantry support role up until the Second World War, and even during the war in some 
cases.25 Infantry support tanks, expected to face anti-tank weapons as they advanced with the 
infantry, were generally heavily armoured but traded speed for this protection. Cruiser tanks, 
on the other hand, were intended to exploit the breakthrough and to drive deep into enemy 
territory. They needed a relatively high level of mobility and a good range of operations, and 
many sacrificed protection to achieve this.26 Tanks were often not even designed to fight 
                                                
23 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 31, 45, 246. 
24 See, for example: Hammond, ‘Practical Considerations in British Tank Operations’, passim; Brian N. Hall, 
‘Development of Tank Communications in the British Expeditionary Force’, in Searle (ed.), Genesis, 
Employment, Aftermath, passim; Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 40-43. 
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26 See, for example: J. P. Harris, ‘British Armour 1918-1940: Doctrine and Development’, in J. P. Harris and 
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other tanks. In the USA for example, the chief of Army Ground Forces, Lt. Gen. Lesley 
McNair, did not believe that tanks should engage in anti-tank operations and that this should 
instead be left to specialised anti-tank guns and self-propelled tank destroyers.27 It took the 
gruelling test of actual armoured warfare to expose the flaws in trying to design and supply 
different tanks to meet different tactical situations, and by the end of the Second World War 
most nations were pursuing a ‘universal’ tank, or main battle tank, that could meet all the 
requirements of tanks on the battlefield. 
1.2.1. Firepower 
The current main battle tank (MBT) is primarily a means to carry a medium calibre high-
velocity direct-fire gun to the forward edge of the battlefield and engage the enemy in direct 
fire. The Director of the Royal Armoured Corps (DRAC) wrote in 1970 that: 
 
There can be absolutely no doubt that firepower is the most important 
characteristic of the tank. The main armament is also the factor which 
principally determines the dimensions and configuration of the vehicle and 
gives rise to the basic conflict of opinion between those who believe in an 
all-purpose tank and those who favour giving the antitank role to a separate 
vehicle. We believe that in the time-frame 1975-90 the guided weapon will 
continue to complement the all-purpose high velocity gun both tactically as 
well as in the range, but will not replace it.28 
 
 
In 1972 the UK was heavily committed to rifled tank guns, and to its own designs in 
particular. After several years of being out-gunned by German tanks during the Second 
World War, in 1948 the excellent Vickers 20pdr (84.5mm), and later the Royal Ordnance 
105mm L7, finally gave the UK domestically designed tank guns that were the best in the 
world. Too late for action in the Second World War, these new British tank guns were 
nonetheless to give the UK’s arms industry a commercial lead in the decades following and 
                                                
27 Starry, Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp. 145-146.  
28 BOV, E2014.1692, HQ DRAC, Successor to Chieftain, 16 March 1970, p. 3. 
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would establish the UK as a centre of tank gun excellence. Married to the Vickers Centurion 
tank, the 20pdr was exported to 16 countries and over half the total production of the 
Centurion was for export. The gun’s successor, the 105mm L7, was even more successful 
commercially, seeing service on tanks with the armies of countries such as the USA, the 
FRG, India, Japan and China.29 Developed in 1957 for the new Chieftain tank then being 
designed, the Royal Ordnance 120mm L11A5 meant that upon its adoption in 1966 the 
Chieftain was NATO’s most heavily-armed tank, and the 120mm calibre was to become the 
NATO standard for tank main guns in the following decades. 
 In February of 1973, less than a year after the Anglo-German Future Main Battle 
Tank (FMBT) joint design and development programme had been formally agreed upon, 
General Sir Noel Thomas, Master General of the Ordnance (MGO) suggested developing a 
110mm gun as the FMBT main armament.30 The advantages of this suggestion were queried 
when the UK already had an existing 120mm and 105mm design, but two experimental 
110mm rifled guns, one with conventional brass cartridges and one with a semi-combustible 
cartridge, were nonetheless developed at the Royal Armament Research and Development 
Establishment (RARDE) as possible main armament for FMBT.31 
As a result of the MBT-70 project, meanwhile, the FRG had been developing its own 
smoothbore 120mm gun when the USA insisted that tank-mounted ATGMs would be the 
next generation main armament and consequently had no interest in developing a new tank 
gun for MBT-70. With MBT-70’s failure, Rheinmetall, a large and influential firm within the 
Federal Republic, was very keen to have its new gun used in FMBT as this would make the 
chances of it becoming the NATO standard far more likely, with all the associated export and 
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30 TNA, FCO 46/1082, Collaboration between the UK and Federal Republic of Germany on Future Main Battle 
Tank (FMBT), Extract from DEP 1st Meeting /77, Main Armament for the Future Main Battle Tank, 2 February 
1973. 
31 Richard Ogorkiewicz, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, in Robert Bud and Phillip Gummett (eds.), Cold War 
Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories 1945-1990 (London, 2002), p. 124. 
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licensing advantages. While both the UK’s Royal Ordnance Factories and RARDE were at 
that point government-owned, Rheinmetall was an independent privately-owned company 
and retained the commercial rights to their inventions, so private commercial pressures to 
adopt a particular gun were as important as purely military ones. Governments are, after all, 
more likely to allocate budgetary resources and bail out in their own in-house nationalised 
organisations than prop up private firms operating under purely market forces. It should be 
acknowledged, of course, that even poorly performing government-owned firms will be 
under pressure to succeed where budgets are tight.32 
The debate between advocates of smoothbore guns and rifled tank guns had begun in 
the 1950s when both the USA and USSR looked at smoothbore guns to fire armour-piercing 
fin-stabilised discarding sabot ammunition (APFSDS) and the smoothbore concept was 
adopted by the FRG in the 1960s, even though the USA had since discarded the idea.33 Rifled 
guns impart lateral spin to a projectile and thus increases its aerodynamic stability and hence 
the accuracy over longer distances, although crucially this does not hold true of fin-stabilised 
projectiles. This principle of rifling had been employed by firearms designers for centuries as 
a way to improve accuracy and effective range, and had been a feature of tank guns since the 
Hotchkiss 6-pounder had been fitted to the Mark I tank in 1916. With Britain wedded to its 
line of successful rifled guns and the FRG developing the Rheinmetall Rh120 smoothbore as 
a result of the failed MBT-70 programme, the main gun for the FMBT was always going to 
be a point of contention. One of the earliest, and arguably one of least persuasive, reasons for 
rifled bores emerged at a UK meeting on 2 February 1972 to discuss the main armament 
options for the FMBT, when it was stated that, ‘The best argument for maintaining a rifled 
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33 Ogorkiewicz, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, p.125. 
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bore [was] that it was just as effective as a smoothbore gun up to 2000m, and the smoothbore 
gun would inevitably cost much more to develop fully.’34 
Three main factors were central to the case for smoothbore guns; weight, imparted 
energy and ammunition. Rifled barrels require a greater thickness and therefore weight, both 
because of the need to cut rifling into the barrel liner and because spinning the round causes 
greater friction and greater heat, requiring thicker walls to dissipate and mitigate this.35 Gun 
barrels are generally lined with a coating of chromium in order to mitigate this wear, but such 
measures delay, rather than prevent, barrel erosion.36 In addition, spinning rounds through a 
rifled barrel converts some of the forward momentum into the lateral momentum for the spin 
and thereby bleeds forward energy from the projectile. This makes high pressure smoothbore 
guns somewhat more efficient at imparting muzzle velocity and means that for a given 
muzzle velocity the gun breach, recoil system, mounting and cartridge can be smaller and 
lighter. Finally, the effectiveness of any gun depends on its ammunition, and rifled and 
smoothbore guns impart different properties to the ammunition they fire, causing a 
divergence of opinion on the relative effectiveness of the various types of round when fired 
from each type of barrel.37 
The key ammunition types under debate were the Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot 
round (APDS), the Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding-Sabot round (APFSDS), 
High-Explosive Squash-Head (HESH), and High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT). The first two 
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rounds rely on kinetic energy (KE) for effect and thus require to be fired at high velocity, 
whereas the second two are chemical energy (CE) rounds and, far from requiring high 
velocity, work best within fairly low velocity ranges. KE rounds rely on their imparted 
velocity and mass to literally punch a hole through armour plate, damaging anything they 
pass through, whereas CE rounds rely on chemical explosions in contact with the armour. In 
addition to the immediate effect of penetration, both types of round also create spalling and 
possibly overpressure. Spalling is a beyond-armour effect (i.e. damage inflicted behind the 
armour following a successful hit) that occurs when a shock wave passing along the inner 
surface of the armour, be it the interior of an AFV or the wall of a structure, mechanically 
over-stresses the inner surface of that wall and causes it to fragment and create a ‘scab’ of 
flying shards. These shards cause death or serious injury to crew and destroy equipment, most 
significantly ammunition and fuel, and can disable or completely destroy the AFV. To 
counter spalling most modern AFVs have interior spall-liners which significantly reduce the 
danger, ammunition is stored in protective water jackets and crewmen can be equipped with 
protective goggles and clothing.38 The goggles and face shields issued to the first British tank 
crews in the First World War, for example, were to protect against spalling.39 Overpressure 
occurs as a shock wave and travels through the crew compartment creating a sudden flash of 
light and heat, even igniting flammable liquids (such as fuel or hydraulic fluids) or fine spall 
fragments (the ‘custard power’ or ‘dust’ explosion).40 
By the end of the Second World War, the UK had further improved the penetration of 
its tank and anti-tank guns by developing APDS.41 This KE round consisted of a sub-calibre 
high-density tungsten carbide ‘penetrator’ held within a shoe or sabot which, when the round 
                                                
38 Joseph E. Backhofen Jnr., ‘Armor Technology (Part V)’, Armor, 43/1 (Jan/Feb 1984), p. 24. See Appendix 1 
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was fired, fell away from the penetrator as it left the barrel.42 The advantage of such a round 
is that the full calibre diameter of the sabot allows for maximum propellant charge to propel 
the projectile, thus achieving consequently higher velocity and potential penetration than 
would the smaller charge held in a round of the smaller calibre of the penetrator alone. A high 
density penetrator is necessary to avoid the round simply shattering when it hits armour plate 
at high velocity, but a full-calibre round of high density metal would be expensive, heavy and 
would lose velocity unacceptably quickly. Being lighter and more aerodynamic than a full-
calibre round, the sub-calibre penetrator is more stable and does not lose so much velocity in 
its time of flight to the target. The result is that the sub-calibre tungsten carbide penetrator of 
APDS had significantly higher accuracy and penetration than previous armour-piercing 
rounds.43 
In the 1950s both the USA and Soviet Union began further development of German 
research during the Second World War into an APDS round with small fins added to improve 
stabilisation in flight, the Armour-Piercing, Fin-Stabilised, Discarding Sabot round 
(APFSDS, also sometimes called APDSFS).44 Although the UK was slow to accept the fact, 
APFSDS rounds were superior to APDS, but they initially required a smoothbore gun. 
Spinning an APFSDS projectile both reduces the energy imparted to the target and, critically, 
destabilises the penetrator’s flight, so when the USA examined the employment of APFSDS 
rounds from their 152mm rifled gun/launcher during the MBT-70 project, they fitted a 
slipping band to the outer casing of the round to isolate the sabot and penetrator from the 
spin.45 Following the failure of the FMBT project and trials of the RARDE 110mm rifled gun 
with APDS against the German Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore with APFSDS, the UK 
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designed a similar APFSDS round for the Chieftain’s hypothetical 120mm rifle-gun armed 
replacement, the proposed MBT-80, this time using isolating bearings on the sabot.46 
An alternative to velocity-reliant kinetic energy (KE) anti-armour rounds are chemical 
energy (CE) rounds which rely on an explosive force applied directly against the enemy’s 
armour. The two rounds used in the anti-armour role are the high explosive squash-head 
ammunition (HESH, also known as high explosive plastic, or HEP, in the USA), and high-
explosive anti-tank (HEAT). HESH was originally developed by the UK in the Second World 
War to tackle concrete fortifications, but it proved so effective against armour that in the 
1950s the UK seriously considered making HESH its standard anti-armour ammunition.47 
The HESH warhead is filled with plastic explosive within a thin metal shell which flattens on 
impact against the target and then detonates. The resultant shock wave passes through the 
armour wall to create a relatively large mass of ‘spalling’ fragments and very significant 
overpressure (with a resultant high-temperature flash) within the vehicle.48 An early 
advantage of the HESH round was that it does not rely on penetration for its beyond-armour 
effect and so may defeat basic steel armour more effectively than an equivalent-weight 
standard armour-piercing shell.49 The stress-fracturing effect HESH causes is also 
particularly effective against concrete or brick constructions, materials for which it was 
originally to tackle.50 In addition, being metal-coated plastic explosive, the blast and 
secondary fragmentation effects of HESH make it very useful as a weapon against personnel 
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and soft targets, around 90% as effective as a dedicated high explosive (HE) round.51 It is, 
however, easily defeated in the anti-armour role by spaced armour, explosive-reactive armour 
(ERA) or high-hardness armour such as electroslag remelted (ESR) steel plate, and it also 
requires a moderately flat and vertical surface to achieve optimum effect.52 Spall liners also 
mitigate the effect of HESH. Although equally able to be fired from a rifled or smoothbore 
barrel, being reliant on the weight of explosive for its effect, HESH rounds are less efficient 
when trading explosive weight for the weight of a finned tail to achieve stability (and 
therefore accuracy) in flight. This makes HESH a somewhat less effective round when fired 
from a smoothbore gun.53 
By contrast, the HEAT round suffers significantly degraded penetrative performance 
when spun.54 Using the principle of shaped charge or the ‘Monroe effect’, the HEAT round 
has a metal-lined cone, typically of aluminium or copper, in its nose, with the base of the 
cone facing the direction of firing and the taper pointing to the rear. Upon the fuse striking a 
target and detonating the charge, the conical liner collapses forward along its axis towards the 
cone’s base to form a molten jet which penetrates armour through chemical heat and pressure 
to throw a stream of metal into the AFV accompanied by significant spalling. To allow this 
jet to form correctly, the collapse of the liner has to be triggered at precisely the correct 
distance from the armour and thus modern HEAT rounds have a stand-off fuse.55 The main 
advantage of this form of round is that it does not rely on high velocity for its performance 
and is therefore used in missiles and hand-held infantry anti-tank rockets, having been 
developed during the Second World War for infantry anti-tank weapons such as the 
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Panzerfaust, Bazooka and PIAT. However, spinning the round degrades the formation of the 
charge and thus firing HEAT from a standard rifled tank gun results in poor armour 
penetration.56 
Like HESH, HEAT can be degraded or defeated by high-hardness and composite or 
laminate armour, and by anything that disrupts the formation of the molten jet at the right 
time and angle, such as ERA or spaced armour.57 HEAT rounds, using as they do a shaped 
charge jet for their effect, are only minimally effective against soft targets and very poor in an 
anti-personnel role where they have nothing hard to explode against. Although a larger 
HEAT warhead provides better penetration (and greater behind-armour effects), the practical 
limitations of incorporating a large warhead in a tank-gun calibre round means that tank-fired 
HEAT warheads are restricted in their potential for improvement, although shaped-charge 
missile warheads have less restriction on size. 
1.2.2. Mobility 
Ogorkiewicz defines three types of mobility: strategic, operational and battlefield.58 Simpkin 
broadly agrees, although he uses the terms operational, tactical or off-road, and battlefield or 
cross-country.59 Most armies, and, most significantly NATO, use similar definitions.60 For 
the purposes of this discussion, Ogorkiewicz’s terminology will be used (with ‘battlefield’ 
being replaced by ‘tactical’) as it is more in keeping with the current NATO definition of the 
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strategic, operational and tactical environments.61 However defined, the need for MBTs to 
meet the need for mobility at each level remains important, whether it be transportation 
globally to an area of conflict or from one firing point on a battlefield to another. While these 
types of mobility are all strongly inter-related they do not necessarily require the same design 
answers. A high degree of mobility on the strategic level does not necessarily equate, for 
example, to a high tactical mobility. In addressing the problems of international collaboration 
in MBT design, it is important to understand why some national doctrines deem mobility to 
be more important than direct protection in the firepower-mobility-protection philosophy.  
Fundamental to any examination of the mobility of NATO military vehicles is the 
concept of Military Load Classification (MLC). This NATO classification system grew from 
a previous British system whereby each vehicle was classified as Light, Medium, Heavy, and 
Super Heavy, and was noted accordingly in a table provided to the Royal Engineers to judge 
whether a particular vehicle was suited to given routes and bridges. This proved to be a 
cumbersome system and required every vehicle to be written into the table and for the table to 
be consulted for each vehicle in a convoy. As an alternative, therefore, each bridge and route 
was classified with an MLC, and the same classification was applied to vehicles. The 
principle stands that a vehicle can safely use a particular route if the route MLC is equal to or 
greater than that of the vehicle MLC. The MLC itself is a combination of weight, turning arc, 
load distribution and whether the vehicle runs on tracks or wheels.62 
In the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War, more than 700 M1A1 MBTs were moved to 
Saudi Arabia by the USA alone, and this was in addition to the US Marines’ battalion of M60 
tanks, the UK 7th Armoured Brigade, and other armoured units of the coalition numbering a 
                                                
61 NATO, British Army ADP Land Operations (AC 71940), Army Doctrine Publications, p. 2-5 – 2-6. 
62 NATO uses MLC numbers; 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 120, and 150. It is useful to 
note that these are upper limits, so a 52 tonne tank, for example, will probably be MLC 60 (depending on the 
other factors as above). See, for this, Think Defence, ‘UK Military Bridging – Load Classification’, 
<http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/12/uk-military-bridging-load-classification/>, accessed 26 April 2017. 
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total of 3,400 tanks.63 This sort of strategic mobility for MBTs, moving tanks from their 
national bases to the theatre of operations, was only possible because the designers had given 
thought to the necessity of building tanks that could be transported by existing ships, railway 
wagons and tank transporters, and even by some aircraft.64 To achieve such strategic 
mobility, the dimensions of the tank need to be considered as well as the weight. Such 
consideration is not new and when transported by rail the early rhomboidal tanks required 
their side sponsons removing (or swinging into the body of the tank) to reduce the tank’s 
width and allow the vehicles to be carried on the European railway system.65 In the period 
leading up to the Second World War, British tank designers faced restriction on turret ring 
diameter (and consequently gun size) because tanks were again limited to being less than 
2.67m wide in order that they could fit within the British railways loading gauge.66 It is rare 
that tanks are produced and stored in global locations convenient for their theatre of 
operations, making strategic mobility an essential part of the eventual design’s capability. 
Once shipped to the required theatre of operations, it is the tank’s operational mobility 
that allows commanders to position forces where they are needed for a particular campaign or 
operation.67 Operational mobility on hard ground and roadways is less efficient for tracked 
vehicles than for those on wheels, and many attempts have been made to develop ‘wheeled 
tanks’ that would be cheaper to run and faster to deploy. As Ogorkiewicz points out, 
however, all these attempts have failed because the resulting vehicle has necessarily been 
lighter and less well-armoured in order to travel off-road as effectively as a tracked tank.68 
                                                
63 William J. Taylor and James Blackwell, ‘The Ground War in the Gulf’, Survival, 33:3 (1991), p. 231; 
Anthony Tucker-Jones, The Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991 (Barnsley, 2014), p. 9. 
64 The C-17 Globemaster aircraft, for example, can carry a single M1 Abrams MBT, with capacity for additional 
lighter vehicles. See Boeing Website, ‘C-17 Globemaster’, <http://www.boeing.com/defense/c-17-globemaster-
iii/>, accessed 2 October 2017.  
65 Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots, pp. 144, 147.  
66 Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks, p. 223. 
67 ADP Land Operations (AC 71940), Army Doctrine Publications (March 2017), p. 2-5, accessed online 22 
September 2017. 
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Although a tank may be able to drive to where it is required on its own tracks, this is far less 
efficient than transportation by rail or road transporter and puts unnecessary strain on the 
engine and tracks, as well as being costly in terms of fuel.69 Specialised road transporters, 
however, are usually in short supply and, fully laden, are obviously even heavier than the 
tanks they transport.70 Ideally, then, a tank should be designed to travel at a reasonable speed 
on roads when required, and have the operational range to move considerable distances under 
its own power and on its own tracks, a feature heavily dependent on the power-to-weight 
ratio and thus the engine and overall weight. The tank’s Military Load Classification (MLC) 
should also be low enough to allow it to travel over bridges and other MLC-limited structures 
en-route. 
Part of the operational mobility capability for any tank is its logistical requirement, 
and a larger engine may mean higher speed and power but almost certainly means higher fuel 
consumption. Modern tanks generally have a better power-to-weight ratio than their 
predecessors but require an enormous amount of fuel. The current US M1 Abrams is one of 
the worst offenders with its thirsty AGT 1500 gas turbine engine, and the modern US 
Armoured Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) uses more than 100,000 gallons of fuel per day.71 
US estimates are that, in the 1991 Gulf War, a single armoured division consumed more than 
600,000 gallons of fuel each day. To put this in perspective, it is almost double the fuel 
consumption of Patton’s entire Third Army in the latter’s drive across France. During the 
Gulf War, 350 tanks and their crews required the attentions of ninety-eight 5,000-gallon 
tankers plus 210 5-ton trucks per day.72 In addition to fuel, tanks and their crews need oil, 
water, spare parts, ammunition, food, medical supplies and all manner of other logistical 
                                                
69 Tytler, et. al., Brassey’s Battlefield Weapons Systems & Technology Series. Volume I, p. 41. 
70 Stone, The Tank Debate, p. 142. 
71 Travis Michelena, ‘Protecting the Tail of the Tiger: Reshaping the Way We Train Logistics’, Armor, 78:2 
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support, and this is usually transported by wheeled vehicles so the longer a tank can run 
without such support the more operational mobility it possesses. Without timely logistical 
support, even the best tank becomes an expensive pillbox. In 1940, for example, fuel-hungry 
French Char B heavy tanks were caught and destroyed while stationary after being forced to 
await their fuel trucks which had been delayed by heavy refugee traffic on the narrow roads.73 
Tactical mobility requires slightly different qualities to either strategic or operational 
mobility. Whereas strategic mobility requires the ability to be transported efficiently by other 
vehicles and operational mobility implies the ability to cover long distances over roads or 
other good going, tactical mobility depends on the ability to move in all manner of terrain and 
over soft soils.74 The British Army’s ADP Land Operations publication defines the tactical 
level as:  
 
… the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and 
executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations 
and units. It is at the tactical level that troops are deployed directly in tactical 
activities, using the tactical functions.75 
 
 
In other words, tactical mobility requires that the tank move into contact, or imminent 
contact, with the enemy. Simpkin categorises this as ‘battlefield’ or ‘cross-country’ mobility 
and it is the category of mobility which requires the highest ‘sprinting’ speed across rough 
ground.76 While a tank’s engine and power-to-weight ratio dictate its operational mobility, 
tactical mobility is as dependent on the suspension and the ground pressure exerted, with 
factors such as the length of the track (and thus the tank) and higher weight even being an 
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advantage.77 Ground pressure can be kept low by carefully distributing the tank’s weight over 
its road wheels and fitting accordingly wide tracks. The German Tiger tank, for example, was 
designed with interleaved wheels and wide tracks and consequently had a remarkably light 
ground pressure. Despite having a combat weight of 57 tonnes, the suggested method to test 
if the ground was firm enough to support it was to have a man, carrying another on his back, 
stand on one leg. If the lower man’s foot began to sink then the ground was too soft for the 
tank.78 
One of the features that defines a tank is that it be self-mobile. With mobility 
including the strategic, operational and tactical, tank designers have to consider more than 
simply the speed of the tank over the ground. A tank that cannot fit in long-range transport 
lacks strategic mobility and is highly limited in where it can be employed. A tank’s 
operational mobility is highly dependent on its supporting logistical tail as well as its own 
capacity to run for considerable distances on its own tracks. Finally, tactical, or battlefield, 
mobility is at the heart of a tank’s fighting effectiveness and its capacity for mobile warfare. 
Each form of mobility therefore requires a different design consideration because a tank that 
cannot reach the battlefield is even less effective than one which cannot move when it gets 
there. 
1.2.3. Protection 
When talking of MBT protection, there are several areas that need to be addressed. As 
Simpkin sets out, protection can be defined as both indirect and direct: 
 
 Indirect protection concerns the chance of not being hit (under some given 
circumstances). 
                                                
77 Ogorkiewicz posits that higher weight is an advantage in so much as it usually corresponds to a larger tank 
and improves trench and ditch crossing. Obviously, this weight must not unduly increase the ground pressure 
exerted or reduce the power-to-weight ratio. Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks, p. 226. 
78 David Fletcher, et. al., Tiger Tank: Owners’ Workshop Manual (Yeovil, 2011), pp. 46, 54, 57-58. 
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 Direct protection concerns the chance of surviving a hit […].79 
 
 
Tank designers speak of the ‘survivability onion’, where incoming attacks must defeat 
several layers of protection. The layers, in order, can be defined as; ‘don’t be seen’, ‘don’t be 
hit’, ‘don’t be penetrated’, ‘don’t be killed’.80 In simple terms, direct protection can be 
achieved using armour and indirect protection using camouflage, a small target area, and 
agility, but these concepts will be expanded upon below. As will be seen, the priority given to 
the balance between direct and indirect protection mirrors that between protection and 
mobility. Where armour is designed to prevent incoming rounds from penetrating to the 
vehicle’s interior (‘don’t be penetrated’), survivability is the ability of the vehicle and crew to 
survive those rounds which do penetrate or otherwise inflict damage despite not penetrating 
(‘don’t be killed’). Survivability can include features such as spall liners, fire extinguishers 
and safe stowage of ammunition. Although an important consideration in its own right, space 
considerations mean that survivability and its associated design features are not dealt with 
here, being a substantial topic and somewhat irrelevant to the thrust of the thesis question. 
A tank is primarily an offensive weapon, and thus is designed to be at the forefront of 
any fighting.81 Ideally, the tank should provide fire support while avoiding returning fire. 
Given the direct-fire nature of the tank’s main armament, to say nothing of the effectiveness 
of modern surveillance capabilities, avoiding both detection and incoming fire presents 
challenges to tank designers. 
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The first and most obvious way to avoid detection is to not be seen. In this, tanks have 
long employed visual camouflage, including suitable paint schemes and shape-altering 
netting and local natural materials such as foliage. Although this may be effective against the 
unaided human eye when stationary, any movement or enemy surveillance with thermal 
imaging using infra-red or similar non-visible spectrum sources will significantly reduce the 
utility of such measures.82 Modern developments in the field of passive camouflage include 
coverings of thermal camouflage material which alter temperature to match the surroundings, 
and can even create a false thermal image to allow the tank to visually appear on infra-red 
detectors as a different vehicle.83 
A second form of indirect protection is to reduce the target area. Small size is one of 
the two main forms of protection normally associated with light vehicles (the other being 
high mobility) but to a lesser degree it is also valid for main battle tanks. In general, this can 
be done by adopting a ‘hull-down’ stance; positioning the tank behind an obstacle or hill crest 
so that as little of the tank as practical is visible while still allowing it to aim and fire the main 
gun. Designing a tank with a lower silhouette is a method of building this form of indirect 
protection into the tank itself.84 Russian tanks from the end of the Second World War tended 
to be low and compact and presented small targets, but such a design has drawbacks. A low 
silhouette presents a smaller target area but reduces the space available inside the tank. This 
can result in poor crew ergonomics with a consequent reduction in crew efficiency, but might 
also have other consequences such as a lack of hull space meaning that ammunition must be 
stored above the turret ring, with the risk of detonation should the turret be penetrated.85 
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Taking the idea of a low silhouette a stage further, removing a tank’s turret creates a 
significantly lower profile. Seen in the German Sturmgeschutz assault guns and various tank 
destroyers during the Second World War, the concept of mounting the main gun directly on 
the hull saw a modern incarnation in the Swedish Strv. 103, more commonly known as the 
‘S-tank’. First proposed by Sven Berge, head of Swedish tank design in 1956, and put into 
service in 1967, the S-tank used an automatic loader and placed the engine and transmission 
at the front of the hull.86 Aside from semantic debates over whether a ‘tank’ without a turret 
is actually a tank, siting the main gun directly on the hull restricts the tank’s tactical 
flexibility by requiring the whole vehicle to slew in order to aim the gun. In addition to the 
problems of mitigating careful aiming while maintaining a stealthy stance, this tended to 
result in the tank slowly digging itself into the ground as it churned up the mud under its 
tracks. In addition, although the S-tank overcame the problem by mounting the gun high on 
the hull rather than within it (a ‘casemate’ mounting), lacking a turret usually means that a 
hull-mounted gun requires the vehicle to expose more of the hull to aim and fire.87 
A third form of indirect protection is high battlefield mobility. This is usually the 
domain of the light reconnaissance tank and other light AFVs, but the philosophy also holds 
true for MBTs. Despite being relatively immune to small-arms fire, the first tanks suffered 
losses when hit by field guns and other artillery. Unable to armour against such heavy 
weapons, British thinking in 1917 was that mobility offered a surer defence than armour.88 At 
that time, of course, tanks were relatively lightly armoured because their engines and power 
trains were insufficient to bear the weight of anything heavier, but the recurring debates over 
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tank armour’s inability to defeat contemporary firepower mean that mobility as protection for 
MBTs has not gone away.  
While ultra-high mobility might allow the evasion of some ATGMs, on a main battle 
tank it was found not to offer any significant protection against hypervelocity direct-fire 
rounds such as APFSDS.89 Ogorkiewicz points out that there is no convincing evidence that 
increasing mobility by reducing the armour provides an equivalence in protection to having 
heavier armour at the expense of a lower mobility.90 Nonetheless, during the post-1945 era 
countries such as France and Germany believed that it was impractical to try to armour tanks 
against contemporary anti-tank weapons and thus they emphasised mobility over protection, 
resulting in high mobility but relatively lightly protected tanks such as the AMX-30 and 
Leopard 1.91 The experience of armoured forces during the Arab-Israeli wars showed the 
importance of direct armour protection despite being opposed by ATGMs and modern anti-
tank ammunition, and German tank philosophy began to favour protection once more to give 
it more of an equal priority with mobility, a combination seen in the current Leopard 2.92 
Finally, where armour is passive protection, active protection is the term used for a 
variety of active measures designed to actively intercept or degrade incoming attacks. An 
early proposal for such active countermeasures was the US ‘Dash-Dot Device’ of the 1960s 
which used a small radar to detect incoming threats and utilised linear charges to destroy or 
degrade them. No further development was made at the time, but by 1983 the Soviet Union 
had installed the ‘Drozd’ active protection system on a T-55AD tank, using radar and clusters 
of 107mm fragmenting-warhead rockets.93 This system proved to be ineffective and 
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expensive in practice, but the theory showed promise in defeating incoming missiles.94 The 
latest Russian T-14 and South Korean K2 tanks are equipped with active protection, and 
future tanks may well be fitted with such systems as standard.95 
Just as indirect protection covers several different factors which contribute to making 
a tank harder to hit, direct protection takes in different forms of armour which protect a tank 
when it get hit. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, the physical armour carried by any 
vehicle is direct protection against potentially penetrating hits. Traditionally, tank armour was 
made of hardened steel (rolled homogenous armour, or RHA) of ever-increasing thickness, 
and non-steel armour such as composite or ceramic armours are generally described in terms 
of rolled homogenous armour equivalent (RHAe).96 Sloping armour helps to increase the 
relative thickness of armour by improving the horizontal shot line thickness, that is, the actual 
thickness a projectile travelling on a horizontal plane must penetrate. In addition, well-sloped 
armour may help deflect incoming horizontal KE rounds, and also help to reduce the 
silhouette of the AFV and thus improve its indirect protection. Sloping armour, however, 
reduces the internal volume of a vehicle and creates a more cramped crew and engine space.97 
In the race between lethality and armour, the thickness of RHA required to protect 
against contemporary weapons became simply too heavy for contemporary power trains and 
suspension units. Britain’s Chieftain, for example, had excellent sloped RHA armour with a 
frontal horizontal shot line armour of 388mm, making it the best protected tank of any NATO 
country until the 1980s. However, the consequence of this protection using steel armour was 
that the tank weighed in at 55 tonnes, compared to its MBT contemporaries the Soviet T-62 
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(40 tonnes), US M60A1 (52.6 tonnes) and FRG Leopard 1A4 (42.4 tonnes).98 The heaviest 
tank built with RHA as its primary armour protection was again British, the 66 tonne 
Conqueror with frontal RHA plate 125mm thick (before the effect of sloping is taken into 
account).99 With both shaped-charge warheads and larger APFSDS KE rounds able to defeat 
any reasonable level of RHA, it was clear that new materials to construct tank armour needed 
to be developed if the MBT was not to become unacceptably vulnerable on the modern 
battlefield.100 
Tank armour began as thin plates of high-strength steel bolted or riveted to a 
framework. Hardened steel provides better protection, but it becomes brittle and liable to 
shatter, so early tanks used face-hardened steel where only the outer face of the armour was 
hardened and the inner face retained enough softness and pliability to absorb the energy of a 
projectile hitting. Welding plates together reduced weight and made a better join, but meant 
that the steel could not be as hard. An alternative to welding plates together is casting, 
creating homogenous components (such as turrets) without the additional preparation and 
weaknesses inherent in joining plates together. Unfortunately, casting requires large 
production facilities and creates steel of less uniform quality and hardness than rolled plates, 
and consequently is required to be thicker to retain the same protection levels.101 
Metallurgical research in the USA resulted in High Performance Armour, as used on the 
abortive MBT-70 project, made from a high quality steel harder and tougher than RHA. 
Other advances in steel include vacuum melted steels with nickel and cobalt, unidirectionally 
solidified steel and electroslag remelted (ESR). Although all these advanced steels are 
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capable of producing stronger and lighter steel armour than RHA, their financial cost has 
proved to be too high for widespread adoption.102 
Lighter armour, made of light alloys and metals such as aluminium, was developed by 
the USA in late 1950s for the armour of some support vehicles where mobility was 
considered to be more important than direct protection. To offer the equivalent protection 
such armour needs to be about three times as thick as the equivalent RHA, but it is 
considerably lighter and so provides better ballistic protection for a given weight. Although 
employed as armour in high-mobility armoured vehicles, aluminium alloy has never been 
used as the main armour for a production main battle tank.103 
While the ability of KE rounds to penetrate the maximum thickness of RHA was 
becoming marginal, improvements in shaped-charge chemical energy warheads both in gun 
rounds such as HEAT and on ATGWs, led some to believe that attempting to effectively 
protect modern tanks using armour was pointless.104 As always, developments in armour 
technology made such predictions somewhat premature; spaced, reactive and compound 
armour saw direct protection offer a counter to the new generation of such weapons.  
Spaced armour consists, as the name suggests, of a second layer of armour held away 
from the AFV’s main armour with a space in between the two layers. Although the original 
use was on warships to defeat torpedoes, this technology was first employed on tanks by 
Germany in the Second World War to increase protection on medium tanks as an alternative 
to bolting on an extra thickness of armour directly to the tank hull (appliqué armour).105 A 
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slight variation of this principle was seen in the lightly armoured skirts carried to protect the 
running gear of some German tanks and assault guns. A projectile hitting the outer layer, if 
not stopped outright (and this is not the primary purpose of the spaced armour), will be 
distorted and deflected by the initial impact and penetration, and will therefore hit the inner 
layer of armour with far less penetrative power. The air gap dissipates energy and means that, 
for example, two layers of 4” thick RHA separated by a few inches is a more effective 
protection against KE rounds than a single layer 8” thick. Against shaped-charge HEAT 
warheads, spaced armour causes the warhead to detonate and the molten jet to form 
prematurely against the outer layer, and it is particularly effective against HESH as the 
‘scabbing’ effect is confined to the outer armour layer only.106 
Reactive armour (a.k.a. explosive reactive armour or ERA) comprises a block of two 
(or more) layers of armour plate with an explosive filler sandwiched in between, arranged on 
an AFV so that incoming rounds strike at an angle of more than 25 degrees. This explosive 
layer detonates when the outer plate is struck, and the force of the explosion deflects the 
projectile’s path and degrades penetration. The force of impact required to detonate is critical, 
and ERA is designed not to explode due to fire, small arms, shell fragments, or fratricidally 
due to the explosion of the adjacent ERA block. ERA is quoted as providing between three 
and four times the protection against HEAT warhead as does RHAe. Although ERA would 
theoretically degrade long-rod KE rounds such as APFSDS if the explosive filler was of 
sufficient density, ERA’s main value is in protecting against CE shaped-charge weapons.107 
The jet of molten metal formed by shaped charge warheads is disrupted and degraded both by 
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the force of the explosion from detonating ERA and also from the outer armour plate being 
lifted through the jet’s path.108 
Composite, or compound, armour is armour that exploits the varying energy-diffusing 
properties of different materials by layering steel and such substances as ceramics, plastics 
and even glass.109 Such armour relies on the combination of disruptor (or distorter) and the 
absorber layers, the first being hard but often brittle and relying on its hardness to slightly 
disrupt the path of projectile or to distort its ballistic shape. The degraded penetrator then 
encounters the absorber layer which absorbs and diffuses the kinetic energy remaining.110 
This principle of layering various materials forms the basis for modern armour systems.111 In 
Britain, the most famous of these modern compound armours is the British development 
‘Chobham Armour’, named after Chobham Common, the Surrey testing area where tanks 
were tested at the time of the armour’s development. Used on British and US tanks since the 
1980s, the exact composition of Chobham, now succeeded by a new armour known as 
‘Dorchester’, is still classified, but it is presumed to be a form of composite armour 
incorporating steel and non-metallic materials.112 
The principle of using different materials was seen in 1952 when the USA sought an 
answer to the large ATGMs then coming in to service. Their answer was ‘siliceous armour’, 
armour composed of silica glass encased in steel, glass being found to be twice as effective as 
steel against shaped-charge weapons. Although not adopted, the principle of layering glass 
with steel was to resurface in the USSR with glass-fibre composites used in the T-64 and later 
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tanks.113 Modern armour systems also make use of ceramics to provide improved ballistic 
protection. The ability of ceramics to protect against ballistic projectiles was discovered in 
1918 when it was found that a thin layer of ceramic applied to a steel plate improved its 
ability to stop projectiles.114 A different approach was to use multiple rubber layers 
sandwiched between steel, often referred to as ‘bulging armour’. In this case, the rubber 
expands as it is struck by a shaped charge jet, forcing both the metal plates and rubber layers 
apart and thus deforming the incoming jet of molten metal. This type of composite armour 
has been seen on tanks such as the Soviet T-72M.115 
Protection and survivability are increasingly important in an age where developed 
nations are becoming more casualty-averse and their MBTs are becoming more expensive. 
No longer is it acceptable for Western nations to accept the sort of loss ratio in tanks seen by 
the Western Allies and Soviet Union during the Second World War.116 Advances in 
technology such as ERA, compound armour and thermal camouflage all increase protection 
without requiring adding so much armour as to overload a tank’s power train, but all increase 
the financial cost of the tank. Technology for active protection is still at a relatively early 
stage but it is possible that the near future might see the balance of firepower versus 
protection swing once more the way of protection, at least until the next advance in 
firepower.  
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1.3. Standardisation: Benefits and Drawbacks 
By 1990, despite NATO’s push for standardisation, two out of the three major arms-
producing European NATO countries of Britain, France and the FRG, had historically 
procured the majority of their own military equipment domestically, with France and Britain 
domestically producing 80% and 75% respectively. A further 15% for each nation was 
produced in collaboration.117 Collaboration in weapons design within NATO is intimately 
linked with the concepts of rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability (RSI), and it is 
therefore helpful to set out in some detail why military alliances such as NATO have tried to 
encourage their members to standardise equipment.118 Briefly, rationalisation encompasses 
all the different processes involved in encouraging standardisation and interoperability, 
standardisation is the adoption of common equipment and doctrine, and interoperability is the 
ability to share resources such as fuel and ammunition.119 There are several arguments 
surrounding whether NATO standardisation is worth encouraging or not, and as to whether 
the perceived benefits are outweighed by the drawbacks. Setting out and briefly explaining 
these arguments will aid any evaluation of the question of collaborative MBT development, 
allowing a better understanding of why the drive for standardisation carries more influence 
for some involved parties than for others. 
Standardisation, as opposed to interoperability, essentially means all those involved 
using the same equipment and procedures, or at least equipment and procedures that are so 
similar as to be interchangeable. In 1978, the UK Defence Ministry defined standardisation 
as: 
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The provision of common, and in many respects, identical weapons and 
equipment. It implies that the weapons and equipment of one force are in 
large measure interchangeable with those of another. Standardisation 
therefore also implies interoperability. However it is important to recognise 




The same year, the US Army set out the following definition of standardisation:  
 
The process by which member nations achieve the closest practicable 
cooperation among forces; the most efficient use of research, development 
and production resources; and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis 
the use of: (1) common or compatible operational, administrative, and 
logistics procedures; (2) common or compatible technical procedures and 
criteria; (3) common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, 
weapons or equipment; and (4) common or compatible tactical doctrine with 
corresponding organizational compatibility.121 
 
 
As Alexander Cornell notes, standardisation does not necessarily mean identical, just that two 
designs or concepts are to an agreed standard.122 A similar definition is provided by NATO, 
whose definition of standardisation in 2007 was: 
 
The development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and 
design to achieve and maintain the required levels of compatibility, 
interchangeability or commonality in the operational, procedural, materiel, 
technical and administrative field to attain interoperability.123 
 
 
By contrast, interoperability suggests that the logistical support for equipment, even if that 
equipment is not the same, may be shared between users. It can be noted from the above two 
definitions that that interoperability is the aim of standardisation. The US Army defined 
interoperability as: ‘The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept 
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services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together.’124 
Within a military alliance such as NATO, having all member states using the same (or 
compatible) equipment and doctrine has obvious advantages in terms of closer cooperation on 
the battlefield, allowing commonality of training and fully shared logistical support. 
Interoperability offers a lesser benefit but still gives a significant logistical advantage over 
having no commonality at all. During the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact had largely 
standardised equipment by virtue of being almost exclusively equipped by a single state, the 
Russian-controlled Soviet Union.125 Although some nations within the alliance fielded a 
small percentage of their own vehicles or variants, an emphasis on central control by Moscow 
meant that the overwhelming majority of Warsaw Pact forces used identical Soviet 
equipment, from MBTs to small arms, which aided logistics and training but reduced 
flexibility in both equipment fielded and the tactics that were developed to use such 
equipment.126 At the same time, by contrast, NATO was a looser confederation of 
independent member states and, while the USA was undoubted the most powerful member, 
there was no overarching political lead to make decisions on which equipment it would 
standardise upon. Each nation therefore made independent decisions on which equipment 
best suited its military doctrine and strategy, leading to a wide variety of weapon systems and 
tactics.  
Cornell argues for standardisation, citing increased effectiveness, commonality of 
logistics, and commonality of training. This commonality, he suggests, helps decrease 
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member states’ domestic military expenses and ‘strengthens the credibility of NATO’.127 
Hans Kopold agrees and suggests that standardisation leads to an improvement of systems 
and equipment, reduced logistical requirements, and an avoidance of duplication in research 
and development.128 As might be expected, the European Defence Standardisation Journal, a 
journal of the European Defence Agency (EDA), promotes the idea of military 
standardisation and gives a fairly comprehensive list of twelve benefits, stating that 
standardisation: 
 
 helps achieve Force interoperability and reduces associated risk in areas of 
operational, materiel and information exchange;  
 enables quality of product/service/life (safety, health and environment);  
 provides for economy in manufacture and servicing;  
 improves collaboration e.g. between countries or contractors;  
 provides a recognized yardstick against which products/processes/services can 
be assessed;  
 ensures the supply of unambiguous technical statements for reference or 
contractual purposes;  
 results in a reduction in the risk of dependence on specific vendors;  
 ensures the avoidance of repetitive effort in producing new specifications, 
processes and products for each procurement;  
 promotes industrial efficiency through variety control;  
 reduces the need to produce project/ equipment specific components and 
process specifications;  
 exploits best practice;  
 helps to achieve and demonstrate a consistent level of equipment safety and 
conformity to regulations.129 
 
 
Although some of these points may overlap in terms of the benefits they describe,130 it is 
clear that the European Defence Standardisation Journal, and presumably therefore the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), believes that standardisation provides efficiency 
throughout the design, development, manufacture, and employment stages of military 
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equipment procurement. While not a NATO agency, the EDA nonetheless faces similar 
issues as does NATO, namely dealing with a number of independent member states, each of 
which has their own defence agenda and their own military doctrines. 
The military and economic benefits of standardisation appear on the surface to be 
unarguable yet there are, indeed, arguments that mitigate against it. One problem that 
standardisation brings is that standardisation necessarily requires agreement on which design 
or doctrine should be chosen to be that standard, and partner nations may well disagree as to 
which design or doctrine should be adopted. For the first four decades after 1945 the most 
common MBTs supplied to NATO member states were designs from the USA and Great 
Britain, yet this situation changed with the German development and export of Leopard 1 and 
more significantly, Leopard 2. This design and its variants has been exported (or has had 
export plans confirmed) to sixteen foreign countries as diverse as Finland, Singapore and 
Saudi Arabia, and at the time of writing is in use by ten of the 29 NATO member states 
(including Germany itself).131 While such commonality of design carries all the benefits of 
standardisation previously discussed, it does not follow that all NATO members would be 
willing to compromise their own domestic designs or particular tactical doctrine requirements 
to adopt a tank designed to US, British or German specifications. The MBT is a core element 
in most developed nation’s military doctrine, and Simpkin notes that governments and 
militaries seem to accept a reduction in effectiveness in the quest for standardisation in some 
weapon systems more than in others, using the example of field artillery being rather less 
performance-critical than a tank or some aircraft roles.132 
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Cornell pointed out in 1981 that standardisation did not necessarily mean 
standardisation by adopting US equipment (the US being the major supplier of military 
hardware to NATO at that time), rather that all participants should have an equal voice in the 
selection.133 In practice, however, the USA was seen as dominating arms production within 
NATO at the expense of its European members, creating political opposition in Europe to 
standardising on US equipment.134 Matthew Ford and Alex Gould explore, for example, how, 
when NATO had agreed to standardise on the 7.62mm small arms round, the USA then 
adopted the 5.56mm and the M-16 assault rifle under circumstances that appeared to have 
more to do with commercial interest than military effectiveness, pushing for this round to 
become the new NATO standard.135 The reluctance by European NATO members to adopt 
the weapons of the major producer and most powerful NATO member for reasons other than 
the weapon’s effectiveness was addressed by C. J. Davidson in 1977, who points out that: 
 
Smaller NATO nations can also be induced, by economic bribery, to take a 
particular US weapon which in turn will mean other NATO nations adopting 
the weapon or equipment even if it is not the best available either in 
efficiency or economic sense.136 
 
 
In these cases, the danger is that standardisation will mean adopting an inferior weapon 
system that happens to be championed by a politically powerful, or financially persuasive, 
developer. Although the USA is named in the above two examples, the developer in question 
could equally be any another country or even a large influential company such as General 
Dynamics, MBDA or BAE Systems. 
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Another argument against standardisation is the loss of variety in the subsequent force 
arsenal, both in terms of actual equipment and in terms of military doctrine. Keith Hartley 
points out that standardisation removes diversification, and thus concentrating on a single 
design linked to a single philosophy reduces the ability of a military force to react to threats 
unforeseen by that philosophy.137 In other words, an opponent only has to be able to counter a 
single type of force structure and tactic rather than having to deal with a variety of different 
weapons systems and their employment. This is an interesting idea suggesting that, like some 
metallic alloys, a mixture of selected separate components is stronger than any of the 
individual parts. The idea is furthered by Simpkin, who describes how a Cold War opponent 
of NATO would have had to face three different models of tank (M60, Leopard 1 and 
Chieftain at the time Simpkin was writing) and a variety of anti-tank missiles with different 
flight characteristics, guidance systems and warheads. Each weapon would be suited to a 
particular situation and scenario and the opponent would therefore have to counter each and 
every weapon in situations for which that weapon might well have been specifically 
designed.138 
Standardisation within an alliance such as NATO obviously has advantages and 
disadvantages. The extreme positions would be for every member state to use exactly the 
same type of weapon and doctrine, or conversely for each to develop their own weapons and 
doctrine completely in isolation with no thought to interoperability or complementing those 
of their allies. The first situation has the advantage of efficiency in development, 
procurement, training, maintenance and logistics. The second approach allows innovation, a 
broad spectrum capability, pursuit of national engineering interests, and a measure of 
unpredictability for potential threats to consider. Clearly the ideal situation is an amalgam of 
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the two approaches. Interoperability, for example, offers logistical advantages without 
necessarily forcing standardisation of equipment. How far down the route towards 
standardisation NATO needs to travel is a question that depends on how much significance 
each member nation puts on the arguments set out above. 
1.4. Technological Determinism, Military Innovation and RMA 
Whilst the subject of this study, collaborative development of main battle tanks, concerns 
itself with technological innovation, this is merely a logical side-effect of studying linear 
progression of MBT models and no significant leap forward in military technology 
surrounding MBTs was evident during the period studied. Nevertheless, technological 
determinism and RMA do offer a wider context and starting point for discussion. 
The theory of technological determinism poses the question as to whether 
technological innovation is driven by society and culture, or whether society and culture are 
driven by technology. In military terms, Raudzens asks the question, ‘Do better weapons win 
battles?’139 Obviously, the inventors and proponents of new weapons will argue that the 
introduction of a given weapon was significant in gaining victory, but this does not seem to 
be as clear as they would argue. Superior technology might gain its holder a tactical 
advantage, but it does not appear to necessarily lead to superiority at a higher level. Staying 
with the subject of tanks, for example, late German models such as the Tiger, Panther and 
Tiger II were arguably individually superior when ranked alongside equivalent Allied and 
Soviet machines, yet they were not capable of turning the tide of battle against Germany.140 
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Further evidence can be taken from the First World nations’ experience of counter-
insurgency warfare in conflicts from Vietnam to Afghanistan. Undoubtedly superior 
technology has demonstrably been unable to guarantee victory. Military technology evidently 
requires a commensurate change in military culture to become significant; it requires 
appropriate doctrinal changes to exploit any technological advantages.141 This, then, is why 
technological determinism is less useful in a study examining the linear development of new 
tank models. Technology alone is rarely so significant as to change the patterns of warfare, so 
until a tank design is finalised, or even enters service, there is very little chance of its impact 
altering existing thinking and doctrine.  
Military innovation might, on the surface, be more relevant to this study. After all, 
any new weapon system is innovative to an extent. Yet even here we encounter difficulty in 
applying the definitions of innovation to linear design development. Grissom offers a 
definition of military innovation that sets out three components gleaned from the extensive 
literature on the subject: 
First, an innovation changes the manner in which military formations 
function in the field.Measures that are administrative or bureaucratic in 
nature, such as acquisition reform, are not considered legitimate innovation 
unless a clear link can be drawn to operational praxis. 
Second, an innovation is significant in scope and impact. Minor reforms 
or those that have had ambiguous effects on a military organization are 
excluded, implying a consequentialist understanding of military innovation. 
Third, innovation is tacitly equated with greater military 
effectiveness.Only reforms that produce greater military effectiveness are 
studied as innovations, and few would consider studying counterproductive 
policies as innovations. 
These three elements constitute a tacit definition of military innovation 
that is, approximately, ‘a change in operational praxis that produces a 
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significant increase in military effectiveness’ as measured by battlefield 
results, Correlli Barnett’s ‘great auditor of institutions’.142 
Whilst a new tank model might be expected to bring greater military effectiveness, it is 
debateable as to how significant would be its impact on the military organisation. Some 
improvements might have a major impact tactically (such as anti-missile systems to counter 
ATGMs), but it doesn’t follow that this will be reflected doctrinally. Greater protection, 
firepower and mobility are all desirable, but for a linear development, these will, again, be 
unlikely to count as significant beyond the immediate small-unit level. It is, after all, assumed 
that the tank design’s specifications will have been drawn up to reflect the organisation’s 
thinking and not the other way around. 
If studying tank development has little in common with studying technological 
determinism, then the field of RMA has surely even less to offer. An RMA can be defined as: 
a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative 
application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in 
military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally 
alters the character and conduct of military operations.143 
Whilst later developments, such as the German approach to warfare in 1939/40 using 
fast armoured thrusts, could potentially be classed as an RMA, neither the initial development 
of the tank nor the linear improvements that form the basis for this study can realistically be 
so classified. The first tanks were simply another weapons system that slotted into existing 
doctrine, and no new tank model has been radical enough that it has led to ‘dramatic changes 
in military doctrine’.144 
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Whilst it might be important to briefly look at the inter-related fields of technological 
determinism, military innovation and RMA, it is important only in the sense that it enables 
those fields to be discounted in the later analysis. Tank models are designed to specifications 
drawn up by military users, and they are required to fit existing needs. Those needs are 
largely determined by existing doctrine and military thinking, and thus it follows that it will 
be highly unusual for a tank designer to offer a design that is so radical as to require a 
completely new way of thinking.  
1.5. Technology Transfer: Lend-Lease, Licensing and Collaboration 
It is important for this discussion to properly differentiate between four major forms of 
technology transfer that feature prominently in MBT acquisition, these being Lend-Lease, the 
purchase of foreign designs, licensed and co-production building, and collaborative design. 
Each form of technology transfer has benefits and drawbacks, and each can be the best option 
in different circumstances. In discussing technology transfer it is also necessary to briefly 
look at the economic implications associated with developing and producing a new product. 
In addition, the definition of collaboration is left rather vague by most commentators and thus 
it is important for this study to establish a tighter definition of this form of technology 
transfer. By doing so, it becomes easier to judge whether or not particular cooperative 
projects fit this definition, and thus whether they fall into the category of collaboration or into 
another area of technology transfer. 
Raymond Vernon’s product cycle hypothesis suggests that a producer will first target 
a market with a nearby location and easy communication for its goods, in the case of the 
armaments industry this tends to be the domestic military. The next market, when the product 
has matured and proven itself, will often involve both export and some relocation of the 
industrial production facilities. Again, applying this to the weapons industry, this often means 
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exporting the design and authorising limited licensed building. The final stage of the product 
cycle is the decline in profitability of domestic production of that product as foreign 
producers and competitors emerge, perhaps even making unlicensed copies.145 Historically, 
armaments industries have tended to remain largely within their country of origin as befits 
important strategic assets, although the creation of many modern multinational firms such as 
MBDA and BAE Systems have seen former national industries become part of wider 
international firms through mergers and takeovers. Vernon’s cycle of domestic adoption, 
export and then foreign copies or competition remains valid when looking at the history of 
tank technology development, but is perhaps less clear-cut when discussing multinational 
conglomerates. 
Lend-Lease is famously associated with the deal between the USA and UK during the 
Second World War, with the US-Soviet deal almost as well known. The background to these 
1940s Lend-Lease arrangements can be traced back to the economic confusion which 
followed the First World War and the poor financial position in which both the UK and 
USSR found themselves when the Second World War started. Neglect of domestic arms 
development and production plus a reduction in overseas trade outside of the Empire meant 
that the UK had little foreign currency to buy goods outright and also a shortage of 
domestically-produced war materiel, especially following the losses at Dunkirk. The US 
public was reluctant to become involved in what they saw as yet another European war so for 
the US government to directly supply the militaries of Britain or France would have been an 
unpopular move domestically Yet at the same time, the US had a surplus of manufactured 
goods and a president sympathetic to Britain and France’s situation. The USSR was also 
struggling industrially at the same time that it found itself requiring large quantities of 
military equipment, particularly wheeled vehicles. Lend-Lease allowed the USA to export 
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these much-needed goods and to then accept payment in the form of loans and leasing 
agreements in the case of the UK, and in the reciprocal trade of rare minerals such as 
manganese in the case of the USSR.146 
The more straightforward approach of buying a foreign design ‘off the shelf’ is 
usually a simple import deal, although the sensitivity of trading weapons means that arms 
deals require more political involvement than most other goods. Buying existing technology 
allows a nation unable to domestically design and produce weapons such as MBTs to acquire 
tried and tested equipment in a short space of time. Although not necessarily the most 
expensive form of technology transfer, buying ‘off the shelf’ represents the least benefit to a 
domestic economy as there is no associated investment in domestic industry. As a means to 
counter trade imbalances, therefore, such deals will sometimes have an associated offset 
whereby the vendor agrees to purchase other goods from the buyer, either to be fitted into the 
equipment being bought (a ‘direct offset’ such as fitting indigenous engines or main guns to 
tanks) or goods unrelated to the original purchase (an ‘indirect offset’). The original 
purchaser thus buys equipment they are unable to produce domestically, and in return 
receives some investment in domestic industry through the sale of indigenously-produced 
goods as part of the offset deal. Given the otherwise one-sided nature of the ‘off the shelf’ 
purchase, it is unsurprising to learn that such deals attract the most heavily weighted trade 
offset deals.147 
Licensed production is more beneficial to the buyer’s domestic economy while not 
requiring them to invest time and money in the design and development of a product. Part or 
all of the components of the final product are produced domestically, or the components are 
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imported to be assembled locally. In this case the final product may sometimes also be 
exported by the buyer country, depending on the exact agreement with the originator. It 
should be noted that the terms for such licenses may differ between countries. Germany, for 
example, has placed tight political restrictions on which countries its weapons may be 
exported or licensed to, whereas the UK and French arms industries have been far more 
willing to export or licence on a purely commercial basis.148 Although benefiting domestic 
industry to a larger extent than ‘off the shelf’ purchasing, licensed buying still offers little 
immediate benefit to the research and development sector and may not provide the end user, 
the military in this case, with the most suitable product for their needs.149 
Co-production has many similarities to licensed production but it is closer to 
collaboration. This form of technology transfer deal gives the second country the 
responsibility and rights for the manufacture of a proportion of the final purchased product, 
even for those products destined for third party markets. The F-16 European co-production 
contract in 1975, for example, saw various European NATO countries share production of a 
total order of nearly 1,000 aircraft.150 A more recent example of such co-production is the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter, where the USA encouraged allied investment and allowed limited 
production facilities in some of the nations committed to buying aircraft.151 It should be noted 
that such deals rarely involve outside involvement at the design stage, and thus the product 
being produced represents no research or development benefits to the co-producing country. 
Finally, collaboration is where two or more partners cooperate on a product’s 
development. Beyond this rather vague definition we encounter problems in establishing 
exactly how much cooperation is required for a given project to count as a collaboration. 
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Hartley and Martin, for example, suggest that a defence collaboration can be ‘involving two 
or more nations sharing the development and production costs and work on defence 
equipment projects’.152 Dirk Klimkeit, the Otto Group Chair of Strategic Management at 
Leuphana University, Germany, elaborates somewhat on this: 
 
Collaboration [...] requires an alignment between actors from various parts of 
the organization so that they show co-operative behaviour and focus on 
achieving the project's goals.153 
 
 
Just how much each partner should contribute to the collaboration is not specified, 
and this leaves the definition unsatisfyingly vague. Asymmetry in contribution might create a 
situation of cooperation without necessarily leading to collaboration in the sense that each 
partner has a meaningful role within the arrangement. Jacques Gaillard addresses this by 
suggesting that the project partners should have some measure of equal standing: 
 
One of the determining condition[s] for successful collaboration is that the 
partners should be equal or at least complementary in many respects. The 
experience accumulated during the last decade shows that this apparent 
vicious circle can be overcome if the collaboration is based on a strong 
mutual interest and if both parties have something to gain from it.154 
 
 
Galliard adds that, ‘Project proposals should, whenever possible, be drafted jointly and each 
partner should be associated as much as possible to the important decisions which need to be 
taken,’ and that, ‘Each cooperating group should include a substantial number of researchers 
(at least 3).’155 
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p. 196. 
153 Dirk Klimkeit, ‘Organizational Context and Collaboration on International Projects: The Case of a 
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It should be noted that any ‘equality’ might not be as simple as contributing equal 
resources at each stage of the project, Andrew Kennedy points out, for example, that 
asymmetry in one area might be offset by advantages elsewhere, such as where a nation gains 
political leverage and improved relations in exchange for investments of money and 
technological expertise.156 DeVore suggests that the key to successful collaboration is 
ensuring that no partner feels that they are losing out relative to the other partners involved.157 
Equality of gains aside, in the case of a design and development collaboration it is suggested 
by this study that it is also important that all partners have significant research input as well 
as any other perceived benefits. In addition, Alicia Mazur, et al., conclude that all 
stakeholders in a project should be involved at all stages if the collaboration is to succeed.158 
For this study, the definition for a collaborative research project will utilise all the 
ideas set out above: The project must involve two or more partners working in cooperation 
towards an agreed and predefined goal, where each partner is contributing a substantial 
amount of research and feels satisfied at the outset that they are gaining an advantage in 
proportion to the amount that they are contributing. Each partner should be involved at every 
stage of the project and, importantly, should have a significant input in the design of the final 
product. 
In theory, such collaboration allows cost-effective development and production; the 
unit cost savings associated with economies of scale mean that having two or more countries 
buying the final product should lead to more units being manufactured and purchased, and so 
the cost of each unit should be reduced. However, the militaries of the states involved in 
collaboration will be looking to maximise features of the final design that best suit their own 
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operational philosophy. Unless all member states share an identical military doctrine, 
therefore, there will necessarily be compromise. In addition, if there is a senior partner within 
the collaboration, the final benefits are uneven. The knowledge gained by the junior partner 
will be greater than that of the senior, but the more senior the senior partner is within the 
collaboration, the less incentive there is to collaborate in the first place. Conversely, the 
closer the partners are in terms of technology, export potential and existing industrial 
capacity, the greater the possibility of friction between them as they struggle to maximise 
their own share of the design and development work.159 This problem multiplies as the 
number of participants increases. Jocelyn Mawdsley, for example, examined the problems 
associated with the collaborative A400M military transport aircraft project and suggests that, 
while collaboration is essential to enable the benefits of larger-scale production, working with 
partners who all have a view on the project’s development is often ‘troublesome’.160 
Although presented as separate forms of technology transfer for convenience, 
variations occur within all of the above project types. A licensed production deal may well 
include some co-operative production, and an ‘off the shelf’ purchase may include a direct 
offset allowing the buyer to licence-build a particular component for their domestic market. 
The abortive 1988 Jaguar MBT collaborative upgrade between China and USA, for example, 
was a collaboration whereby existing Chinese Type 59 tanks were to be jointly upgraded by 
Cadillac Gage in USA, and the China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export 
Corporation in China. The deal was not a success, with political and commercial factors 
dooming it to failure, but it is of interest as an example of a US company collaborating and 
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sharing technology with China for the update of a Chinese tank design which itself was a 
licence-built T-55 from the USSR.161 
1.6. Relevance of the MBT for Contemporary Warfare 
There is no doubt that the modern main battle tank (MBT) is an expensive investment for any 
nation. But what is it that the MBT offers that nation and is it worth all the development, 
purchase and running costs? Is adopting a compromise MBT for financial reasons a valid 
course of action when it is known that the MBT does not fully fulfil the military’s criteria? 
The military of most modern developed nations faces a wide variety of threats, from cyber 
warfare through international policing and asymmetric warfare, and on to the possibility of 
full-scale conventional warfare against a technologically equivalent opponent, or even a 
nuclear exchange. Jeffrey Bradford, the U.K. Defence Forum's Director of Research, wrote in 
April 2016 that: 
In considering the role of armour and the future of the Main Battle Tank in 
particular it is very clear that whilst the nature of its capabilities and 
contribution to military capability ("the what question?") is obvious how it 
will be employed ("the how question?") is not so clear.162 
 
 
Developed with conventional warfare against a peer nation firmly in mind, is the MBT still 
relevant given the divergent pressures on military budgets? 
A long-running and recurring debate surrounds the relevance of main battle tanks to 
the modern battlefield. Once its original purpose of breaking the stalemate on the Western 
Front in the First World War had been realised, the arguments began that the tank concept 
was no longer relevant to modern warfare. Each new counter to the tank, from anti-tank guns 
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to shaped charges and then anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), led to a new wave of 
predictions that the tank was obsolete. Referring to the MBT, Richard Simpkin pointed out in 
1979 that, ‘Politicians, scientists and the media have been performing its obsequies every 5 
years or so since the twenties.’163 
The role of the MBT is assumed to be the application of mobile armoured firepower 
to the battlefield. The current view of the British Army is that: 
 
The role of Armour is to fix and destroy the enemy through shock action - 
the sudden, concentrated application of violence. Armour is the epitome of 
offensive spirit and the presence of Main Battle Tanks provides a 
psychological and physical edge in close combat operations.164 
 
 
While the tank’s role is likely to remain the same, the vehicle itself may become significantly 
different as technology advances. William Suttie of Dstl is quoted as saying that: ‘Whatever 
we do, the chances are other nations will continue to field heavy main battle tanks, hence 
we will continue to need something that can do what current MBTs can do, even if it looks 
different from current vehicles.’165 The ability to counter enemy main battle tanks is 
crucial. While some thinkers such as Lt. Gen. McNair, the US Army’s head of Ground 
Forces from 1942 to his death in 1944, had argued that anti-tank artillery was the most 
effective way to defeat tanks, an argument later expanded by others with the introduction of 
ATGMs, it has been recognised by most observers since the Second World War that the 
best counter to an MBT is another MBT.166 
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Thinkers such as McNair believed that tanks were primarily the weapons of 
exploitation and should not be involved in fighting other tanks. McNair’s philosophy of using 
anti-tank guns and tank destroyers to defeat enemy armour saw a parallel in the post-1945 
period when long-range ATGMs gave the infantry a real counter to armour at long range. 
Shaped-charge anti-tank missiles demonstrated their lethality against contemporary tanks in 
conflicts such as the 1973 'Yom Kippur' War, where Egyptian forces used large numbers of 
3,000m-ranged AT-3 ‘Sagger’ ATGMs against Israeli armour in the open Sinai desert. 
Despite most tanks in the 1973 war being knocked out by other tanks, some observers 
predicted the end of the tank as the dominant battlefield weapon.167 A report from the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, for example, concluded that, ‘the advent of the 
missile suggests that the day of the main battle tank […] may be ending. The superiority of 
the offensive may be declining in favour of the defensive.’168 
Rather than signalling the end of the tank, the rise of the ATGM threat instead saw 
new armour technology introduced. Designers made increased use of ‘stand-off’ or spaced 
armour and developed explosive reactive armour (ERA) which degraded the missile’s 
warhead by exploding on contact and dissipating the warhead’s force. Later developments 
included composite armour and more active measures such as firing decoys and using small 
anti-missile missiles to attack the incoming ATGM. Once more, the cycle of offence and 
defence had found equilibrium and the evolution of the MBT continues. 
Despite all the questions over its relevance, the military value of the MBT has 
remained. The MBT is still the single most useful combination of mobile protected firepower 
available, and the unequalled level of protection found on MBTs is useful even when the 
opposition, such as insurgents employing RPGS and IEDs, does not warrant employment of 
the main gun. The flexibility of the tank means that it can be employed in almost any terrain 
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and any conditions, even when other weapon systems such as air power are significantly 
degraded or ineffective. Lastly, the MBT provides land forces with mobile firepower that can 
be deployed to the very front of the battlefield area and support the infantry while 
simultaneously remaining protected. No other system has yet been developed that provides 
all these advantages.169 
From the first tanks that caught the imagination both of the military and the public the 
tank has held a special place in global culture. It has not always been a positive icon but it is 
undoubtedly a powerful one. As Meyer states, this symbolic importance suggests that having 
a sovereign tank design carries a level of national prestige which can influence the decision to 
collaborate with a foreign power on a new tank project.170Above and beyond their obvious 
use on the battlefield, the tank can be used to send a diplomatic message of military strength. 
Deploying tanks can be used as warning or statement of purpose. It might show a willingness 
to escalate a conflict, to employ the most powerful weapons in the arsenal short of nuclear 
munitions. While air power might allow more potent stand-off striking forces, aircraft do not 
have the same immediacy and front-line visibility as tanks. Being weapons usually employed 
at a distance, strike aircraft do not portray the same commitment to ‘get stuck in’, and thus 
their deployment does not carry the same immediate psychological and symbolic message as 
that carried by tanks and their associated armoured support vehicles.171 As General Sir 
Nicholas Carter said in an address to RUSI, ‘“Boots on ground” is not a positive term at the 
moment, but our allies on NATO’s eastern flank absolutely appreciate that a platoon of 
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infantry is worth a squadron of F-16s when it comes to commitment.’172 If a platoon of 
infantry shows commitment, how much more commitment is shown by a platoon of tanks? 
1.7. Summary 
The main research question under consideration in this thesis, why no collaborative MBT 
project has been successful between NATO nations since 1945, will be answered via several 
case studies. In order to answer the question, the introductory discussion above has sought to 
provide a backdrop to the consideration of the case studies. The main battle tank is a 
particularly complex vehicle which represents a unique combination of firepower, mobility 
and protection. Any study of MBT development must be based on an understanding of these 
factors and the multiple variations which emerge from the emphasis of one element over 
another. The optimum balance of these factors is a measure of the design philosophy of the 
end user and, thus, the relationship between doctrine (whether published or part of military 
traditions) and design is important to understand. As this study will demonstrate, differing 
national views on creating the optimal combination and balance of factors very quickly create 
grounds for disagreement. Nonetheless, the drive for, on the one hand, standardisation, and, 
on the other, technology transfer, led to extremely difficult negotiations within the context of 
international tank collaboration projects.  
 While it is the aim of this study to explain why several collaborative MBT projects 
failed, despite the strong political backing they initially received, this should not lead to the 
over-hasty assumption that all international MBT projects are somehow doomed to failure. 
Although it is not the intention of this study to consider likely future scenarios, it must be 
plain to even the most uninformed observer that the broader strategic situation of Western 
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Europe, and the threats it faces, has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. 
Given the new types of threat, new budgetary constraints, and a host of other international 
and technological factors, such a changed set of parameters now exists that it may well be 
that the conditions exist now, or, may exist at some point in the near future, which may 
enable an international MBT project to succeed. In order that any new attempt at an 
international, collaborative MBT project has a chance of success, it is only logical that 





The Search for a ‘NATO Tank’: 
The FINABEL ‘NATO Standard Tank’ (1957-1963) 
and ‘Tank 90’ (1977-1983) 
A common tank has arguably been the oldest aim of those seeking European military 
cooperation.1 Although not a genuine example of a joint project, the Renault FT-17 light tank 
gave rise to one instance where some of the elements of a ‘joint design’ could be observed, 
partly caused by the chaotic international circumstances created by the First World War. First 
used in action on 31 May 1918, it was employed interspersed with the infantry to give 
support in dealing with strong-points. Although small, being only 5m long and weighing only 
six-and-a-half tonnes, the FT-17 was surprising well armoured. It was armed with either an 
8mm Hotchkiss machine-gun or a low velocity 37mm Puteaux gun in a fully rotating turret, a 
design first for any production tank. The design was revolutionary and was adopted or copied 
as the first tank in the armies of countries as diverse as the USA, China and Brazil. The 
Russian Red Army reverse-engineered the FT-17 from a machine they had captured from 
White forces in the Civil War, the result subsequently being termed the ‘Russki Reno’. A 
direct development of this led to the MS-1, MaliySoprovozhdeniya-Perviy or ‘first small 
support vehicle’, later called the T-18.2 What this curious case seems to demonstrate is that 
the possibility of ‘joint design’ emerged very early in the history of the tank. To the example 
of the Russian Reno, one could add the case of the German Leichter Kampfwagen II, of 
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which only ten were ever built; production was only given the go-ahead on 23 October 1918. 
The completed machines were sold to Sweden after the war; these were then used as a 
platform for early Swedish tank development.3 
Of course, a number of countries bought foreign designs, licence-built machines and 
copied weapons from other nations in the wake of the Great War. But the 1918 Anglo-
American ‘International’ or ‘Liberty’ tank designed and built by the Inter-Allied Tank 
Commission represented the first occasion when two allied nations became involved in a true 
collaboration to build a modern, tracked weapons system.4 Yet the hurdles to creating a true 
collaborative tank project were so great that the next occasion when such a project was 
attempted was after 1945 – the 1957 ‘Standard Tank’ project. Hence, any study of 
international tank collaboration must begin with this project. While it would be wrong to 
dismiss completely the ‘International’ as irrelevant to a study of contemporary tank 
development, the differences in technology and the international context mean that focussing 
on the post-1945 era is more helpful for gleaning any lessons and conclusions applicable to 
contemporary projects. The difficulties which the Inter-Allied Tank Commission faced were 
so great, and progress so slow, that the 1957 Franco-German project was effectively the first 
genuine collaborative tank development programme.  
The 1957 Franco-German collaboration ran under various names: the ‘NATO 
Standard Tank’, ‘European Standard Tank’ and ‘Euro-Panzer’. As the first example of an 
international NATO tank collaboration, the 1957-1963 project is important for any study of 
Cold War technology collaboration within the NATO alliance. The later Franco-German 
‘Tank 90’ or ‘Napoleon’ project lasting from 1977 to 1983 bears so many similarities to the 
1957 collaboration that it is useful to look at these two projects together, both to compare and 
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to contrast the programmes. Aside from the obvious similarity that France and the FRG were 
the main collaboration partners, the two cases demonstrate just how important political 
patronage can be for any international collaborative project.5 
Secondary source material covering the two Franco-German tank collaborations 
which goes into any depth is scarce. Andrew Moravcsik offers a useful six pages on the 1977 
‘Tank 90’ project, briefly charting the project from beginning to end and concluding that the 
final collapse was down to German political and industrial misgivings.6 Particularly useful 
for this overall study of international collaboration is that Moravcsik’s chapter looks at 
several collaborative projects, and approaches each study in the same way, allowing 
comparison between the different programmes. Stephen A. Kocs provides essential political 
background to the Franco-German relationship and provides four-and-a-half pages of 
information specific to the Tank 90 project.7 General works on armour occasionally mention 
the two Franco-German tank collaborations in passing, usually as a preface to information on 
the sovereign tanks projects that emerged, AMX-30 and Leopard for the 1957 ‘European 
Standard Tank’ collaboration, and the Leclerc for the 1977 ‘Tank 90’ project.8 Wider 
political context is provided in several useful studies, particularly Autonomy or Power? The 
Franco-German Relationship and Europe’s Strategic Choices, 1955-1995 by Stephen Kocs,9 
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although a range of sources is required to grasp the contours of domestic and international 
politics at the time. These works provide important political background, without which any 
study of the NATO international collaborative projects would make little sense. 
Against the background of obvious, and apparently very seductive, political 
advantages which could accrue from the design, manufacture and adoption of a standard 
NATO tank, both the 1957 ‘Standard Tank’ and the 1977 ‘Tank 90’ collaborations offer in 
many respects an obvious first case study for any consideration of the dynamics of 
international collaborative tank projects. The two projects possess so many similarities that 
considering them together makes most sense within the context of the overall analysis. This is 
not only because ‘Tank 90’ faced – more or less – the same challenges as the ‘Standard Tank’ 
project, but also since it picked up in many ways where its precursor project had left off. The 
alliance framework was, at the very least, similar, while Franco-German bi-lateral relations, 
even if they had developed further, were still affected by comparable military, technological 
and strategic considerations.10 
In order to consider what appears to be one single military technological challenge, so 
many factors need to be considered that a multi-perspectival approach will be adopted. In 
doing so, there is, in fact, little in the way of accepted methodological approaches to draw on. 
Many of the widely used textbooks in the field of Security Studies tend, when dealing with 
land warfare, to refer to the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, ‘divergent realities’ and 
‘multiple paradigms’, yet offer little in the way of guidance in terms of methodology.11 But 
                                                
10 The literature on case studies is, not surprisingly, voluminous, to say the least. While there are many 
discipline-specific variations, many of the basic methodological considerations are similar. For studies on the 
approaches to case study analysis, see: John Gerring, ‘What is a Case Study and what is it for?’ American 
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given the obvious value of considering these two joint tank projects as a single ‘case study’, 
the full complexities of alliance politics, technological challenges, organisational context and 
competing motives will need to be woven together in a unified analysis which extends across 
the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and into the early part of the 1980s. As such, this chapter will also 
provide background in support of the subsequent chapters, outlining the broad inter-alliance 
framework in which joint tank projects were undertaken. 
In pursuing a multi-perspectival approach, a range of subjects will be discussed: first, 
the chapter will provide some general military-historical context, including an explanation of 
FINABEL, one of several European military initiatives under which the initial 1957 
collaboration emerged;12 second, the fundamentals of the tank design which were agreed 
once the Franco-German agreement had been signed; third, the reasons behind the collapse of 
the 1957 ‘Standard Tank’ programme; fourth, the second collaborative project, the 1977 
‘Tank 90’ or ‘Napoleon Tank’; fifth, the problems encountered during the ‘Tank 90’ project; 
and, sixth, the end of the Tank 90 collaboration. While the second project did not advance as 
far as the first, it was nonetheless taken at least as seriously politically. From the initial 
political enthusiasm, the mounting problems encountered led, however, to the French 
‘Leclerc’ tank which replaced the failed collaborative MBT. 
2.1. NATO, FINABEL, France and the FRG 
Given the chaos of the immediate post-war period, it is perhaps unsurprising that France and 
Germany focussed primarily on their immediate domestic problems. Initially, de Gaulle was 
determined that France should regain national prestige lost during the Second World War, 
insisting upon equal standing with the UK, USA and USSR at the conference table. French 
                                                
12 FINABEL is the collaborative organisation set up in 1953 to promote armaments cooperation between the 
Ministries of Defence of France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, with West Germany joining in 
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national policy during 1944-1945 was committed to creating an alliance with the USSR from 
which a French-led European coalition would stand as the Western bulwark against the 
possibility of a resurgent Germany, with the USSR forming the Eastern bulwark and neither 
power being dominant. De Gaulle distrusted the UK due to disputes over national influence 
in the Middle East and was sceptical of the USA’s willingness to remain committed in 
Europe following the end of hostilities. Following de Gaulle’s departure from the French 
leadership in 1946, a growing realisation that the Soviet Union was a greater threat than any 
potential German recovery led to French foreign policy changing from facing eastward to 
once more nurturing closer diplomatic relations in the West, including with Great Britain and 
the USA.13 On 13 October 1946, the French Fourth Republic was created with a lacklustre 
plebiscite supported by a third of the electorate. The Fourth Republic inherited relatively 
powerless governmental institutions and decentralisation which weakened the grip of the 
national government. Decolonisation in places such as Indochina and Algeria represented 
military crises that occupied the attention of a newly reunified French state pressing to 
recover its political prestige within Europe and globally. Such rebuilding lasted until 1958.14 
Meanwhile, Germany was divided into zones of occupation and its future as an 
independent state was in serious doubt. West Germany was not a political entity at the time of 
the original 1948 Brussels Treaty which sought a mutual European defence agreement to 
counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Union.15 The new state of West Germany (Federal 
Republic of Germany, or FRG) only came into being on 23 May 1949 when the former 
German territories occupied by the UK, USA and France were merged. The first Chancellor 
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of the Federal Republic, Dr Konrad Adenauer, set out to raise the country’s standing within 
Europe to something approaching equality with the other powers, and to rebuild the German 
military to the point where it could contribute to Europe’s defence. Such concerns required 
attention before potential international collaborations could be pursued.16 However, as the 
danger presented by the Soviet Union dominated Western thinking, the future defence of 
Europe became directed towards a combined European Defence Community (EDC) in which 
Germany would be an ally rather than the projected enemy. The 1950 French proposal, the 
‘Pleven Plan’, called for a European army in which Germany might play a role as an 
integrated EDC member, but the German state was still not to have independent armed 
forces. The rival US proposal, the ‘Spofford Plan’, saw European countries, including 
Germany, contributing their national forces to a military entity under US overall control. 
Both plans, and other moves towards an EDC involving German rearmament, fell out of 
favour as France grew less eager to see the Germany military rebuilt and any form of 
organisation that removed French military independence.17 
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, was founded on 4 April 1949.18 In 
August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully detonated its first atomic bomb; in October that 
same year Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which soon aligned 
itself with the Soviet Union.19 With the Soviet Union now a nuclear power and with China in 
the Communist sphere, the new US-dominated NATO needed all the conventional military 
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strength it could muster to maintain any sort of parity.20 Being an alliance of independent 
nations, NATO countries attempted to bring about some measure of standardisation through 
international negotiation and compromise. Coming out of the Second World War, both the 
USA and UK had tried and tested military doctrines and existing equipment programmes 
which they were understandably reluctant to abandon. France and the FRG, however, were 
not in the same strong position. The leaders of both countries foresaw the political and 
military advantages of working together, and thus both were initially willing to work within 
the framework of a collaborative partnership.  
In October 1954, the Western allies agreed to end the occupation of the FRG and to 
allow West Germany to rearm and become a member of NATO. On 5 May 1955, the FRG’s 
NATO membership was formally confirmed.21 This move was countered by the Soviet Union 
proclaiming the creation of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955.22 The Cold War intensified in 
1956 with Hungarian unrest resulting from a desire for political independence and popular 
objections to becoming part of the new Warsaw Pact, civil unrest which resulted in armed 
Soviet intervention.23 France initially objected to the creation of the FRG from the three 
Western Allied occupation zones, but the USA insisted and France was too dependent on US 
military and economic assistance to offer prolonged resistance in the face of President 
Truman’s determination that Western Germany should become part of NATO’s defence 
against the Warsaw Pact.24 
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The governments of the French Fourth Republic had opposed the creation of a West 
German state, but rising tensions between the West and the Soviet Union and the resulting 
Cold War persuaded other European nations that a new German state friendly to what was 
then the North Atlantic Alliance (later NATO) would be a valuable ally and bulwark against 
potential Soviet aggression and expansion. France, being heavily dependent on the financial 
and military aid then being provided by the USA, proved unwilling to oppose the US in such 
an important political decision, despite their earlier objections. Thwarted in its attempt to 
block the formation of the German republic, the French Fourth Republic under Mendés-
France next tried to control German rearmament by establishing a European centralised arms 
procurement authority. Following the French rejection of the European Defence Community, 
American sponsored negotiations began in October 1954, and the Federal Republic became a 
member of NATO in May 1955.25 
Attempts to standardise NATO military doctrine and equipment had been plagued by 
problems from the beginning. Alexander Cornell, an American former NATO Fellow, has 
blamed this on ‘ignorance, selfishness, and lack of willpower.’26 A less critical explanation 
was suggested by Fred Mulley, the then UK Secretary of Defence, when he noted in 1978 
that most of the nations that made up the NATO alliance had a long history of political and 
military independence, and that it was unlikely that such NATO members would be willing to 
compromise this independence for political, industrial and economic reasons. Highlighting 
the dominance of the USA within the NATO alliance, Mulley went on to suggest that the 
USA would have to change its position on its tactical doctrine to fit in with European 
                                                
25 For a very useful study of French policy and security concerns in the 1950s, see Dieter Krüger, 
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members, and also to agree to buy more European equipment.27 Phillip Taylor offered 
another perspective in 1982 when he wrote: ‘Unfortunately, neither the efforts to achieve 
NATO standardization nor the inability or unwillingness of the member-states to progress 
substantially toward that goal can be explained by any of the current international integration 
theories.’28 
Confusion and inefficiency within the loose NATO alliance were significant and 
prevalent enough that, in 1978, the British Minister of State for Defence expressed concern 
about the different tactical doctrines within NATO and even called for a simple definition of 
the terms, ‘standardisation’ and ‘interoperability’.29 Within NATO, many organisations were 
established to help promote international cooperation and standardisation both of equipment 
and of doctrine. By 1978, the many intra-European NATO organisations and sub-
organisations dealing with European defence included: FINABEL, EUROGROUP, the 
Anglo-French and Anglo-German Army Equipment Commissions, EUROLONGTERM, the 
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), the NATO Army Armaments Group 
(NAAG), and many others. Unfortunately, this plethora of organisations inevitably led to 
duplication of effort, blurring of responsibilities, greater bureaucracy and greater inefficiency. 
It was pointed out that ‘[i]t is an unavoidable disadvantage that there is considerable 
duplication of work between the various bodies.’30 
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It was the FINABEL committee, comprising the army chiefs of staff from France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, that was responsible for the 
French and Germans setting out to collaborate on the ‘Standard Tank’. FINABEL met in 
November 1956 to set standards for a common NATO tank, specification FINABEL 3A5, 
and, although no immediate development resulted, the meeting led to German and French 
representatives meeting in 1957 independently of FINABEL to pursue a bi-lateral main battle 
tank design, based on the standards discussed at the FINABEL meeting.31 
At the time of the 1956 FINABEL meeting, NATO’s attempts to standardise were in 
their infancy and untarnished by the failures that were to come. Only two NATO members 
had nationally-designed tanks that could be considered modern MBTs, the USA with the 
Patton series and the UK with the Centurion. While the USA and UK may have had 
confidence in their post-war tank designs, France and the newly created FRG entered the 
mid-1950s with a significant gap in their tank technology. France had not designed and 
produced a modern main battle tank since 1940 and, although the FRG had inherited 
Germany’s technological legacy, the last practical German tanks, the Panzer VI ‘Panther’ and 
Tiger 2, had entered production in early 1943 and early 1944 respectively.32 All German tank 
development had, of course, come to a halt in 1945.33 Given this set of circumstances, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that France and the FRG were the first two NATO members to 
undertake a serious attempt at a cooperative main battle tank programme in 1957. 
The French Fourth Republic had opposed German rearmament for almost five years 
but was, by 1956 under René Coty, reassessing its position. France was becoming increasing 
disenchanted with NATO, which had done nothing to aid it in Indochina and Algeria. The 
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humiliation of the 1956 Suez crisis highlighted France’s inferior position within the Alliance 
compared to that of the USA, and French politicians began to seek ways of improving their 
country’s international standing. A collaboration and closer political relationship with the 
new FRG seemed to offer a way to boost France’s standing within NATO, a step towards 
dominating European politics, and to breaking their dependency on the USA for the French 
Army’s tanks.34 Adenauer, the German Chancellor, was a staunch supporter of European 
integration and, indeed, unification. A former mayor of Cologne, Adenauer considered 
himself politically closer to the Rhineland and French influence than to the strong German 
nationalism of the NSDAP, and he had spent some time during the Third Reich as a political 
refugee and two years in a concentration camp. Overseeing the rebuilding of Germany, both 
politically and economically, he was convinced that only by building closer Franco-German 
political ties could a strong and secure Europe be guaranteed.35 
At the 1957 Franco-German meeting between the German Defence Minister, Franz 
Josef Strauß, and the French Defence Minister, Maurice Bourgés-Maunory, it was proposed 
to jointly develop and produce a tank of either 30 tonnes or 22 tonnes, with both nations 
being interested in keeping the weight as low as possible and hoping for the lighter proposed 
figure. Despite some uncertainty over the final weight, the priority was to enter negotiations 
‘as soon as possible’. The agreement included within the contract a termination clause, 
whereby compensation would be paid by either government if they chose to pull out of the 
collaboration, a clause intended to avoid either partner being contractually tied to the 
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agreement should they feel that it was no longer in their interests.36 The new tank, classified 
at the time as a medium-heavy despite its proposed low weight, was to be designed in 
accordance with the military requirements set by the 1956 FINABEL meeting. An additional 
requirement was that the chassis was to be capable of conversion to a 155mm self-propelled 
artillery piece, the military requirements for which would be agreed by FINABEL.37 
2.2. Franco-German Tank Concepts 
One challenge for the establishment of a joint Franco-German tank project was the scepticism 
of some of the former generals with extensive wartime experience towards some of the 
assumptions around producing main battle tanks. These generals often had strong connections 
to both politicians and arms manufacturers, and thus could make life quite uncomfortable for 
officials in the defence ministries. A case in point is former tank general Baron Leo Geyr von 
Schweppenburg.38 Nonetheless, he reflected the opinion of many former tank officers in the 
1950s that off-road mobility across rough terrain could be achieved through tracked vehicles, 
whose technical characteristics had now improved considerably over the AFVs employed 
during the Second World War. This said, he was not prepared to write off wheeled vehicles 
for reconnaissance purposes since his wartime experience with them had been largely 
positive. At the same time, he was in agreement with the view that there was a tendency to 
look for technical perfection in the development of new tanks rather than to produce a less-
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than-perfect but functional tank that required fewer resources and development time.39 But, 
despite criticising the pursuit of technical perfection, he was at the same time critical of what 
he saw as a lack of understanding for technical questions surrounding the development of 
wheeled and tracked vehicles in the Federal Defence Ministry. Due to the connections of 
former officers like Geyr, which reached well into foreign armaments companies, it was 
fairly easy for them to complain about the lack of battlefield experience among those 
involved in weapons development.40 
In the debates among former soldiers over the future of armour, the likelihood of the 
employment of tactical nuclear weapons formed another consideration which was discussed 
behind the scenes. Geyr von Schweppenburg considered it unlikely that their employment 
would be directed towards the main operational area for land forces. He thought that NATO 
airfields would be the most likely target; that these often lay close to cities he thought would 
have little impact on Russian decision-making. He also thought that it was unlikely that 
supply lines and logistics could be disrupted completely by enemy interdiction efforts.41 In 
other words, those generals with the experience of commanding armoured troops during the 
Second World War did not question the future of the tank in a shooting war with the Warsaw 
Pact, even one involving nuclear weapons. At the same time, their attempts to influence 
members of parliament on the choice of future tanks met with, to quote Helmut Schmidt, 
‘only limited success’.42 
In 1956, Germany had only a small number of tank designers and firms still familiar 
with designing and producing tanks, and even these were unfamiliar with modern 
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developments.43 At the same time, France had not designed a main battle tank since the 
transitional and stop-gap model, the ARL-44 of 1946 which had its roots in tank concepts 
from 1940 and was consequently obsolete by the time it went into production. Impressed by 
the designs of the German Panther and Tiger 2, the French copied many features of those 
tanks for their proposed 59 tonne heavy tank, the AMX-50, which had reached the prototype 
stage by 1949. Originally intended to carry the same 90mm gun as ARL-44, developments in 
armour and gun technology meant that AMX-50’s planned gun was subsequently upgraded to 
a 120mm, which would have been compatible with the contemporary US heavy tank, the M-
103, and the heavy British Conqueror. An up-armoured, 120mm prototype was also built, but 
this weighed 70 tonnes, 11 tonnes heavier than the original AMX-50 design. Eventually, 
reflecting NATO-wide thinking at the time, the French abandoned the idea of the heavy tank 
in the face of the increasingly widespread adoption of shaped-charge weapons by armies 
worldwide. The potential penetration of shaped-charged warheads such as HEAT rounds 
made heavy steel armour less useful and, in the French view, not worth the cost of heavy 
armour and the reduction in mobility due to the increased weight.44 
Abandoning the heavy AMX-50 concept, the French military were left with former 
US M4 Sherman tanks of Second World War vintage and the 60 ARL-44s that had been 
produced. The original order had been for 300 ARL-44s, but the design had proven so 
outdated and inferior to contemporary medium tanks that production had been prematurely 
halted. Lacking a sovereign, modern, main battle tank design, France bought the US M-47 
Patton which had been little used by the United States Army, but was supplied to European 
NATO nations in large numbers as part of the Military Aid Program.45 France was more 
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successful with its AMX-13,46 a well-armed light tank which weighed only 14.7 tons (13.3 
tonnes) and was armed with a high velocity 75mm gun, later upgraded to a 90mm gun in 
French service and a 105mm gun for export versions. First built in 1952, the AMX-13 
enjoyed impressive export sales to over twenty nations around the world, as well as being in 
service with the French Army.47 
Acknowledging that Germany was lacking current expertise in tank development, the 
German project committee agreed that their contributions to the new Franco-German 
‘Standard Tank’ should ‘avail themselves of all accessible foreign experiences and insights’, 
even though this might use up valuable time.48 Although France was their collaboration 
partner, it is likely that the committee had US and, particularly, contemporary British designs 
in mind. Since 1945, while France had developed only the inadequate ARL-44, the United 
States had developed the M-47 Patton, a troubled design which was widely exported, and its 
improved successor, the M-48, also named Patton. In the same time period, Britain had 
developed the highly successful Centurion, a good all-round design which saw many 
upgrades and modifications and had a long and successful service with the armies of 14 
nations around the world.49 Nonetheless, there were still German voices in 1956 expressing 
worries about the purchase of Centurions, which they saw as being slower and heavier than 
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required. Those with wartime experience thought that a heavy tank ought not to be employed 
in the way in which many planners assumed it would be.50 
One of the biggest challenges for the embryonic Federal German arms industry at this 
stage was the need to rely on foreign companies. This made some projects vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of foreign arms competition, with battles raging between, for example, the Swiss 
companies Bührle and Hispano-Suiza. This vulnerability led to disasters such as the HS-30 
Schützenpanzer Infantry Fighting Vehicle, called SPz 12-3 in Bundeswehr service, designed 
by Hispano-Suiza, a project which led to press investigation into the receipt of bribes as high 
as 2.3 Million DM.51 
For the Standard Panzer project, each of the two national delegations submitted a 
preliminary proposal for the new tank; proposals which were then further developed. Due to a 
need for rapid rearmament, the FRG delegation considered that the new project was of more 
immediate use to the Bundeswehr than to those of the French, and agreed that Germany 
would meet the greater share of the project’s costs. Despite the Federal Republic thus being 
the primary partner from a financial viewpoint, the Germans acknowledged that the French 
had superior knowledge in contemporary tank technology, and agreed that German planning 
work would be complemented by the preparatory work which had already been carried out by 
the French for their own tank programmes.52 But former German soldiers and some engineers 
seem to have agreed privately that there was an attempt being made to pursue technical 
perfection rather than realistic designs for lighter vehicles, which could then be put into 
production relatively quickly. There was a strong belief that light, fast machines were what 
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was required since speed was a prerequisite for surprise, whereas heavy, tracked vehicles 
could not achieve this speed and required greater maintenance and supply.53 
The initial discussions left it unclear as to whether production of the tank would be 
undertaken in the FRG or France, or divided between the two.54 Fifteen German firms were 
allowed to bid for the initial Standard-Panzer contract. These were to be split into three, 
quickly reduced to two teams, or Firmengruppen, A and B, which would work on different 
prototypes. Meanwhile, France’s DEFA (Direction des Etudes et Fabrications d'Armements, 
the weapons design and manufacturing directorate), effectively held the position of prime 
French contractor.55 The initial contract of study called for each country to develop their own 
prototypes, which would then be assessed, followed by a decision as to which design would 
be pursued. It was agreed that a decision on the final design would be made a maximum of a 
year after the assessment of the prototypes.56 
For the new tank, the emphasis was to be on firepower and manoeuvrability. With this 
in mind, the main gun was to be of either 90mm or 105mm, with both US and French-
designed guns initially considered.57 Following demonstrations for the Defence Minister at 
Munsterlager, the German military were increasingly interested in developing a tank in the 
22-25 ton range using a 90mm gun accurate out to 1500m.58 The French half of the 
committee pushed to use their 105mm D.1507 gun, still in development (and later designated 
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the 105mm mle.59), but the records show that the German delegation doubted the French 
design, especially given that the gun was still unproven.59 
In addition to calling for a 105mm gun, the French required that the new tank carry a 
substantial amount of ammunition and pressed for a width of 3.25m. In justification, they 
pointed out that this would still be narrower than the 3.63m wide US M47 Patton, then in 
German service, and that some French heavy tanks were 3.4m wide.60 The Germans 
countered this by pointing out that there were great difficulties in loading the 3.63m wide 
M47 tank onto their rail network for transportation. Transporting tanks of 3.50m and wider 
was only possible in theory on the German rail network because 3.5m was also the gauge of 
the rails and thus a wider load could easily lead to overbalancing, especially when the trains 
travelled around bends and when changing tracks at points. With this in mind, German 
proposals were for a tank with a maximum height of 2.2m from the ground to the top of the 
turret, not including the commander’s cupola, and for the width to be no more than 3.15m. 
The French eventually agreed to the 3.15m width ‘in principle’ but noted that ‘the matter 
would be reviewed’.61 
Armour requirements were similarly a matter for debate. In keeping with the 
emphasis on manoeuvrability over direct protection, both countries agreed that the armour 
would be relatively light. The M47 Patton had frontal hull armour of 101mm sloped at 60 
degrees, and side hull armour of between 51mm to 76mm.62 German tests had shown that 
sloping was almost as important as thickness in armour protection, so German armour 
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requirements for the new tank were 60mm at the front, 50mm at the side and 40mm at the 
rear, with the armour incorporating a significant slope wherever practical. Turret armour was 
to be 80-100mm at the front, 50mm on the sides and rear. The French representatives, 
however, only wanted 40mm armour on the hull side and 30mm at the rear.63 
While rolled homogenous armour (RHA) had, by 1957, long been accepted as 
superior to cast amour by most tank-producing nations, the French explained that they had 
been considering the problem for a long time and would be using cast plates. If large casting 
facilities were available, casting was industrially easier than forming and joining RHA, but 
the resultant steel was weaker and less homogenous than RHA. The reason for the French 
decision was not military but instead down to the way that France regulated contractors. In 
France, the government did not specify a material or construction method to be used for 
producing the tank’s armour, but rather specified the required strength and then allowed the 
contractor to choose how that specification was best met. While they acknowledged that there 
was a undoubtedly a difference between cast and rolled steel, they told the joint committee’s 
German delegation that this difference was not thought in France to be significant.64 
Tank direct protection was undergoing something of a transformation at the time of 
the 1957 collaboration. Shaped-charge warheads had revolutionised thinking on tank 
protection, a shaped-charge high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round could defeat a greater 
thickness of RHA than could a conventional armour-piercing round of the same calibre. The 
90mm gun of the M47, for example, could penetrate 147mm of perpendicular (i.e. non-
sloped) RHA at 1000m with a kinetic energy high-velocity armour-piercing round (HVAP), 
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whereas the same gun could defeat 252mm under the same conditions using HEAT.65 In 
particular, shaped-charge warheads increased the lethality of lightweight anti-tank missiles 
and thus improved the ability of infantry, aircraft and light vehicles to defeat armour. In the 
race between weapons and armour, one early answer to shaped-charge warheads was spaced 
armour which prematurely detonated the warhead and severely degraded its effectiveness. 
Aware that they were compromising armour protection for reduced tonnage, the FRG 
delegation proposed that spaced armour should be used on the new tank. The French, on the 
other hand, did not believe that such armour was effective enough against shaped charges to 
make the increase in tank weight and width desirable. In the event, the German delegation 
agreed to drop their requirement for spaced armour.66 
Other important general requirements for the new tank were that all main parts should 
be quick and easy to replace, that the tank have a low reflection for infra-red and radar, an 
exhaust system that gave off minimal flame and heat emission, and that all main parts 
(including the rubber road wheel tyres), were not flammable.67 Unlike with the, albeit 
relatively minor, disputes over armament and armour, both the FRG and French delegations 
readily agreed to these more general requirements. 
The Franco-German collaboration proposal demonstrated some disagreements over 
the military requirements for a new tank. The Germans were, at that stage, still looking to fit 
a 90mm gun and slightly thicker armour than the French. The French requirements were for a 
larger 105mm gun and thinner armour. However, compromise seemed highly likely as the 
differences of opinion were minor. Both countries wanted a lighter and more manoeuvrable 
tank than the existing NATO MBTs, and both wanted a conventional gun in the 90-105mm 
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range. There were no fundamental disagreements over the role of the tank, nor attempts to 
introduce radical new technology. Although some minor compromise between the two 
designs would be necessary, the collaborative project’s future seemed secure. 
2.3. Collapse of the Standard Tank Project 
The political situation in France at the time of the Franco-German collaboration was lacking 
in stability. A long series of on-going crises had led to a general feeling that France was 
losing its position as a global great power. The defeat in Indochina in 1954, the Algerian 
crisis, the loss of former African countries as they gained independence, the 1956 Suez crisis, 
and internal party factionalism, all added to a general feeling of discontent within the 
turbulent French government, which had experienced many changes in the period 1947-58.68 
Franco-German defence relations were similarly unstable, with frequent changes of French 
government ministers bringing uncertainty to the bi-lateral negotiations.  
Following the collapse of the Fourth Republic, Charles de Gaulle came to power in 
France in 1958. In contrast to his political predecessors, he believed that France was best 
served by maintaining political independence and becoming an influential power in 
international politics without compromising this independence. When de Gaulle became 
President, he made it clear that he was opposed to political collaboration and unity between 
France and other nations within Europe, was unconvinced of NATO’s benefit to France, and 
was in particular suspicious of the USA’s dominance within NATO.69 In 1958, de Gaulle’s 
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strategy was to establish a US-UK-French directorate which would have global influence and 
consequently place France in a more prominent international position. In particular, he saw 
France as taking a leading role in the future in negotiations with the Soviet Union and, thus, 
increasing French prestige. His military strategy was to put French sovereign interests ahead 
of any NATO commitments, arguing that France needed to deploy its military forces in areas 
of the world over which the North Atlantic Alliance claimed no influence.70 This political 
belief in national sovereignty over collaborative international bodies inevitably represented a 
real danger for the Franco-German tank project. 
For its part, Konrad Adenauer’s Federal Republic was very aware that its newly 
acquired ‘rehabilitation’ and military security largely depended upon the sponsorship of the 
United States. Although a collaboration with France offered political advantages for the FRG 
within Europe, it also potentially distanced the country from the USA’s influence and could 
have damaged German-American political relations. In addition, any increase in French 
power within Europe would have come at the expense of the FRG, particularly were the US-
UK-French tripartite pact become a reality.71 
Within a year of the collapse of the French Fourth Republic and the establishment of 
the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle, Adenauer’s own political position looked under threat. 
Formerly lauded for his role in the West German international rehabilitation and economic 
recovery, Adenauer alienated many even within his own party when he attempted to stand as 
German President on the condition that the largely ceremonial position be equipped with new 
powers and that he would be able to choose his own successor. Given Germany’s experience 
of the results of such centralisation of power only thirty years previously, such a move could 
not be seen as anything but ill-advised, at best, and it cost Adenauer much of the support he 
had built up. Later still, politically-motivated arrests of Der Speigel journalists caused a 
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national scandal and Adenauer’s support of Strauß, his Defence Minister and the man 
responsible for ordering the arrests, damaged both the Chancellor’s personal popularity and 
that of his party. Perceived weakness with regards to the East German and reunification 
question, exacerbated by the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, spelled the beginning of the 
end of Adenauer’s political career. He finally stepped down in 1963 to be replaced by 
Ludwig Erhard.72 To make matters worse, the great hopes which had been invested in Strauß 
by military men, who had hoped he would create some form of order in the Federal Ministry 
of Defence, proved to have been – in their opinion – unwarranted.73 
German and French political enthusiasm for the collaboration faded quickly as the 
wider political situations in both France and Germany changed. Neither country’s military 
saw an advantage in a necessarily compromised tank design and, without the political will to 
drive them, the motivation of the two delegations to collaborate and compromise decreased 
accordingly. By 1960, it was announced that the two French and German concepts could not 
be successfully integrated into a single design; hence, the respective defence ministries 
agreed to bring in an Italian chairman as a third party to break the deadlock. A competition 
was scheduled for September 1963 to decide which design was better. Despite this, however, 
the two nations announced in July 1963 that they would instead be pursuing their own 
national designs and that the collaboration was at an end.74 
Given the similarity of the original project specifications, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the two sovereign designs from France and the FRG bore a striking similarity to each 
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other. Both were light in weight and carried well sloped, but relatively light armour; both 
were armed with a conventional 105mm gun; and both emphasised speed and 
manoeuvrability over direct protection. It is, however, interesting that neither country 
managed to meet their initial proposed weight limit of 30 tonnes, although in other regards 
the sovereign designs bore a close resemblance to the collaborative designs. Certainly, it is 
difficult to see how design differences could have led to a collapse of the collaboration had 
the political backing remained strong. 
The FRG’s sovereign design became the Leopard (later renamed Leopard 1 with the 
introduction of the Leopard 2), although it was still occasionally referred to in the Federal 
Republic as the ‘Standard Panzer’ until officially renamed ‘Leopard’ on 1 October 1963. 
Considered by many commentators to be the best tank in its class, the Leopard underwent six 
major upgrades and was used as the basis for other AFVs such as the Leopard Bergepanzer 
ARV (Armoured Recovery Vehicle) and Gepard anti-aircraft gun system.75 Although finally 
replaced by Leopard 2 as an MBT in 2003, Leopard 1 ARV variants are still in service in the 
German Bundeswehr at the time of writing. The Leopard 1 was also a major export success 
for Kraus-Maffei and Krupp MaK, the German contractor and main sub-contractor 
respectively, with nearly half of the total production exported to the seven NATO countries 
that adopted the design.76 
On October 1963, Major J.H. Larminie of the Queens’s Dragoon Guards was given 
the opportunity to inspect the new German ‘Standard Panzer’; in the available documentation 
this would appear to refer to the prototype of the Leopard 1 although it is also possible that it 
was a prototype produced for the Franco-German project. While later Leopard models had 
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thicker armour, particularly on the turret, Larminie noted that, amongst other technical data, 
the armour thickness on the frontal glacis was 70mm (on a 60 degree slope) and 30mm 
(vertical) on the sides.77 As the Leopard was Germany’s new MBT, a comparison should be 
made with the contemporary US M-60A1, the most widely used tank model in NATO at the 
time, which had 115mm glacis armour (on a 60 degree slope) and an average of 50mm on the 
sides.78 However, while the 40 tonne Leopard had a power-to-weight ratio of 20.75 
bhp/tonnes, which gave it a top road speed of 65 kmph and road-range of 600 kilometres, the 
M-60A1 had a power-to-weight ratio of 14.24 bhp/tonnes and could only manage 48.28 
kmph and 500 km on road.79 
Unsurprisingly, the French also opted for a design that emphasised manoeuvrability 
over protection. The AMX-30 weighed slightly less than the FRG’s Leopard, at 36 tonnes 
combat weight against Leopard’s 40 tonnes.80 The AMX-30 also had well-sloped glacis 
armour of 79mm thickness and side armour of between 57mm and 30mm. This gave it 
slightly better direct protection than the prototype and first production series Leopard, but, as 
a consequence, the power-to-weight ratio was less, at 18.91 bhp/tonnes, with a road speed of 
50 kmph, and a 500-600 km road range.81 As the Leopard was almost immediately up-
armoured following its introduction, the AMX-30 became NATO’s lightest-armoured MBT 
in service at that time. The AMX-30 was widely employed by the French Army, with over a 
thousand entering service and many weapon systems, including a launcher for the ‘Pluton’ 
tactical nuclear missile, utilising the same chassis. However, although bought by eight 
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foreign nations – Chile, Greece, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela – the AMX-30 did not enjoy the same export success in hard numbers as the 
Federal Republic enjoyed with the Leopard.82 
2.4. Tank 90: The Start of a New Project 
Fourteen years after the collapse of the original Franco-German collaboration, the 
governments of France and the Federal Republic once more sought to initiate a joint MBT 
programme. In the budget-strapped era of the late 1970s, most NATO members were more 
concerned with updating their existing equipment than in developing completely new systems 
in readiness for potential conflicts at least 20 years in the future.83 Since the end of the 
Standard Tank programme in 1963, two further collaborative MBT programmes were 
attempted within NATO, neither of which had resulted in a production tank.84 Despite this, 
the political attraction and potential financial advantages of collaboration were strong enough 
for a fourth attempt, the second between France and the FRG. 
It was in 1976 when France began to consider replacing the AMX-30, which had, 
quite obviously, resulted at least in part from the 1957 Franco-German Standard-Panzer 
project. At the time, the French Ministère de la Défense was strongly in favour of Franco-
German cooperation in armaments acquisition and development. With an eye towards 
financial savings as well as symbolic political gestures, French ministers initiated a tripartite 
meeting held on 3 and 4 November 1977 to examine the possibility of a new tank for the 
1990s to be developed jointly between France, the Federal Republic and Britain.85 
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At a meeting between the British Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley, and the FRG and 
French Ministers of Defence on 3 November 1977, the French Minister of Defence, Yvon 
Bourges, stated that France wished to give absolute priority to the European armaments 
industry and preferred to use the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) to a 
NATO forum when discussing arms collaboration. At the same meeting, the German Defence 
Minister, Georg Leber,86 stated that the FRG preferred cooperative to national projects 
because of the ‘military, technological, economic and Alliance advantages that cooperation 
brought.’87 On 9 November 1977, the British Secretary of Defence and French and German 
Defence Ministers issued statements of support for cooperation and commonality, including 
in the field of tanks, stating that, ‘The Ministers declare their will to seek all possibilities of 
cooperation between the three countries.’88 Despite the rhetoric, Britain quickly dropped out, 
having only cancelled the collaborative Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) programme with 
the FRG in March 1977 and having subsequently begun its own domestic MBT-80 
programme. Within the remaining two countries, the leaders, Helmut Schmidt and Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing,89 were the political drivers behind the project, even though the vast 
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majority of the actual negotiation was carried out by the respective Ministries of Defence 
armaments directors, Hans-Ludwig Eberhard and Henri Martre.90 There can be little doubt 
that Schmidt and Giscard considered each other friends faced with similar political problems; 
moreover, that they regarded international security questions as essential components of their 
European policies at that time.91 
Eberhard and Matre were apparently as enthusiastic about the collaboration as their 
respective political leaders, with the French arms procurement bureau seeing an opportunity 
to procure a modern MBT at a fraction of the price of a national tank design. France’s 
existing tank fleet consisted of about 1,200 AMX-30s, designed in the early 1960s and thus in 
dire need of modernisation. The German side, however, were more interested in the political 
rather than the financial advantages of a collaboration.92 At the time of the programme, the 
FRG was in the process of introducing the Leopard 2 and saw the proposed Franco-German 
tank simply as an opportunity for further development of this already existing design. 
Consequently, Hans-Ludwig Eberhard, the Armaments Director at the German Ministry of 
Defence, announced that he foresaw no great problems in running the potential ‘Tank 90’ 
alongside the Leopard 2 within the Bundeswehr.93 
The German concept for armoured warfare for the 1980s had been developed during 
the 1970s by Ferdinand Maria von Senger und Etterlin, the son of the Second World War 
tank general, Frido von Senger und Etterlin. He envisaged two ‘families’ of vehicles, one 
heavy and one light. The heavy family would be based around a relatively heavy MBT, with 
a higher calibre gun than the Leopard (which carried a 105mm gun), and with an engine with 
a higher performance which would provide much greater speed and agility in open terrain. A 
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further tank to ‘accompany’ the heavy tank was envisaged, which would also function as a 
Flak-Tank. The chassis for this lighter vehicle would be the basis for an APC, a transport 
vehicle and a reconnaissance vehicle, as well as communications, command and medical 
AFVs. It was noted in early 1973 that five arms companies in the Federal Republic had been 
commissioned to present suggestions for production ready tanks and their associated 
vehicles.94 
The French, however, wanted a completely new tank and were aware that accepting a 
simple upgrade of Leopard 2 meant limited involvement from French developers and 
industry. The French delegation pushed for a completely new design, but the defence 
ministries of the two countries could not agree on a unified operational concept for a 
completely new tank. The impasse was only broken when, in 1979, Schmidt and Giscard 
d'Estaing ordered their respective delegations that an agreement would be reached. After this 
political intervention at the highest level, on 31 January 1979, a statement of intent to reach 
common agreement on the new tank was released by the two nations’ national armaments 
directors. Later still, and further underlining the political importance of the project to the 
leaders of the two countries, at the Franco-German summit in February 1980, Schmidt and 
Giscard d'Estaing agreed to promote the Franco-German ‘Tank 90’ collaboration as a symbol 
of bilateral unity.95 
2.5. Tank 90: Problems in Collaboration 
Despite the political intervention and optimism, problems within the programme remained. 
One issue was that of export rights for the final tank. The FRG policy on arms exports was 
restrictive and tightly controlled by the Federal government, whereas France was prepared to 
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export far more widely. Although there was no state ownership within the German arms 
industry, any export licenses required state agreement. Article 26 of the Federal German 
Grundgesetz, roughly translated as ‘Basic Law’, states that, ‘[w]eapons designed for warfare 
may be manufactured, transported or marketed only with the permission of the Federal 
Government’. The German government was, and still is, sensitive to lending support to 
military regimes deemed to be oppressive, or whose behaviour can be seen as contrary to 
democratic principles; thus it had long restricted its authorised arms exports to only a limited 
group of countries.96 Germany saw France’s potential export of a new tank to countries in 
Africa and the Middle East as likely to conflict with its own laws, and a collaborative tank 
project thus created potential legal problems given the principle espoused in Article 26. 
 A case in point was the problem caused by the Italian company OTO Melara, which 
had been allowed to continue licensed production of the Leopard 1 after the Bundeswehr had 
received a completed set of orders. In the early 1970s, complications in both diplomatic 
relations between the government and arms companies were caused when the Italian arms 
firm began negotiations with Kuwait and the United Emirates over the export of licence-built 
Leopard tanks from Italy. The first problem which emerged was that it was discovered in 
mid-1975 that Krauss-Maffei, who were in charge of the licence, had not been informed of 
this step. The board of Krauss-Maffei was taken aback when they discovered the Italian 
export moves. This led to the former Panzer-General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin to enquire 
in Bonn on behalf of the German arms company whether the Federal Government was 
willing to permit this.97 The incident had already been preceded by increasing tensions in 
1973 over the question of tank exports to Kuwait, given the Kuwaiti need to ‘modernise the 
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Chieftain’.98 Schwerin, who was still active in the 1970s as a representative of German arms 
manufacturers, did not himself think that the Federal Government was pursuing the correct 
policy, believing in 1973 that Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia should be supported, not least of 
all due to the Western dependency upon oil deliveries from the Gulf.99 Despite official 
approaches both from the Italian defence and foreign ministries to Bonn in 1974,100 the 
attempt to export the Leopard to the Middle East through an Italian company failed due to the 
Germans’ desire not to compromise Art. 26 of the Basic Law. 
French diplomats acknowledged that France would export the new tank to a wider 
market than domestic political restriction currently gave the Federal Republic access to, but 
attempted to demonstrate that the intended French exports would still be of benefit to German 
industry and the German economy thanks to the increased overall production figures. The 
proposed solution was that France would inform the FRG before agreeing to any new export 
sales, while the FRG would have the right to ‘make observations upon those intentions if she 
felt her interests to be affected’. This was not, it was made clear, a veto authority, but was 
intended to enable the problem to be addressed at the Presidential/Chancellor level should it 
become necessary.101 
France’s suggestion was that each country be allowed to export the tank according to 
its own laws, a solution that had been invoked in previous arms collaborations. However, 
unlike other arms developments, tank exports were seen as something of a special case. 
German political opinion saw tanks as politically symbolic as well as simply examples of 
advanced military technology. It was only at the 1980 Franco-German summit that Helmut 
Schmidt and Giscard finally came to an agreement. Schmidt agreed with the proposed French 
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special provision ensuring that bilateral discussion would take place before any export 
agreements were signed.102 This provision was signed by the respective defence ministers 
even though the new German Defence Minister, Hans Apel, who had replaced Leber in 
February 1978, had opposed the whole project and only signed after being directly ordered to 
by Schmidt.103 
Weight was also a bone of contention. The French still favoured a lighter tank (less 
than 50 tons) with consequent higher mobility, just as they had with the earlier European 
Standard Tank project. The Germans had, by this stage, acknowledged the importance of 
heavier armour and were looking for a tank weighing up to 60 tons, albeit one driven by a 
sufficiently powerful and robust engine and transmission to maintain good mobility. France’s 
continued policy of insisting upon a tank no heavier than 50 tons was mainly due to a long-
held armoured doctrine which emphasised tactical mobility over direct protection. But 
Moravcsik suggests that it might also have been influenced by potential exports to markets in 
developing countries where mobility was of even greater importance than on the flat 
European plains of the NATO-Warsaw Pact border, countries where road communications 
and infrastructure were poor, where even light armour could be decisive and where potential 
opponents were less likely to have modern anti-tank weapons.104 
Having solved, or rather bypassed, the problem of both exports and differing military 
specifications by means of political diktat, the next round of disputes was industrial. For the 
main German contractor, Krauss-Maffei, future export sales of the Tank 90 held a couple of 
major commercial problems. Sales within NATO would be split with the French contractor, 
offering a less attractive prospect than in the case of the existing Leopard 2 sales which 
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would exclusively benefit the German firm. Secondly, with France having a more laissez-
faire export policy, Kraus-Maffei was concerned that subsidised sales to non-NATO 
countries would provide the French with, what appeared to be to the Germans, a potentially 
unfair sales advantage. Should the French subsidise exports of the new tank to countries 
currently buying Leopard 2, it would still further erode Germany’s export market.105 
The threat of the new tank competing with Leopard 2 was exacerbated when Belgium 
declared that it was considering replacing its own Leopard tanks with the new Franco-
German design. Belgium had traditionally looked to France to supply its military hardware 
and the possibility that they would be interested in a new Franco-German tank would have 
been unsurprising, if unwelcome, news for Krauss-Maffei. The French decision to enter a 
collaborative development with Germany had been at least as motivated by the export 
potential as it had for its domestic defence needs. An internal French memorandum made this 
clear when it concluded that a jointly produced tank would offer better export opportunities 
than a development of the existing French AMX-30. As a further example of the importance 
of potential exports to France, the French insisted that no US components be utilised. This 
was due to a desire to avoid US export control restrictions which would have limited any 
French export possibilities for the new tank.106 
The agreement also attracted little popular support within Germany. In addition to 
Apel’s dissention, the collaboration was not supported by the Bundestag Defence Committee 
which roundly condemned the Government’s failure to consult them beforehand, insisting 
that they should be consulted before any substantive agreement was agreed. Communication 
problems were not limited to the Bundestag for, while German officials saw the agreement 
only as a study into possible collaboration, the French government portrayed it as a firm 
commitment to develop and build the new tank. The technical and military philosophy 
                                                




disagreements between the two sides remained substantial and German industrialists were 
openly sceptical about the possibility of a successful collaboration. A UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) memo dryly noted that, ‘The political desire for 
Franco/German tank collaboration is very high but it may still be defeated by the facts of the 
situation and the very real differences which exist between the two countries at the working 
level.’107 
Both French and German industry experts were worried that the collaboration might 
turn into an unequal partnership, with France worried that they would have little to contribute 
and German suspicious that the French were simply gaining access to superior German 
technology in areas such as diesel engines, chassis development and armament. As part of a 
collaborative project, the French believed that they should take responsibility for major 
components, such as the electronics. Krauss-Maffei objected to this as they believed that 
German engineers had demonstrated superiority in these areas and that the Federal Republic 
should therefore hold responsibility in that field.108 
The Germans had established a definite superiority over the French tank industry in 
the development of the Leopard 2, and the French were concerned that this would lead to a 
German-led programme rather than to a fully equal partnership. French industry had lobbied 
their government to ensure that the new tank would be a truly cooperative design rather than 
simply a further development of the Leopard 2. But Giscard d'Estaing had, nonetheless, 
agreed to a design that effectively mounted a new turret on the existing Leopard 2 chassis. 
The French press reported how French industry was attempting to secure more responsibility 
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within the project, but there was widespread scepticism within German over France’s ability 
to equal their own technical contributions.109 
Certainly, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) supposition was that the 
next German tank would be an updated Leopard 2; and, this view was apparently shared by 
some German politicians in Bonn. Any potential French involvement was noted as likely to 
be ‘marginal’. It was an open secret that the collaboration was not popular in Germany, apart 
from with the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and that the Germans were ‘paying a heavy 
technical and financial price for the dubious political benefit of French partnership.’110 
A report in Le Monde of 23 January 1981 mentioned that that the French trade union 
confederation, Confédération générale du travail (CGT), had written to President Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing protesting about the inequality of the proposed joint tank project. The CGT 
complained that French industry’s share of the project would be no more than 20%, with the 
prime contractors being German and the whole project regulated by German law. The CGT 
stated that an unequal agreement ‘would endanger not only national independence, but also 
employment and the status of the some 130,000 civilian [workers in] arsenals and military 
establishments.’ They also protested at efforts to recruit French workers to work in Germany 
on the project, comparing it to the forced labour of the Second World War.111 
Ministries of Defence in both the Federal Republic and France continued the project 
despite the concerns from both German and French industry over the division of 
responsibility. An agreement was signed in February 1981 which sought to address the 
problems of different weight requirements, and of French concerns over German domination 
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of the tank’s hull and chassis development. The February agreement foresaw development of 
two different tank hulls, one heavy and one lighter in accordance with the international 
disagreements over the final tank’s maximum weight. The collaborative project would then 
develop a single turret which would be fitted to both hulls. However, even this substantial 
compromise encountered difficulties, with concern being expressed over which of the two 
proposed hulls the new turret would be optimised for.112 
By March 1981, the general position of the talks between the two sides had reached 
some agreements, but major hurdles to the project still remained. The French and Germans 
had reached agreement on the hardware development programme for a lower profile turret 
than was fitted to the contemporary Leopard 2, the new turret housing the German 120mm 
smoothbore with the possibility of also being able to accept the French 120mm. An automatic 
loader system and digital fire control would be fitted, with the Germans eager to include the 
Italians, and specifically the firm OTO Melara who, it was noted, had considerable expertise 
in autoloaders. The French were still undecided about this proposed Italian involvement. The 
French were also in disagreement with Germany over what the new tank would actually 
comprise, with France still wanting to develop an entirely new vehicle, while the German 
delegation only wanted an upgrade based on the Leopard 2. The issue of armour thickness 
was another hurdle and one that harkened back to the abortive 1957 Franco-German tank 
project, with the Germans wanting a more comprehensive armour distribution and, 
consequently, a heavier vehicle than the French were prepared to accept.113 
Despite all the issues over industrial inequality, doctrinal differences, export 
problems, and German governmental opposition, in March 1981 the German embassy 
officials in Paris informed their counterparts in the British Embassy, Paris, that there was ‘no 
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question of the Franco-German tank project being cancelled’. The plan was reportedly to 
have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cover the second phase signed, but the 
signing itself was to be delayed until after the French Presidential Elections, set for 10 May 
1981. The expectation was that the second phase would last about two years and that it would 
be followed by a development phase, which would involve the building of prototypes. The in-
service date (ISD) for the new tank was set for 1992, with the first deliveries going to the 
French Army who had the more pressing requirement. At this point, the German embassy 
officials believed that the collaboration only involved the turret but understood that the 
question of whether improvements to the chassis would be addressed once the turret design 
and production decisions were complete.114 
After having withdrawn from the original tripartite agreement in 1977, the UK 
Department of Defence saw an opportunity in the Tank 90 project’s development, wondering 
if the question of potential development of the tank hull might allow the UK to become 
involved in the collaboration again, even at this late stage. This would have been a useful 
exercise because the proposed MBT-80 project had been cancelled and the Challenger and 
Chieftain improvement programmes had recently been severely downgraded, leaving a 
potential operational gap with regards to the technological effectiveness of British tanks post-
2000.115 The UK’s Chief of Defence Procurement noted in April 1981 that the Franco-
German tank project was facing ‘major problems’, and pointed out that, whilst the UK should 
not be seen to in any way be responsible for furthering the collapse of the project, there was 
                                                
114 TNA, FCO 46/2775, NATO: Franco-German Tank Cooperation, Memo from British Embassy, Paris, to 
C(A&DS), ‘Franco-German Tank’, 26 March 1981. 
115 TNA, FCO 46/2775, NATO: Franco-German Tank Cooperation, Memo from Defence Department to 
AUS(IP), MoD, ‘Franco-German Tank Project’, 5 May 1981. 
126 
 
nonetheless an opportunity to join the collaboration. Germany, he reported, had already 
invited the UK to see some of the work they had done on the project.116 
Restricted military budgets had thrown serious doubts on the wisdom of the Federal 
Republic funding a new tank project so soon after Leopard 2. On 7 March 1981, the FRG 
announced budget cuts which prompted President Giscard d’Estaing to seek assurance from 
Chancellor Schmidt that the decision taken in February 1980 to proceed with the project was 
still valid. A UK Embassy telegram rather cynically noted that, ‘At least he needs the 
semblance of an assurance which will tide him over publicly until after the Presidential 
elections.’117 Throughout 1981 and into 1982, three of the four major parties in the 
Bundestag, the CDU (and their Bavarian sister party, the CSU), SPD and FDP,118 spoke out 
against the collaboration. While the military favoured allowing enough time to make a 
substantially better tank than the Leopard 2, the SPD and FDP objected because they saw 
French involvement as potentially violating the strict German arms export policy.119 
Despite opposition from elements on the French political extreme left and nationalist 
right who both favoured a sovereign design, with the left also wanting the vehicles built in 
state-owned factories, the French continued broadly to favour a collaboration which would 
see a tank ready to enter service in 1991. The ISD was of more importance to France than to 
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the Federal Republic, which already had the Leopard 2 in service. By November 1981, 
Germany questioned France’s preferred ISD of 1991. France still insisted that the tank should 
be an entirely new design rather than an improved Leopard 2, but Germany already had a 
perfectly adequate tank in the Leopard 2 and had little need to replace it so soon. The Federal 
Republic instead favoured an ISD of 1995 or 1996, allowing sufficient future leading-edge 
technical improvements to be incorporated into the new design to make changing from 
Leopard 2 worthwhile. French elections had seen President Giscard d’Estaing replaced by 
François Mitterrand, the French Fifth Republic’s first socialist president, on 10 May 1981. 
With German enthusiasm for Tank 90 seemingly waning, Mitterand began to push Helmut 
Schmidt for a concrete decision on the collaboration.120 
2.6. Tank 90: The Collaboration Ends 
Mitterrand was something of a political opportunist, moving his political stance according to 
the mood of the time. Previously a libertarian centrist in the French Fourth Republic, the 
arrival of the Fifth Republic in 1958 had seen French politics become more polarised and 
Mitterrand had moved to a more left-wing position. One aspect of his political career that 
remained a constant was his antagonism towards Charles de Gaulle, with whom he had 
feuded since the days of the German occupation. Yet when Mitterrand became President of a 
Socialist coalition-governed France on 10 May 1981, in a move that bore similarities to de 
Gaulle’s policy of 1958 which helped put an end to the Standard Panzer project, Mitterand 
moved France away from European and US influences and instead looked internally, 
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increasing the public sector and nationalising French industry to tackle unemployment and 
inflation.121 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had faced ongoing opposition for the 
collaboration, not just from the parliamentary opposition but also from within his own Social 
Democratic Party.122 Upon his replacement as Chancellor by Helmut Kohl on 1 October 
1982, both the main German and French advocates for the collaboration had departed the 
political stage, so the project was effectively dead. On 30 November 1982, the French Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mauroy, announced that France was to pursue a sovereign design, named the 
‘Leclerc’. The French Ministry of Defence was thrown into some disarray, announcing that it 
would look to modernise the AMX-30 as a temporary measure while it continued to seek a 
collaboration with a suitable European partner. The French President, Mitterrand, approached 
Helmut Kohl in an attempt to resurrect the collaborative project, but the negotiations came to 
nothing and any last-minute plans for the project were finally abandoned in 1983.123 
The Leclerc tank was not considered a success by many in the French military, 
General Philippe Arnold, a former Commander of France’s 1st Armoured Division and 
Commander of the Saumur School of Cavalry, was suspended from duty after criticising the 
government’s procurement decisions which had, in his opinion, led to France’s armoured 
forces being inferior to that of its NATO peers. At its launch in 1987, the GIAT prototype for 
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the Leclerc was widely considered inferior to either the contemporary version of the Leopard 
2, or the US M1 Abrams, despite those tanks entering service years prior to the Leclerc’s own 
1991 production schedule.124 
This perceived inferiority of the Leclerc was highlighted when the Saudi government 
announced that it was looking to purchase modern tanks to upgrade its army and asked for 
prospective sellers. The Saudi army was at that time using the AMX-30, so the French were 
optimistic of the Leclerc receiving serious consideration. In the event, however, the Leclerc 
did not even make the shortlist of candidates. With German export restrictions ruling out the 
Leopard 2 from the competition, the two final candidates were the US M1 Abrams and the 
Brazilian Osorio, with the final decision going the way of the M1 Abrams. While geopolitics 
played a part in the final decision (the order from the Saudis was placed on the eve of the 
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), for their newest tank not to make the shortlist of a country 
already using French tanks must have been demoralising, and even more so to lose out to the 
Osorio, the first domestic tank design from Brazil.125 
2.7. Project Evaluation and Analysis 
As we are evaluating two projects simultaneously, we will use Fortune and White’s project 
analysis framework,126 with the two projects side by side to enable easier comparisons 
between the critical success factors evident in each case: 
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 Political ambition on the wider 
European stage appears to have 
been the primary motivation for the 
project. 
 Both countries sought a similar 
tank design. 
 Neither country had an 
unbalancing lead in tank 
development. 
 Both nations sought 
collaboration for political and 
financial reasons. 
 Germany was looking to 
upgrade Leopard 2, whereas France 
wanted a wholly new tank design. 
Performance 
monitoring.  
 Each country kept the other 
informed as to their progress, and 
initial difficulties appear to have 
been negotiation. 
 The negotiations between 
French and German design teams 
did not translate into agreement on 
a final design. 
Decision-
maker(s).  
 Political events in each country 
led to a reduction in political 
support of the project. 
 Political events in each country 
led to a reduction in political 
support of the project. 
Transformations.   Minor differences in design 
goals were resolved. 
 German lacked recent tank-
building experience, and France 
had not designed a successful 
modern MBT since 1940.  
 Aside from the issue of weight, 
little agreement seems to have been 
reached in design differences. 
 Established German superiority 
in tank design was a bone of 
contention for both nations. 
Communication.   Documents covering the project 
suggest that communication 
between the two countries was 
good. 
 Throughout the project, French 
and German priorities appear to 
have been different and not 
effectively communicated. 
Environment.   The political situation in both 
countries became unstable during 
the project lifetime, and in each 
case led to a change of 
government. 
 Despite working within 
established political and military 
alliance frameworks, agreement 
could not be reached on the design. 
 The historical dangers of 
relying heavily on political 
patronage to the exclusion of other 
factors were not realised. 
Boundaries.  Nothing about the project 
design was revolutionary or overly 
complex. 
 Although France wanted a new 
design, Germany was only looking 
to upgrade their existing Leopard 2.  
 Significant greater German 
experience and technical expertise 




Resources.   There is no evidence to suggest 
that the project was under-funded 
or suffered through lack of 
resources. 
 Starting from a position of 
relative inexperience in tank 
design, the German team made it a 
priority to learn from foreign 
designs. 
 Collaboration was initially 
suggested as a means to conserve 
and maximise resources. 
 Imbalance between the 
capabilities of the two nations 
caused friction. 
Continuity.   Differences of opinion between 
the two project teams were 
generally minor. 
 Problems of differing 
specifications were only raised 
once political support had been 
much reduced, suggesting that the 
differences were being used as a 
convenient excuse to cancel the 
project. 
 Each country appeared to be 
unaware that the national 
expectations of the projects differed 
between the two countries. 
 Germany was reluctant to invest 
in a completely new design after so 
recently establishing the Leopard 2. 
 Germany saw French foreign 
policy as giving them an unfair 
export advantage. 
 
Even though both projects were separate, there are striking similarities between the two. 
Political motivation to be seen as dedicated to a European community drove both projects; in 
each case, a change of internal political leadership spelled the end of political support and the 
end of the project. In addition, the relative technical expertise and experience of the nations 
involved caused friction in both cases. For the 1957 project it was the French who had the 
most recent experience and thus expected to have the greater share of the project, in 1977 the 
positions were reversed and the FRG considered that they had the more advanced MBT 
design experience. 
Unlike with the 1957 project, the 1977 collaboration had little communication of 
expectations between the two countries, and no firm agreement on sharing of responsibilities. 
Going into the collaboration, the FRG was looking for a possible upgrade to their Leopard 2, 
which contrasts markedly with the French understanding that the programme would result in 
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an entirely new tank design. In addition, French export regulations were also a good deal 
more liberal than those of the FRG, which suggested an imbalance for future export deals. 
2.8. Summary 
It should be noted that the MBT projects were only two of a number of collaborative defence 
programmes being investigated at the time, with France and Germany seeking some measure 
of independence from reliance on US weapons.127 Taken together, the two cases of the 
‘Standard Tank’and ‘Tank 90’ demonstrate just how important continued political support is 
to any international collaboration.128 Although both nations were primarily seeking to 
improve the international standing of their respective countries in 1957, Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer and President René Coty had slightly different reasons for seeking collaboration. 
By collaborating with France, Adenauer sought to re-establish German political influence and 
military power within Europe and NATO, and France sought to distance itself from US 
influence by collaborating with another European nation. Both programmes faced problems 
of industrial and minor doctrinal disagreements over the relative values of weight, firepower 
and protection, but it was primarily within the political arena that the projects failed. 
 With hindsight, the 1957 ‘Standard Tank’ programme seemed to offer a good chance 
for success. France and the Federal Republic shared a doctrine of manoeuvre over direct 
protection, and were both seeking a conventional layout, mounting a 90-105mm gun. There 
was enough agreement that a formal study contract was drawn up and agreed.129 Yet, 
ironically, the very political motivation that began the project was its undoing. Coty and 
                                                
127 Kocs, Autonomy or Power? pp. 19-20. 
128 Frinsdorf, et al., suggest that strong management support is a vital ingredient of any successful collaborative 
project, which can be translated into support from political leaders when talking of international projects. See on 
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International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 813. 
129 BA-MA, BW1/452528, Deutsch-französisches Abkommen über die Entwicklung eines Standardpanzers 
(Vertrag-Nr. 899/57), 1957-1958; TI3 – Commande No 899/57 – Indicateur No 2355/58, Contratd’Etude.  
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Adenauer and their respective Defence Ministers, Bourgés-Maunory and Strauß, strongly 
backed the collaboration and invested much political capital in pushing the programme 
forward. Identifying themselves so strongly with the collaboration, however, meant that the 
projects became hostage to their patrons’ political fortunes. 
 The 1957 project certainly had minor conceptual differences of opinion between 
France and the FRG, notably in disagreements over the thickness of the armour and weight, 
but the general concept was so similar between prototypes that it is hard to believe that a 
compromise would not have been found. However, the troubled French Fourth Republic 
collapsed and was replaced by de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic in 1958. De Gaulle exploited an 
ambiguity in the Fifth Republic’s constitution to dominate foreign policy, and soon made it 
clear that he was uninterested in international collaborations.130 When Strauß and Adenauer 
lost their respective positions as a result of the ‘Spiegel Affair’ and other unwise political 
activities,131 nobody was left in either French or German politics to promote the ‘Standard 
Tank’ collaboration and it subsequently collapsed. But as a result of the much larger political 
issues at the time, the Standard Tank issue disappeared very quickly from view.132 
 The 1977 ‘Tank 90’ or ‘Napoleon’ collaboration faced far more obstacles than its 
1957 predecessor. Objections from both French and German industry, political opposition 
and military sources left the project with support only from the German Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, and French President, Giscard d’Estaing, backed by their Defence Ministers, Leber 
and Bourges. Once again, changes of political leadership spelled the end for the programme 
as both Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing were replaced by leaders less interested in pursuing an 
                                                
130 Clift, ‘The Fifth Republic at Fifty’, p. 385.  
131 ‘50th Anniversary of the “Spiegel Affair”: A Watershed Moment for West German Democracy’, Der 
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132 Strauß does not mention the Standard Panzer in his memoirs, although he does refer to a controversy 
surrounding the procurement of the Schützenpanzer HS 30. At the time, and much later, atomic questions, the 
broader political canvas, and clashes with generals appeared to be more important to him. See Strauß, Die 
Erinnerungen, esp. pp. 268-334. 
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international collaboration. It is revealing that the official German Defence White Papers, in 
German, the Weissbuch, only referred to the collaborative Kampfpanzer 70 (US-German 
MBT-70) in the 1969 edition, whereas in later editions there was no mention of collaborative 
tanks projects, beyond general remarks about the importance of international arms 
collaboration.133 
 Although it might be somewhat simplistic to blame the withdrawal of political support 
for the collapse of the two Franco-German MBT collaborations, particularly the 1977 ‘Tank 
90’ project, it is nonetheless evident that the end of both programmes coincided with the 
replacement of their primary political supporters. This suggests that collaborative projects 
within democratic countries must not rely solely on their political patrons but should be 
supported by the industry and the military of both nations. ‘Tank 90’ saw German military 
indifference, French military misgivings, and suspicion and outright hostility from the 
industry of both countries. Without political support there was nothing to drive the 1977 
collaboration. The 1957 collaboration had greater military and industrial support, but it was, 
once again, politics that instigated, drove and finally finished off the ‘Standard Tank’.  
This all may provide an indication as to why NATO nations have not managed to 
collaborate successfully on an MBT. There are, of course, other, quite obvious reasons. As an 
official NATO publication pointed out in 1971: ‘Nato, since it is not a supranational 
organization, does not possess mandatory powers over national governments. The 
responsibility for equipping and maintaining forces remains therefore a national one.’134 
Nonetheless, since its inception, NATO had at least declared economic cooperation an ideal 
which was to be pursued in the future, even if this was not necessarily primarily directed 
                                                
133 Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Weissbuch 1969: Zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bundesregierung 
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towards collaborative arms projects. Beyond the more idealistic notions of economic growth, 
there was at least an awareness of the need for a more efficient use of armaments and 
logistics within the Atlantic Alliance. A string of committees and boards bear testament to 
this. The Military Production and Supply Board was set up in November 1949, followed by 
the Defence Production Board, then, in 1952, the Production and Logistics Committee, which 
changed its name to the Production, Logistics and Infrastructure Division in October 1960, 
becoming the Defence Support Division on 1 September 1967. It was fully acknowledged 
that the best early successes in standardisation were to be found in fighter aircraft production 
and ammunition.135 
In essence, the countries that comprise the NATO alliance are a collection of (mostly) 
democratic governments with disparate military doctrines136 and independent long-
established national industrial bases, with their own standards and commercial interests. Only 
a strong and stable political leadership could push through an international collaboration 
under such circumstances, yet politicians and parties come and go within democratic national 
governments. True international collaborations must overcome all these obstacles to be 
successful, and so far, main battle tank projects have eluded such success. 
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‘How Not to Design a Tank’: 
The US-German MBT-70 (1963-1970) 
Referring to the MBT-70, a contributor to a military journal asked in 1966 whether it was ‘in 
fact possible for two world powers, any two, to arrive at agreement on a concept which will 
fully meet the requirements of both?’1 His consternation was not surprising since, as an 
example of how not to approach an international collaboration on main battle tank (MBT) 
design and development, it would be hard to find a better example than the US/FRG MBT-
70, also known as Kpz-70, XM-70 and the ‘US/FRG Tank for the 1970s’.2 The USA and 
FRG committed themselves to designing and building a tank that would be at least a 
generation ahead of anything in service when it was produced yet, from the start, the 
militaries of both sides saw little benefit in collaboration. Problems of unhelpful political 
interference, poor project management, two different languages, different national industrial 
cultures, incompatible military doctrines, and over-ambition, all conspired to make the MBT-
70/Kpz-70 project’s failure almost inevitable.  
NATO had admitted the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1955, at least partly 
as an additional bulwark against the growing power of the Soviet Union.3 With the 
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requirement to build new, democratic forces, almost from scratch, Germany immediately 
looked to her new NATO partners for expertise in rebuilding the FRG’s new tank forces, 
turning firstly to France in 1957 and the ill-fated ‘European Standard Tank’ programme.4 
With that project’s collapse, the Federal Republic began development of her own tank, the 
Leopard (later re-designated Leopard 1 with the arrival of Leopard 2), with the first prototype 
phase running from 1957-1961 (as part of the ‘Standard Tank’ collaboration), followed by a 
second prototype phase, which ran seamlessly from the first phase, 1960-1963, with pre-
series phase running from 1962-1964.5 But the Leopard 1 was not as yet in production when 
Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, persuaded the German Defence Minister to 
collaborate on an entirely new tank design that would represent the very limits of current 
AFV technology. This project would be the US/FRG tank of the 70s, or MBT-70/Kpz-70. 
The other case studies in this thesis are not dealt with other than a cursory fashion in 
the secondary literature, whereas the MBT-70 stands out as the one project which has 
attracted minor but nonetheless identifiable attention, enough indeed that in 1968 Richard 
Ogorkiewicz considered that ‘No tank has attracted as much attention recently as the MBT-
70.’6 Whether this is because the design managed to reach the prototype stage, or because it is 
such an excellent example of how a collaborative project should not be run, or because the 
US Congress demanded an investigation into the causes of MBT-70’s failure, the programme 
has been written about by several authors in varying degrees of detail. 
By far the most important and in-depth treatment is Thomas McNaugher’s study 
written for the RAND Corporation in 1981, detailing the MBT-70 project and subsequent 
                                                
4 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, p. 190. See Chapter 2, above, for more details on the Franco-
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developments using first-hand interviews, project documents and US Congress reports. The 
RAND Note ‘examines that experience in search of lessons for U.S. policymakers, who now 
are attempting to collaborate with their European allies over a broad range of weapon 
systems,’7 which makes it a noteworthy source for this case study. McNaugher not only 
provides details of the evolution of the MBT-70 project, but also the subsequent XM-803 and 
XM-1 projects which lie somewhat outside the parameters of this study. Representing as it 
does the most accessible evaluation of the MBT-70 project to date, McNaugher’s RAND 
Note is most useful for an exploration of the case of the MBT-70. McNaugher also published 
an article in Armed Forces and Society, which is essentially a summary of the RAND Note.8 
Beyond McNaugher, secondary sources do not consider the project in any real depth. 
A handful of authors refer to its proposed technology, usually as a reference to potential 
technological advances and how it was loosely connected to the development of the Leopard 
2 and M1 Abrams.9 In Tank Warfare, Richard Simpkin does cover the basic points of the 
MBT-70 programme, concluding that the ‘MBT 70 project is one of the case studies that 
suggests that main battle tanks are not ideal candidates for standardisation, even though their 
increasing cost and complexity makes collaboration an attractive future option.’10 Hoffman 
and Starry also give the MBT-70 project brief treatment,11 as does Ogorkiewicz, although the 
latter concentrates mainly on the project’s technology rather than the political or project 
management dimensions.12 Although it is mentioned in several other works, these references 
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tend to be brief and are almost incidental background provided to underpin the coverage of 
the Leopard 2 or M1 Abrams main battle tanks. 
Surprisingly, given the disproportionate interest shown in the MBT-70 project 
compared to other collaborations, the documentary source material available has not been 
exploited to the full. Primary source material is to be found in the National Archives of the 
United Kingdom, Kew, the Bovington Tank Museum archives and the Federal German 
military archives in Freiburg. The National Archive files contain British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) reports on the MBT-70 gleaned from British Embassy 
evaluations. The documents and reports on which these evaluations were based were 
generally acquired unofficially as the UK was ‘largely excluded’ from receiving information 
on MBT-70.13 In addition, the project attracted an unusually high level of secrecy, with 
information and updates not being freely shared within NATO but only being released 
annually through official NATO channels.14 The information acquired by the British 
Embassy was largely down to well-established relationships with individuals from within the 
US project team.15 There is also a collection of papers relating to the MBT-70 in the archives 
of the Tank Museum at Bovington; representing largely neutral, third-party accounts of the 
project; such British sources tend to be useful for their impartiality. The military section of 
the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau, provides valuable German source material on the 
MBT-70 programme. 
There are several reasons why the MBT-70 project is essential for any study of 
international collaborative tank projects: not only is its abject failure (at least at first glance) 
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easy to employ as an argument against such projects, it raises a number of fundamental issues 
around international cooperation on tank design. Seen superficially, it seems to offer a perfect 
case study in how not to attempt an international tank design project. The hurdle of the 
language barrier, the distance between the two countries involved, poor project design, very 
divergent military philosophies in relation to tactics and the respective roles of firepower, 
mobility and protection conspired with an over-ambitious agenda to create less than ideal 
conditions for both project teams. While the main driving forces behind the project, namely, 
NATO standardisation and interoperability, were laudable goals,16 it should also be borne in 
mind that this was the first time that such a technically ambitious joint tank development 
programme had been attempted. Thus, it is important not to dismiss the project out of hand at 
the outset. 
The best way to chart and explain the birth, progress and ultimate collapse of the 
MBT-70 project is to consider its main phases in rough, chronological sequence. Following a 
summary of the MBT-70 project’s background and inception, an examination of project’s 
dual management structure will be given. This is followed by the national allocation of 
developmental responsibilities for the new tank and to the technology being developed and 
proposed. With different technological solutions being proposed and negotiated, there will be 
an analysis of the differences of opinion between the two development teams that bedevilled 
the project and led to its failure. The final stages of the project are dealt with thereafter, 
showing how the politicians of both nations lost faith and withdrew their support. To round 
off the chapter there will be a brief look at the fate of FRG/US collaboration within the two 
national tank design programmes which followed the collapse of the MBT-70 project. 
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International Organisation, 36:1 (Winter 1982), p. 95. 
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3. 1. Inception of the MBT-70 Project 
NATO member states had been committed to standardisation for many years.17 Following its 
entry to the alliance in 1955, the Federal Republic had begun building its armed forces in 
1956 and almost immediately began a collaborative main battle tank project with France. 
This project had failed by 1959, with each nation subsequently adopting their sovereign 
design, France with their AMX-30 and the FRG with the Leopard 1. The US Army was 
planning the replacement to the existing M-60 tank when Robert McNamara took office as 
US Secretary of Defense on 21 January 1961. The M-60 was the last in a line of tanks that 
represented a direct linear development beginning with the prototype T-20 in 1942, and 
included the T-26 Pershing and the post-war ‘Patton’ series of M-46, M-47, M-48, and 
ultimately the M-60.18 Although slow, the M-60 was heavily armoured and armed with the 
excellent British 105mm L7 gun, but the US acknowledged that the line was at the upper 
limits of what could be achieved before a completely new design was adopted.  
With numerical inferiority to Warsaw Pact forces in Europe emerging as a major 
concern, there was a requirement for the US to meet quantity with quality.19 The US Army 
was therefore in real need of a completely new tank, and one that represented the best of 
contemporary technology. McNamara, a former businessman and accountant, and described 
by Ogorkiewicz as ‘that arch-apostle of cost-effectiveness’,20 decided that the answer lay in 
collaboration with the FRG. McNamara believed that, despite accepting that war between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact might result in nuclear exchanges, a strong conventional defence 
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would allow a flexible response and mean that NATO would not have to rely on the first use 
of nuclear weapons. An effective modern tank was key to such a conventional defence. From 
his background at Ford, McNamara was used to employing commonality and standardisation 
to achieve efficiency and value for money, and thus the idea of standardisation came 
naturally to him. Ironically, in light of the direction that MBT-70 took, McNamara was 
suspicious of untested technological innovations.21 Nonetheless, he confidently stated that: 
‘From 1970 onwards the German Republic and the USA are going to produce the first joint 
wartime tank in history.’22 Having failed in the attempt to collaborate with France on an MBT 
design, Franz Josef Strauß,23 the West German Minister of Defence, was still eager to 
cooperate with NATO members possessing advanced weapons technology, hoping thereby to 
aid Germany’s economy and political standing. He believed that the FRG could only be a full 
and equal partner within NATO if it possessed at least some advanced defence technology.24 
As the FRG had the Leopard 1 scheduled to enter full production in 1963, any collaboration 
on MBT development would seem to be something of a diversion and not an immediate 
requirement to replace existing tank models. At the same time, the US Army was eager to 
produce a completely new tank, having come up with a requirement in 1957. The 
requirement, endorsed by the Department of the Army in 1959, became the basis for work to 
begin on developing suitable components and such work was already in progress when the 
MBT-70 collaboration overtook it.25 
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For some time, the US Defense Department and Army had been eager to find 
opportunities for becoming involved in sharing and acquiring international research and 
development.26 Upon being appointed US Secretary of Defence in 1961, Robert McNamara 
approached Strauß, his opposite number, with a proposal to collaborate on designing new 
MBTs for their respective countries. As the Leopard programme was already at an advanced 
stage, prototypes having already been produced by 1961, Strauß was initially more interested 
in persuading the USA to buy the Leopard than in entering into a collaboration.27 
Eventually, McNamara and Strauß came to an agreement. At first, in 1962, the two 
countries only committed themselves to jointly developing tank components rather than full 
vehicle designs. At McNamara’s urging, however, FRG and US tank experts entered 
discussions on the desired characteristics of a single future tank. These discussions soon 
became a more formal arrangement and in 1962, McNamara had succeeded in persuading the 
FRG to agree to a full collaboration on developing an entire MBT. The agreement on desired 
tank characteristics was accepted, after some suggested changes, by the NATO working 
group on main battle tanks. Following the Federal elections in January 1963, Strauß had been 
replaced,28 so that, on 1 August 1963, McNamara and the new German Defence Minister, 
Kai-Uwe von Hassell,29 signed an agreement on the formation and the rough pattern of a 
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cooperative programme to develop an entire new MBT, officially designated ‘MBT-70/Kpz-
70’ in March 1965.30 
In 1965, McNamara stated that:  
 
I am interested in […] [the MBT-70] project because I am convinced that 
joint development efforts of this sort with our NATO allies […] can be 
highly beneficial to all concerned. The pooling of idea and sharing of costs 
should make for a better end product at lower expense. Identical items of 
equipment in our inventories simplify maintenance and support problems and 
exemplify that cooperation which is essential to NATO’s success.31 
 
However, while seeking cooperation between the Federal Republic and the United States, 
McNamara in particular was strongly opposed to any British participation in the new 
programme which somewhat undermined the stated aims of NATO standardisation. The 
Germans, by contrast, repeatedly assured the UK that they would welcome British 
involvement. In any event, the advice from the British Foreign Office was not to press for 
inclusion as the programme was unlikely to be successful. They predicted that the Germans 
were unlikely to be enthusiastic about the project, surmising that West Germany was being 
forced into an agreement with the US due to political pressure. Britain, in any case, had little 
need of joining a collaborative programme on the other side of the Atlantic at that time as it 
was looking to produce its own new tank, the Chieftain.32 
The drive for NATO standardisation has always had a strong element of economic as 
well as military reasoning.33 Yet, if simple NATO standardisation was McNamara’s goal, it 
would have made sense to approach one of the other two tank-building nations within NATO, 
France or Britain, as a partner in the collaboration. Indeed, openly sharing technology and 
progress reports within the Alliance would have been a sign that NATO standardisation was 
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31 Ibid. 
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the major goal, yet ‘a virtually complete security ban’ was placed on release of information 
about the MBT-70 project, with updates only being released on an annual basis through 
official NATO channels.34 Several other possible motives for persuading the FRG to join a 
collaboration have been suggested. At the time, Britain was a major tank exporter, with 
Centurion being used around the world, whereas Germany had not produced an indigenous 
tank since the Second World War. British observers suggested that McNamara wanted to 
avoid commercial competition with the UK. Although the new tank would be developed 
collaboratively, export orders would still benefit whichever country they were placed with. 
By not allowing the UK into the partnership, it avoided Britain potentially gaining 
disproportionately high future export orders for the tank from countries already using British 
tanks and thus being more inclined to deal with the United Kingdom than with the United 
States or Federal Republic.35 
Although not mentioned by Robert McNamara, it was noted by several observers that 
in the late 1950s the US had found itself in economic difficulties, with a serious problem with 
their balance of payments.36 The USA had 240,000 troops in bases stationed around West 
Germany and was bearing the cost without any German contributions. The FRG felt that to 
pay towards the stationing of US troops would be politically unacceptable, raising as it did 
the memories of being forced until 1954 to pay punitive occupation costs to the Allies while 
the Federal Republic was under military occupation. As a compromise, the country agreed to 
buy in US military and civilian goods to offset around 75 percent of the garrison costs.37 As 
the initial supposition by many US observers was that the MBT-70 collaboration would 
mainly use US components, it is possible that a motivation for the deal was that the Federal 
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Republic would, in essence, be tied into importing US manufactured components in order to 
construct their own MBT.38 A similar arrangement did, after all, exist when Italy bought the 
rights to construct the US M-113 APC but had to import the components from the USA, only 
securing rights to manufacture them within Italy in 1966.39 
It should be noted that the August 1963 agreement was not a declaration of common 
requirements agreed as part of the MBT-70 programme. It was rather an acknowledgement 
that both the Federal Republic and the US were in broad accord with what they wanted from 
their new tank. Instead of setting down a single specification, the agreement therefore took 
the approach that the existing disagreements and divergence of opinion could be overlooked 
in order that the overall collaboration programme should go ahead. Up to this point (1963), 
the specification for the new tank was consequently remarkably vague. As the first US MBT-
70 programme manager described it, the specification was ‘not at the level of detail that one 
would normally associate with a Qualitative Matériel Requirement (QMR).’ 40 
This vagueness over the specification continued.  By 1965 the three officially stated 
goals of the MBT-70 programme were: 
 
1. To develop a Main Battle Tank which meets the military characteristics 
agreed upon by the two governments, to be ready for production by not 
later than 1970 for joint use. 
2. To make equally available to both governments the knowledge gained 
during the development and to insure [sic] each government the right to 
utilize the resulting knowledge. 
3. To meet to the extent possible during the development, the criteria 
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40 McNaugher, Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks, pp. 3-4, 6. 
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The wording of the first point, an intention to ‘meet the military characteristics agreed upon 
by the two governments’, indicated that, two years after the official start of the programme, 
the military characteristics were still to be agreed upon. This failure to agree was always 
going to cause problems throughout the programme. Even the agreed guidelines for the new 
tank were vague, setting out only that out that the MBT-70 would: 
 
Offer improvements in firepower, mobility, and protection over the M-60A1, 
[…] be capable of operating on a battlefield where tactical nuclear weapons 
are employed, […] be armed with a tube-fire missile, or both a missile and a 
gun combination, and […] have the latest electronics for communications, 
navigation and fire control.42 
 
 
Apart from stating that the new tank would be an improvement over the old ones (a worthy 
goal for any replacement!), the only substantive information within the guidelines was that 
the new tank would use a missile. As noted below, however, even this single specifically 
named goal was to cause many problems.  
The agreed production deadline of December 1969 effectively delayed a replacement 
for the US Army’s M-60 tank by four years, moving it from the original 1965 acceptance 
date. Unhappy at the delay, the US Army were still nonetheless prepared to accept the deal at 
the time because the agreement contained a clause allowing either party to withdraw from the 
project after giving two-months’ notice of intent. They were, after all, potentially going to 
receive a more capable tank than might be expected of a unilateral design. By contrast, the 
Bundeswehr was on the verge of adopting the Leopard and, assuming this design proved 
successful in service, was consequently in no real hurry for another new tank until the late 
1970s.43 The problem of the failure to agree specific requirements was simply not addressed, 
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being sidelined as not as important as the political advantages of securing a collaboration 
agreement. While the requirements should perhaps have been established with the agreement 
signed in 1963, in reality the requirements process continued throughout the programme’s 
life as new ideas were introduced at every stage.44 
3. 2. Parallel Project Teams 
As part of the 1963 agreement, an international ‘Program Management Board’ (PMB) was 
created, with one German and one US programme manager, but no further organisational 
arrangements were specified at that stage. The US programme manager was Major General 
Welborn G. Dolvin, and on the German side, Dr. Fritz Engelmann, later replaced in 1968 by 
General Helmut Schönefeld.45 It is worth noting that Schönefeld46 had been transferred in 
1963 to the Armaments Office of the Army Staff, serving there when the decision to accept 
the Leopard design was taken. The PMB was described as regulating the ‘pulse of the 
project’, with each programme manager being authorised to act for their respective nation on 
all matters relating to the programme. The PMB was the highest-level joint body within the 
programme. Should the PMB be unable to agree or a matter arise which required diplomatic 
or political decisions, the PMB would pass the issue to their nation’s separate political 
apparatus for resolution.47 
In September 1963, Dolvin and Engelmann, the two programme managers, first met 
and began to organise and staff their projects while also beginning the process of refining the 
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rather vague specification so far laid down for the new tank. Four working groups were 
established, equally represented by American and German personnel, one to consider the tank 
concepts, one for the military requirements, one for specifications and standards, and the 
fourth for the legal and funding issues. The second group, the Military Requirements 
Working Group, was the group responsible for taking the vague operational requirements 
established by the August 1963 agreement and turning them into requirements precise enough 
to begin design and manufacture of the MBT-70.48 
The Programme Management Board (PMB) was given complete freedom to organise 
the MBT-70 project. Having decided that forming a single multinational company would be 
impractical, not least legally, they instead decided in 1964 to approach the project by splitting 
responsibility down the middle and establishing two parallel national hierarchies, one 
American and the other German. Immediately below the PMB in the hierarchy were the two 
bodies that represented each respective nation as the Joint Engineering Agency (JEA). To 
staff the US side of the JEA, Dolvin turned to the US Army Tank Automotive Command and 
several other relevant technical commands. Engelmann, by contrast, had no FRG technical 
commands to draw from, so instead filled the German half of the JEA with experts from the 
FRG Defence Ministry’s Federal Equipment and Procurement Office.49 
The JEA had a single reporting body, the Joint Design Team (JDT) which was again 
split along national lines but was staffed by representatives of firms which had bid for the 
contracts to carry out the design work. Illustrating the composition of the JDT, the US 
required that contractor(s) of the JDT provide: 
6x Experienced professional executive engineers and/or management 
personnel,  
1x Experienced lawyer capable of providing counsel in matters of German 
civil law,  
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3x English-speaking secretaries,  
3x English-German interpretors [sic].50 
 
 
The Allison Division of General Motors (GM) won the position as prime contractor for the 
USA in July 1964.51 The FRG, however, had no single contractor of a size and experience 
sufficient to bid for the position of prime contractor on a project the size of MBT-70, and so 
they instead formed a consortium, DeutscheEntwicklungsgesellschaftGmbH (DEG) 
specifically for the joint project. The consortium comprised the firms Krauss-Maffei, Atlas 
MaschinenbaumbH Kiel (MaK), Rheinstahl AG, Daimler-Benz Stuttgart, and Keller and 
Knappich Augsburg (KUKA).52 It was DEG that represented the German half of the JDT. 
The 1963 agreement estimated the project’s development costs at $80 to $100 million, 
to be shared equally between the FRG and USA. The production deadline was set as 
December 1969.53 The US considered that, while the administrative costs of a collaboration 
would be higher than for an equivalent unilateral project, each nation’s share of the unit costs 
would still be lower than with a sovereign design. Although GM and DEG were the prime 
contractors, the sub-contracts on offer were substantial. One document gives a breakdown of 
US contracts awarded by 14 November 1967 for the tank’s developmental phase, which 
included $393,000 for a parametric design/cost effectiveness (PD/CE) study by Lockheed’s 
Aircraft and Missiles Company, $8 million to Philco Corporation for the Shillelagh missile 
system, $2.7 million to Chrysler Corporation for HET-70 (heavy equipment transport), $37.1 
million to Allison Division (GMC) which subcontracted $11 million to Continental Aviation 
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52 TMARL, E2014.3220, copy of article, Jacques Baud, ‘MBT-70/Kpz-70: Revolutionary but Luckless’, Armies 
and Weapons, year not identifiable but possibly 1975, p. 38.  
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for the engine and $2 million to National Waterlift Company for the hydro-pneumatic 
suspension system.54 
The potential problems associated with international collaboration were known, even 
if they were not necessarily fully addressed. As an article in the US journal Armed Forces 
Management set out in 1965:  
 
In addition to normal complications that arise in developing a new weapon 
system, there must be compounded into this venture the obstacles of 
language, distance and culture. Another challenge that planners face is the 
welding of the diverse views of the diplomat, soldier, civil servant, engineer 
and industrialist from both countries into a useful end product.55 
 
 
The problem of designing a single tank which suited two different national tank concepts was 
certainly recognised by the PMB members, Dolvin and Engelmann. With two equal partners 
arguing for their own designs to be adopted, there had to be a single decision-maker who 
could break the tie. Consequently, in December 1964 the PMB contracted Lockheed to take 
all the design concepts submitted and create a virtual ‘rubber tank’ whose characteristics 
could be manipulated inside a computer. Each iteration of the tank would then be run through 
combat simulators to determine which design would be most cost-effective. This parametric 
design and cost effectiveness (PD/CE) study was intended to act as an ‘impartial umpire’ to 
adjudicate in the inevitable differences of opinion arising from different national tank 
philosophies and doctrine.56 
Overall management of the MBT-70 project, and thus of the PMB, was the 
responsibility of the Army Materiel Command in the US, and in the FRG of the Federal 
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Ministry of Defence.57 Final project authority was held by the PMB, and Dolvin and 
Engelmann had complete authority over their respective national teams. This meant that all 
the unilateral decisions required by the programme had to be negotiated at the JDT and JEA 
levels, then agreed at PMB level by both Dolvin and Engelmann. If they could not reach 
agreement, a new round of discussion at the national JDT and JEA levels would be required 
before the process was repeated until an agreement was reached. Each partner team needed to 
be consulted at each important stage and before any major decision was made.58 
Early signs of the bureaucratic disadvantages of having two parallel hierarchies in 
different countries became apparent when a decision had to be made as to where the MBT-70 
programme would actually be based, the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Mirroring the bi-national nature of the whole project, the decision was finally made to base 
the programme in Koblenz in Germany until 1966 and, then, with the assumption that the 
prototypes would be ready by that stage, to relocate the whole management organisation to 
Detroit. Leadership of the JEA and JDT would fall to the nation in whose country the project 
was currently not based, so the USA would lead while the project was located in Germany 
and vice-versa. It was in September 1964, a year after the official start to the MBT-70 
programme, that the JDT and JEA members first met in Koblenz. Although the delay allowed 
Dolvin and Engelmann time to staff their subordinate bodies and tender for JDT contractors, 
there was still no design requirement in place upon which to build. The process of firming up 
the vague list of characteristics set out at the inception of the project had been expected to 
take only ‘five or six months’ yet, a year after the project had begun, no firm specification of 
military characteristics had been established.59 
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Language difficulties contributed significantly to the problems faced by the 
international collaborative team, especially as the project involved the use of highly technical 
and specialised terms. In one notable example, Dolvin records that the two sides negotiated a 
particular key point for two hours before realising that, due to a mistranslation, they were 
arguing over different things. There was obviously a requirement for interpreters to have the 
necessary engineering and technical knowledge to cope with the language and concepts being 
discussed. Unfortunately, the US team could not fill the post at the salary being offered and 
hence asked that the interpreter position be allocated a higher pay grade. This was initially 
refused because the raise would have resulted in the project interpreter being paid more than 
the interpreter of the US President.60 If we assume that this problem of mistranslation was not 
an isolated incident, then it suggests that language problems must have added to the already 
extensive time spent on negotiation and hence to the deadline being extended by two years 
before the project finally collapsed.61 
At a time before mobile telephones, email and instant online communication, even the 
disruption caused by travel and geographical dislocation was of major concern. Senior and 
important personnel frequently had to travel from Germany to the USA and vice-versa, and 
were thus unavailable at their home company for long periods. Indeed, while actually 
travelling, they were unavailable to anyone in the project team. While this could be disruptive 
when a key individual was travelling, it was a far greater problem when several members of a 
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team were unavailable. One US executive was heard to shout despairingly, ‘Right now 
damned near everybody I’ve got is in Germany.’62 
3. 3. Division of Responsibility 
By 1962, under the terms of the agreement to collaborate on tank components, the United 
States and Federal Republic had agreed on the characteristics which would be needed for a 
new NATO tank. A NATO working group suggested some modifications which were duly 
integrated, and the working group approved the set of characteristics in January 1963.63 
Using these characteristics as a guide, Dolvin and Engelmann agreed the basic MBT-70 
military characteristics in March 1965.64 Simpkin suggests that that the Germans and 
Americans had ‘little difficulty’ in reaching an operational requirement for the MBT-70.65 
Given the time taken to reach the 1965 agreement, which itself had been based largely on an 
agreement reached two years earlier, as well as the subsequent disagreements over the tank’s 
design features, Simpkin might have been generous in his conclusion. 
The initial intention of the project was that each nation would focus on components 
according to their perceived particular technical expertise, with the USA tackling the 
weapons system, engine and primary fire-control, and the FRG responsible for the secondary 
armament, transmission, auto-loader and suspension. The decision was eventually made that, 
of the tank’s 34 basic components, 18 would be developed solely by the FRG, six solely by 
the USA, and the remaining ten by both countries jointly.66 
However, while the hull and turret layout remained as joint design considerations, 
collaborative development for the rest of the MBT-70 was in no real sense a joint effort. 
                                                
62 TMARL, E2014.3247, copy of article; Anon., ‘How is the West German-American Main Battle Tank 
Development Program Coming Along’, Armed Forces Management, January 1965, p. 45. 
63 McNaugher, Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks, p. 3. 
64 Ibid., p. 14. 
65 Simpkin, Tank Warfare, p. 67. 
66 TMARL, E2014.3220, Baud, ‘MBT-70/Kpz-70: Revolutionary but Luckless’, p. 38. 
155 
 
Having been developing their own tank for several years at the time that MBT-70 agreement 
was signed, the USA already had components under development and saw little reason to 
discontinue these. As the FRG had been unconvinced of the effectiveness of US-developed 
components, such as the main armament and the diesel engine, they duplicated the work and 
developed their own components in parallel with the US. For example, although the USA was 
supposed to have responsibility for the engine, Daimler-Benz also received funding from 
DEG (the German JDT consortium) to develop a German engine which would be less 
complicated than the proposed US Continental design. Both German and US developers 
simply unilaterally developed their own components and then fought to include their 
particular design in the joint requirement agreement with little regard to the initial division of 
responsibility. While the project agreement had allocated responsibility for such components 
to the US, the FRG therefore found itself with little need to avail itself of US technology in 
order to build its own modern MBT. In particular, the Americans wanted the Shillelagh 
missile system to be the tank’s main armament, although this had never been accepted by the 
Germans. The Americans’ conciliatory attempts to modify the launcher to fire conventional 
152mm shells did not convince the West Germans that the launcher would be better than a 
conventional 120mm gun. Neither were the Germans happy at the increasing weight of the 
tank. They were adamant that the new vehicle should meet a MLC-50 bridging limit; yet all 
the US designs exceeded that weight, partly due to their prioritising of armour over 
mobility.67 
This duplication of effort was justified at the time by claiming that it was desirable to 
have a second design in reserve should the primary design prove to be unsatisfactory. But it 
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was likely that both sides were simply eager to advance their own political and industrial 
agenda by gaining valuable experience and expertise in developing the components so as to 
have them adopted for the MBT-70. The firms comprising the FRG’s DEG consortium held 
the commercial patents and rights to their own designs and were naturally eager to have these 
designs used in a new MBT. Funding from the project allowed components to be developed, 
but the real money would have been in selling those components for use in a production MBT 
with potentially large sales within the NATO Alliance. The US firms, on the other hand, 
would not have kept the commercial rights to their designs, which would have been held by 
the government, but many had already invested time and resources in development as part of 
the earlier US tank replacement programme. It would have been painful to have seen such 
investment go to waste, especially as the components had been tailored to the specific needs 
of the US Army.68 
Finally, political will to see the programme succeed ironically doomed it. With both 
nations looking for different military solutions, the project should have stalled before it really 
got going. Instead of accepting that they were looking for two different tanks, or 
compromising requirements for the sake of the collaboration, the project instead dealt with 
the impasse diplomatically, if impractically, by trying to please both parties; allowing each 
nation to separately develop the components that they wanted. The result was, of course, that 
each nation designed a different tank and the two designs bore little of the standardisation or 
interoperability features which had been at the heart of the collaborative ethos. The Lockheed 
parametric design and cost effectiveness (PD/CE) study had been commissioned to overcome 
the problem of two different design teams backing their own national designs and refusing to 
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compromise, but this did not prevent each nation backing their own component and tank 
design concepts, resulting in time-consuming delays when attempting to establish the tank’s 
specific requirements.69 
3. 4. Technological Innovations 
Hopes for the new tank were initially high. Official press reports said of the tank: ‘Officially 
designated the MBT-70, the new weapon will outshoot, out-maneuver and outrun any known 
tank and, at the same time, provide unprecedented crew protection.’70 This was quite an 
impressive and optimistic goal to be aiming for, but the US development team believed that 
the components would all be ready. The US had had their existing tank development project 
that they had set aside when the MBT-70 collaboration agreement was signed, and this 
provided several of the key design features of the new tank. The three-man crew, the 
provision of an auto-loader, the US-developed diesel engine, hydro-pneumatic suspension, 
and the Shillelagh missile system, all came from this original US design.71 Paper projections 
and early prototype trials of the MBT-70 suggested that it would be ‘a marked improvement’ 
in speed, agility and on-the-move shooting accuracy.72 An M-60 tank traversing a ‘ripple 
course’, a series of low humps set close together and resembling corrugations, was able to 
maintain eight mph and even this, it was noted, had resulted in an injury to the driver. The 
MBT-70 with its hydro-pneumatic suspension, by contrast, is reported to have ‘apparently’ 
managed the course at 25mph with no (vertical) hull movement.73 
The MBT-70 requirement represented several major technological departures from 
existing conventional tank designs. While they were in use in Warsaw Pact tanks, NATO had 
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not yet developed and fitted an effective autoloader and had, consequently, always had four-
man MBT crews. Furthermore, new for a NATO tank was the dedicated NBC-protected 
turret capsule concept and the use of a hydro-pneumatic suspension, intended to adjust the 
height of the tank to take advantage of local terrain for firing from‘hull-down’ positions. This 
system was fitted to the revolutionary turretless Swedish Strv-103 (the ‘S-tank’) which was at 
the prototype stage in 1961, but it had not been adopted by any other armed forces at that 
point.74 The power-to-weight requirement for the MBT-70 was also new, much higher than 
with any previous NATO tank which, as a result, required a more powerful engine.75 
As time went on, instead of compromising on one system, competing components 
were simply added to the design and the weight inevitably began to increase. Although the 
US representatives saw higher weight as acceptable, the German team were insistent on a 
tank that met their 46-ton, MLC-50 limit. With neither design team able to solve the problem 
even at PMB level, the debate was addressed by the two national defence ministries. Their 
impractical – and, as it transpired, impossible – solution was to increase the MBT’s specified 
upper weight limit at the same time as focussing on reducing further weight increases to the 
design, all without reducing the tank’s effectiveness as specified in the agreed military 
requirement.76 
The MBT-70’s external dimensions were fairly conventional when compared to 
contemporary tanks, having a considerably lower silhouette than the notoriously tall 3.27m 
M-60A1, and being narrower than the equally notorious 3.63m wide M-47.77 The width limit 
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had originally specified that two tanks should be able to cross a standard NATO bridge 
simultaneously, and the height was to allow the tank to pass under existing underpasses. The 
design’s width in 1967 was 3.5m (138”) and the height to the top of the turret was 2.29m 
(90”), or 1.83m (72”) with the hydro-pneumatic suspension lowered, plus an additional 0.3m 
(12”) when the turret-mounted auxiliary 20mm gun was raised to its fullest extent. The length 
was 7.62m (25 foot) excluding the length of the gun.78 
US doctrine called for engagement ranges out to 3000m, beyond the realistic 
capability of contemporary 105mm guns. In its eagerness to develop a completely new and 
sophisticated main battle tank to enter service around 1965, the US Army turned to the 
Shillelagh anti-tank guided missile system (ATGM) in a stabilised turret, and fed by an 
autoloader.79 Following the end of the Second World War, both the French and Americans 
regarded shaped-charge warheads as the best anti-tank ammunition available, and this, 
combined with the US Army’s tank doctrine of engaging at long range, led to the US Army’s 
Armament for Future Tanks and Similar Combat Vehicles Committee (ARCOV) 
recommending in 1957 that future tanks should be armed with guided missiles rather than 
guns. This recommendation led directly to the development of the Shillelagh missile 
system.80 
The XM-13 Shillelagh Combat Vehicle Weapon System, 152mm missile launcher, as 
later used in the M551 Sheridan armoured reconnaissance vehicle and M-60A2 support tank, 
was approximately half the weight and length of a 105mm gun and its infra-red (IR) guided 
missiles were effective out to ranges beyond that of contemporary conventional guns.81 The 
term ‘Shillelagh’ properly referred only to the missile itself, although in casual usage the 
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whole XM-13 system was often called ‘Shillelagh’.82 The US tested the Shillelagh against the 
existing 105mm of the M-60A1 and showed that the Shillelagh had improved penetration, 
rounds-to-kill over 500m, time-to-kill, and first-round hit probability over 500m.83 
The FRG representatives did not agree that ATGMs were the future of tank armament 
and wanted a more conventional gun. As a compromise, the Americans modified the XM-13 
to enable it to fire conventional 152mm high-velocity rounds with combustible cartridges. 
The initial XM-13 system used a barrel only 17.5 calibres long, but this short barrel length 
made it unsuitable for firing high-velocity ammunition which required a longer barrel.84 The 
Germans requested a weapon that could fire more conventional high velocity rounds and, in 
1967, the length of the barrel was increased to 30.5 calibres. This new gun/launcher was 
named the XM-150 (also sometime referred to as the XM-152).85 
It was noted that the calibre of the 152mm gun-launcher design allowed for the 
potential firing of tactical nuclear warheads, although given the limited range of the XM-150 
it would have had to be a desperate situation to do so.86 More practically, although rifled, the 
XM-150 could fire armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding-sabot (APFSDS) rounds, the 
best kinetic energy (KE) anti-armour round available, by using ‘slipping bands’ to steady the 
projectile in the rifled barrel and, thus, avoid spinning the finned dart which would have 
degraded its penetrative capabilities.87 This system of slipping bands was later adopted (with 
modification) by the British Army to fire APFSDS rounds from its 120mm rifled guns. A 
British Embassy’s Defence Research and Development Staff (DRDS) evaluation of the XM-
150 firing APFSDS expressed doubts about its accuracy, citing that the MBT-70 office was 
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being ‘extremely reticent’ about the accuracy figures, although their view on the Shillelagh 
missile itself was that it ‘should be alright’ following the twelve years and many millions of 
dollars that had been spent on its development.88 
Although XM-13 Shillelagh missile system worked as an ATGM, attempts to convert 
it to fire conventional ammunition resulted in problems developing a combustible cartridge 
that completely burnt away and did not leave smouldering residual debris in the breach 
chamber. In addition, the combustible cartridge cases were found to be excessively 
hygroscopic, absorbing water and becoming useless.89 The British Embassy’s DRDS also 
highlighted several problems they believed existed with the MBT-70’s autoloader.90 There 
was little doubt that the autoloader was causing problems and the Germans were having many 
technical problems in developing it.91 The XM-150 autoloader was only capable of loading 
seven or eight rounds per minute due to the combustible cartridge cases fracturing at higher 
rates. It also required that the gun be returned to the horizontal after each shot, and then 
automatically returning to the last sighting position after the round was loaded.92 The 
autoloader held eight ‘ready’ rounds and, whilst the US developers stated that these could be 
replaced from the tank’s 26-round magazine from inside the tank, they accepted that the lack 
of space would make this very difficult to achieve.93 In practice, it is highly likely that 
reloading the 8-round autoloader would have had to be carried out outside the tank, requiring 
the crew to pull out of action and take the tank to a safer area.94 
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Other potential problems with the XM-150 gun/launcher were identified, such as the 
IR tracker, meaning that it would be unable to be fired within 7 degrees of the sun.95 Another 
potential issue was that, while the system employed a ‘multi-purpose’ CE round (HEAT), a 
white phosphorous (WP) smoke round and a practice round, there was no provision for a 
standard HE round.96 This meant that a ATGM-armed MBT-70 would have little ability to 
suppress or engage area targets outside machine-gun ranges and would consequently require 
external artillery support. However, the US design team persisted with the ATGM-armed 
tank concept even after the end of the MBT-70 programme, possibly because of the money 
and resources already sunk into the Shillelagh, XM-13 and XM-150 projects.97 A covering 
note by a member of the British Army Staff on an 1967 article in the US Armed Forces 
Management journal suggests that the article’s claim that the MBT-70’s firepower had a 
‘better than two-to-one firepower superiority over any tank in use today’ was ‘misleading’. 
The covering note also pointed out that information from ‘some quarters’ responsible for US 
tank-crew training had expressed doubt that new crewmen could be ‘adequately’ instructed 
on the new tank within their draft period (then two years for US Army draftees).98 
Another unique innovation was in siting of all three crewmen in the turret. The US 
requirement for an autoloader meant a reduction of crew from the usual NATO complement 
of four down to only three men. At the same time, the FRG demanded improved NBC 
protection for the crew. The solution was a ‘crew pod’ housed in the turret which contained 
all crew positions and could be NBC shielded at a fraction of the weight of shielding a 
separate hull position for the driver.99 The driver was set in a contra-rotating capsule within 
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the tank turret, allowing him to maintain forward vision even when the turret rotated.100 Tests 
had been successfully carried out to determine the effectiveness of using polyethylene 
containing boron as shielding against neutrons, with the result that the MBT-70 turret had a 
double skin which was to be filled with this compressed boron-enriched polyethylene.101 As 
additional NBC protection, wading tubes were to be fitted to feed air to the engine only, 
leaving the crew to use a bottle of oxygen in the turret. The system was thought to provide 
about 40 minutes of breathable air, although it was noted that a similar system equipping 
Panzer IIIs for the 1940 operation SEALION had only managed to supply ten minutes of 
breathable air in practice.102 
A 1961 UK report on the planned MBT-70 recorded that the driver-in-turret position 
was shown to have advantages over the usual driver-in-hull arrangement: it gave 80% better 
vision; was out of the mud splash; was out of any mine blast area; the commander did not 
always have to direct the driver; it gave higher vision in engagements particularly when in a 
hull-down position; and, it allowed the tank to ford depths up to the top of the turret without 
requiring preparation to seal the driver’s position.103 However, the driver in his own contra-
rotating turret would often suffer motion sickness and nausea as the main turret moved 
around him.104 In addition, having all crew positions in the turret led to a necessity to link all 
instruments and controls to there. One UK observer considered that there were an ‘excessive’ 
number of hydraulic and electrical links from the hull to the turret (seven hydraulic and 220 
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electrical, compared with a total of 27 in Chieftain).105 Such concern was, perhaps, justified 
when the entire crew was sharing the turret space with so many potential hazards because 
linkages were particularly prone to damage in the case of turret hits. 
The US engine contractor was originally US Continental, already working on a diesel 
engine for the M-60’s replacement.106 Continental, however, found that their engine could not 
produce the required power. The US MBT-70 prototypes fitted with the beleaguered diesel 
engine were not only underpowered but gave off ‘an appalling amount’ of black exhaust 
smoke when the accelerator was depressed.107 Having had doubts about the Continental 
diesel engine from the beginning, the Germans had developed their own Daimler-Benz diesel 
engine in parallel and this proved to be superior. The German diesel engine proposed for 
MBT-70 (and later used in Leopard 2) was rated as between 1475 and 1500 bhp, meeting the 
MBT-70 requirements and, significantly, being shown to work. The Germans consequently 
moved to use the engine on the new tank.108 The US did not wish to have so important a 
component as the engine move from their sphere of responsibility to that of the FRG team 
and resisted the German move.  
The US apparently faced a choice of continuing with an inadequate US-developed 
diesel engine or adopting the German one against the established division of responsibility. 
Instead of choosing either option they decided to move their focus to formerly obscure gas-
turbine technology and introduced a gas turbine engine into the MBT-70 specification.109 The 
US plan was to replace the troubled Continental diesel with a Lycoming gas turbine, although 
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this plan was, in the event, not followed up by the time of the project’s cancellation.110 The 
UK’s evaluation of the Swedish ‘S-Tank’ trials indicated that gas turbine engines had a 
tendency to produce a large heat shimmer which was judged to be worse even than producing 
excessive exhaust smoke because smoke only tended to be an issue when the engine was 
revved to move, whereas the heat shimmer hovered above even a stationary tank.111 As the 
initial MBT-70 design did not include a small charging set, intended to run electrical 
components while the main engine was powered down, the engine would have had to run for 
long periods even while stationary, so the heat shimmer would have represented a major 
problem for concealment.112 
While under development, the US Lycoming Army Ground Turbine (AGT) 1500hp 
gas turbine was promised to run at a similar level of fuel efficiency as contemporary diesels. 
When eventually fitted, however, it proved to have double the fuel consumption, representing 
a major logistical implication for any tank fleet so equipped. Indeed, even at idle a gas turbine 
engine could consume ten gallons of fuel per hour.113 An attempt was made in the 1980s to 
demonstrate better fuel efficiency in gas turbine engines and overcome the reluctance of other 
nations to use such technology in their tanks. A Garrett GT-601 gas turbine engine was test-
fitted to a variety of NATO tanks and proved to have a consumption only 10 percent higher 
than an equivalent diesel. However, to achieve this, the engine was twice as large and heavy 
per horsepower as the AGT-1500 and thus offered no benefits over diesel engines.114 
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Sixteen prototypes were initially planned, eight each for the US and FRG. As costs 
rose, though, pressures on the budget led to a reduction in the planned prototypes to only six 
each.115 The first MBT-70 prototype was completed in July 1967 at the Cleveland Army 
Tank Automotive Plant, operated by the Allison division of General Motors.116 By the time 
the prototypes were built, it was obvious that compromising designs on paper by trying to 
please everyone was not possible when faced with physically building a tank. The two 
prototypes each suited their builder nation’s military requirement more than they represented 
a collaborative compromise.117 By 1968, for example, the FRG team had decided that the US 
Continental diesel engine was simply not powerful enough and decided to simply replace it 
on five of its prototypes with German Daimler-Benz MTU 873 Ka multi-fuel engines. The 
Continental produced 1475hp at 2300rpm, the Daimler-Benz produced 1500hp at 2600rpm. 
Practical testing of the prototypes began in 1969. Another six prototypes were built by each 
country by 1969, but by the end of that year the Federal Republic had decided to cancel the 
project.118 
The high level of new and complex technology demanded by the project made at least 
some failures probably inevitable. Installing the Shillelagh missile system was one particular 
area of development that did not run smoothly. Getting the system correctly installed in the 
turret and solving the problem of the combustible cartridges led to delays. Faced with the 
problems that the US were having in developing and fitting the XM-150, the Germans, never 
convinced of the superiority of mounting an ATGM in the tank, began working on a more 
conventional 120mm smoothbore gun which subsequently replaced the XM-150 on the 
German prototypes.119 Although the appearance of the prototypes marked the end of the 
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MBT-70 programme, the project had never really embodied a collaboration in any real sense. 
Neither country had fully accepted the specifications representing the military requirements 
of the other. The biggest warning flag that the project was finished must have been when it 
was obvious that future MBT-70 models would have to use different engines and armament 
depending on which country they were produced to supply.120 
The project was pioneering and ambitious in many ways, which could have been a 
major benefit had the technology been made to function effectively. As it was, three main 
areas were assessed by the UK embassy staff as being, ‘unduly sophisticated, complicated 
and thus expensive’. These were the driver in the turret, the variable height and tilt facility 
offered by the hydro-pneumatic suspension, and the autoloader.121 The components planned 
for MBT-70 were ahead of their time and the difficulties inherent in their development added 
considerably to the design’s delays and increasing costs.122 As Ogorkiewicz put it, ‘The […] 
inherent fault of the approach exemplified by the MBT-70 program was the assumption that, 
once a new concept was approved on the basis of analytical studies, sufficient resources 
could always be mobilised to put it into practice’; and, he added that ‘In principle this may be 
true, but thenecessary expenditure of effort and money may be unacceptably high or 
evenunnecessary.’123 
3. 5. Differences of Opinion 
In the circumstances of the 1960s, it would have taken strong management decision-making 
and significant compromise to get both design teams to agree on what was required. The US 
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M-60 was the result of continual upgrades of the same basic design that dated back to the M-
26 of the 1940s; and, the US Army was in dire need of a completely new tank to replace it.124 
The Americans wanted a new MBT as soon as possible, but the Germans had almost finished 
development of the Leopard and were therefore looking at least a decade into the future 
before requiring a new tank model.125 The US half of the MBT-70 project team were 
committed to the US components and tank specifications that had been drawn up before the 
agreement to collaborate. Having invested almost six years in drawing up specifications for 
the M-60’s replacement, the US was reluctant to abandon or compromise that work. 
McNaugher reported: ‘Some members of the Army’s Tank Automotive Command apparently 
assumed that the joint program would involve little more than a continuation of their 
component development efforts, perhaps with a certain amount of German “kibitzing” in the 
background.’126 
The timescale and existing investment aside, the United States and the Federal 
Republic had different military requirements linked to their respective military doctrines. The 
FRG’s tank doctrine in this period called for short-range engagements (1000 metres or less) 
in a highly mobile form of manoeuvre warfare.127 Consequently, they were less concerned 
about long-range firepower and protection than with ensuring low weight and high mobility. 
The FRG was looking at a vehicle that could negotiate West Germany’s secondary road 
network and bridges, and hence wanted a tank that met the MLC-50 limit, looking for a tank 
weighing a maximum of 46 tons.128 
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By contrast, the US Army’s tank doctrine of the time, which was based on bringing 
enemy tanks under long-range fire from defensive positions, called for tanks to have a 
reasonable chance of hitting and destroying the enemy at ranges of between 2000 to 3000 
metres.129 This was at the upper limits or beyond the capability of contemporary tank guns 
and aiming systems, so the US looked to anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which had 
longer effective range and could use infra-red guidance to hit their targets. Unlike 
conventional tank gun rounds, missile diameters are also not restricted by the calibre of the 
firing gun and can, therefore, carry a relatively large shaped-charge high-explosive anti-tank 
(HEAT) warhead. As a consequence of planning to fight at long range from relatively static 
defensive positions, US tank designs did not need to place a high emphasis on mobility, 
andcould thus afford the luxury of heavy armour; hence, the US design aimed for a 55-ton 
weight limit (MLC-60), nine tons and, significantly, one bridging class higher than the 
German limit.130 
Gary Bloedon wrote at the time that the divergent tank philosophies within NATO 
could best be seen by comparing the contemporary MBT designs of France, the FRG and the 
UK (the USA’s tank design philosophy largely agreed with that of the UK). The AMX-30 
weighed 35.8 tons with a road speed of 40mph, the Leopard 1 weighed 42.9 tons with a road 
speed of 42mph, but the heavily-armoured Chieftain weighed 56.2 tons and had a 25mph 
road speed. The French and German tanks both had 105mm guns, but the UK had opted for 
the 120mm. The proponents of lighter armour cited the ability of modern weapons to defeat 
practically any thickness of armour, concluding that the loss of mobility associated with extra 
armour was not a worthwhile exchange. Bloedon pointed out, however, that there has never 
been a time in the tank’s history when it has been invulnerable to contemporary weapons. He 
                                                




suggested that saving money by reducing the effectiveness of a tank is a false economy, 
noting, ‘I feel that a tank that cannot do the job is more expensive than one which can.’131 
The USA was committed to using the XM-13 Shillelagh ATGM system in the new 
tank. This suited their doctrine of engaging opponents at long-range from defensive positions, 
but the system proved expensive and highly complex. The price of the missile system would 
have been a hugely significant part of any tank it was fitted to, actually costing more to 
develop than any proposed tank design. It should be noted, however, that some in the 
American military were as unconvinced as the Germans of the superiority of the ATGM over 
the conventional tank gun, and many advocated retaining a gun for the new tank. To break 
the impasse, the US team decided to modify the Shillelagh to fire conventional APFSDS 
rounds as well as missiles. The result was the XM-150, a 152mm gun/missile launcher which 
was even more expensive, complicated and time-consuming than the XM-13 both to develop 
and produce.132 
The FRG were primarily unconvinced by the XM-150 gun/launcher because they did 
not believe that the likely engagement ranges in Central Europe would be long enough to see 
the advantages of using the Shillelagh as the tank’s main armament. In addition, the 
contemporary cost of the missiles at between $2500 and $3000 each compared unfavourably 
with the $240 cost of a conventional 105mm HEAT round. The FRG estimated that on a 
1500-tank production run of a XM-150-armed MBT-70 (1500 tanks being the production 
numbers for their recent Leopard 1), each tank would cost them DM 2.4 million compared 
with DM 2.2 million for a similar run of a conventional 120mm-armed version.133 In 
addition, using 152mm tank rounds meant that the tank could not carry so many reloads and 
manual reloading would be slow and tiring. The MBT-70 partly solved the problem of shell 
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weight by using an autoloader system which held eight rounds in the autoloader and could 
reload from a magazine of 26 rounds.134 However, holding only 26 rounds, let alone only 8 
‘ready’ rounds, was a liability for an armoured doctrine which emphasised manoeuvre and 
mobility, although not so much of an issue for tanks that were intended to engage the enemy 
at long range from static positions.  
US doctrine was also somewhat different to what had been issued by the Bundeswehr 
when addressing the dangers of battlefield nuclear radiation protection for the tank crew.135 A 
nuclear weapon detonation involves the release of both neutron and gamma radiation, the 
former primarily from the initial burst and the latter from ‘fallout’ resulting from the gamma 
radiation contaminating the surrounding terrain and then being emitted from the earth. While 
tests showed that standard steel AFV armour gave good protection against gamma radiation 
even on less well-armoured vehicles, it was much less effective against neutron radiation. 
Adding dedicated polyethylene shielding could significantly reduce the neutron radiation 
passing into the tank but this was bulky and added weight.136 The US team decided that it was 
not worthwhile attempting to provide significant protection against neutron radiation by 
adding bulky shielding to their tanks, but the FRG team were more interested in providing a 
higher measure of nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) protection.137 However, the Germans 
were prepared to compromise to attain a lower weight, accepting a reduction of both the NBC 
and armour protection, even though the radiological protection being reduced was already 
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‘considerably less’ than initially specified by them.138 The Americans, however, did not wish 
to reduce the armour on their designs and thus the problem of weight remained. 
Finally, in almost a parody of the difficulties faced by international collaborations, the 
two sides could not agree on whether the screw threads should be in metric or imperial.139 
Neither side was prepared to alter their existing industry-standard tooling for the sake of the 
project, believing that such a move would adversely affect their respective industrial and 
logistics chain. The FRG put the case that metric was becoming the standard system of 
measurement throughout the world, but the US countered by pointing out that the USA, UK 
and Canada still used imperial and that the ‘unified inch’ was still commonly used worldwide 
for screws and other fasteners, independent of the rise of metrication in other measurements. 
Following a year of disagreement at PMB level, the decision was passed up the political 
hierarchy for the respective national governments to deal with.140 The eventual compromise 
reached was to use metric for FRG-produced components and imperial for those produced in 
the USA. Where two components joined, the thread would be metric.141 One can only 
imagine the impact such an arrangement would have had on supply and maintenance teams in 
theatre had it been adopted. 
The MBT-70’s requirement as reached through the collaborative process was a 
compromise which did not satisfy either nation. The main armament was a major point of 
disagreement, with the FRG doubtful of the utility of the missile system and preferring a 
conventional gun. Meanwhile, the USA did not believe that the NBC-protected capsule in the 
turret was required and would have preferred to use the space and weight either to decrease 
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the vehicle weight or, more likely, increase the armour. Some of the main points of 
disagreement were managed simply by incorporating both the conflicting requirements into 
the design. Thus, the debate over the Shillelagh missile system versus the conventional gun 
resulted in attempts to develop a 152mm kinetic energy (KE) round with a combustible 
cartridge case. The FRG’s commitment to NBC shielding, with the attendant additional 
weight and bulk, was also added to the specification without any concomitant reduction of 
other components to compensate.142 
Part of the problem was that, at the stage when the military characteristics were being 
drawn up, the designs existed only on paper, so the practical problem of incorporating so 
many different components was overlooked. Severe problems caused by the collaborative 
nature of the project became far more obvious once the design had moved to the prototype 
phase.143 The German components were reported by the US to be, ‘too heavy or didn’t work 
very well’, and the US claimed that these components were holding up the project and 
delaying development. US components were reported by the FRG, on the other hand, to be 
too expensive and complicated, and, in particular, the Germans were unconvinced by 152mm 
gun/launcher.144 
Rather than acting as a final arbiter for the two conflicting national design proposals, 
the Lockheed PD/CE study that appeared in February 1965 appears to have simply supported 
proposals from both sides. Dolvin, who was jointly responsible for initiating the PD/CE 
study, is quoted as saying that while, ‘the PD/CE Study did play an important role in the 
decision process […], it should be emphasized that it was not the sole source for decision.’ 
Another participant noted: ‘It appears as if the mass of data generated by the PD/CE Study 
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did not change greatly the design being approached by the unilateral US program which had 
already been initiated.’145 Although the MBT-70 project led to prototypes in 1967, by that 
stage of the programme there had been significant increases in costs and lengthening of time 
estimates which had reduced the popularity of the whole project.146 
3. 6. The End for MBT-70 
The collaborative basis for the MBT-70 began to fall apart as the project settled into an 
unofficial policy of parallel development of components and disagreement over the tank’s 
requirements, In late 1967, the first prototypes appeared and these demonstrated how far the 
two nations had abandoned any serious commitment to joint development. Two key areas for 
military interoperability and standardisation are the gun and the engine; in neither of these 
areas did the MBT-70 prototypes show any acceptance of the principles of standardisation. 
German models contained German diesel engines while US prototypes held the troubled US 
engine, with the new gas turbine in development and likely to replace it. Although the 
Shillelagh XM-150 was mounted on the prototypes of both countries, the Germans were 
committed to replacing the ATGM system with their 120mm smoothbore gun when it 
became available.147 
Interestingly, in September 1968 MBT-70 was the sole remaining international 
collaborative weapons programme within NATO, following the cancellation of the 
US/German V/STOL fighter programme in early 1968. However, duplication of effort 
combined with problems associated with using new technology meant that even by 1967, the 
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schedule and cost had over-run by a significant margin. Support for the MBT-70 project 
started to decline both in the United States and the Federal Republic.148 
As of 14 November 1967, the project was two years behind schedule. The MBT-70’s 
In Service Date (ISD) had originally been December 1969 and, although the US now 
accepted an ISD of 1971, the FRG was happy with an ISD of 1972.149 Pressure on the 
programme was mounting. The UK’s Master General of Ordnance visited the USA in 1969 
and ascertained that a reappraisal of the project would be completed by the end of that year. 
He believed that, if the FRG dropped out, which was thought ‘more than likely’, then it was 
probable that the USA would continue alone.150 The Federal Republic did not abandon the 
project completely in 1969, but instead significantly reduced its involvement because they 
saw rising costs as well as the programme not meeting their own requirements.151 
In particular, the Federal Republic was not as insistent as the US on the project 
completion date: it had already brought Leopard to near production status at the time of 
McNamara’s approach to collaborate; the tank entering service in 1965. To fund an 
increasingly expensive MBT programme due to reach production five years after the Leopard 
was a somewhat profligate use of scarce funds at a time when the FRG was still building its 
armed services. Aggravating the issue was the USA’s apparent willingness to increase the 
costs of the MBT-70 project in order to speed it up; the US having urgent need of a 
replacement for the existing M-60. In February 1968, Robert McNamara resigned as US 
Secretary of Defense following disagreements with President Lyndon B. Johnson over the 
United States’ role in Vietnam. By 1969 the Office of the Secretary of Defense under 
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McNamara’s replacement, Clark M. Clifford,152 was questioning the entire MBT-70 
programme. Cost and complexity made it unlikely that replacing the entire fleet of M-60s 
with the MBT-70 would be practical or possible. In September of 1969 the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense suggested to Congress that the programme be streamlined and simplified 
wherever possible.153 The German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, announced on 12 
September 1969 that the USA had suspended development on the project although no official 
announcement had been made up to that point. The USA had, however, reduced the project’s 
funding by a ‘substantial but unspecified’ amount.154 
The programme incorporated the requirement for collaborative agreement at each of 
its key stages, yet, despite this, by 1970 the project broke down in disagreement over the 
required characteristics.155 One US participant commented that: 
 
There could be nothing worse than one army or the other being forced to 
accept a piece of jointly developed equipment that did not meet its own 
requirements. US Army priority requirements for a piece of equipment must 
not be sacrificed for the sake of a politically desirable international 
program.156 
 
If West Germany was unhappy at the way the US was pushing the MBT-70, the US Army 
was also unhappy with the direction the project had taken, believing that too much 
compromise had been agreed simply to keep the programme alive.  
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The Ministry of Defence in Bonn funded their half of the MBT-70 programme by 
receiving the money in block sums over a five-year period, and thus the initial allocation was 
negotiated in 1963 when the original project estimate was $80-$100 million. As with most 
parliamentary systems, once funding had been allocated it was difficult to secure further 
project funds from the Ministry of Finance within that same five-year period. This made the 
increasing estimated cost of the MBT-70 project a problem for the Federal Defence Minister 
and, at the time of the first increase in estimate to $138 million in 1965, the country could no 
longer afford to divide the costs equally. To maintain the collaboration, the USA agreed to 
pay the excess and thus contribute $85 million to the FRG’s $53 million. When the project’s 
estimate again rose in 1968, this time to $300 million, it marked a new five-year period and 
the Defence Ministry was once more in a position to enter negotiations willing to pay half of 
the development costs. Although able to secure the funding, the increasing cost estimates 
were causing concern on both sides.157 
Unconfirmed figures estimated that eventual production figures would have been 
between 1000 and 1500 units for the USA and 500 for the FRG. Estimates and rumours of 
MBT-70 unit production costs varied between $400,000 and $750,000 per tank.158 Such 
figures led the German Finance Minister in 1969 to express ‘great scepticism’ over the cost-
effectiveness of the MBT-70.159 How cost-effective it would have finally proved to have been 
will never be known, for, in January 1970, the collaborative MBT-70 programme formally 
ended. The US Deputy Secretary of Defense declared that the programme would instead lead 
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the drive towards interoperability and commonality in future tanks that each nation would 
design and build unilaterally.160 
McNaugher points out that the costs surrounding the MBT-70 project are difficult to 
debate accurately because no production tank was produced and no parallel sovereign project 
took place that can be taken as a control comparison.161 Although MBTs were certainly 
designed and built in the period, the plan for MBT-70 was uniquely complicated and 
incorporated untested and highly complex technology. Some components and subcomponents 
were never completed and fitted, so we will never know if they may have been value for 
money or an expensive failed experiment. Although each tank would obviously have had an 
individual unit production cost, the cost of development becomes less significant as more 
units are produced. It is possible that wholesale adoption by the US and FRG would have 
encouraged other NATO countries to buy the MBT-70, and the final production numbers 
might have been high enough that the initial research and development investment looked 
proportionately more reasonable. Another unknown question is how much the process of 
collaboration added to the final cost of the project, although it is difficult to see how the price 
could have been the same had there not been the duplication of agencies and component 
development, and the long and repeated periods of international negotiation. 
Estimates of total project costs, to be shared equally between the USA and the Federal 
Republic, began at between $80 and $100 million in August 1963, with an estimated 
completion of the prototype by January 1967 and the first production vehicles by December 
1969. It should be noted that the FRG had insisted that McNamara’s starting figure of $80 
million was unrealistic and had thus argued for the estimate’s upper limit of $100 million. 
Having more recently completed an MBT programme of their own, it is possible that the 
FRG were simply more aware of the potential costs involved, or perhaps McNamara gave a 
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lower estimate to make the project seem more attractive. Whatever the reason for the low 
initial estimate, two years later in August 1965 it had risen to $138 million. In December 
1966, this rose to $200 million and the delivery of prototype and production vehicles had 
slipped to July 1967 and December 1970 respectively. The 1970 production vehicle delivery 
estimate lasted less than a year; in September 1967, it was pushed back to December 1971. 
This was the final delay in the estimated delivery date, but the joint project itself was 
abandoned in January 1970. Although the delivery schedule had seen its final change in 1967, 
the cost estimate was to rise again. In March 1968 it increased this time by 50% of the 1966 
estimate to $300 million. In five years, the budget estimate had risen by no less than 300%.162 
In April 1969, the FRG announced that it would be building its own tank and that it 
would bear little resemblance to MBT-70. It did not completely abandon the project 
agreement and was still willing to buy a number of MBT-70s if and when they were produced 
but intended to buy far fewer than originally indicated. In addition, the FRG announced that it 
would discontinue funding the MBT-70 programme, although both countries did agree to 
continue pursuing standardisation.163 David Packard, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
declared on 15 December 1969: ‘Based on information to date, I have concluded that I will 
not approve development of MBT-70 under the current system.’164 Each nation in the 
collaboration blamed the other for failure and the problems in the project, seeing intractability 
over military requirements and design specifications as responsible for the rising costs and 
delays.165 Following the termination of the agreement, some US officers felt that the Germans 
had bought ‘26 years of technical tank know-how.’166 
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The total spent on the MBT-70 project was $138 million by the USA and $75 million 
by the FRG.167 A major investigation into the causes of delays and cost increases was 
instigated by US Representative William E. Minshall, whose district included the Cleveland 
Tank-Automotive plant. On the subject of delays within the MBT-70 programme, Minshall 
suggested: ‘No doubt, some are attributable to it being a joint program, but it must be some 
kind of a record to have a program this far behind.’ Defence officials had reported the 
increase in the MBT-70’s R&D funding was due to the additional time required, a duplication 
of components, major changes in the military characteristics and modifications, and 
developmental problems with the ‘coke bottle’ autoloader. The time over-runs were blamed 
on a lack of any proper time analysis at the beginning of the programme.168 
After the end of the programme, the US and FRG decided to develop MBTs 
unilaterally while continuing to cooperate to achieve commonality.169 It is interesting to 
compare this statement of intent with what actually happened during the collaboration, when 
each nation effectively developed unilateral tanks with little obvious commonality other than 
at a superficial level. After $218 million spent on the project, neither partner can be said to 
have benefited and the USA might even be said to have ended up in a worse position than 
before. It still needed, after all, to develop a replacement for the M-60 and was now several 
years behind schedule and $138 million out of pocket. McNaugher notes that the principle 
obstacle to US-FRG collaboration from 1971 onwards was US domestic politics, since 
members of the US Congress opposed the joint project out of fear that it would delay the 
introduction of a badly-needed new main battle tank into the US Army.170 
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3. 7. US-FRG post MBT-70 ‘Harmonisation’ 
As announced in 1969, the Federal Republic of Germany began to work on its own MBT 
design, later to become the Leopard 2. In 1970, the US decided to abandon the collaborative 
MBT-70 project entirely and instead begin development of a less technologically advanced, 
and consequently less expensive, version of the MBT-70 design, the XM-803, initially and 
unofficially referred to as MBT-75 in general conversation.171 The XM-803 was to retain the 
three-man crew including the driver in the turret, the Shillelagh system, and hydro-pneumatic 
suspension.172 
While the new tank was intended as a simplified and ‘austere’ answer to the overly 
complex MBT-70, in one area at least the XM-803 development team took what can be seen 
as a retrograde step. The inadequacy of the Continental diesel engine had been recognised 
and it was intended that this would be replaced in XM-803 by the Lycoming XM-1500 gas 
turbine, then still under development.173 In the event, MBT-70 proved almost impossible to 
simplify sufficiently to satisfy the requirements of the XM-803 programme. Too many 
fundamental technical decisions had been incorporated into the original design in order to 
accommodate the advanced components. Simplifying the turret, for example, would have 
meant overturning all the design decisions taken to fit the Shillelagh, automatic loader and 
NBC pod, effectively calling for a complete redesign. A 1971 British Embassy DRDS memo 
reported of XM-803 that, ‘Most crew positions seem to have so many switches and test 
panels that they look rather like the cockpit of a 747. […] I hope they can train their soldiers 
to switch them all on in the right order.’174 
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Improvements in kinetic energy rounds for conventional 120mm guns made mounting 
an ATGM system as a tank’s main armament look less attractive, and the Shillelagh was in 
any case still proving expensive and unreliable.175 The XM-13 missile system did see use as 
the M-81 on the M-60A2 ‘Starship’, which entered service as an ‘overwatch’ tank in 1974, 
and also on the M-551 Sheridan Armoured Reconnaissance Airborne Assault Vehicle 
(ARAAV), or light tank.176 Its use, despite its unreliability and limitations, may have been 
due to 300 XM-13 turrets having been ordered in 1966 before the missile system’s problems 
had been rectified.177 
XM-803 was intended to cost only a quarter of that of the MBT-70 costs to date, 
$585,000 per tank as against a high point of $2.4 million for MBT-70. Within a year this 
figure had grown to a projected estimate of $650,000 per tank for XM-803.178 At this point, 
the US Congress decided that the entire programme was too expensive and the whole idea 
was scrapped. In December 1971, the joint House-Senate conference committee 
recommended:  
 
The committee continues to feel that the MBT70/XM803 is unnecessarily 
complex, excessively sophisticated and too expensive, and that the Army has 
failed to satisfy the recommendation of the committee report on the fiscal 
1970 bill. For these reasons the Committee has recommended that all funds 
for the MBT70/XM803 be deleted from the budget and the program be 
terminated.179 
The cost of the cancellation itself was $40 million.180 
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The XM-803 programme had lasted just less than two years. Aware that time was 
running out for its existing fleet of tanks, upon the cancellation of the XM-803 project the 
USA looked instead at upgrading its existing M-60A1s. This project was designated XM-815 
and the proposed tanks would eventually be known as the M-60A3. In the meantime, studies 
began into a completely new tank, provisionally known as XM-1 but later to become the M1 
Abrams.181 Like so many projects, both civil and defence, before and since, the original 
estimates for both MBT-70 and XM-803 proved optimistic. Projects that come in on budget 
and on time are rare, and defence projects are no exception.182 Peter Morris and George 
Hough point out that project overrun is so common that it is the norm rather than an 
exception, with the reverse, underruns being extremely rare. Almost every project 
management study into the phenomenon from the 1980s and 1990s shows the same result, 
and more complex projects are, perhaps understandably, most liable for overrunning. 
Although late completion and unexpected problems are certainly not rare, the most common 
manifestation is cost overrun, with costs typically between 40% and 200% of the original 
estimate. Significantly, a survey of US Army programmes showed that they overran by up to 
400%. 183 
The FRG also looked to adopt a far simpler MBT design, originating from the 1968 
‘Keiler Study’ into MBT-70. The three-man crew and autoloader arrangement was 
abandoned to be replaced by a more conventional four-man crew and manual loader. The 
armament reverted to the FRG’s favoured option of a conventional smoothbore gun and the 
first Leopard 2 prototype was complete by 1972.  Although the early prototypes tested a wide 
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variety of options, including a 105mm rifled gun and hydro-pneumatic suspension, the 
production vehicle used a conventional torsion bar suspension and mounted the FRG’s own 
120mm gun. Ironically, following the lessons of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the protection, 
and consequently weight, was increased. The Leopard 2’s upper weight limit was raised from 
the MLC-50 limit which had frustrated the MBT-70’s US designers, to MLC-60, which the 
FRG had vehemently resisted during the collaborative programme.184 
After the 1971 collapse of the MBT-70 project, it was two years before the possibility 
of main battle tank collaboration between the USA and FRG was again mooted.185 This time 
that agreement was for the US and FRG to ‘make all reasonable efforts’ to achieve 
standardisation between tanks. The study costs, up to $1 million each, would be shared. Any 
overrun would have to be negotiated.186 The agreement was not without its critics in the US, 
who saw it as yet another potential blow to the new US tank’s ISD. It was the same US 
Congressmen opposing collaboration who were also the main reason both the MBT-70 and 
XM-803 projects were cancelled. They were also prominent in establishing the XM-1 project, 
both by securing funding and in demanding assurances that the XM-1 would come in on 
budget and on schedule.187 
Despite some objections, particularly to any potential adoption of the German 
120mm, a 1974 MOU was signed which set out that the USA would examine the Leopard 2 
for possible purchase and, if that did not happen, the two countries would look at bringing a 
measure of commonality between the Leopard 2 and XM-1 designs by sharing components. 
Finding commonality between the XM-1 and Leopard 2 began with no specific goals, the 
1974 contained no specific outcomes, areas of collaboration or developmental cooperation. 
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The FRG agreed to modify and supply a Leopard 2 for the US Army to test, but US testing 
and development of the XM-1 was unaffected.188 
In 1976, an amendment to the MOU committed the US Army to buy the FRG’s 
Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore gun to mount on the XM-1. In exchange, the FRG would 
test a US turbine engine and consider mounting it in the Leopard 2. This MOU caused a 120-
day delay, the first such delay, in the XM-1 programme development, to allow the design to 
be modified and for bidding companies involved in the engine and gun mounting components 
to modify their submissions. Congressional criticism of the 1976 amendment to the MOU 
was particularly strong in the House Armed Services Committee, where there was opposition 
both to the delay the amendment caused and to the decision to mount the German 120mm 
gun. Questions were raised about both the effectiveness of the gun and its impact on the XM-
1’s schedule and cost.189 At this time, it should be borne in mind, the debate was still ongoing 
over the relative effectiveness of a smoothbore versus a rifled gun, with many in the US 
Army unconvinced that a smoothbore offered the same effectiveness. Gun trials were planned 
and submissions invited from the FRG and UK, but a British Embassy DRDS letter of the 
time noted that, despite the US Army being eager to proceed slowly enough to give the 
British developers a chance to design and submit a new rifled 120mm gun that met US 
requirements, a great deal of political influence was, ‘emanating from Secretary Rumsfeld 
[the US Secretary of Defense] …[who did] not intend things to go that way’.190 
In September 1976, the US Congress passed the ‘Hillis Resolution’ which put the 
1976 MOU amendment on hold for a year and ensured that future collaborative measures in 
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the XM-1 programme had closer Congressional involvement. In November that year, 
Chrysler won the contract for the XM-1 and the development programme continued 
independently of the FRG-US collaboration agreement. A year later, the US Secretary of the 
Army announced in January 1978 that the US Army would adopt the FRG Rheinmetall 
120mm for the XM-1, and that it would be fitted once it had undergone testing and 
modification to allow it to fit inside the US tank. Until the 120mm was ready, the XM-1 
would be equipped with the existing 105mm.191 In the end, greater standardisation emerged 
from two separate tank programmes than from a dedicated collaborative programme, and the 
arguments over the main gun were only solved when the political pressure to collaborate had 
been relaxed. 
3. 7. Project Evaluation and Analysis 
As before, we will use Fortune and White’s project analysis framework to provide a structure 




Evidence of Critical Success Factors in MBT-70 Project 
Goals and objectives.   Both the USA and FRG saw political advantages in 
collaboration, and McNamara was also eager for collaboration 
to reduce the costs of developing a new MBT. 
 The US needed a new MBT design, but the FRG had less 
need due to having recently developed Leopard. 
 Despite reaching a consensus on the general characteristics 
of a new tank, the design process was very fluid, with neither 
nation agreeing a specific design goal. 
Performance 
monitoring.  
 Each nation had its own separate design team and they did 
not work jointly. 
Decision-maker(s).   No overall decision maker. 
 When the national project managers could not agree, the 
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decision was made by discussion between political leaders 
rather than technical experts. 
 Political support vulnerable to internal political pressures. 
Transformations.   The US, in particular, wanted to innovate as much as 
possible and thus looked to new and unproven technology. 
 Innovative components adopted because of pressure from 
external contractors rather than being demand-led.  
Communication.   Language issues caused communication problems. 
 Two teams working in different continents with limited 
technology available for international communication. 
Environment.   Both nations were politically stable but subject to internal 
political pressures from governmental opposition. 
 Despite the previous Franco-German project failing largely 
due to a withdrawal of political support, the MBT-70 project 
did little to avoid the same fate. 
Boundaries.  The project attempted to bring in a large number of untested 
and complex technologies. 
 The number of people involved was inflated due to 
doubling the project teams to have one parallel team in each 
country. 
 FRG wanted a conventional gun, but the USA insisted on a 
missile launcher as the main armament. 
Resources.   Although the resources allocated by the USA were 
generous, Senate overview meant that they had to be seen to be 
justified. 
 The FRG was less willing to invest heavily in a new project 
when their existing tank programme seemed adequate for their 
needs. 
 US suppliers were eager to push new and untested 
technology. 
 FRG intention to equip MBT-70 with conventional 120mm 
gun, with the USA equipping theirs with 152mm missile 
launcher, ran contrary to aim of standardisation. 
Continuity.   Splitting the development team into two national teams 
limited any ability to detect or deal with differences of opinion. 
 Split management meant that change management 
sometimes had to be made at national government level. 
 
The analysis framework presented above highlights several interesting factors which affected 
the MBT-70 project. Perhaps most significantly, there seems little evidence of true 
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collaboration between the design teams. By splitting into two, separate, national teams, the 
MBT-70 developers compounded existing hurdles of language and culture. Whilst the USA 
pushed to include untested and experimental technology, the FRG appears to have been more 
conservative in their aims. In particular, the FRG disagreed strongly with the US insistence 
on equipping MBT-70 with a missile launcher rather than a conventional gun, so much so 
that they intended to equip their own MBT-70 with a 120mm gun, contrary to the 
programme’s aim of standardisation.  
Resources, a critical requirement of any project, initially appeared sufficient, but 
Senate and Federal government oversight meant that such resources were not unlimited. 
Concentrating on new and advanced technology inevitably meant that project costs rose faster 
than an equivalent project using more established components. 
3. 8. Summary 
What lessons can be drawn then from the ill-fated MBT-70 project? Frinsdorf, et al., suggest 
that the efficiency of defence projects is dependent on matching the project to the 
organisation’s capabilities, appropriate support from senior managers, a well-defined and 
understood project scope, strong communication pathways and availability of appropriate 
resources. They also advise that periodic reviews be undertaken and any issues addressed as 
soon as possible.193 There is little doubt that if MBT-70’s ambitious technical goals had been 
attainable then the FRG and USA would have been high on the list of nations able to achieve 
them. While not everyone was convinced about the advisability of a collaborative MBT 
project, it appears that political support was at least adequate. Management decision-making 
must be questioned, though, and most significantly the extraordinary decision by Dolvin and 
                                                
193 Olivia Frinsdorf, Jain Zuo and Bo Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 813. 
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Engelman to completely split the project team. Resources were certainly available up until 
the project was cancelled, but the requirements for ‘a well-defined and understood project 
scope’ and ‘strong communication pathways’ were quite clearly lacking.  
Although not specifically considering defence projects, Bresnan and Marshall’s study 
of cooperation in engineering partnering projects found that: 
In the early stages […] client and contractor members of the team tended to 
relate primarily to their own groups, communications between the two 
groups were poor and there was some confusion about the division of roles, 
responsibility and authority.194 
This obviously held true for MBT-70, even more so their second finding, which was that: 
‘Both project teams experienced problems due to role ambiguities and conflicts, unexpected 
and unplanned for duplication of effort and reversion at times to more traditional command-
and-control structures.’195 Bresnan and Marshall’s findings suggest that collaborative teams 
prefer to work under well-defined hierarchies with clear divisions of responsibility and roles. 
MBT-70 blurred these distinctions by having two separate teams working to their own 
programme manager, but with each manager required to negotiate with his opposite number 
for a final decision. Where a decision could not be made by the programme management 
board (PMB), the problem was passed to politicians, whose primary concern was keeping the 
project alive by diplomatic compromise rather than reaching a hard engineering decision. 
Project management failures aside, could the project have worked? The UK verdict 
was that the project was simply ‘reaching too widely and too far ahead’, and that the two 
partners were too far apart geographically.196 Any project that is pushing the boundaries of 
technology is going to encounter problems, and to complicate this with an international 
                                                
194 Mike Bresnan and Nick Marshall, ‘The Engineering or Evolution of Co-operation? A Tale of Two Partnering 
Projects’, International Journal of Project Management, 20 (2002), p. 500. 
195 Ibid., p. 503. 
196 TNA, DEFE, 13/1368, MBT, Report for Minister of Defence, German/American Main Battle Tank (E/P.O. 
55/69 of 10/02/69), 17 March 1969. 
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collaboration requires a highly experienced international management team to make it work. 
McNaugher makes the point that the USA had had limited and largely one-sided experience 
when it came to international collaborative arms projects, and that the majority of experience 
in true collaboration actually first came with the MBT-70 project itself.197 
Marc DeVore states that international arms collaboration is an inherently bureaucratic 
and inefficient business and that there are specific restrictions as to how much this 
inefficiency can be resolved. This, he suggests 
renders it improbable that collaborative projects will ever achieve more than 
a small proportion of the economic and military benefits anticipated by 
collaboration’s proponents. In fact, modest R&D savings and improvements 
to partners’ interoperability are most likely the only benefits that states can 
realistically hope to achieve.198 
Whilst McNaugher points out that ‘the cost of collaboration cannot be cited with precision 
when the cost of not collaborating is unavailable for comparison’, he agrees with DeVore in 
that, far from showing that collaboration in developing main battle tanks saves time or 
money, rather that the evidence suggests that such collaboration is actually more expensive 
on both counts. McNaugher goes on to suggest that the USA spent money on the project as a 
means to a political goal.199 Given the differences of opinion over military doctrine, and 
therefore military requirements, competition from industrial concerns, a difference of priority 
on In Service Dates, and an ill-advised management structure, it is hard to see how the MBT-
70 project could have succeeded in its stated aims of producing an MBT. 
Perhaps significantly, however, MBT-70 at least managed to bring the Federal 
Republic and USA closer together politically and led to cooperation on subsequent tank 
development, with consequentially some interoperability. Arguably, this was the real – but 
                                                
197 McNaugher, Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks,pp. iii, v. 
198 Marc R. DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 25:4 (2014), p. 416. 
199 McNaugher, Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks, p. x. 
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unacknowledged – benefit. Within NATO, only the USA, France and Britain were well-
established as tank-building nations in the early 1960s, the FRG not yet having put the 
Leopard into production. France and Britain were already successful exporters of tanks and 
this could have had an impact on competition for potential sales within any collaboration. 
With Britain more closely aligned with the USA on armoured doctrine, an Anglo-US 
collaboration would seem to have been more logical, yet McNamara not only pushed for a 
German collaboration but also deliberately kept Britain out of the project. Perhaps Britain’s 
existing Chieftain tank project influenced his decision, or, perhaps, he did not wish the US to 
face commercial peer competition over the allocation of responsibility for components. If this 
were the case, then the FRG’s reluctance to accept US technology must have come as an 
unwelcome surprise. 
Whatever the reasons, MBT-70 stands as an example of how not to collaborate. 
Fundamental problems plagued the project from the beginning. When US General Edwin H. 
Burba wrote in 1968 that ‘Skeptic and advocate alike have been impressed with the 
smoothness which has characterized the program’s progress since inception’,200 it seems 
likely that his statement reflected the major factor which kept the project running for so long 
– political pressure. 
                                                




Unconventional Solutions:  
The Anglo-German Future Main Battle Tank,FMBT/KPz3 
(1971-1977) 
German/UK collaboration attempts on tank design can be said to have commenced in 1959 
when the Federal Republic of Germany approached the British government wanting to buy 
two examples of the prototype ‘Medium Gun Tank No.2’ (subsequently the Chieftain), an 
approach which came to nothing and which characterised the equally unsuccessful 
collaborative relationship in main battle tank (MBT) design that followed.1 The 1971 Anglo-
German FMBT project is an interesting case study into how two European NATO nations 
were politically driven to collaborate in designing an MBT, despite having different military 
priorities and with both being determined to see their own main gun design incorporated into 
the final tank. Following as it did the equally unsuccessful Franco-German and US-German 
collaborations, it is useful to examine how the Anglo-German FMBT project originated and 
evolved, and to identify those milestones and fundamental failings in the process that 
contributed to its eventual official collapse in 1977. 
The end of the Second World War had seen the deliberate destruction and disposal of 
all German tank industry by the Allies, and the confiscation of Germany’s remaining tanks.2 
                                                
1 TNA, T 225/1571, Anglo-German co-operation in tank development, Ministry of Supply, Supply Attaché, 
British Embassy, Bonn, letters between MOD, War Office and Treasury, January-February 1959. 
2 Following the Allied victory in 1945, Germany was disarmed and forbidden from having armed forces. Its tank 
development facilities were destroyed, and all surviving tanks taken by the Allies to be scrapped, used in their 
own armed forces, on target ranges, or, sold off to other Allied or neutral countries. See here: Gerhard Wettig, 
Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland 1943-1955: Internationale Auseindersetzungen um 
die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa (Munich, 1967); Frank Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-49 
(Stanford, 1961), p. 24; CIA Memo on Syrian Arms Purchases (10 Aug 1950), 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R005500200002-1.pdf>, accessed 19 July 
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In 1955, however, the FRG was admitted to NATO with the expectation that it would provide 
significant elements of the NATO forces defending West Germany against the perceived 
threat of the Soviet Union; and, with the subsequent expansion of the Bundeswehr (the 
Federal Republic’s armed forces) came the desire to develop and build a German main battle 
tank. Having lost so much ground, both industrially and technologically, as a result of the 
Stunde Null (zero hour) it was natural that the newcountry should look to NATO’s remaining 
major tank-producing countries for inspiration and collaboration. Such collaboration would 
also improve the FRG’s standing within NATO and strengthen its diplomatic ties within the 
Alliance.3 In 1957, an initial approach to France to build a collaborative ‘Standard European 
Tank’ under the auspices of the European FINABEL organisation had led to two separate 
successful national designs, the Leopard 1 and AMX-30, but this initiative failed as a 
collaborative project.4 In 1963, their second collaborative MBT project, the ‘MBT-70’ 
programme, once again failed to produce a successful design.5 Apparently undaunted, in 
1971 the FRG agreed to talks with the UK to produce the Future Main Battle 
Tank/Kampfpanzer 3, or FMBT/Kpz3. 
Secondary sources mention the 1971 Anglo-German FMBT project (FMBT/KPz3, 
herein referred to simply as the FMBT for brevity) only in passing, if at all. While 
Ogorkiewicz, Simpkin, Foss and Hilmes all mention the programme, Ogorkiewicz, Simpkin 
and Foss only do so in passing; Hilmes devotes only a few short paragraphs to the project.6 
                                                                                                                                                  
2017. For more on the legal position of Germany immediately post-Second World War, see Hans Kelsen, ‘The 
Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin’, The American Journal of International Law, 
39:3 (July 1945), pp. 518-526. In addition: Richard Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles 
(New York, 1968), p. 48; and, idem, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution (Oxford, 2015), pp. 187, 200. 
3 Phillip Taylor, ‘Weapons Standardization in NATO: Collective Security or Economic Competition?’, 
International Organisation, 36:1 (Winter 1982), p. 95. 
4 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, p. 190. See Ch. 2 above for the Franco-German FINABEL 
collaborative tank project. 
5 See Ch. 3 above for a comprehensive examination of the MBT-70 project. 
6 See, for example: Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 181-183, 197; Richard Simpkin, Tank 
Warfare: An Analysis of Soviet and NATO Tank Philosophy (London, 1979), p. 208; Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s 
Main Battle Tanks (Second Edition) (London, 1986), p. 95; and, Rolf Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank 
Development, 1956-2000’, Armor, 110:1(January-February 2001), pp. 18-19. 
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Given that no working tank design resulted from the programme, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that it has received so little attention from authors; moreover, there is no mention of the 
FMBT project in many standard works on Cold War tanks.7 This dearth of specific secondary 
source material makes careful analysis of the available primary sources even more necessary. 
Nonetheless, on the wider subject of post-1945 tank development in the UK and FRG, rather 
more secondary sources are available.  
Hilmes has given a broad overview of German tank development since 1956 in an 
article, briefly covering the Franco-German ‘NATO Tank’ and Tank-90 projects, the US-
German MBT-70, as well as the Anglo-German FMBT. Useful though this piece is in 
providing a basic overview, the length of the article means that no one development is 
covered in any depth.8 Ogorkiewicz has covered the post-war development of tanks of most 
major countries in some depth, giving the developmental background in which the FMBT 
project was set, with chapters devoted to both the FRG and the UK.9 In addition, both 
Ogorkiewicz and Simpkin have set out in detail the engineering challenges and solutions 
involved in post-war tank design, allowing the FMBT project to be judged in relation to 
general developments in tank technology at the time.10 Given that the problem of protection 
was central to the disagreement over the FMBT design, the technology of armour and 
survivability were obviously key to the UK-FRG discussions. Despite its sensitivity and 
technological complexity, Joseph Backhofen, Jr., has examined some of the principles of tank 
protection technology in several articles, dealing with both the physical external armour and 
                                                
7 Examples of works listing Cold War tanks that have no mention of the FMBT project include: Marsh Gelbart, 
Tanks: Main Battle Tanks and Light Tanks (London, 1996); and, I. F. B Tytler, et al., Brassey’s Battlefield 
Weapons Systems & Technology Series Volume I: Vehicles and Bridging (London, 1985). 
8 Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, pp. 16-21. 
9 Richard Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks (Coulsdon, 1991), pp. 36-41, 53-56; idem, Tanks: 100 Years of 
Evolution, pp. 176-186, 194-203.  
10 Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks, passim; Simpkin, Tank Warfare, passim. 
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other protective measures to improve a tank’s survivability; this field of armour technology 
has also been covered by other writers.11 
The progress of the FMBT project will, for the most part, be traced chronologically, 
wherever possible using information from original government papers (mainly from the UK). 
However, in some cases, a particular sub-theme will be examined as a subject in its own 
right, which will depart from the chronological approach. Some overlapping in dates is, 
therefore, unavoidable, but every effort will be made to explain fully the precise evolution of 
the project. The decision-making behind the Anglo-German tank project may be divided into 
three areas – political, military and technological – and each of these will be covered within 
the case study, with the broader military and engineering challenges inherent in designing and 
building any MBT (already considered in greater depth in Chapter 1).12 
To understand the political decision-making behind the FMBT project, it is useful to 
summarise the wider political situation in 1971. By that year Britain had twice tried to join 
the European Economic Community (EEC), once in 1961 and again in 1967. On both 
occasions, the bid had been vetoed by France’s President de Gaulle, possibly in an attempt to 
prevent Britain’s entry eroding French influence and increasing that of the USA, the UK’s 
closest partner.13 Under Prime Minister Edward Heath, however, Britain’s third bid (set for 
1973) looked more likely to succeed as de Gaulle had been replaced as French President by 
George Pompidou. Heath, and to a lesser extent his Foreign Secretary in 1971, Lord 
                                                
11 Joseph E. Backhofen Jr., ‘Armor Technology (Part III)’, Armor, 42:2 (Mar-Apr 1983), pp. 18-20; idem, 
‘Armor Technology (Part IV)’, Armor, 42:3 (May-Jun 1983), pp. 38-42; idem, ‘Armor Technology (Part V)’, 
Armor, 43:1 (Jan-Feb 1984), pp. 21-25; Donald R. Kennedy, ‘Improving Combat Crew Survivability’, Armor, 
42:4 (Jul-Aug 1983), pp. 16-22. For further discussion on the technology of tank armour, see Ch. 1 above. 
12 For more on the contemporary debate over tank gun design, see Ch. 1 above. For more information on the 
technical and engineering challenges see Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks. 
13 See here: Wolfram Kaiser, ‘“What Alternative is Open to Us?” Britain’, in Wolfram Kaiser & Jürgen Elvert 
(eds.), European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History (London & New York, 2004), pp. 10-33; 
GuiliaBentivoglio, ‘Britain, the EEC and the Special Relationship during the Heath Government’, International 
Affairs, 64:2 (1988), pp.282-283; and, European Futures, ‘How Did We Get Here? A Brief History of Britain’s 
Membership of the EU’ <http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-3278>, accessed 5 July 2017. 
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Carrington, were in favour of European integration.14 In 1971, therefore, the UK government 
wished to be seen as pro-European and willing to cooperate with other European nations on 
major economic projects: hence, the political pressures for collaboration on a large defence 
programme such as FMBT were consequently very strong.15 
In order to analyse the FMBT project systematically, some points of reference are 
desirable. Thus, it is useful to refer here to a note from the UK’s Vice Chief of the General 
Staff (VCGS) of September 1980 on the logical course of future collaboration listing five key 
points which he believed necessary for success: 
 
1. Political encouragement for collaborative studies. 
2. Detailed military studies on Tactical Concepts required. ‘Agreement on this is a 
first and essential step without which collaboration is bound to fail.’ 
3. Devise common operational requirements. 
4. Give common operational requirements to the national procurement executives 
from which work sharing and design agreements can be negotiated. 
5. Still requires a strong and sustained political and military determination to drive 
the project through.16 
 
 
These requirements do in many ways mirror the factors identified in 2014 by Frinsdorf, et al., 
for successful military projects. These were, that: the project should match the capability of 
the organisation; there be appropriate senior management support; the project scope be well 
defined and understood; strong communication pathways be identified; and, appropriate 
resources will be made available when required.17 If we equate the ‘senior managers’ here 
with politicians, the ‘defined project scope’ as agreement on tactical concepts and a common 
operational requirement, and ‘availability of resources’ as sustained political and military 
                                                
14 Bentivoglio, ‘Britain, the EEC and the Special Relationship’, pp. 282-283, 286-287. 
15 TMARL, E2014.1841, RAC Conference 1972, FMBT Progress Report, 14 November 1972, p. 8. 
16 TNA, DEFE 70/586, Future Main Battle Tank (FBMT), equipment, future tank policy study, possible 
collaboration, Note from VCGS to CGS, Tank Collaboration, 12 September 1980. 
17 Olivia Frinsdorf, Jian Zuo, and Bo Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 813. 
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determination to see the project through, then both frameworks appear to be virtually the 
same in terms of the essential factors required for a successful international collaborative tank 
project. Using these two parallel frameworks, it will be possible to evaluate the progress of 
the FMBT project against those requirements which were deemed necessary for success at 
the outset. 
4.1. Inception of the FMBT Project 
When in 1959 the FRG requested two ‘Medium Gun Tank No.2’ prototypes from the UK for 
study in order to help the recovery of the German tank industry, Britain responded that it 
wanted £500K for them. The thinking behind this relatively large sum was that, although a 
large portion could be justified as research and development (R&D) and ‘commercial’ costs, 
the rest was to ensure some profit should the FRG decide to reverse-engineer the tanks.18 The 
FRG was reluctant to pay so much to evaluate two prototypes that might not even be suitable 
for their needs; in order partially to offset the cost, it suggested that the UK reciprocally 
purchase two ‘30-ton prototypes of a Continental design’ for evaluation, the asking price 
being £350K. As the Federal Republic and France were engaged in a collaborative venture to 
build a ‘European Standard Tank’ at the time, it was unclear which of the two German and 
one French designs the Federal Republic intended the UK to buy, although it was almost 
certainly intended to be one of the German ones.19 In any case, the Director of the Chobham 
Fighting Vehicle R&D establishment declared that only the German ‘Type B’ design was of 
interest, and then only the hydraulic transmission and suspension.20 Given this, the UK 
Treasury did not feel it worth the asking price for two 30-ton prototypes when only the 
                                                
18 TNA, T225/1571, Anglo-German co-operation in tank development. Ministry of Supply, Supply Attaché, 
British Embassy, Bonn, letters between MOD, War Office and Treasury, January-February 1959. 
19 For more detail on the Franco-German ‘Standard European Tank’ programme, see Ch. 3 above. 




transmission and suspension was of interest, and consequently rejected the German 
suggestion.21 The Federal Republic, likewise, withdrew from purchasing and evaluating the 
‘Medium Gun Tank No.2’ prototypes, so the deal fell through.  
By 1970, the German domestic armaments industries were resurgent. The Heer (the 
Federal Army) was equipped with a mixture of their own Leopard 1 tanks and the US M48. 
The Leopard 2, in some ways a by-product and extension of the failed MBT-70 programme 
was, at that time, still under development. The FRG’s policy was to only replace half its tank 
fleet at a time, thus keeping costs low at the expense of more complex logistics and training. 
In 1970 it was looking to replace both tank models, scheduling to replace the M-48 with the 
Leopard 2 from 1976, and to replace the Leopard 1 with an, as yet undetermined, advanced 
design by around 1985.22 At the same time, the UK was planning to replace completely its 
own Chieftain tank fleet with a new design, also beginning the replacement in 1985. Since 
1960, the UK had been studying different MBT configurations, including different weapon 
systems; in 1970, these studies were reviewed and the most promising designs were selected 
as the basis for an intensive programme of studies between design engineers and the General 
Staff; this study was known as ‘AFV of the 80’s Study Stage 2’.23 
In 1970, informal talks between army chiefs in both countries about a collaborative 
development became increasing formalised, with a bilateral working party established in the 
same year with the aim of harmonising the Operational Requirements (ORs) between the two 
countries.24 A General Staff Target (GST) agreement was signed in November 1971 and a 
technical symposium followed in May 1972, the idea of D. Cardwell, the Deputy Director, 
Specialist and Design Services (DD/S), at the Fighting Vehicle Research and Development 
                                                
21 TNA, T225/1571, Anglo-German co-operation in tank development, Memo, 11 September 1959. 
22 Heinrich Felix Beckmann, Schild und Schwert: Die Panzertruppe der Bundeswehr. 
GeschichteeinerTruppengattung(Friedberg, 1989), pp. 153-228. 
23 TMARL, E2005.1079.4, Technical assessment of all UK and FRG concepts from ʼ72 to ’76 inclusive, p. 1. 
24 Ibid.  
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Establishment (FVRDE). Cardwell’s aim was that the bilateral symposium should allow the 
two countries to show their national concepts to each other as a matter of mutual interest. 
However, these military and technical aims were overtaken and subverted by politics. Two 
days before the symposium, Lord Carrington, the UK Defence Secretary, who had been in 
talks with Helmut Schmidt, the FRG Defence Minister, decreed that the ‘UK and FRG will 
collaborate on the FMBT – or there will be NO FMBT’ (emphasis in original).25 
Consequently, it was agreed at the symposium that a joint design and development 
programme should begin.26 
With the intention that a common General Service Requirement (GSR) and design 
should be agreed upon, an Anglo-German Concept Working Group was established. 
However, disagreement began almost immediately over the basic concepts that the designers 
should be working to. A fundamental difference of opinion was over the vehicle weight. 
NATO classifies vehicles and the routes they might safely negotiate by using sixteen Military 
Load Classification (MLC) numbers from 4 to 150, the MLC numbers being roughly 
(although not solely) based on the maximum tracked vehicle weight in US short tons, with 
wheeled vehicles being classed using 85% of their weight and the number and location of 
axles.27 From the early days of the collaboration, the Germans felt strongly that the FMBT 
should be limited to an MLC of 50 to facilitate strategic and operational movement within 
Western Germany. For their ‘AFVs of the 80s’ study, meanwhile, the UK had estimated that 
its tank transporters would have an MLC of 80 and would carry an MBT of no more than 55 
tonnes (60 US short tons or MLC 60). Britain felt that a reduction in MLC of their 
conventionally turreted MBT designs from MLC 60 to MLC 50 would be impossible without 
                                                
25 TMARL, E2005.1079.4, Technical assessment of all UK and FRG concepts from ʼ72 to ’76 inclusive, 
Marginalia on back of p. 1 by W. Beaver, 14 January 198; E2014.1841, RAC Conference 1972, FMBT Progress 
Report, 14 November 1972, p. 3. 
26 TNA, WO 362/54, Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT)/KPz3 equipment collaboration: lessons learnt during the 
Anglo-German FMBT project (1971-1977), p. 1. 
27 Think Defence, ‘UK Military Bridging – Load Classification’, <http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/12/uk-
military-bridging-load-classification/>, accessed 26 April 2017.  
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a severe and unacceptable reduction in armour protection. For this reason, a number of more 
unconventional designs would be included in the coming FMBT studies.28 
In addition to and connected with disagreements on weight, in November 1972 a 
strongly German-influenced report on future armoured threats noted that the projectile would 
always be superior to armour which should be borne in mind when developing the balance 
between firepower, mobility and protection. German thinking was that armour protection 
would never be sufficient to stop a projectile and, thus, more indirect protection in the form 
of manoeuvrability should be emphasised. In the marginalia of this report, the British 
recipient at the Ministry of Defence (signed as ‘QDG’) made a short, but frank and forthright, 
comment which left no doubt that he disagreed with this view. He also queried the 
assumption given in the report that stated that smoothbore projectiles are superior to those 
which are spun, in other words, those fired from a rifled gun.29 British thinking at the time 
was exemplified by a memo from the Director of the Royal Armoured Corps (DRAC) 
explaining that, just because contemporary HEAT ammunition could penetrate any practical 
thickness of armour plate (this was before the introduction of composite and layered armour), 
there was no need to neglect armour thickness, and he cited the practical and psychological 
advantages of providing the best armour protection available.30 This debate between 
firepower, mobility and protection would hinder the FMBT project throughout its life. 
Whatever the arguments over the relative technical capabilities of the UK’s rifled-
bore and the German smoothbore and their accompanying ammunition,31 it is clear that 
commercial factors played a large part in each country’s championing of its own gun 
                                                
28 TMARL, E2005.1079.4, Technical assessment of all UK and FRG concepts from ’72 to ’76 inclusive, pp. 1-
2. 
29 TNA, DEFE 70/468, Future Main Battle Tank: Anglo-German Combat Vehicles Operational Requirements 
(OR) Working Group, Anglo-German Concept Working Group, A Concept to Counter the Enemy Armoured 
Threat in the 80s, 2 November 1972. 
30 TMARL, E2014.1692, HQ DRAC, Successor to Chieftain, 16 March 1970, p. 5. 
31 For details on the arguments over the two guns see Ch. 1 above. 
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design.32 Both the UK and the FRG wanted and expected that the gun selected for FMBT 
would become the future NATO standard, which carried with it both future sales to NATO 
nations and the strong possibility of sales to NATO-friendly countries. Britain’s position in 
the West as a leader in tank gun design was threatened by the FRG developing and 
championing the smoothbore. The UK might have also pursued smoothbore technology if it 
had been convinced of it being more effective, but it had already invested heavily in rifled 
guns and would have had to start from a disadvantageous technological position vis-à-vis the 
Germans. Adopting the German gun would effectively have been acknowledging that the 
Rheinmetall option was better than any British example for potential foreign buyers. The 
option chosen was therefore to continue to champion the rifled-bore gun, gambling on past 
performance and proving (or at least convincing enough potential buyers) that rifled guns 
were superior. In particular, at the same time the gun for the FMBT project was being 
debated, the USA was looking for a gun for its XM-1, later to be called the M1 Abrams. Both 
the FRG and UK expected that the main gun for the FMBT would subsequently be adopted 
by the USA.33 Consequently, when the Americans adopted the Rheinmetall Rh120 design it 
was acknowledged in the UK that Britain had lost its position as the centre for tank gun 
excellence.34 
                                                
32 See for example: TNA, DEFE 13/1225, Future main battle tank (FMBT) and associated weapon systems, 
Memo from APS to Minister of State, 7 March 1978; FCO 46/1082, Collaboration between the UK and Federal 
Republic of Germany on Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT), Background Equipment Brief. Anglo-German 
Collaboration on Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT), 14 February 1973. 
33 TNA, FCO 46/1082, Collaboration between the UK and Federal Republic of Germany on Future Main Battle 
Tank (FMBT), Background Equipment Brief, Anglo-German Collaboration on Future Main Battle Tank 
(FMBT), 14 February 1973. 
34 TNA, DEFE 13/1211, International collaboration in defence areas, meetings with French and German 
Defence Ministers, Memo from Head of IP2 to PS/Minister of State, Pamphlet by Dr Gardiner Tucker, 
Interoperability within NATO, 14 December 1976. 
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4.2. Division of Responsibility and Design Philosophies 
Following the agreement on a GST and the 1972 technical symposium to initiate the joint 
FMBT programme, an early political agreement was sought for a broad division of 
responsibilities, ‘so that wasteful competitive development could be minimised.’35 From the 
beginning of the FMBT project it was obvious that the main gun was going to be a key 
feature of the new tank and that both countries were eager to have their own design adopted. 
Consequently, the division of design systems would be critical. While there was recognition 
in the UK that developing a new British gun to replace the L11A5 of the Chieftain would be 
prejudicial to any acceptance of the FRG’s Rh120 as the future standard, it was still 
considered by the UK that they should develop the FMBT’s main gun.36 The UK’s thinking 
behind the intended division of responsibilities is well illustrated by a Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) note of 9 February 1973 which emphasised the need to avoid 
being seen as the ‘supporting partner’ in any such collaborative tank project: 
 
Morale and National Standing. In the popular understanding a tank is a 
machine consisting of two major items, the gun and the power train, mounted 
in an armoured hull. Thus to be seen to be equitable the distribution of 




The armour for FMBT was also felt in the UK to be best designed by them because 
Britain’s composite armour development, Chobham, was more advanced than any armour 
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Tank (FMBT), Basis for the Bilateral Division of Work on FMBT. 9 February 1973. 
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development in the Federal Republic.38 In return for the UK having responsibility for the 
design of the main armament and armour, it was considered that the FRG should concentrate 
on the engine, running gear and suspension, something they had in any case been working on 
for the MBT-70 and the abortive SP-70 collaborative self-propelled artillery project.39 Given 
the problems being faced by the Chieftain’s engine at the time, giving the Germans 
responsibility to develop the FMBT’s automotive train was probably a wise decision, even if 
it was made primarily to allow the UK to develop the main armament.40 The British view was 
that such a division of responsibility would enable each nation to preserve and work to its 
national capability. Each country was viewed as having strengths and weaknesses which 
needed to be taken into account; the Germans were expected to have advanced automotive 
developments stemming from the MBT-70 project, but the British believed that it had 
superior gun and ammunition designs and that these would be ‘lost or severely impaired’ if 
foreign designs were chosen.41 In the event, and ominously reminiscent of the failed MBT-70 
project, no agreement on work sharing was reached. 
The proposed production split of the FMBT was easier to agree on. Each country was 
to set up a separate production line and the number of tanks to be produced was intended to 
be weighted towards the nation which actually bought the most units. The initial domestic 
production figures were estimated at 2,000 vehicles for the FRG and 1,000 for the UK, with 
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third party sales, expected to be considerable within NATO and NATO-friendly states, to be 
split evenly between the FRG and UK production lines.42 
While the sharing of production might have been easily agreed upon, fundamental 
problems remained over work-sharing agreements at the design stage, with the disagreement 
over which nation would develop the main gun only part of the problem (if a major part). In 
addition to a failure to agree the division of responsibility for systems design, there was also 
the problem of agreement on the overall balance of the tank itself. The FRG and the UK 
foresaw very different tactical employment scenarios for the FMBT, and thus had different 
priorities when it came to the allocation of priority to the firepower-mobility-protection 
triumvirate of main battle tank design.43 Britain, like the USA at that time, emphasised long-
range firepower, with protection coming a very close second, and mobility third. The British 
Army on the Rhine (BAOR), operating as part of NATO’s Northern Army Group 
(NORTHAG) defending northern Germany and the critical North German Plain, expected to 
defend a series of forward defensive positions with long range gunnery and relatively little 
manoeuvring against a fast-moving Soviet armoured thrust. The tank Britain needed, 
therefore, was typified by the Chieftain with its 120mm (rifled) main gun and heavy well-
sloped armour. Mobility was still important, of course, but it was deemed acceptable to 
sacrifice or compromise this in favour of firepower and direct protection.44 Indeed, it was 
noted that the major differences between the 1971 joint Anglo-German GST and the UK’s 
own guidelines, drawn up in 1969, were that the MLC of the new design should not exceed 
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50 (the UK had been working to an MLC limit of 60) and that the FMBT should have a 
higher level of agility than the UK was planning for.45 
By contrast, the Bundeswehr was expecting to defend the entirety of West Germany 
as part of both NORTHAG and CENTAG (Central Army Group) and had traditionally relied 
on mobility and manoeuvre in employing its armoured forces.46 This, combined with a belief 
that modern tank guns were able to penetrate any practical thickness of armour, meant that 
the FRG had previously emphasised mobility over both firepower and armour protection, an 
approach typified by the German Leopard 1.47 By 1974 this had altered, with German 
doctrine changing from a mobile defence to holding ground, so the MBT design priority 
moved towards an emphasis on firepower with mobility and protection having equal 
importance, as illustrated by the eventual Leopard 2 design.48 In 1971, however, the FRG 
were still committed to a design with low weight and high mobility, as well as using the 
Rheinmetall smoothbore gun. To meet their needs in terms of mobility, the FRG were 
reluctant to use a UK engine and suggested that they might use a US design. Given an 
expectation that either Germany or the USA would produce the automotive system, and with 
the FRG not prepared to adopt the UK’s rifled main armament, this left the Britain in a 
distinctly inferior position within the project. If they agreed, then neither the FMBT’s gun nor 
the engine were likely to be British, leaving an ‘uneven split of design responsibility’. The 
UK would be left manufacturing components mainly designed elsewhere and the final design 
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would consequently be more German or US/German than British. It was noted within the UK 
that this would not represent true collaboration.49 
It should be borne in mind that the participants in the FMBT project were not unaware 
of potential difficulties in reaching compromise between different design philosophies and 
tactical doctrines. The FRG had recently encountered the same problems regarding failed 
collaborations with both France and the USA and a long project timescale was believed 
necessary in order to bring British and German ‘conceptual thinking’ into line.50 Awareness 
that the French at that stage gave even greater emphasis to mobility over protection than did 
the Germans also led to a British FCO memo advising that any approaches by the French to 
join the FMBT programme should ‘not be encouraged’.51 It should be noted that the French, 
like Britain and West Germany, altered their priorities as doctrine changed. A 1973 
communication from the British Military Attaché in Bonn stated that the French at that time 
saw their defence policy as purely defensive and saw no need for their tanks to undertake 
strategic or large tactical (‘operational’) movement. Consequently, the French described their 
tank philosophy as being more in line with that of the British (protection at the expense of 
mobility) rather than that of the Germans, a reversal of their previous position.52 
4.3. Evaluation of Concepts 
By the end of 1971, a joint GST had been agreed for FMBT and this was followed by the 
joint UK/FRG technical symposium in May 1972, held at the UK’s Military Vehicles and 
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Engineering Establishment (MVEE) at Chertsey. The UK already had several concepts that 
had been submitted as part of their existing unilateral ‘UK AFVs of the 80s’ study, and now 
attempted to find a shortlist of those designs that met the new Anglo-German GST. The 
concepts considered for the shortlist, and presented for evaluation to the ‘UK AFVs of the 
80s Studies Stage 2’ committee in February 1972, were: 
 
1. Conventional turreted: 
a. Meeting MLC 50 limit. 
b. Meeting MLC 60 limit. 
2. External pedestal gun meeting MLC 50 limit: 
a. With external magazine. 
b. With internal magazine. 
3. Semi-fixed casemate gun, with MLC 50/60 dependant on armour: 
a. With stabilised crew and weapon ‘pod’. 
b. Without stabilised ‘pod’ with three different power/weight ratios. 
 
 
At the joint Anglo-German symposium in May, both countries presented their concepts 
which were then discussed in detail by the specialist groups attending. The UK designs 
shortlisted and submitted were the turreted MLC 60, external gun MLC 50 and one each of 
the two semi-fixed gun designs. All the UK concepts were fitted with the newly developed 
rifled FVDRE 110mm gun. From the FRG came four designs, all but one of which met their 
requirements of MLC 50: an external gun design, a turreted driver-in-turret design (similar in 
concept to the aborted MBT-70) with limited traverse of +/- 90ofrom forward, a twin-gun 
concept with guns externally mounted and semi-fixed either side of the crew compartment, 
and a non-turreted design, with gun and crew mounted in an oscillating pod which gave 
stabilisation on all three axes, this design having two armour options to meet either the MLC 
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50 or MLC 60 limits.53 All the FRG designs submitted were armed with the Rheinmetall 
120mm high-velocity smoothbore gun.54 
The turretless casemate or hull-mounted gun concept had been influenced by the 
success of the highly effective German wartime tank destroyers and Sturmgeschütz (StuG) 
series of turretless assault guns; but also by the radical Swedish ‘S-tank’ design which had 
appeared in the early 1960s.55 A turretless AFV has several advantages over turreted designs. 
Without a turret they could be built with a lower weight and a lower silhouette, but they also 
came with drawbacks. The lower height, whilst it meant that the tank was easier to conceal 
from the enemy, resulted in the commander and crew having reduced observation as 
compared to that from a turret.56 A turret also offered greater flexibility in the installation of 
equipment for the commander and gunner, giving as it does additional dedicated space for the 
crew.57 Finally, although semi-fixed guns allow some independent movement of the gun, 
aiming beyond the limited traverse or elevation of this mounting necessitates the entire 
vehicle to be moved to lay the gun on the target. This was considered by the UK to be 
unsuited to fast-moving mobile warfare where a target may need to be tracked whilst the tank 
is on the move.58 It should be noted that the semi-fixed gun differed from the design of the 
turretless Swedish ‘S-tank’ in that it had some degree of independent movement, whereas the 
gun on the ‘S-tank’ was completely fixed and the vehicle had to be moved for even the 
slightest adjustment to the gun’s aim. 
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The two variations on the turretless semi-fixed gun theme submitted for evaluation in 
1972 were the FRG’s experimental Versuchsträger tank (VT-1) which mounted twin semi-
fixed main guns outside and either side of the main crew compartment but within armour 
plate, and the UK’s Casemate Test Rig (CTR), a semi-fixed gun in a heavily armoured hull.59 
The FRG’s twin-gun design was proposed in order to improve the hit rate while the vehicle 
was weaving, firing a volley using both guns simultaneously. In keeping with the German 
emphasis on mobility, the VT tanks also offered a very high power-to-weight ratio.60 As 
subsequent exercises showed, however, twin guns were actually little better than a single gun 
(as fitted to the UK experimental CTR) and required almost twice the amount of 
ammunition.61 
First seen on the UK’s experimental COMRES 75 in 1968, the external pedestal-
mounted gun, on the other hand, offered the rotation of a turret but required an auto-loader, a 
system used in the Soviet Union but one which Western nations were not yet employing in 
their designs as they could not overcome the technical difficulties posed. Pedestal guns give a 
smaller frontal ‘turret’ area, but again remove the tank commander’s turret and deny him the 
height and 360o vision which he enjoys in a turreted tank. The external gun is not within the 
tank’s main armour and is thus more vulnerable to being destroyed or damaged, rendering the 
entire tank ineffective in its main purpose. In addition, the exposed position means that crew 
cannot access the gun or autoloader to perform minor repairs or address malfunctions on the 
battlefield.62 Lower crew numbers, something that many designs such as the pedestal 
mounted gun sought to incorporate, also came with the operational disadvantage that fewer 
crew operating the tank meant fewer crew for other tasks around the vehicle, such as standing 
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guard in picket, readying and stowing camouflage netting, refuelling and loading, and minor 
(but urgent) maintenance, such as track repairs. The Director of the Royal Armoured Corps 
(DRAC) pointed out that a future conflict might require that tank crews operate continuously 
for long periods, and thus reducing the number of men in a crew was ‘not sensible’.63 After 
the 1972 evaluation, the UK’s ACGS (OR) (Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the 
Ordnance) discarded with no detailed explanation any design mounting an external gun, as 
well as the concept of a conventional tank meeting the MLC 50 limit.64 
Both countries quickly acknowledged that many of the submitted designs were 
flawed. Two of the UK’s designs did not meet the new MLC 50 target and, even those which 
did would have had to sacrifice even more armour to meet the FRG’s demand for higher 
agility. The least affected would be the ‘CTR’ semi-fixed gun design, followed by the 
external pedestal gun and finally the conventional turreted design which would have had to 
lose between 50% and 75% of its armour, the exact amount depending on the agility to be 
achieved. For their part, the Federal Republic’s limited traverse turreted design, as noted, was 
very cramped and ergonomically poor for the crew, with one German commentator arguing 
that the loader would have to be a ‘Bavarian gorilla’. The oscillating pod design was noted as 
being very complex and not meeting the protection requirements of the FMBT’s GST.65 
At the time of the 1972 symposium, the UK view was that external gun tanks were 
‘unfightable’ (suggesting that they believed the design was not fit for combat operations) and 
that the German turreted pod design was unnecessarily complicated. They also maintained 
that MLC 50 conventional tank designs left the tank inadequately protected, which left the 
concepts most worth pursuing those of a 55-ton (MLC 60) conventional turreted tank and 
casemate semi-fixed gun. Disagreements persisted between the two countries and it was 
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noted that ‘some differences’ were resolved at the symposium through argument and 
agreement, others by compromise on both sides, but that still others were left unresolved to 
be carried forward to the feasibility study stage.66 Britain had previously been largely 
committed to a conventional turreted design and the feeling was that such a design should 
still be ‘seriously considered’ for FMBT, noting that using theoretical performance estimates 
of unproven concepts alongside the existing empirical data for conventional designs might 
result in unreliable comparisons favouring the theoretical concepts.67 It was noted within the 
UK that the recent developments ‘considerably altered’ the outlook for FMBT. Two years 
previously (1970), the UK had been looking at a solution based on the evolutionary 
development of existing conventional tank designs, but thanks to a combination of strong 
political pressure stemming from Britain’s forthcoming entry into the EEC (scheduled for 
January 1973), theoretical economic advantages and potential military advantages within the 
NATO alliance, the UK was now committed to bilateral feasibility studies into 
unconventional designs such as semi-fixed guns.68 
Neither side were encouraged by the conventional MLC 50 concepts, but both had 
been attracted to the semi-fixed gun designs. It was agreed, therefore, that the direction of 
future main study should be into designs with semi-fixed gun configurations, with a reserve 
study into turreted designs, including those with limited traverse should this prove to be 
advantageous. At the same time, both countries proposed that they would continue with their 
own unilateral studies, specifically that the FRG would continue to pursue an external gun 
concept and the UK would pursue their heavier MLC 60 designs. Although unilateral, these 
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national studies would be available for inspection by the other country at the end of the Joint 
Feasibility Study Stage of the project, planned for March 1975.69 
In 1973, the year after the Anglo-German FMBT symposium, there was what was 
described as a ‘rapid escalation of interest in the problems of short and long term 
standardisation of tank guns in NATO involving the US as well as FRG and UK’. The USA, 
after being committed to arming its future tanks with ATGMs, had finally decided against 
this and was now looking to replace its existing 105mm guns. The expectation was that 
whichever gun the US chose would become the NATO standard tank armament, with obvious 
implications for large export opportunities for the nation which designed it. Coming as it did 
just as new FMBT concepts were being pursued by the UK and FRG, this new debate 
distracted and diverted the FMBT programme and the project began to lose impetus.70 
By August 1974, two years since the technical symposium and four years since the 
first tentative discussions between the Army Chiefs, the UK Defence Equipment Procurement 
Executive (DEPC) endorsed further funding for the FMBT project, expecting to produce a 
tank which could enter service by the late 1980s. There was officially ‘total commitment’ to 
the FMBT programme beginning in earnest by March 1976 with costs estimated at £14.5M, 
with the engine alone costing £2.5M. The government’s Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) 
wrote that:  
 
The desirability of such a collaborative project was agreed by Herr Leber and 
Lord Carrington some three years ago with the aim of equipping the NATO 
alliance, particularly on the central front, with a standardised tank, thus 
ensuring logistic unity and enabling us to share the expertise available and 
the development costs between the two countries.71 
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With such high-level backing it appeared that the FMBT project had a bright future, at 
least from the UK’s point of view. However, little of substance had been agreed. The UK was 
still under the impression that the Germans would design the automotive systems and the 
British would design the weapons system, even though the FRG had given no indications that 
it was prepared to accept such a division of labour. Indeed, the two countries were working 
on separate concept studies with the expectation that an agreed single concept could be 
reached by the following year, the reasoning presented to the public being that by presenting 
two or more competitive designs they could then take and use the best system from each 
design, although the suspicion must be that it was actually due to wanting to keep control of 
the final MBT design. The work-sharing on the final design had still only been discussed 
tentatively, with negotiations on which nation would design which system only expected to 
be agreed by 1977, at which point the decision would be made whether or not to enter full 
collaborative development and production.72 It is useful to note at this stage that one of the 
most critical stages of collaborative MBT design, that of reaching agreement on the design’s 
eventual tactical qualities, was only now (1974) being planned to happen in 1977, which 
would be five years after the initial 1972 technical symposium.73 
At the same time as the UK and the Federal Republic were attempting to agree 
possible future design-sharing for the FMBT, Germany was in negotiation with the USA. 
Following considerable Congressional criticism as a result of the failed MBT-70 programme, 
which many blamed on the collaborative nature of the project, it is perhaps surprising that the 
USA was so soon to look once more at European MBT collaboration.74 The failure of the US-
FRG MBT-70 project had left both nations to pursue their own domestic MBT designs 
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resulting in prototypes for the German Leopard 2 and the US XM-1 (later to become the M1 
Abrams).75 However, both countries were still ostensibly committed to the concept of a 
standardised NATO tank, particularly in NATO’s CENTAG area of southern West Germany 
where the bulk of both the US Army and Bundeswehr armoured formations were assigned, 
and they had mooted a possible harmonisation programme between the Leopard 2 and XM-1. 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the US and FRG drawn up in December 
of 1974 officially stated that both countries wished to make ‘all reasonable efforts’ to 
standardise between tanks.76 Consequently, in August 1974, the German National Armaments 
Director, Herr Wahl, informed the UK that Germany was ‘overstretched’ on work both 
towards the Leopard 2 and with the USA on a ‘hybrid of Leopard 2 and the XM-1’. He said 
that Germany required a ‘pause for reflection’ of about three years regarding the FMBT 
project.77 This ‘pause for reflection’ became an indefinite halt when, on 8 October 1974, 
Germany informed the UK that it was going to have to put the FMBT project on hold as its 
resources were becoming too stretched.78 
Although the FRG participation was temporarily on hold, in March 1975 the 
Feasibility Study trials were held at the Royal Armament Research and Development 
Establishment (RARDE) at Fort Halstead, Sevenoaks.79 Three UK and two German FMBT 
concepts were evaluated, these concepts being the results of national developments based on 
the 1972 symposium decision to concentrate effort on semi-fixed guns with turreted designs 
as reserve options. No attempt had yet been made to work on a joint design, although there 
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had been regular bilateral meetings to coordinate the national studies, and the designs 
submitted for testing reflected the different military priorities of the two countries. The 
designs submitted were: 
 
UK1 A semi-fixed gun in casemate (CTR). 
UK2 Turreted conventional AFV with V12 engine. 
UK3 Turreted conventional AFV with V16 engine. 
FRG1 Twin semi-fixed, externally mounted guns (VT-1). 
FRG2 Driver-in-turret with +/-90o turret traverse.80 
 
 
The evaluation was mainly a paper exercise but also included armour performance 
data derived from practical firing trials. In April 1975, following the evaluation there was a 
comprehensive exchange of data, including technical descriptions, drawings, weight analyses 
and data sheets. Each country validated the other’s data and the results were initially planned 
to be completed by January 1976. However, the FMBT Joint Steering Group issued an 
Additional Studies Directive ordering that additional studies be carried out starting November 
1975. The directive was that work should end on the twin-gun concepts and should instead 
look towards harmonising the turreted designs, something of a reversal of emphasis from the 
1972 symposium.81 It is worth reflecting that this change of direction back towards a more 
conventional turreted design, a design that the UK had been championing over more 
unconventional concepts, came at a time when the Germans were showing a lack of interest 
in pursuing the joint tank design with the UK, having asked for their ‘pause for reflection’ the 
previous year. 
On 19 March 1976, RARDE conducted war games to test the effectiveness of three 
different potential FMBT designs from the UK. The war games presented three scenarios to 
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be played out, with the tanks tested playing the part of the Blue force, as usual in NATO 
simulations:  
 
1. Red advance into contact and Blue fighting withdrawal. 
2. Blue engaging Red in a killing zone. 
3. Blue attacking Red under covering fire. 
 
 
The three UK designs evaluated the previous year were tested: a semi-fixed gun casemate 
design (UK1, the CTR), a conventional turreted tank with V12 engine (UK2) and a 
conventional turreted tank with a V16 engine and lighter side armour to improve mobility 
(UK3). The conclusions reached from the tests were that the CTR non-turreted design was, in 
fact, more vulnerable than the turreted designs because it needed to expose more of itself to 
fire its main gun over obstacles and cover from a defensive position, the most likely scenario 
for BAOR tanks in predicted Cold War engagements. UK3, with the larger engine and lighter 
side armour, was found to be no more vulnerable than the slower and heavier UK2 as the 
armour sacrificed was from the side, which was rarely targeted in the scenarios. UK3 was 
also faster and spent more time engaging the enemy because it spent less time moving into 
position.82 
These conclusions suggested that the UK’s emphasis on protection over mobility 
might require something of a compromise, with mobility to be given more consideration in 
the FMBT or future sovereign MBT-80 design. Ironically, the USA had concluded from the 
lessons of the Yom Kippur War that their future tanks required more protection and 
survivability, and this was a key factor in the design of the XM-1.83 The 1976 RARDE trials 
suggested that, in defence in open country, protection was not as important at long range as 
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attackers acquired only a few targets and those were mostly hull-down, and that direct 
protection was of most use in defence in close country where engagements were short-
ranged. This was significant because another conclusion was that effective long-range 
gunnery was invaluable in defence and whilst in open country in good visibility, but 
otherwise (i.e. in attack or in close country) long-range gunnery was less useful. The trials 
also showed that high speed was most advantageous when conducting a linear defence, but 
only when the enemy was out-ranged. Greater mobility and a longer effective range allowed 
vehicles to fire and then reposition efficiently, but any form of defensive weaving or ‘jinking’ 
was of negligible advantage in such circumstances as the vehicle was likely to be out of direct 
enemy observation.84 The conclusion drawn from the trials was that the UK’s future tank 
requirement, be it FMBT or MBT-80, would be met with a tank that was turreted, with a 
main gun effective to longer-range than the likely opposition, was mobile and manoeuvrable, 
and had armour thickest at the front. In October 1976, a bilateral symposium was held at 
which the ‘essential characteristics’ of FMBT were finally agreed.85 
4.4. Enthusiasm Wanes 
In 1974 the West German Army was still using Leopard 1 tanks, introduced in 1965, 
alongside the older and less capable US-designed M-48s which had originally been 
introduced into US service in 1952, and which had been operated in the Heer since late 
1957.86 The FRG hoped that FMBT might lead to a replacement for Leopard 1 and had 
originally stated that this would begin happening by 1985. The UK’s ‘In Service Date’ 
deadline for FMBT was the late 1980s. The older M-48 design was clearly in more urgent 
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need of replacement and the FRG was looking to replace these by 1976; initially, the Leopard 
2 was planned as the replacement, but this design had still not been finalised in 1974; and, the 
FRG let the UK know that at that time it considered that it had three options for the 1976 
replacement: 
 
1. More Leopard 1s (although these were considered to be deficient in armour and fire 
control by contemporary standards). 
2. Introduce the Leopard 2 when it was ready. 
3. Develop a hybrid Leopard 2/XM-1, for example a German engine in an XM-1 body 
and/or US fire-control in a Leopard 2.87 
Especially given the usual problem of overruns seen in other collaborative projects, it 
was unlikely that a new tank would be ready within two years, even if it were a ‘harmonised’ 
development based on two tank designs that were almost ready for production. Leopard 2 
was therefore by far the most likely option presented, although political considerations 
favoured the international hybrid. Timely replacement was important to counter potential new 
Soviet MBTs that were known to be in development, with the T-72 having entered service in 
1973, and the T-80 due to be ready three years later in 1976.88 Even in Britain there was 
acknowledgement that an improved version of Chieftain could be developed before the 
FMBT project would result in a production vehicle.89 The Chief Executive of the 
Procurement Executive (PE) believed that the delay to the FMBT programme caused by the 
‘pause for reflection’ would be ‘at best’ two years. But he did not believe that Germany 
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would have the funding to restart the FMBT programme in so short a time; he predicted that 
the delay would probably therefore be much longer.90 
With the FMBT project on hold, if not officially cancelled, the UK had to look at 
other alternatives to replace its fleet of Chieftains. The proposed theoretical new design was 
given the project name MBT-80, the designated Chieftain replacement’s original name before 
it became FMBT in 1972. The Germans already had the Leopard 2 design at a fairly 
advanced stage, having produced sixteen prototypes by 1972, although no decision had been 
taken to bring the new tank into production at this point; this decision would not be taken 
until 1977.91 With the USA and Federal Republic having recently been in partnership in the 
abortive development of the MBT-70, and already in negotiation to create a hybrid of the 
XM-1 and the Leopard 2, which would possibly become a replacement for the FRG’s M-48, 
the UK believed that the negotiations would also lead to a US-FRG collaboration on the 
successor to the Leopard 1, the role that FMBT was intended to fulfil.92 The UK’s Head of 
Defence Sales (HDS) also stated that he believed that the USA and Germany were involved 
in denigrating UK equipment in Iran to sabotage future UK-Iran arms deals. He believed that 
the German ‘pause for reflection’ was because Germany wished to sell the Leopard 2 to 
Iran.93 
In 1974, the UK was developing the Shir (or ‘Lion’) MBT for Iran. Iran was then the 
major importer of Chieftains, being the largest foreign operator of the type, and the Shir tank 
was an improved Chieftain being developed to Iranian specifications.94 The resources 
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demanded of the Shir programme, combined with the implications of the German decision to 
halt its commitment to the FMBT project, caused a reconsideration of the UK’s own position 
with regards to the FMBT collaboration. Whilst there was political regret at the uncertainty 
over the FMBT project’s future, it was also noted that the halt would benefit the Shir 
programme. In particular, there was now no urgent need to use resources to develop the 16-
cylinder engines that the FRG had wanted in its quest for emphasising manoeuvrability in the 
FMBT. Instead, the 12-cylinder engine that Britain believed was sufficient could be used 
both for the new Iranian tank and for the UK’s own MBT-80 programme.95 However, direct 
adoption of the Shir as Chieftain’s replacement was rejected as the Shir was not considered to 
be as advanced as either the T-64 or the T-72, and was also considered to fall short of the 
General Service Requirements (GSR) for the MBT-80 in terms of protection, fire control, 
night-fighting and mobility. In light of the RARDE trials which showed the advantages of 
mobility, even in defence, Shir was also believed to be too heavy at 60 tonnes. Linear 
development of the Shir design was a possibility, but it was considered that any such 
development to meet the GSR would be so extensive a project as to constitute a completely 
new tank.96 In addition to problems of meeting the MBT-80’s GSR requirements, any linear 
development of the Shir would result in an MBT that was radically different to either the 
FRG’s Leopard 2 or the USA’s XM-1. The Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) 
acknowledged that whilst the UK could certainly produce ‘world-beating tanks’, there were 
still powerful military and political arguments for standardisation within NATO.97 Lord 
Carrington, the then Secretary of State for Defence, had considered back in 1972 at the start 
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of the project that it was essential to have a single Anglo-German tank for military, political 
and economic reasons, and the FMBT remained the UK’s primary focus for a new tank even 
as the Germans were displaying a considerable lack of enthusiasm.98 
Another possibility for the Chieftain’s replacement was to purchase the USA’s XM-1, 
a design believed to be superior to the Leopard 2 which itself had not being considered for 
reasons of its smoothbore gun and emphasis on mobility over protection.99 It should be noted 
that the decision on the main gun for XM-1 had not been officially made at this point and the 
UK still believed that its own RARDE experimental 110mm rifled gun could be chosen. The 
XM-1 had the advantage that it was considered that it would be available at the ‘right price’, 
being something of a relatively low-budget tank due to the US Administration facing strong 
Congressional pressure to keep the XM-1 project’s costs down. However, it was also noted 
that the XM-1 (like Leopard 2) was essentially an older design that had originally been 
conceived before the experiences of the Yom Kippur War, a conflict which had caused a 
global rethink of tank design, especially how to deal with ATGMs and handheld RPGs.100 In 
light of this conflict and its illustration of how infantry armed with modern shaped-charge 
warheads could defeat conventionally armoured tanks, by the time of the German 
announcement that it wished for a ‘pause for reflection’ concerning the FMBT, the US had 
adopted the UK’s Chobham composite armour; it was also temporarily fitting the XM-1 with 
the US derivation of the British L7 rifled 105mm, with the UK still pushing for its rifled 
110mm gun to be adopted as the main armament.101 However, the AGT-1500 gas turbine 
engine of the XM-1 had a particularly high fuel consumption, as much as twice that of a 
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Leopard 2, and the British assessment was that gas turbines were inferior to more 
conventional diesel engines for that reason.102 
4.5. The End for FMBT (and UK Tank Guns?) 
In March 1976 the Soviet journal, Krasnaya Zvezda (or ‘Red Star’, in essence, the official 
Soviet MOD organ), reported on NATO’s manoeuvrings for a ‘uniform tank’ and suggested 
that NATO’s European members were taking revenge on the USA for the imposition of the 
F16. In return, the journal went on, the USA were trying to sabotage the Anglo-German 
FMBT agreement by persuading the Federal Republic to accept the Leopard 2/XM-1 hybrid. 
Given the failure of the FMBT programme, Krasnaya Zvezda claimed that Britain’s future 
prospective tank sales were ‘questionable’.103 
Destabilising propaganda though the intention behind the article might have been, it 
was certainly accurate in so far as the USA-FRG agreement signified the end of the FMBT 
project, even if the major problems had been there from the beginning, so the harmonisation 
programme between the Leopard 2 and the XM-1 might be more accurately described as a 
symptom of the loss of German enthusiasm rather than the cause of FMBT’s demise. It was 
likewise true that the UK was in the process of losing its position as a major exporter of both 
tanks and tank guns. Though the fundamental disagreement on the relative values of 
smoothbore versus rifled were highly significant, the problems within the FMBT 
collaboration went much deeper.104 Following the 1976 Fort Halstead trials the ‘essential 
characteristics’ of FMBT were finally agreed at a symposium, although there was still 
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disagreement over the gun and other system details.105 However, the FRG had found that its 
Leopard 2, originally intended to replace the aging M-48 and not to be an alternative to 
Leopard 1, was a very capable design. Indeed, there was a ‘strong body of German opinion’ 
that considered the Leopard 2 to be the ultimate in conventional tank design, meaning that its 
successor would have to be a ‘significant’ improvement, something made clear to the FMBT 
project team.106 
In the meantime, the debate over the best tank gun continued.107 The initial trilateral 
trials to determine which gun the US would adopt for the XM-1 were held in 1975, pitting the 
US rifled 105mm against the UK’s rifled 110mm and the FRG’s smoothbore 120mm. As a 
result, the US decided to adopt the 120mm calibre using one-piece ammunition, even though 
many in the US military had doubts about the Federal Republic’s gun which prompted the 
UK to begin hurried development of a new rifled 120mm to meet those requirements.108 In 
July 1976, the USA announced new trilateral gun trials for 1977, and that it was willing to 
adopt for the XM-1 whichever 120mm gun was agreed upon to be the standard in Europe; 
specifically it wanted France, the FRG and UK to agree on a standard gun. However, France 
had no 120mm tank weapon in development, and the UK had only taken the decision to 
develop its 120mm M13A following the 1975 trilateral trials. Since the FRG had already 
stated that would use its own Rheimetall 120mm smoothbore and was not interested in the 
UK’s rifled-bore guns, it was unlikely that the US were expecting anything but the German 
                                                
105 TNA, WO 362/54, Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT)/KPz3 equipment collaboration, lessons learnt during 
the Anglo-German FMBT project (1971-1977), p. 2. 
106 TNA, FCO 46/1372, NATO, collaborative procurement of tanks, minute from AUS(IP) to Secretary of State, 
Future Main Battle Tank, 22 September 1976. 
107 As mentioned earlier, the debate over tank guns in this period largely revolved around accuracy and the 
ability to destroy enemy armour, particularly other main battle tanks. Britain (and, to a lesser extent, the USA), 
favoured the rifled gun whereas Germany and the USSR had chosen to pursue smoothbores. As set out in Ch. 1 
(above), the arguments largely revolved around which ammunition could be effectively fired by smoothbore and 
rifled guns, as well as the relative accuracy of each type at typical tank engagement ranges. See, for example: 
Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 238-239; Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design 
since 1945, pp. 36-37. 
108 Richard Ogorkiewicz, ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles’, in Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (eds.), Cold War 
Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain's Defence Laboratories 1945-1990 (London, 2002), p. 124. 
224 
 
weapon to be adopted. Indeed, the Congressional XM-1 Tank Panel themselves noted that the 
new requirements for the gun had been written in such a way as to exclude the British M13A 
and leave the German Rh120 as the only real choice.109 
More evidence for chicanery in the US decision-making process came from Dr. 
Malcolm R. Currie, US Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who reportedly stated 
that, ‘Rumsfeld [US Secretary of Defense] was very keen to take a decision on the new gun 
on purely political grounds before the US election [November 1976], and was not likely to be 
swayed by technical arguments.’ All the evidence pointed to the US having already made the 
decision to adopt the German 120mm, possibly as part of US/FRG deals which included 
many future weapons and the trade offset for US troops based in Germany.110 Indeed, at the 
end of July 1976, the same month that the USA had publicly announced that it would hold 
trials and adopt whichever 120mm gun the Europeans agreed upon, there was an ‘off the 
record’ announcement that the USA and FRG had reached an agreement on harmonisation 
between the XM-1 and Leopard 2.111 A minute to the UK Secretary of State for Defence 
noted that the FRG had ‘probably’ given a political commitment to buying the US AWACS 
and was prepared to accept the US fire control and engine in return for the USA accepting the 
FRG smoothbore gun. This created grave concern in Britain for the future adoption and sales 
of both the Nimrod AEW and for the future sales prospects of UK tank armament (and 
consequently tanks).112 
Despite strong evidence that the US had already made the decision to adopt the 
Rheinmetall gun, diplomatic efforts were still made to withhold any final US official decision 
until after the UK’s new 120mm rifled gun was tested in the new round of trilateral trials to 
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be held in 1977.113 The British Embassy in Washington had managed to get hold of a copy of 
the addendum to the original US/FRG MOU on the Leopard 2/XM-1 harmonisation 
programme. The obtaining of this document by Her Majesty’s Government was noted to be 
on a, ‘strictly private and confidential basis’ and with a caveat that the FRG should not know 
that the UK had a copy. This placed the UK’s diplomatic efforts towards persuading the US 
to hold a decision in a fairly awkward position, as they were obliged to negotiate using 
information obtained from the MOU addendum without letting slip that the document had 
been seen.114 At this point, with the US and FRG in agreement on Leopard 2/XM-1 
harmonisation, and the FRG declaring that FMBT needed to be ‘significantly better’ than 
Leopard 2, a failure to agree on work sharing with FMBT, and the UK struggling to have its 
M13A gun adopted, there was official recognition in Britain that the FMBT project was 
effectively finished. The situation was described as being the ‘worst of all possible worlds’: 
there would be no FMBT and the FRG gun was to be used in the XM-1, with a probable 
reduction of UK sales of its own rifled-bore gun as a consequence. 
Although the UK had further major arms projects in development relating to NATO 
standardisation, there was no doubt that the failure of both the FMBT project and the sale of 
the M13A 120mm gun were major setbacks. Such a high-profile weapon system as an MBT 
would have helped retain the UK’s global position in the international arms trade. There was 
now concern that UK might end up with a ‘disproportionately small share’ of future 
international development and production programmes, especially as the UK was more 
reluctant to buy from abroad than others were to buy from the UK. The ideal potential export 
markets were seen as European countries, especially Germany, so it was still considered 
important to involve Germany in future collaborative projects. Although the USA was a 
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larger single market, it was recognised that the UK had little to offer the US in terms of 
weapons technology and, conversely, was being (politically) pressured into accepting the US 
AWACS and the Harpoon and TOW missile systems.115 A government pamphlet on the 
subject of defence collaboration wryly noted that the US approach was heavily influenced by 
its large and powerful industrial lobby pushing for the sale of US equipment. The USA 
appeared to be in favour of NATO standardisation, but only if the agreed standard equipment 
was American, to the detriment of the European arms industry. Indeed, the French were 
apparently especially sceptical of the US balance of arms trade within the NATO alliance.116 
The agreement between the USA and FRG on harmonisation between the Leopard 2 
and XM-1 was seen in the UK as the ‘last nail in the coffin’ of the FMBT project, even 
though it ultimately failed to result in an improved tank for either side.117 Although full 
disengagement would have been difficult politically, it was advised that spending any more 
time, money and effort on the FMBT programme was now a waste of resources.118 The UK 
had two realistic options for the Chieftain’s replacement: either to buy a foreign design or to 
go ahead and design unilaterally the MBT-80 in the face of increasing calls for NATO 
standardisation. Buying a foreign design was seen as a poor option for British industry as 
such a move would be damaging for any future domestic tank-building capability. Whilst 
collaboration was not a perfect solution, it would at least have provided the opportunity to 
maintain expertise in the various engineering fields required for designing and building a 
main battle tank. By sharing the development process and foreign sales, a collaborative 
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partner would at least have retained a share of the experience and exports.119 However, apart 
from the Federal Republic, no other nation within NATO was planning to replace its current 
MBT within the time-frame which had been laid down for MBT-80. 
The UK Secretary of State for Defence was advised on 14 March 1977 that the 
Expenditure Committee be informed that the FMBT programme had encountered problems 
and that the UK and Germany were in contact over future prospects; and, a decision ‘should 
be ready soon.’ The outcome was not really in doubt, but as the political, industrial and 
military consequences were significant, the advice was that any announcement of the 
project’s cancellation be played down.120 In a draft communication for the UK military 
theatre commanders (BAOR, UK, Northern Ireland, and Hong Kong), it emerges that the 
VCGS was to make them aware of the forthcoming official announcement of the failure and 
cancellation of the FMBT project. He put the official blame on the timescales involved as the 
Chieftain’s replacement was required by 1989 at the latest; moreover,‘it has become quite 
clear that the collaborative project would not have achieved this.’ The VCGS pointed out that 
the Federal Republic was not tied to the same deadline in seeking to develop an improved 
Leopard 2 and were, in any case, not convinced that FMBT would be significantly better than 
the Leopard 2, an assumption that the VCGS disagreed with.121 
Official confirmation of the end of the Anglo-German FMBT project came on 24 
March 1977 in a letter from Fred Mulley, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, to his 
counterpart in the West Germany, Georg Leber. After four and half years of joint study on the 
project, Mulley wrote that:  
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I think we are agreed that although our two countries have found the joint 
study of considerable value it has not gone as either of us would have wished 
in agreeing on a co-operative tank programme […] It is against this 
background that we have just formally announced the end of our work on 
FMBT to our NATO partners.122 
 
 
Like the VCGS, Mulley diplomatically blamed the timescale for the failure of the 
programme, not mentioning the inability of either country to compromise on the issue of the 
main gun or the differing priorities over protection or mobility. Nor was there any mention of 
the German talks with the USA over the Leopard 2/XM-1 harmonisation programme, 
although he did allude to the FRG’s wish to adopt an improved Leopard 2 as their future new 
MBT: 
 
The threat we face is the same; the requirements our two staffs formulated to 
meet the threat were almost identical; two essential pre-conditions of a 
successful collaborative project between our two countries were therefore 
present. Nevertheless[,] as a result of our divergent replacement time-scales, 
you will, no doubt continue developing the Leopard 2 tank while we 
concentrate our resources on introducing a replacement for Chieftain starting 
certainly no later than 1989.123 
 
 
In his reply, Leber confirmed the FRG’s position that that the FMBT programme had 
been halted but was more open about the question of the main gun, writing that: ‘the 
promising work for a joint concept of weapons systems ideally requires certain assumptions 
which did not exist when we started on our programme in May 1972.’ The letter contained a 
final attempt to persuade the UK to adopt the German 120mm smoothbore for MBT-80, even 
noting that adopting the gun would not imply any UK export plan restrictions on a new 
MBT.124 Mulley’s response was that the UK still considered the rifled 120mm the better gun 
and that, although the Anglo-German FMBT/KPz3 steering committee had been disbanded, 
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the UK was nonetheless still open to possible future collaboration with the Federal 
Republic.125 
4.6. MBT-80: A Blow to Standardisation? 
The MBT-80 project followed directly from the failure of the FMBT collaboration and after 
the possibilities of other collaborative development had been ‘fully explored.’126 The project 
name ‘MBT-80’ was actually the original name given to the Chieftain’s replacement when 
this was being investigated by the ‘UK AFVs of the 80s’ study. It had been superseded by 
‘FMBT’ when the collaborative project had been initiated, so the project name’s restoration 
can be seen as symbolic.127 The possibilities considered for replacing the Chieftain MBT 
were either buying the Leopard 2 or XM-1 (‘off the shelf’, alternatively to be built in the UK 
under licence), or a UK national development, possibly including foreign components.128 The 
option of using foreign components was suggested as an opportunity to bring a greater 
harmonisation of components with the French, US and FRG tank fleets; while not true 
‘standardisation’ it would have been a step in that direction which would have improved 
NATO logistics. The purchase of an ‘off the shelf’ foreign tank, it was predicted, would have 
led to the direct loss of 2,000 UK jobs after 1986, and 10,000 indirectly as regards the 
suppliers of components. Licensed building was seen as a better route than buying a foreign 
design as it would at least have maintained British industrial capacity. But it was still 
believed that such a move could affect future UK design and development capability and 
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overseas sales markets.129 In any case, a foreign design would not have been designed and 
built to meet the British Army’s particular requirements and was, therefore, seen as a bad 
choice for both the Army and the UK’s domestic tank industry.130 MBT-80’s requirements 
were to be (in order of priority): firepower, and then equal priority for protection and 
mobility, with a much greater emphasis to be placed on reliability than in the past. No 
European tank was considered to meet those requirements.131 
Intelligence estimates in 1978 indicated ‘substantial’ advances in Soviet tank design. 
The T-64 (designed in 1976) was replacing or supplementing the older T-62,132 and the T-72 
(designed in 1977) was also gradually being introduced. The M1980 (later designated T-72A) 
was known to be in the early stages of development.133 Both the T-64 and T-72 tanks were 
considered a generation ahead of any NATO tank of the time and were believed to have 
laminate armour and advanced control systems.134 With this intelligence in mind, the 
Operational Requirements (ORs) for the MBT-80 were: the ability to ‘withstand and 
overcome’ the new Soviet tanks entering service in terms of firepower, mobility and 
protection, but also to have the ability to operate for longer periods without a break than 
Soviet tanks. The ORs dictated a crew of four and ‘maximum possible’ fuel and ammunition 
load, a 55 tonne limit (MLC 60) to negotiate German bridges, a conventional turret, a 120mm 
gun and Chobham armour.135 
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In 1977, the argument for a 120mm gun was that each main gun round stowed within 
the tank, smoke excluded, should be capable of killing a tank. There was also a balance to be 
found between the physical weight and size of a round and the explosive content of chemical 
energy (CE rounds). Possible future developments in armour protection were also to be 
considered, especially given that Soviet tanks in the 1990s might be invulnerable to 105mm 
KE rounds striking their frontal armour. Nonetheless, there remained the view that KE rounds 
should be regarded as the primary tank killer and that CE should become the domain of 
ATGWs, a view reinforced by the development of Chobham armour, designed specifically to 
defeat CE and, reportedly, capable of defeating HESH and HEAT from 120mm guns. A UK 
requirement for rounds to tackle soft targets and strongpoints meant that HESH was preferred 
to HEAT, a key operational point in favour of retaining rifled guns over smoothbores.136 
Although closer to the UK’s requirements than Leopard 2, as the US shared the UK’s 
priorities on firepower and protection, the XM-1 was still not considered to meet the MBT-
80’s GSR in firepower, protection and survivability. It was also criticised for the inability of 
its commander to acquire targets and indicate them quickly to the gunner, and also for its 
inadequate armour protection compared to Soviet tanks’ capabilities – the frontal armour was 
believed to be defeatable by the 125mm round beyond 4,000m. In addition, storage of single-
piece ammunition in the turret bustle was considered riskier than storage below the turret 
ring, the UK method with its two-part ammunition. Although the turret bustle used in XM-1 
was designed to vent any explosion away from the crew compartment, it had not at this stage 
been tested with 120mm ammunition, and was in any case deemed vulnerable when in action 
as the armoured doors were often opened. Fuel storage in the crew compartment and high-
pressure hydraulic fluids in the gun control equipment were also considered unacceptable 
hazards present in XM-1. It should be pointed out that the XM-1 was still under development 
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and, although rejected by the UK as a replacement for the Chieftain, it was noted that the 
design might be improved upon in the future.137 Finally, the British Army still preferred the 
rifled gun over the Rheinmetall Rh120, or, indeed, the US development of the German 
smoothbore gun which was to be fitted to the XM-1.138 
With a second attempt at collaboration unlikely in the near future, and the purchase of 
available foreign designs rejected, a domestically-designed MBT was the only remaining 
option.139 An initial budget of £14M was allocated for the MBT-80 project, a sum that should 
be seen in relation to the £8.5M already spent on the FMBT.140 The development of the 
MBT-80 was considered to be £175M as of September 1977; the final cost of replacing the 
Chieftain fleet of 1029 vehicles (numbers as of July 1978) by the 1989 In Service Date (ISD) 
was projected to be between £1100M and £1200M (at December 1977 prices).141 The new 
design would build upon work, in particular on the transmission and running gear, already 
undertaken for the Shir Iran, which it was believed would be in production by the early 
1980s.142 
The engine choice was initially between the US AGT-1500 gas turbine as used on 
XM-1, and the Rolls-Royce CV12 (with the expectation that a 16-cylinder version was to be 
developed later).143 Gas turbine engines had lower vibration, were quieter, easier to start, 
were more reliable and required less time between maintenance, but created a noticeably heat 
haze and, crucially, were very demanding of fuel. The intended eventual engine for MBT-80 
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was, therefore, to be a Rolls Royce 16-cylinder CV16, a projected development of the new 
CV8 and CV12 designed for the MICV (later called Warrior) and Shir respectively. This 
requirement for a 16-cylinder engine is particularly interesting in light of the previous belief 
that a 12-cylinder engine would be sufficient for FMBT; it might be noted that the 16-
cylinder engine was never developed. MBT-80’s main gun was intended to be the UK’s 
M13A rifled 120mm originally developed with the XM-1 in mind.144 
The theoretical advantages of standardisation on the FRG smoothbore gun for the UK 
were considered to be outweighed by the operational advantages of the rifled-bore gun; and 
the adoption of a foreign gun design was also considered to have negative implications for 
both British industry and future foreign sales of UK guns and equipment. Any national 
development of the UK’s own smoothbore gun was considered likely to cause an 
unacceptable delay to the MBT-80 programme and to disrupt existing productionand R&D. 
With the controversy and arguments surrounding the relative advantages or disadvantages of 
smoothbore versus rifled, combined with the growing pressure for NATO to standardise its 
weapons, the decision to go with a rifled gun was considered to require a carefully worded 
announcement. MBT-80 might, after all, be seen as a blow to standardisation.145 However, 
the UK’s position was summed up in a memo pointing out that, ‘[f]or the UK, the advantages 
of standardisation are in any case outweighed by operational considerations.’146 It was also 
noted that, having so recently introduced new national tank projects of their own, neither the 
US nor the FRG were in any position to criticise a national UK tank project, despite all the 
calls for NATO standardisation.147 
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When the ISD for MBT-80, originally set for 1989, slipped by two years, the Army 
were instead offered the Challenger. Challenger was essentially a UK-requirement modified 
Shir-2, itself a development of the original Shir developed for Iran, but delivery of which had 
been stopped following the Iranian Revolution and overthrow of the Shah in 1979. 
Development costs of the Challenger had, therefore, effectively already been met by Iran, 
although each tank still cost more than £1M, almost as much as MBT-80 was projected to 
have cost taking development costs into account. This price was a sobering warning that 
MBT-80’s final unit costs might have been far greater than originally estimated.148 
Challenger was only supposed to be a temporary replacement, intended to cover a UK 
capability gap for the ‘latter half of the decade’, and, ‘tide BAOR over into the 1990s’.149 The 
UK was now looking at an immediate quarter fleet replacement with Challenger, and a 
further quarter replacement with an ‘improved version’ of Challenger by the late 1980s, thus 
putting the UK on a half fleet replacement cycle like other nations within NATO.150 Buying 
Challenger would give the UK the opportunity to collaborate with the French and Germans 
on production of a new MBT for the 1990s, an aim that the UK Secretary of State for 
Defence indicated that he set great store by.151 Regardless of the intention for Challenger to 
be a stop-gap, its adoption made the chances of a new national UK-made battle tank for the 
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1990s ‘extraordinarily weak’.152 Consequently, on 8 July 1980, the decision was made to 
abandon MBT-80 entirely in favour of adopting Challenger.153 
4.7. NATO Discussions on Collaboration after the Failure of FMBT 
In March 1978, Lessons Learnt during the Anglo-German FMBT Project (1971-1977), was 
published. The report highlighted six main areas which had led to the project’s failure: 
1.) There were ‘markedly different’ technical solutions to the FMBT’s developmental 
requirements, exacerbated by differing tactical philosophies for the design and use of 
armour. 
2.) There had been a failure to agree on the main gun, the decision on which was to be 
delayed until both guns could be properly evaluated. This delay was then compounded 
by the involvement of the USA in pushing for a standard NATO tank gun and the 
consequent involvement of a US gun in the trials. When trilateral tests were finally 
conducted, there was considerable controversy over the interpretation of the results 
and the final decision. The report noted that the momentum behind the project had 
evaporated in the face of this inability to agree. 
3.) By the time the need for a further twelve-month joint study to provide better project 
definition was realised (to be known as Concept Study Two), it was too late for such a 
study to be implemented as the project had already been terminated. 
4.) The harmonisation programme between the Leopard 2 and the US XM-1 created a 
further delay to the FMBT project. It also made the requirement for FMBT as a 
standardised NATO tank somewhat less significant. 
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5.) The Germans did not believe that FMBT would offer a significant enough advantage 
over the Leopard 2 to make the FMBT programme worth pursuing. 
6.) Although further development might have resulted in a more advanced design to meet 
the FRG’s requirements of being a ‘significant improvement’ over Leopard 2, such a 
development would have created further delay to the introduction of FMBT, and 
would have been unacceptable to the British who were seeking the replacement of 
Chieftain by 1989 at the latest.154 
The most commonly stated reason for the cancellation of the FMBT remained the timescale, 
exacerbated by delays in the project which pushed the likely production date for a common 
tank after 1989, a delay the UK could not accept due to its urgent need to update or replace 
Chieftain.155 
However, the official report made clear that political disagreements over the main 
gun, a belief in the Federal Republic that FMBT would offer little significant improvement 
over Leopard 2, and the distraction of the FRG/US harmonisation programme, were at least 
as much to blame as any ‘timescale’ issues. A lack of agreement on what is the main feature 
of any modern MBT, the main gun, as well as the best balance between firepower, mobility 
and protection was unlikely to lead to a successful collaboration. Neither side was prepared to 
compromise on what they saw as the best solution, an attitude summed up in a memo to the 
UK Secretary of State for Defence which pointed out that: ‘We are always in favour of 
standardisation and rationalisation until it is required of us! But standardisation and 
rationalisation do not make sense for their own sake if the resulting product is inferior.’156 
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With the failure of the MBT-70, the Franco-German ‘European Standard Tank’,157 
and the Anglo-German FMBT project, in addition to the failure to harmonise the Leopard 2 
and XM-1, a series of tripartite meetings was organised between the UK, French and German 
Defence Ministers in early November 1977, which sought to identify specific components 
which could be ‘harmonised to the mutual benefit of each country’.158 M. Bourges, the 
French Defence Minister, stated that France not only wished to give absolute priority to the 
European armaments industry, but also preferred to use the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG)159 as opposed to a wider NATO forum when discussing arms 
collaboration, such a move excluding the USA from those talks. Herr Leber, the German 
Defence Minister, stated that the FRG preferred cooperative to national projects because of 
the ‘military, technology, economic and Alliance advantages that cooperation brought.’160 All 
three ministers present gave statements of support for cooperation and commonality in 
matters of defence, including in tanks, stating: ‘The Ministers declare their will to seek all 
possibilities of cooperation between the three countries.’161 
Standardisation was noted as carrying several potential advantages: improving NATO 
military effectiveness, economic savings for unit costs, savings for research and development 
and logistics (including training), and a pooling of knowledge. However, it was also 
recognised that there were disadvantages and hurdles, such as, differing national doctrines 
and regional requirements, a lack of diversity in weapon systems which made developing 
counter-measures easier to implement, industrial rigidity and a stifling of innovation, and a 
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growth of a few large monopoly suppliers, with all the problems of lack of diversity and 
competition associated with such a situation.162 One possible alternative to full 
standardisation was the suggestion of an emphasis on interoperability, instead.163 In response 
to a request to define the difference between the terms, the UK Defence Ministry’s head of 
Intellectual Property defined ‘standardisation’ as: 
 
The provision of common, and in many respects, identical weapons and 
equipment. It implies that the weapons and equipment of one force are in 
large measure interchangeable with those of another. Standardisation 
therefore also implies interoperability. However it is important to recognise 




Thus, interoperability might be illustrated by having two different weapons which use 
the same ammunition, an example being the modern US M4 carbine (a shorter and lighter 
version of the M16 assault rifle) and the UK’s L85A2 assault rifle. Both are designed to do 
the same job, but are very different weapons, and the two are hence not standardised. They 
do, however, use the same ammunition, 5.56×45mm NATO rounds, and are therefore de 
facto interoperable. This makes logistical support much easier as only one type of 
ammunition need be transported, and the British and American armies (and others using the 
same ammunition) could share a common pool of ammunition if required. 
David Owen, the UK Foreign Secretary in 1978, was particularly keen to promote the 
idea of standardisation within NATO. But he also recognised that potential European 
customers were now looking to Germany and the USA because their own forces were largely 
based on existing FRG and US equipment, thereby making replacement schedules dependent 
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on the FRG and US’s own developments.165 If NATO standardisation was going to mean an 
increasing reliance on German and US equipment, then the best that the UK might be able to 
hope for was collaboration with one or the other country, although Owen did suggest the 
possibility of collaboration with the French. If collaboration and standardisation were to be 
achieved, he felt, then NATO’s different tactical requirements needed to be overcome. He 
suggested that the FRG and UK should work to bring their requirements closer together.166 
But, at the time, there were at least eight different groups within Europe and the NATO 
umbrella that were working to better integrate European and NATO weapon systems and 
defence doctrines. These included: NATO and EUROGROUP; Anglo-French and Anglo-
German Army Equipment Commissions; EUROLONGTERM; Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG); NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG); EURONAD; SAC of 
WEU; and, FINABEL. 
With so many groups all working along roughly similar lines, it was inevitable that 
there would be much duplication of effort, something noted as being an ‘unavoidable 
disadvantage’.167 A second Franco-German MBT collaboration had begun in 1979, the Tank 
90, or, ‘Napoleon’ project, and this might have presented the UK with a second opportunity 
to collaborate on an MBT with European NATO allies. However, a Foreign Office 
memorandum in February 1980 stated that there was ‘no question’ of the UK joining the 
Franco-German collaboration, although it did not elaborate on the grounds for this.168 The 
reasoning may have been that France’s tank philosophy emphasised mobility over protection 
even more than the Germans did, or it may have been a belief that such a collaboration with 
France on an MBT was unlikely to succeed. Having just seen a collaboration with the FRG 
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fail over differing priorities, philosophies and an inability to agree on a standard main gun, 
the likelihood of now finding common ground while facing the hurdles magnified by 
France’s inclusion seemed remote. This did not stop Sir Clive Rose, the UK’s Permanent 
Representative to NATO (1979-82), writing in July 1980 that, were Britain to approve the 
adoption of an improved Shir (now called Challenger) as a temporary measure, and halt the 
MBT-80 project, it ‘could provide a unique opportunity’ for collaboration with the Federal 
Republic and France for a standard NATO tank.169 The UK’s adoption of Challenger did, of 
course, come to pass, but recent experience had shown that the reality of collaboration could 
appear unattractive, whatever the initial political advantages. Nonetheless, there was strong 
political pressure from her NATO allies for the UK to standardise.170 
At this time, there was also discussion in both the UK and elsewhere surrounding the 
future relevance of the tank in its conventional form. The Yom Kippur War had demonstrated 
the vulnerability of tanks to shaped-charge missiles, yet there was simultaneously a belief that 
Soviet tanks by the 1990s might be invulnerable to frontal attack by conventional guns.This 
doubt about the future of the MBT thus made any major governmental investment a risky 
prospect.171 The UK Secretary of State for Defence defined a ‘tank’ as ‘that part of our anti-
armour capability which provides direct fire from positions which are adequately protected 
yet mobile, and at the same time provides the ability to counter-attack.’ He defended the need 
for an AFV to fill the tank role, citing the ability to destroy Soviet tanks with direct fire 
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would ‘remain crucial’ with both ATGMs and very high velocity tank guns. But he also 
stated that the exact form of any future weapon system in that role had yet to be decided.172 
Three months after MBT-80 was abandoned, Britain was once more in the position of 
having to choose between buying a foreign design, a collaboration, or developing a national 
design to have an MBT to replace Challenger (and its likely immediate successor) to face 
potential future Soviet armour developments. A list of options was drawn up and the 
advantages and disadvantages for each option noted.173 The conclusion drawn was that, if the 
UK wanted a replacement to the Challenger’s immediate successor in the short to medium 
term, it would have had to compromise. Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister in 
1980, expressed her interest that a future tank should be produced collaboratively.174 If a 
European collaboration were to succeed, to the advantages of collaboration within NATO for 
spreading the cost, maximising production capabilities, and the advantages of commonality 
within the alliance, would be added to in large measure through European independence in 
the face of US dominance in arms production. Collaboration with the USA, on the other 
hand, was thought to be ‘always difficult’, and the relative numbers of tanks purchased would 
mean that the UK would be a very junior partner. In any collaboration, the actual realities 
might mean this option would not work out any cheaper; a ‘rule of thumb’ guideline was that 
such collaborative projects cost around 30% more than national ones. The timescales 
involved in full collaboration projects were also expected to take much longer due to the need 
to reach agreements on essential points before any development commenced. In addition, the 
                                                
172 TNA, FCO 46/2220, NATO, collaboration on tanks, tank guns and ammunition, Covering minute from 
Secretary of State to Prime Minister, Tank Policy, October 1980; FCO 46/2220, NATO, collaboration on tanks, 
tank guns and ammunition, note from Defence Minister to Prime Minister, Tank Policy, 16 October 1980. 
173 See here Appendix 6 below. 
174 TNA, FCO 46/2220, NATO, collaboration on tanks, tank guns and ammunition, covering minute from 
Secretary of State to Prime Minister, Tank Policy, October 1980. 
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advantages of national tank development included prospective third-party sales and design 
control besides.175 
4.8. Project Evaluation and Analysis 
As with the other case studies, we will use Fortune and White’s project analysis framework to 
provide a structure of the project’s critical success factors for analysis.176 
Component of Formal 
System Model 
Evidence of Critical Success Factors in FMBT/KPz3 Project 
Goals and objectives.   Both FRG and UK were, at the time, looking to design and 
produce a new MBT. 
 FRG and UK were looking to emphasise their European 
credentials with collaboration. 
 UK wanting a heavier armour-protected tank than did the FRG. 
 FRG looking for a faster tank which would necessarily have 
less armour protection than the UK preferred. 
 Each country looking to install their own main gun design, with 
an eye to future exports. 
Performance 
monitoring.  
 Joint committees agreed concepts to test, but in most cases the 
concepts presented met national, rather than bi-national, 
requirements. 
 The question of tank gun standardisation within NATO 
distracted and diverted FMBT project. 
 Disagreement over splitting of responsibilities. 
 Both countries working on separate designs with an expectation 
that one would be chosen.  
Decision-maker(s).   Political support was initially very strong. 
 Long delay (5 years) in planning agreement on the critical 
design factors regarding the design’s eventual tactical qualities. 
 FRG simultaneously in negotiation with the USA over possible 
cooperation on Leopard 2 and XM-1. 
Transformations.   Each development team worked in isolation to design and 
produce prototypes. 
 Although conferences jointly agreed which designs to test, there 
was no cooperation in actual development. 
                                                
175 TNA, FCO 46/2220, NATO, collaboration on tanks, tank guns and ammunition, note from Defence Minister 
to Prime Minister, Tank Policy, 16 October 1980. 
176 Joyce Fortune and Diana White, ‘Framing of Project Critical Success Factors by a Systems Model’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 24 (2006), p. 57.  
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Communication.   Poor communication led to, for example, misunderstanding as 
to the work-sharing for the final product. 
 No agreement on the final main gun, with each nation wanting 
to use their own design. 
Environment.   The FRG and UK were both stable democracies subject to 
internal political oversight from political opponents and 
domestic bodies. 
 The USA and FRG began to cooperate on greater 
standardisation between MBTs, at the expense of the FRG-UK 
project. 
 USA opened competition to choose main gun for XM-1, which 
further disrupted the FMBT project. 
 FRG’s interest waned as time passed with no sign of UK-FRG 
agreement on a design. 
Boundaries.  Disagreements from the start over the division of 
responsibilities. 
 Each country to produce tanks separately, with numbers 
produced weighted by national purchases. 
Resources.   Both the FRG and UK governments had budgetary limits and 
were subject to democratic governmental oversight. 
 Both countries were looking to replace existing MBTs and had 
budgeted accordingly. 
 No radically new technology was proposed, although the UK 
introduced its ‘Chobham’ composite armour. 
 Both countries looking to use their own domestically designed 
and produced main gun. 
 FRG’s resources and attention split when it entered agreement 
with USA to look at standardising MBTs. 
 USA’s announcement of competition to choose new main gun 
for XM-1 focussed and diverted both UK and FRG on that 
issue. 
Continuity.   Project saw no real attempt to address differing views on main 
gun or tactical requirements. 
 Separate national teams and development saw duplication of 
effort. 
 Pressure to adopt domestic main gun by both nations, especially 
following USA’s announcement with regards to XM-1 gun. 
 
Analysis using the above framework strongly suggests that the project lacked specific aims 
and therefore lacked a clear direction. Although political support was strong, this did not 
translate into agreement of a final design, with each country wanting something different in 
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their new MBT. It is hard to see how the programme could have succeeded when no clear 
goal was established; any agreement on the main gun would have meant a significant 
compromise by one or the other partners and a severe blow to that nation’s tank gun industry. 
The domestic industries of both the FRG and UK wanted their own main gun design to be 
adopted for the final MBT, something that became more critical when the USA announced 
that it was looking for a main gun design for the XM-1. Indeed, the USA’s influence on the 
FMBT programme should not be overlooked but was, perhaps, a symptom of ongoing 
disagreement rather than any cause of the failure. At a time when the FRG and UK were 
struggling to agree an MBT design and on which main gun to use, the USA approached the 
FRG to collaborate on standardisation plans between Leopard 2 and XM-1, as well as 
announcing the competition to find a new main gun. This distracted the FRG’s resources at a 
time when they might have been concentrating on the FMBT project. How likely it is that the 
UK and Germany would have agreed a design and main gun is open for speculation, but it 
seems unlikely given the problems encountered. The USA’s approach, therefore, might have 
been a welcome excuse for Germany to bow out of the FMBT programme given that the FRG 
was no closer to a successful MBT design with the UK and was, in any case, happy to stick 
with its Leopard 2. 
4.9. Summary 
The 1978 joint Anglo-German paper, FMBT/KPz3 Equipment Collaboration: Lessons Learnt 
during the Anglo-German FMBT Project (1971-1977), detailed three principles that its 
authors stated were the lessons learned for future collaboration: that a project must be 
feasible, likely to succeed and be of benefit to both sides; that a common aim should be 
established, and competition and duplication avoided; and, that information should be 
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exchanged in a timely and effective manner.177 The fundamental requirements for the success 
of a project as established by the UK’s Vice Chief of the General Staff – and Frinsdorf, et al., 
(adapted to the FMBT project in the introduction above) – are having initial political support, 
an agreement on a common scope or design, good communications between the participants, 
and sustained support to see the project through.178 
Looking at the principles contained in these lists in relation to the FMBT project 
shows that only the political encouragement for initial collaborative studies was successfully 
applied. The project set up national feasibility studies to arrive at a common design concept 
based on the tactical requirements, but these came to nothing and a General Staff 
Requirement was never arrived at. Without a GSR, there was no chance of achieving unity on 
work-sharing agreements because each side knew that the other would likely design a system 
based on their own requirements. Communication was sporadic, and generally consisted of 
telling the other party what the designers of a nation were working on, rather than any 
attempt at bringing together ideas and establish a common design. There was a lack of faith 
in reaching compromise which resulted, in turn, in a lack of enthusiasm to work towards a 
successful project, while the armies of both nations were not prepared to accept the designs of 
the other. 
Beyond the multiple failures within the broad project structure as set out above, two 
specific and highly significant points of disagreement stand out: the early failures to both 
agree on a main gun and the different priorities over the balance of firepower-mobility-
protection. Although widely quoted as the reason behind the project’s failure, the different 
                                                
177 TNA, WO 362/54, Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT)/KPz3 equipment collaboration, lessons learnt during 
the Anglo-German FMBT project (1971-1977, p. 2. 
178 TNA, DEFE 70/586, Future Main Battle Tank (FBMT), equipment, future tank policy study, possible 
collaboration, Note from VCGS to CGS, Tank Collaboration, 12 September 1980; and, Frinsdorf, et al.,‘Critical 
Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, p. 813. 
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timescales for ISD do not appear to be as significant as assumed by some observers.179 The 
Federal Republic had always intended that FMBT replace the Leopard 1 tank starting in 
1985, while the UK had a similar initial ISD in mind for Chieftain’s replacement. The UK’s 
proposed ISD was subsequently extended to 1989 at the latest, which was certainly a later 
deadline than initially suggested for FMBT, but unlikely to have been impossible for the FRG 
to agree to. However, whilst the FRG might have been able to extend the ISD for FMBT 
beyond 1989 due to its proposed introduction of Leopard 2 to run alongside the existing 
Leopard 1 tanks, this would have been unacceptable to the UK which was looking to replace 
its entire, ageing Chieftain MBT fleet. However, many of the delays in the FMBT project 
were themselves due to a failure to agree on tactical concepts from the start, leading to 
duplication and additional work.180 
Of course, the potential for further overrun is always present in any development 
project, and in collaborative projects in particular, something that the Germans had 
discovered only too recently with the MBT-70. However, blaming different timescales was a 
convenient political excuse to mask the fact that the FMBT project had been doomed by a 
lack of agreement and compromise in tactical design concepts, with neither country willing to 
compromise its own position in the mobility-versus-protection debate, or to threaten its 
domestic arms industry by adopting the other’s tank gun design.181 In addition, in the Leopard 
2 design the FRG found that it had a tank that might potentially give it a leading position vis-
à-vis international arms exports, something which would have been compromised by the 
development and adoption of FMBT. 
                                                
179 For some examples of the blaming of timescale, see: TNA, DEFE 13/1045, Tanks and tank guns, proposals 
and developments, MO 26/4/2, letter, UK Secretary of State for Defence to FRG Minister of Defence, 24 March 
1977; DEFE 13/1045, Tanks and tank guns, proposals and developments, draft, VCGS to Theatre Commanders 
(CinC BAOR, CinC UKILF, GOC NI, CBF HK); WO 362/54, Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT)/KPz3 
equipment collaboration, lessons learnt during the Anglo-German FMBT project (1971-1977), p. 2. 
180 TNA, WO 362/54, Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT)/KPz3 equipment collaboration, lessons learnt during 
the Anglo-German FMBT project (1971-1977), pp. 2-6. 
181 See, for example: Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, p. 19; and, Ogorkiewicz, 
Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, p. 182. The tank gun debate is covered in some detail in Ch. 1 above.  
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The fact that the FRG was convinced of the superiority of the Leopard 2 design and 
its own smoothbore gun – and, conversely, that the UK was likewise convinced that its own 
rifled gun was superior – must therefore be seen as more significant than any differences in 
ISD. For the Federal Republic, developing a radically different MBT in collaboration was a 
less attractive option than linear development and the export of a domestic design. The strong 
possibility of persuading the USA to adopt the Rheinmetall smoothbore gun further reduced 
any enthusiasm for FMBT when the UK was still insisting on using its own rifled-bore gun. 
Clearly, neither the FRG nor the UK wanted to be seen as the junior partner in any 
collaboration, and both had future foreign arms sales firmly in mind. The adoption of the 
main gun was of vital significance for the tank gun industry, and indeed the wider tank 
industry, of whichever country could persuade the other to compromise. 
Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from the FMBT project is that MBT collaboration 
should be first and foremost a military decision based on necessity, with agreement on the 
tactical requirements essential to allow later political decisions on work-sharing and foreign 
export sales.182 In other words, agreement is vital on the military role, as determined by a 
nation’s armoured doctrine, not to mention its own future ‘threat perception’, that the new 
MBT is expected to fill. Although both (or all) partners must obviously also be politically 
committed to the design, it is doctrine that should determine the final design. Sharing design 
responsibilities can only be agreed when both parties are working towards the same goal, 
both military and political, and without this focus any project will be highly likely to fail. A 
comment made at the Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) conference of November 1972 on the 
progress of the FMBT is instructive in this regard:  
 
The successful outcome of a bilateral project is dependant to a large extent 
on the two countries identifying and facing up to differences at the start. 
                                                
182McNaugher, Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks, pp. 71-72. 
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Failure to do so can only result in bitter and costly arguments, even 
breakdown later on.183 
 
 
Based on the experience of the FMBT project, it can be argued that political 
engagement on MBT collaboration may be useful to boost the standing of individuals and 
governments, but if the planners cannot agree on what tactical requirement the MBT will 
meet, much less find a final design that meets their national military requirements, then the 
project will inevitably stumble towards failure. As Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign 
Secretary, wrote in 1980 to Francis Pym, the Defence Secretary, ‘one does not buy tanks 
purely as a matter of political convenience.’184 Tanks have a symbolic and political impact 
for a nation over and above their military value.185 Yet they remain, first and foremost, a 
weapon system, and their design might best be led by defence experts and the soldiers who 
will operate them rather than simply using their development and acquisition as political 
capital. 
                                                
183 TMARL, E2014.1841, RAC Conference 1972, FMBT Progress Report, 14 November 1972, p. 6. 
184 TNA, FCO 46/2219, NATO, collaboration on tanks, tank guns and ammunition, draft memo from Secretary 
of State to Francis Pym (Secretary of State for Defence), Tanks, Cooperation with France and FRG, 17 July 
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185 See, for example: Dmitry Evstafyev, ‘A Song About a Tank, or Reflections on Russian Military Strategy’, 
Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 18:2 (2012), p. 105; Alaric Searle, Armoured 





Placing MBT Collaboration in Context: 
Other Defence and Technology Projects since 1945 
The apparent advantages of international collaboration make it an attractive option for any 
new development where cost and statements of political unity are more important than the 
sovereignty of the design.1 Large projects such as airliners, next generation fighter aircraft 
and complex missile systems might be beyond the economic and technological capability of 
single nations, especially those with smaller budgets and research and development (R&D) 
resources. Joining an international collaboration offers the opportunity to develop such 
weapon systems without bearing the entire cost or R&D burden. While this study is directed 
primarily towards NATO collaborations in the design and development of MBTs, such a 
study cannot exist in isolation, and it is useful to examine briefly other collaborative projects. 
In other words, given the complex, technical, technological and organisational issues 
surrounding MBT collaborative projects, it is only logical to consider other projects not 
involving MBTs as a means of placing the material examined in this thesis within a broader 
context. 
Chapter 1 explained the differences between collaboration and other forms of 
technology transfer, but it seems appropriate to revisit these definitions in order to look at 
some of the wider problems of collaboration. Hartley and Martin suggest that European 
defence collaboration consists of programmes ‘involving two or more nations sharing the 
                                                
1 Andrew Movavcsik, ‘Armaments among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985’, in Peter 
Evans, Harold Jacobson & Robert Putnam (eds.), International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-
Edged Diplomacy (London, 1993), p. 128. 
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development and production costs and work on defence equipment projects’.2 Although 
collaboration thus appears to be deceptively easy to identify, the main problem with defining 
real-world projects comes when the balance of responsibilities is highly asymmetric. In the 
definition provided above by Hartley and Martin, for example, there is no indication of any 
sort of equality in the division of costs and work. Dirk Klimkeit, the Otto Group Chair of 
Strategic Management at Leuphana University, Germany, used the following definition: 
 
Collaboration [...] requires an alignment between actors from various parts of 
the organization so that they show co-operative behaviour and focus on 
achieving the project’s goals. Apart from differing interests and priorities as 
impediments to collaboration, the organizational context into which projects 
are embedded varies in how conducive it is to international collaboration.3 
 
 
This definition again sets outs that the development work ought to be shared between the 
involved parties, but once again avoids suggesting any measure of parity in the work-sharing 
or responsibilities. 
Andrew Kennedy, using the example of the United States’ R&D collaborations with 
India and China, notes that asymmetry in one area might be offset by advantages elsewhere. 
In the case of the US-India-China collaborations, the USA was gaining political leverage and 
improved relations in exchange for investing money and technological expertise in Indian and 
Chinese projects.4 The balance of gain from such asymmetric deals is highly subjective, it 
being almost impossible to quantify such ‘soft’ benefits as political influence. This makes any 
hard evaluation very difficult. Rather, it must be for the partners involved to judge how 
satisfied they are with the arrangement. As DeVore points out, the prospect of losing out 
                                                
2 Keith Hartley and Stephen Martin, ‘Evaluating Collaborative Programmes’, Defence Economics 4:2 (1993), p. 
196. 
3 Dirk Klimkeit, ‘Organizational Context and Collaboration on International Projects: The Case of a 
Professional Service Film’, International Journal of Project Management, 31 (2013), p. 366. 
4 Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘Unequal Partners: U.S. Collaboration with China and India in Research and 
Development’, Political Science Quarterly, 132:1 (2017), p. 84. 
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relative to the other partners involved is a strong deterrent to any potential collaboration.5 
Jacques Gaillard addresses the problems of asymmetry in international collaborations and 
concludes that: 
 
One of the determining condition[s] for successful collaboration is that the 
partners should be equal or at least complementary in many respects. The 
experience accumulated during the last decade shows that this apparent 
vicious circle can be overcome if the collaboration is based on a strong 
mutual interest and if both parties have something to gain from it.6 
 
 
Thus, Gaillard is in broad agreement with Kennedy in that apparent asymmetry in one 
area can be balanced out if there is a clear gain elsewhere. However, he also suggests that two 
of the prerequisites for a successful collaboration are that ‘Project proposals should, 
whenever possible, be drafted jointly and each partner should be associated as much as 
possible to the important decisions which need to be taken,’ and furthermore that, ‘Each 
cooperating group should include a substantial number of researchers (at least 3).’7 Alicia 
Mazur, et al., would also seem to conclude that all stakeholders in a project should be 
involved at all stages if the collaboration is to succeed.8 
The literature suggests that a key factor for successful collaboration is that all parties 
believe themselves to be gaining advantage in approximate proportion to the contribution 
they are investing. However, this also holds true for non-collaborative international 
transactions, even simply purchasing a foreign design ‘off the shelf’ might be seen as an 
equitable exchange while, self-evidently, not being collaboration in any real sense. Thus, it is 
it acknowledged here that the exact definition of a ‘collaboration’ is vague at best, and that 
the theoretical ideal of two or more parties investing equally in development and 
                                                
5 Marc R. DeVore, ‘The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective 
Action Problems’, Security Studies, 20:4 (2011), p. 626. 
6 Jacques F. Gaillard, ‘North-South Research Partnership: Is Collaboration Possible Between Unequal 
Partners?’, Knowledge and Policy, 7:2 (1994), p. 57. 
7 Ibid., p. 58. 
8 Alicia Mazur, et al., ‘Rating Defence Major Project Success: The Role of Personal Attributes and Stakeholder 
Relationships’, International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 953. 
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manufacturing may not survive contact with actual projects. Nonetheless, the principle of 
involving all partners in the development process seems to differentiate ‘true’ collaborations 
from projects where one partner develops a product independently, and later invites others to 
simply invest money in it or to produce an already-developed system under licence. 
A number of successful international collaboration projects, both military and civilian, 
are relevant to investigating the question of collaboration, and could have been included, but 
space limits both the number of case studies and the depth of coverage. With the thesis 
focussed on NATO MBTs, a decision was made to concentrate on other military projects for 
these smaller studies, although the civilian BAC/Aerospatiale Concorde airliner is obviously 
a significant departure from this. The projects covered are divided into three broad categories: 
tanks and ground vehicles, aircraft, and weapon systems. Three examples of international 
collaboration for each of these three categories have been chosen, with the expectation that 
examining a broad range of programmes will reveal a pattern pertinent to our study of MBTs. 
The Mark VIII ‘International’ tank has already been mentioned earlier in the thesis as the 
only historical example of a collaborative tank project to result in a production vehicle. Given 
its significance, the Mark VIII is dealt in more depth than the other case studies in this 
chapter and appears towards the end of the chapter rather than in the section on tanks and 
other ground vehicles since it was a collaboration which predates the Cold War. Other 
projects not covered here that are, nevertheless, worthy of a brief mention include the 
Indonesian-Turkish PT/FNSS/CMI Tiger/Harimau medium tank,9 the Lockheed Martin F-35 
                                                
9 See, for example: Jane’s 360, ‘IDEF 2017: Prototype Kaplan MT Medium Weight Tank Completed’, 
<http://www.janes.com/article/70297/idef-2017-prototype-kaplan-mt-medium-weight-tank-completed>, 
accessed 31 January 2018; and, Jane’s 360, ‘Indonesian Army’s Tiger Medium Tank Programme Moves 
Ahead’, <https://www.janes.com/article/84825/indonesian-army-s-tiger-medium-tank-programme-moves-
ahead>, accessed 28 November 2018. 
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Lightning II,10 the Austrian-Spanish ASCOD Fighting Vehicle,11 and the ‘Black Night’ 
upgrade to Challenger II.12 
Finally, in order to highlight how programmes which involve cooperation may not be 
collaborative in the sense of co-development and joint responsibility, two significant defence 
programmes, the Sino-Pakistani MBT-2000/Al-Khalid MBT and the F-16 Falcon combat 
aircraft have been chosen for brief examination. By showing how the dynamics within these 
cooperative projects differ significantly from those illustrated in the main MBT case studies 
above, a better critical comparison between types of technology transfer can be made in the 
conclusion.  
5.1. Tanks and other Ground Vehicles 
Main battle tank collaborative projects have generally taken place between NATO nations, 
even if Warsaw Pact nations produced Soviet tanks under licence. Any collaboration within 
the Warsaw Pact was, though, very far away from the intentions which lay behind NATO 
nations’ efforts at collaborative AFV projects. The Sino-Pakistani MBT-2000/Al-Khalid 
likewise does not fit the model of a genuine collaborative AFV project. Thus, this section will 
consider two collaborative AFV projects: first, the case of the Franco-German KNDS EMBT, 
which was a demonstrator tank, developed as an exhibition vehicle to showcase KNDS as a 
company; second, the SP-70, which was Italian-German-British self-propelled artillery piece, 
                                                
10 See, for example: F-35, ‘F-35 Lightning II’, <https://www.f35.com/>, accessed 23 December 2018; and, 
Gertler, Jeremiah, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 
16 February 2012), accessed via. 
<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA590244>, accessed 28 
September 2016. 
11 Army Technology, ‘ASCOD (Pizarro /Ulan) Armoured Fighting Vehicle’, <https://www.army-
technology.com/projects/ascod/>, accessed 29 September 2018. 
12 See, for example; BAE Systems, ‘Black Night Unveiled, <https://www.baesystems.com/en/black-night-
unveiled>, accessed 1 January 2019; and, Army Technology, ‘BAE Systems unveils Black Night Challenger 2 
MBT for British Army’, <https://www.army-technology.com/news/bae-black-night-challenger-2-army/>, 
accessed 10 October 2018. 
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which failed as a project due to technical difficulties. These two examples provide variations 
on the main theme of this thesis. 
Franco-German KNDS EMBT 
On 15 June 2018, the Franco-German KNDS Group, comprising Krauss-Maffei Wegmann 
(KMW) and Nexter Defense Systems, unveiled its new tank demonstrator at the Eurosatory 
Defence and Security Exhibition. This demonstrator was not a completely new tank but was 
instead a KMW Leopard 2A7 MBT chassis fitted with the turret of the Nexter Leclerc MBT. 
Despite calling their vehicle the ‘European Main Battle Tank’ (EMBT), KNDS were not 
actually suggesting the EMBT as a finished tank but rather promoting it as evidence that they 
were capable of producing a next-generation MBT.13 This new project is particularly 
interesting as it may signal a possible collaboration between French and German companies 
to produce a new MBT for NATO countries. Whilst it is too early, especially in light of the 
history of such collaborations, to state that a post-1945 collaborative project will lead to a 
new NATO tank, the EMBT demonstrator is certainly a significant enough development to 
warrant some examination. 
The origins of EMBT must surely be traced back to the 1977 Franco-German ‘Tank 
90/Napoleon’ project.14 After several disagreements and re-evaluations of the aims of that 
project, a late proposal was for a new, collaboratively developed, turret to be mounted on an 
improved Leopard 2 chassis.15 The Tank 90 project was eventually cancelled in 1983, 
cancellation having also been the fate of the earlier 1957 ‘FINABEL’ Franco-German 
attempt. Evidently two failed collaborative proposals had not dampened enthusiasm for 
another attempt between these two major continental European countries because another 
                                                
13 Jane’s 360, ‘EU Tank Breaks Cover’, <https://www.janes.com/article/81083/eu-tank-breaks-cover-es18d5>, 
accessed 2 August 2018.  
14 See Ch. 2, above, for more details of the 1977 Franco-German project. 
15 TNA, FCO 46/2775, NATO: Franco-German Tank Cooperation, memo from British Embassy, Bonn, to 
British Embassy, Paris, ‘Franco-German MBT’, 20 March 1981. See also Ch. 2 above. 
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tank collaboration project was announced in 2012. The French and German governments 
agreed to cooperate on a new Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) to potentially replace 
both the Leclerc and Leopard 2A7, as well as a related range of AFVs and support vehicles.16 
On 20 June 2018, Germany’s KMW and France’s Nexter announced the creation of new bi-
national company, KMW and Nexter Defense Systems (KNDS), to develop new land combat 
vehicles. 
Nexter and KMW have been exploring the possibility of a collaboration for some 
years. In an interview on 22 July 2016, the Polish Defence Minister announced that Poland 
wanted to be part of any international collaboration between the two firms, although no 
Polish involvement has yet been revealed in the KNDS consortium.17 Such interest in a new 
development is prescient, especially for a country close to an area of current conflict.18 Yet 
the Cold War vintage that underlies the design of the current MBT fleets of NATO member 
states’ means that widespread replacement is going to be required within NATO in the next 
20 years. Many Western countries have neglected their MBTs in the face of reduced defence 
budgets and contemporary conflicts which predominantly involve counter-insurgency and 
low-intensity warfare. Urgent replacement of obsolete tanks is likely to be met with 
progressive upgrades rather than with the development of new models, but upgrades can only 
offer limited technological improvements and new models will inevitably be required in the 
longer timeframe. KNDS’s EMBT demonstrator may thus be a sensible first move towards 
meeting the requirements of several NATO members within the next couple of decades.19 
                                                
16 Jane’s 360, ‘Design Concepts Emerge for Possible New French-German Main Ground Combat System’, 
<https://www.janes.com/article/80463/design-concepts-emerge-for-possible-new-french-german-main-ground-
combat-system>, accessed 6 June 2018. 
17 Defence News, ‘Poland Wants to Play in Franco-German Tank Program’, 
<http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2016/08/03/poland-wants-play-franco-
german-tank-program/87929202/>, accessed 17 August 2016. 
18 At the time of writing, the Ukraine is still fighting Russian-backed separatists on its eastern borders and 
tensions with Russia are mounting over navigation rights in the Sea of Azov, amongst several other disputes. 
19 IISS, ‘France and Germany: on the right tank tracks?’,<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-
balance/2018/07/france-and-germany-tank-tracks>, accessed 20 July 2018. For an example of how governments 
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According to a study by Frinsdorf, Zuo and Xia, there are five main factors that 
should be taken into account when assessing a potential project’s efficiency: the 
organisational capability should be sufficient to meet the project’s scope; the project should 
enjoy sufficient support from senior management; the project’s aims and objectives should be 
well-defined and understood; communication pathways should be well-established, and; 
sufficient resources should be available to meet the project’s requirements.20 For many 
national government-led projects not all of these requirements can be guaranteed. Elected 
politicians support projects for only so long as they remain in office, and an election or 
governmental reshuffle can leave projects without strong political support. With strong 
management identified as a particularly important factor in successful project management, 
politically-driven projects within democracies can therefore be at a severe disadvantage in 
relation to those undertaken within the private commercial sector (or, indeed within a 
dictatorship).21 Resources depend on budgetary allocations, something that may be reduced 
or withdrawn at any time according to political necessity or changing priorities. A politically-
driven project might be overseen by diplomatic forces with political goals but without a clear 
and defined military target. Commercial collaborations, by contrast, are far more likely to 
begin projects with a set goal in mind, with allocated resources and with a strong 
management structure. Obviously even commercial collaborations can run over budget or 
fail, but the incentives to succeed commercially are stronger than with a programme under 
governmental supervision, where the consequences of failure are perhaps not as 
commercially catastrophic. 
                                                                                                                                                  
upgrade older MBTs, see UK Defence Journal, ‘BAE Unveils “Black Night” – the First Fully-Upgraded 
Challenger 2 Tank’ <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/bae-unveils-black-knight-the-first-fully-upgraded-
challenger-2-tank/>, accessed 3 December 2018. 
20 Olivia Frinsdorf, Jian Zuo& Bo Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 813. 
21 Stephen B. Johnson, ‘Technical and Institutional Factors in the Emergence of Project Management’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 31 (2013), p. 677. 
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The most recent international defence collaboration, the KNDS EMBT may signpost 
the future of such programmes. Multinational consortia are commonplace in the field of high 
value large projects and having the single management structure and development team 
allows for fewer disagreements over specifications and direction. Whilst this might also 
restrict developmental input to a single team, being a commercial concern means that such 
consortia are theoretically going to be developing to a fixed governmental tender. At the time 
of writing, KMW itself might be acquired by Rheinmetall, which could affect the future of 
the KNDS collaboration.22 With few nations having the budget, facilities or resources to 
develop new sovereign MBTs, it will be interesting to follow the fortunes of KNDS and 
similar international consortia and discover if such private sector international collaborations 
are the future for MBT development within NATO. 
The Italian-German-British SP-70 Self-Propelled Artillery System 
The SP-70 was intended to be the self-propelled variant of the 155mm FH-70 howitzer, 
covered below, which was jointly developed in the late 1960s by Britain, the FRG and Italy. 
The towed FH-70 howitzer officially entered service with those countries in 1978, although it 
was not operational until two years after that.23 The SP-70 was subsequently accepted as a 
NATO project in 1973 on the basis of the success to that point of the FH-70.24 Whilst it is 
acknowledged that covering the SP-70 before the FH-70 project is not the logical sequence, 
as an armoured vehicle the SP-70 belongs in this section and knowledge of one project does 
not really depend on knowledge of the other. 
                                                
22 Defence News, ‘Tank Maker Takeover: Germany’s Rheinmetall Eyes Acquisition of Rival KMW’ 
<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/27/tank-maker-takeover-germanys-rheinmetall-eyes-
acquisition-of-rival-kmw/>, accessed 27 November 2018. 
23 R.G. Sawhney, ‘Field Artillery Today and Tomorrow’, Strategic Analysis, 7:11 (1984), p. 931. FH-70 is dealt 
with in more detail below. 
24 Alan G. Draper, European Defence Equipment Collaboration: Britain’s Involvement, 1957-87: RUSI Defence 
Studies (London, 1990), p. 89.  
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Self-propelled artillery has several advantages over towed guns. It is faster to get into 
action, is about as mobile as any armoured units it is supporting, and it usually provides some 
protection both for the crew and the gun. By contrast, disadvantages include the additional 
expense, the fact that its mobility relies on its own internal engine which is not easily 
replaced in cases of mechanical breakdown, less efficient operational mobility than a towed 
gun, and greater weight than an equivalent towed gun which consequently reduces its 
strategic mobility in comparison.25 In the years following the Second World War, armoured 
warfare was predicted to remain an important feature of any potential European Cold War 
conflict. Most NATO countries therefore saw a need for self-propelled medium artillery to 
complement the existing self-propelled light pieces. 
The successful progress of the FH-70 towed howitzer encouraged the trilateral 
collaboration of Britain, the FRG and Italy which had developed it, so that they took the 
decision in 1973 to use this gun as the basis for a new self-propelled version, to be known as 
SP-70.26 Development was split between the three participating countries, with Britain taking 
responsibility for the turret, ammunition handling system and sights; the Federal Republic 
contributing the ammunition, chassis and main engine; and Italy the elevating mechanism, 
hull and auxiliary power unit (APU). With the aim of improving both interoperability and 
reliability, the FRG used components from several existing vehicles such as Leopard 1 and 
the Marder Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). The gun, as mentioned, would be the FH-70, 
further improving interoperability.27 
In 1973, the trilateral group completed the SP-70’s Project Definition Phase and then 
went on to conduct exhaustive validation trials which included the production of five 
prototypes by 1976. These trials were extensive and included operation in the freezing 
                                                
25 J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Basingstoke, 1989), p. 11. 
26 For more information on the FH-70 towed howitzer, see below. 
27 R. C. F. Craven, ‘A 70 for the 90s’, Field Artillery Journal, 51:3 (1983), p. 28; and Military Today, ‘SP-70’, 
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conditions of northern Norway and the hot, dry conditions of Sardinia. Crucially, mobility 
was found to be equal to that of the new US M1 tank (then still under development) and of all 
contemporary NATO’s tracked personnel carriers. The system proved itself capable of 
negotiating rocky conditions and firing with consistent accuracy; and it was successful 
enough in the trials that the project moved on to Phase B.28 With the Phase B trials set for 
1983, SP-70, also known as PzH-70 in the Federal Republic, was expected to enter service in 
1988.29 
However, various technical problems emerged during the Phase B trials, including 
reliability issues with the turret and the ammunition handling system. As these problems 
continued to delay the programme and with rising costs, the Federal Republic took the 
decision to withdraw from the collaboration in 1985. As the major partner, this effectively 
doomed the project. With the collapse of the SP-70 project, Britain, the FRG and Italy were 
still left in need of a replacement for their existing US-built M109 SPGs. It was highly 
unlikely that another European self-propelled howitzer collaboration was going to be 
proposed within the required time frame, even had the three countries been eager to enter 
another such project so soon after the failure of SP-70. With the USA looking to a linear 
upgrade of, rather than replacement for, their own existing M109s, Britain, the FRG and Italy 
instead chose to develop their own sovereign mobile artillery systems. Britain subsequently 
developed the AS-90, Germany the PzH-2000 and the Italians the Palmaria.30 
The SP-70 collaboration demonstrates an important consideration when entering such 
partnerships, be they international or not, in that any partnership is reliant on continued 
cooperation between its members. When one partner withdraws from the collaboration, the 
consequences can be disastrous. The Federal Republic’s decision to withdraw effectively 
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spelled the end of the project, forcing the other two participants to choose between 
substantially reallocating and restructuring the existing resources and responsibilities, or also 
withdrawing in turn. Of course, such a consideration might also act to dissuade a partner from 
withdrawing, even whilst facing unfavourable financial circumstances. Dooming a project to 
failure by withdrawing support might result in negative political consequences, something 
which could be deemed more important than the potential financial disadvantages of staying 
part of the programme.  
5.2. Aircraft 
This section is slightly different in that a civilian collaborative project has been included. 
This is because it is a good example of an Anglo-French joint aircraft project, established 
with the intention of a combined effort being deemed the best way of solving major technical 
challenges. It seems obvious that the timing of the project coincided with Britain’s intention 
of attempting once again to join the EEC. The second project – the Eurofighter Typhoon – 
deserves inclusion as it could be seen as an example of successful high-technology aircraft 
project conducted by four NATO nations. Finally, this section will consider A380/A400M 
because this project was driven almost entirely by political considerations to produce a 
military airlift aircraft. 
Concorde 
Described by BAE Systems as an example of “what can be achieved when ‘great minds think 
alike’ ”, the Anglo-French BAC/Aerospatiale Concorde31 emerged from separate studies by 
                                                
31 Through a long sequence of mergers and eventual nationalisation, the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) 
became one of the companies inherited by BAE Systems. The company Aerospatiale is similarly the inheritor of 
Sud-Aviation. See BAE Systems, ‘BAC Concorde’, <https://www.baesystems.com/en/heritage/bac-concorde>, 
accessed 18 September 2018; and Reference for Business, ‘The Aerospatiale Group’, 
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both Britain and France in the mid-1950s to examine the possibility of a practical supersonic 
transport aircraft.32 The project history is interesting for several reasons, most notably the 
point that political enthusiasm over-ruled any economic realities which would likely have 
otherwise hindered or even halted the aircraft’s development. As an example of international 
collaboration, Concorde can be viewed as an attempt by two major European nations, both 
with a recent history of being global superpowers, to regain global prestige with a ground-
breaking scientific and technical project and, in particular, to gain a technical lead in 
commercial aviation over the USA.33 As a commercial venture, Concorde was a financial 
failure but it certainly achieved the political aim of highlighting British and French technical 
expertise to the world.34 
In 1954, the future of Britain’s commercial aircraft industry looked bleak. The much-
vaunted Brabazon project, a large luxury airliner intended to attract rich passengers, had 
failed to attract orders in the face of increasing mass-market commercial air travel. The 
British Comet, the world’s first jet-powered airliner, had just been grounded following a 
series of accidents and issues with metal fatigue and structural weakness reportedly due to the 
shape of the windows.35 The French, meanwhile, had produced the Sud-Aviation Caravel 
sub-sonic airliner, but were very aware that the years of German occupation during the 
Second World War had stagnated their airliner technical expertise, especially compared to the 
USA whose increasing industrial dominance in Europe de Gaulle particularly resented and 
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sought to counter.36 Since being elected to head the French Fifth Republic, de Gaulle had 
committed France to a series of grands projets to further the country’s global standing. The 
quest for a supersonic airliner that would result in the Concorde was only one of these 
prestige projects.37 
Both Britain and France came to the same conclusion, that in order to regain lost 
prestige in the global airliner industry they needed to develop a supersonic passenger aircraft. 
The technical problems were considerable; and, both nations had encountered similar 
obstacles. As a consequence of the aerodynamic forces encountered, supersonic aircraft must 
have smaller wings than aircraft designed for slower flight, but small wings produce less lift, 
particularly at slower speeds. This lack of lift means a very long run is required to achieve 
take-off speed and, conversely, it results in a frighteningly high landing speed. These 
drawbacks meant that supersonic airliners remained technically impractical until Britain’s 
Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough developed the concept of the ‘slender-delta 
planform’ wing shape which overcame most of the problems.38 
Both France and Britain sought collaboration as a means to reduce development time, 
reduce costs and to pool technical expertise.39 Each had slightly different aims, with Britain 
holding an uncertain middle ground between wishing to dominate the global aeronautical 
industry and pursuing cooperation with the USA, and with France looking to dominate 
politically and industrially in Western Europe. Yet the governments of both nations 
recognised that the costs of these ambitions would be prohibitive for their respective national 
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economies. The apparent answer was collaboration. France lagged behind Britain in the fields 
of engine manufacture and metallurgy (the required special steels cost three times as much to 
make in France as compared to Britain), so collaboration with Britain offered solutions to 
both of these problems.40 Britain, for its part, primarily saw collaboration with France as an 
opportunity to reduce the cost of the development and simultaneously improve its 
relationship with the EEC, which organisation Britain was negotiating to join at the time of 
the decision to collaborate on Concorde, making the first unsuccessful attempted to join in 
1963.41 
In 1959, the British Government had awarded a contract for study of preliminary 
designs to Hawker Siddeley Aviation and Bristol Aeroplane Company (BAC). In France, the 
equivalent contract was awarded to Sud-Aviation with their Super-Caravelle proposal. The 
decision to collaborate began in April 1960 when the Sud Technical Director approached 
BAC and discovered that the two teams were broadly in agreement with the proposed design. 
Rather than form a simple commercial partnership, however, the strategic implications 
behind developing the world’s first supersonic airliner led the respective governments to 
insist on forming the partnership at an international level. Britain and France signed the draft 
‘Treaty Agreement Regarding the Development and Production of a Civil Supersonic 
Transport Aircraft’ on 29 November 1962.42 
Despite some disputes over the name, whether the aircraft would be the British 
Concord or the French Concorde, an ironic disagreement given that the name was supposed 
to represent harmony and agreement between the nations, the project went ahead smoothly 
and first of the two prototypes (one French and the other British) made its test flight on 2 
March 1969. It took seven years of testing and further development before Concorde first 
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entered commercial service on 21 January 1976.43 Sadly, the aircraft proved an economic 
failure almost from the start. Sales were very poor, with British Airways and Air France 
buying a handful of machines, and Singapore Airlines and Braniff International Airways 
(operating from Dallas, Texas) each leasing a single aircraft for less than a year. Political 
disputes regarding overflight privileges and airport access severely restricted the routes on 
which Concorde could operate. In particular, the USA was reluctant to allow Concorde to fly 
from its airports and only Dulles International in Washington DC was eventually opened to 
the model. Energy and environmental concerns were cited as influencing the decisions to 
disallow the supersonic airliner freedom to operate, but political motives were strongly 
suspected to be a major factor. The USA, for example, had attempted its own supersonic 
airliner project but this had failed, and Concorde undoubtedly represented a threat to its own 
domestic aerospace business.44 
The Concorde programme shows what can be achieved with strong political support, 
even in the face of economic hurdles. As an international collaboration it was successful, but, 
as Martin Edmonds points out, ‘decisions about what to build, how many and at what cost are 
of paramount economic importance’.45 The Concorde programme showed off the engineering 
talents of Britain and France at a time when both countries were eager to regain some 
international prestige globally. Yet it also demonstrated that international collaborations 
driven so strongly by political factors are in danger of losing sight of economic advisability in 
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the face of a desire to succeed ‘at all costs’ and against sound economic objections.46 Some 
comparison can be made with the MBT-70 project which was similarly motivated primarily 
by politics and also proved economically disastrous, albeit that project was cancelled before 
reaching the production stage.47 The Concorde programme stands as an example of how even 
successful collaboration does not necessarily lead to a successful end project. A marvel of 
engineering, Concorde sadly proved to be economically flawed. 
Eurofighter Typhoon 
The Eurofighter Typhoon project has been, to date, the largest European military aircraft 
programme. Despite much criticism aimed at the collaboration, it has resulted in a wide range 
of employment and technical benefits to the nations involved, and produced a highly effective 
fourth-generation multi-role combat aircraft that is in use, or on order, with nine nations 
around the world.48 With a four-nation NATO collaboration involving Britain, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, the Eurofighter programme demonstrates that such international consortia are 
able to successfully develop and produce highly technical weapon systems. 
In the late 1970s, NATO’s European-built fighter aircraft were beginning to look 
inadequate when compared against both those of the USA (F-15 and F-16) and the Soviet 
Union (Su-27 and MiG-29). Developing and building a fourth generation fighter aircraft was 
going to be an expensive proposition and so, whilst some governments bought US equipment, 
Britain, Germany and France instead considered the collaborative development of a 
‘European Fighter Aircraft’ or ‘Eurofighter’. Britain’s British Aerospace (BAE) and 
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Germany’s Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) discussed an Anglo-German 
collaboration in 1979 and produced a design for a ‘European Collaborative Fighter’ (ECF) 
which was later renamed the ‘European Combat Aircraft’ (ECA). Although initially showing 
interest in joining the collaboration, France, and particularly Dassault, finally withdrew from 
discussions in 1980 over disagreements regarding their prominence in any such coalition, 
instead beginning development of their own aircraft (eventually to become the Dassault 
Rafaele).49 
The proposed new ECF aircraft project was almost abandoned due to funding cuts and 
differing government priorities. However, BAE turned to the old Anglo-German-Italian 
Panavia consortium which had produced the Tornado MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) 
and managed to persuade them to work on a new ‘Agile Combat Aircraft’ (ACA). Italy was 
particularly interested in the project as it was looking to update its aging F-104 Starfighters, 
but the German government was reluctant to wholeheartedly support either the Anglo-Italian 
ACA initiative or the French programme, believing that to choose either side would incur 
diplomatic displeasure from the other. However, MBB had not abandoned the idea of the new 
ACA aircraft, despite their government’s official position. In May 1983, they aided BAE and 
Italy’s Aeritalia in creating a demonstrator known as the ‘Experimental Aircraft Programme’ 
(EAP). Significantly, the EAP greatly impressed the pilots who flew it, one comment being 
that, ‘It goes like a ferret with a firework up its bum!’ 50 
On 29 April 1983, just a month before the BAE/MBB/Aeritalia EAP demonstrator, 
the air staffs of Britain, France Germany, Italy, and Spain had met to discuss a ‘Future 
European Fighter Aircraft’ (FEFA) project collaboration. Following this meeting came the 
Turin Agreement in August 1985, a formal invitation to participate in what had by then 
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become the ‘European Fighter Aircraft’ (EFA) programme. Britain, Germany and Italy all 
signed together, with Spain joining a few weeks later. However, France would not join the 
partnership unless it was the predominant partner and unless the EFA was based on the 
Dassault Rafaele, something that the other partners rejected. Even those remaining were not 
completely in agreement over the direction of the new aircraft, with Britain and Spain 
wanting the ‘European Fighter Aircraft’ (EFA) to be a multi-role machine, capable of ground 
strikes as well as air superiority, whereas Germany and Italy only wanted an air superiority 
fighter. Discussion and compromise allowed agreement to be reached on a final design by 
September 1987, and the EFA programme was given the go-ahead in January 1988.51 
The Eurofighter consortium completed prototypes based on the BAE/MBB/Aeritalia 
EAP in 1989 and the four partners agreed to divide responsibility for setting up 
manufacturing of their allocated components for future production aircraft. The exact division 
on production responsibility was not finalised until 1996. Following extensive testing, the 
first aircraft entered service with the air forces of the four participating nations between 2003 
and 2005. At the time of writing, Eurofighter Typhoon is in service with Germany, Italy, 
Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman. 
Ordersfor the aircraft have been placed by both Kuwait and Qatar.52 
Criticisms of the Typhoon project include questions about its relevance in a post-Cold 
War world, the escalation of costs, and the delays taken in development and production. The 
relevance of any military system is only highlighted when it is required, but that requirement 
might come at any time and place, and history has shown that few conflicts wait until all 
participants are prepared. The cost escalation seems to be standard for all collaborations, and 
indeed most complex projects. On 16 June 2006, Keith Hartley presented a report on the 
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industrial and financial benefits of the Eurofighter Typhoon, concluding that the collaboration 
had saved the European combat aircraft industry, as well as providing around 100,000 jobs 
and various technology spin-offs.53 The overall costs were undoubtedly higher than had the 
project been handled by a single nation indigenously, but this should be seen in relation to the 
splitting of the budget between the four participants and the advantages of increased 
economies of scale. Despite the escalation of overall costs, therefore, each participant spent 
less on their share of Eurofighter than had they pursued their own designs.54 
The Eurofighter programme is a good example of how international collaborations 
can successfully produce complex defence technology. Whilst both over-budget and over 
schedule, it is hard to recall a defence development that has done otherwise and this should 
not be seen as a fault of collaboration, even though these over-runs were considerable in the 
case of Eurofighter.55 With collaboration, at least, such costs are shared. The political strain 
that such projects come under is perhaps magnified within collaborations because each 
partner is at the mercy of domestic political opinion, no matter which partner (if any) is 
actually responsible for any problems, and domestic political opponents can trumpet any 
delay or additional cost as examples of governmental mismanagement or poor decision-
making.56 On a wider stage, international cooperation requires that all partners share a single 
goal. Both the refusal of the French to enter the Eurofighter programme unless it was 
dominated by France, and the negotiations required to agree on the future role of the EFA, 
show how different countries bring different opinions to any coalition and thus demonstrates 
how any successful collaboration must ensure that such differences are taken into 
consideration and overcome from the outset. 
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Inspired by the commercial Airbus A380, the A400M project was a multinational 
collaborative programme to produce a military airlift aircraft meeting a requirement between 
the tactical/operational capability of the Lockheed C-130J Hercules and the larger strategic 
capability of the Boeing C-17 Globemaster.57 Following the cost and time over-runs of the 
Eurofighter programme, A400M was intended to be an example of how European 
collaboration could produce good results to a budget and deadline.58 Unfortunately, the 
programme actually reinforced how such international collaborations rarely manage to meet 
such targets. 
The Airbus consortium had developed and built the A380, a project that has its roots 
in the 1960s and a desire to compete with the USA, and especially with the Boeing 747 
‘Jumbo Jet’. The supersonic BAC/Aerospatiale Concorde was proving a commercial 
failure,59 and politicians in Britain, France, the FRG, and the Netherlands met in July 1967: 
 
For the purpose of strengthening European co-operation in the field of 
aviation technology and thereby promoting economic and technological 
progress in Europe, to take appropriate measures for the joint development 
and production of an airbus.60 
 
 
A coalition of manufacturers, Airbus Industrie GIE, was formed in 1970, and Spain joined in 
1971 with the first Airbus aircraft, the wide-bodied A300B being launched in 1972. Although 
it took nearly 35 years for a single multinational company to form, in 2001 the Franco-
Germany EADS and British BAE Systems finally established Airbus as a company in its own 
right. In 2003, Airbus overtook McDonnel-Douglas and Boeing as the world’s largest 
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supplier of aircraft. In 2006, BAE sold its share in the collaboration to EADS, with a 
proposed return to the consortium in 2012 blocked by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
who feared that such a return would threaten the strong German position within Airbus.61 
The Airbus A380 was the largest commercial airline in service at the time of its first 
flight on 27 April 2005 and remains so at the time of writing, possessing a wide body and 
double-decked fuselage. This made it suitable for use as the basis of a new military transport 
aircraft, something that the management of Airbus was aware of and, in 1999, planned to take 
advantage of. As a European coalition, Airbus was uniquely positioned to develop and build 
an operational military airlift aircraft to supply both NATO and non-NATO European 
countries. After consultation with potential customers, in 2005 Airbus began work on the 
A400M Atlas.62 
Partly in response to the excessive delays and cost overruns of the Eurofighter 
Typhoon programme, on 12 November 1996 the Defence Ministers of Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy signed an agreement forming the procurement agency, Organisation 
Conjointe de Coopérationenmatièred'Armement (OCCAR), or the Organisation for Joint 
Armament Cooperation. This organisation was given legal status on 28 January 2001, with 
the intention that it could award defence contracts and supervise international defence 
programmes on a commercial basis and avoid undue political and national influence.63 
OCCAR oversaw a new military airlifter contract awarded to the Airbus Military 
Company, a subsidiary of the larger EADS-owned Airbus firm. Having learnt from the 
Eurofighter programme, this contract was intended to run to a fixed price, with penalty 
clauses to penalise the primary contractor for late delivery. This, it was hoped, would transfer 
                                                
61 Financial Times, ‘Airbus–the European Model’, <https://www.ft.com/content/c9a9a77c-db07-11e3-8273-
00144feabdc0>, accessed 12 December 2018; and, Christopher Bronder& Rudolf Fritzl, ‘Developing Strategic 
Alliances: A Conceptual Framework for Successful Co-operation’, European Management Journal, 10:4 
(December 1992), p. 414. 
62 Stephen J. Mraz, ‘Airbus Builds a Military Airlifter’, Machine Design, 77:4 (2005), p. 98. 
63 OCCAR, <http://www.occar.int/>, accessed 14 December 2018. 
271 
 
the financial risks to Airbus rather the involved governments meeting such costs. It 
highlighted a growing interest in allowing national governments to distance themselves from 
the running and financial risks of such projects, which would instead be run on commercial 
lines.64 A deadline for the new airlifter was set that envisaged a first test flight in 2008 and 
delivery of the first production aircraft in 2009.65 
Almost inevitably, the A400M project ran into delays, in particular regarding the 
engines. Airbus sub-contracted much of the work on the aircraft, including the development 
of the engines. The requirements for the A400M were that it would be agile, fuel-efficient, 
able to climb and takeoff steeply and also able to descend and slow down quickly. These last 
requirements resulted from consultation from the military users who needed the airlifter to 
operate on short and rough runways in hostile environments where slow descents and climbs 
would increase the time the aircraft was vulnerable to short-ranged surface-to-air anti-aircraft 
fire.66 The engine requirements suggested an extremely powerful eight-bladed turboprop, but 
no Western manufacturer had yet developed such an engine. Bids were received for the 
tender from the Canadian Pratt-Whitney and the European Europrop International (EPI) 
consortium, led by Rolls Royce and France’s Safran. The Pratt-Whitney bid was the cheapest 
but political pressure from France and Britain persuaded Airbus to allow EPI to resubmit 
their bid. With the Pratt-Whitney bid now known and with Britain promising to subsidise 
development funding for Rolls-Royce engines, the resubmitted bid was unsurprisingly lower 
than the original one from Pratt-Whitney and thus secured the contract.67 
The delays and problems developing the new engines put pressure on the A400M 
project that almost saw it abandoned. Despite the original contract placing any financial risks 
onto Airbus, in 2010 the participating governments were pressured into ‘bailing out’ the 
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programme. Although EADS, Airbus’s owner, offered to absorb some €3.2bn of the costs 
associated with the overruns, they insisted on renegotiating the original contract and that the 
partner nations invest a further €7bn. Both France and Germany resisted any changes and 
made clear that they expected Airbus to both absorb the additional costs and pay the penalty 
fines as contracted.68 Despite their objections, however, all partners of the Airbus project 
eventually realised that EADS’s threat to simply cancel the programme should additional 
funding not be forthcoming, around a third of the original sum agreed in the contract, was 
simply too serious to reject outright. The project came into that category of being ‘too big to 
fail’, where the consequence of cancelling is deemed to be more disadvantageous than 
meeting additional financial commitments to keep it going.69 As a result of the potential 
political and financial implications of a failed programme, the partner nations eventually 
agreed to bail out the A400M as demanded by Airbus, and the project continued. The first 
test flight of the A400M was on 11 December 2009, a year later than scheduled.70 The first 
delivery of a finished production aircraft, to the French Air Force, was in August 2013, fully 
four years later than originally agreed.71 
The A400M project stands as an example of how such collaborations can primarily 
serve a political purpose. Initially intended as statement of European capability and unity, 
several decisions made during the project’s lifetime suggest that the continuance of that aim 
was seen as being more important than commercial efficiency. The shenanigans surrounding 
the awarding of the engines contract to EPI show a desire for keeping the project as European 
as possible. In 2000 in the face of cost over-runs and delays, the British government publicly 
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supported Airbus over a US alternative, meaning that a reluctant Germany would have 
appeared to be politically isolated and anti-European had it then opted out of the Airbus 
project. Conversely, in 2002 Portugal left the A400M programme in favour of the Lockheed 
C130J during the controversy over the Iraq conflict, a move widely seen as political and a 
desire to reinforce the Portugal-US relationship at a time of heated diplomatic debate and 
widespread anti-US rhetoric over the legality and advisability of a US-led coalition invading 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.72 
5.3. Artillery and Anti-Armour Weapons Systems 
In addition to AFV and aircraft programmes, it is worth taking into account projects 
dedicated to specific weapons systems (the three examples explored here cover anti-armour 
missiles and medium artillery systems), which are in essence the smallest size of weapons 
systems which justify international collaboration. This section will consider the MILAN 
Anti-Tank Guided-Wire Missile, the Brimstone dual ‘fire-and-forget’/laser-guided air-to-
ground anti-armour weapon, and the FH-70 155mm towed howitzer (an Anglo-German 
collaboration, joined later by Italy). The two missile projects in particular seem to point to a 
much brighter future for international, collaborative weapons projects, as a result of their 
being conducted an international consortium. The FH-70 likewise succeeded, but for different 
reasons to the two anti-armour projects. 
The MILAN ATGM  
MILAN (Missile d’Infanterie Leger ANtichar, or Light Anti-Tank Infantry Missile) had its 
origins in the decision by both France and Germany in the early 1960s to develop new anti-
tank and anti-aircraft missile systems. The contemporary cost of developing and producing 
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advanced missile systems was prohibitive, and so the two NATO allies made the decision to 
collaborate in order that costs might be reduced for each country.73 MILAN, together with the 
longer-range HOT missile and the anti-aircraft missile, Roland, both also developed by the 
collaboration under the same programme, were the products of a Franco-German consortium, 
Euromissile, set up specifically for that purpose. The success of this collaborative consortium 
suggests that complex military technology can be developed in international collaboration so 
long as the project aims are clear and the development team are in agreement. 
In 1963, France’s Ministry of Defence procurement directorate, DTIA, awarded a 
joint development contract to France’s Aerospatiale and FRG’s Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm (MBB) to develop a second generation guided anti-tank missile system to meet the 
requirement of both countries. Second generation missiles allowed the operator to guide the 
missile by keeping the cross-hairs of his eyepiece trained on the target, a marked 
improvement over the first generation where the operator guided the missile in the manner of 
flying a remote-control aircraft.74 
Initially, the collaboration was led by France. The Committee of Directors was French 
and the initial project contract had been given to Aerospatiale who sub-contracted half the 
work to MBB. The committee comprised members of both firms, and the project managers 
came from both companies. Whilst this superficially gave both parties equal responsibility, 
France’s Aerospatiale was definitely the lead partner, with the French Committee of 
Directors making final decisions that affected the joint project. Significantly, German 
governmental export restrictions meant that MBB had to organise future exports through the 
less prohibitive French government export control. This decentralised project development 
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structure was satisfactory at the initial stages, but it became obvious that a tighter hierarchical 
system would be needed for future development and to organise production, sales and 
exports.75 In 1972, as MILAN was accepted for service by the French Army, Aerospatiale 
and MBB formed Euromissile, an international groupement d'interet economique (GIE), or 
Economic Interest Group, which represented an equal partnership between the two firms and 
thus the two countries.76 The partnership held obvious economic and technical advantages for 
Euromissile’s future stakeholders. By forming a single business hierarchy, the consortium 
was more streamlined and efficient than the previous decentralised system.  
An industrial alliance with Germany held political advantages for France; de Gaulle, a 
strong advocate of European self-reliance (led by France) to counter what he saw as undue 
US influence, had stepped down in the spring of 1969 and was succeeded as president by 
Georges Pompidou who had been his prime minister and shared many of de Gaulle’s political 
beliefs.77 A joint Franco-German defence company could only help to strengthen the position 
of Europe’s position within NATO, as well as reducing Europe’s reliance on imports of 
American weapons. Neither Willy Brandt, FRG chancellor in 1972 when Euromissile was 
established, nor Ludwig Erhard, chancellor in 1963 when the initial collaboration agreement 
between Aerospatiale and MBB had been signed, were as publicly concerned as de Gaulle 
about US influence in Europe. Instead, Erhard was primarily concerned with rebuilding 
Germany’s economy and Brandt with strengthening NATO. Ludwig Erhard, the Federal 
Republic’s chancellor from 1963 until 1966, has been credited by many commentators with 
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putting in place the post-war West German economic recovery. Although initially close to the 
French leader, he disagreed vehemently with de Gaulle over the latter’s plans to negotiate 
with the Soviet Union on Germany’s behalf, and Erhard considered himself a personal friend 
of the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson.78 Willy Brandt, although a socialist and in favour of 
negotiation with the Soviet Union over the status of East Germany, was a strong supporter of 
US forces in Europe as part of NATO, also putting him at odds with Gaullist French 
position.79 
Despite his support of US influence within Europe, Erhard acknowledged that closer 
strategic ties with France were important both for European and German military security, 
and also for Germany’s reconciliation following the Second World War. Charles de Gaulle 
and Konrad Adenauer, the president and chancellor of France and the FRG respectively, had 
signed the Elysée Treaty on 22 January 1963 which signalled closer Franco-German 
cooperation and which was a significant gesture signalling a closer political relationship. The 
proposed Franco-German tank project had failed,80 and there had been few circumstances 
where France and Germany could cooperate on major programmes, so the MILAN 
collaboration represented an important opportunity to implement the terms of the Elysée 
Treaty.81 
Strategy for Euromissile was determined by the six-man Assembly of Members, 
effectively the board of directors, comprising three each from Aerospatiale and MBB. 
France’s BPFA and Germany’s BLBM, the two respective government programme offices, 
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issued the contracts to Euromissile who then subcontracted as required. The two parent 
companies, Aerospatiale and MBB, retained their own independent manufacturing and 
industrial capabilities, but production coordination and sales were the responsibility of 
Euromissile itself.82 In particular, this arrangement allowed MILAN to be more widely 
exported than it could have been had the company been more subject to tight German 
weapons export restrictions. By classifying German-made components as French, the 
consortium managed to greatly increase the number of countries to which it could sell 
MILAN, eventually exporting to 41 countries.83 
The modern incarnation of the Euromissile consortium is the international group, 
MBDA, created from several mergers and acquisitions of European aerospace and missile 
companies. MBDA is jointly owned by three companies; Airbus (with 37.5%), BAE Systems 
(37.5%) and Leonardo (25%).84 The MILAN anti-tank guided-wire missile system is now in 
its third incarnation and has sold over 360,000 missiles worldwide.85 By any measure, then, 
the collaboration that created Euromissile and MILAN has been a success. Missile systems 
are technologically complex and expensive to develop, but perhaps the project succeeded 
where tank projects failed because there was little or no disagreement over the specification 
of the system, and management of the project was streamlined at a crucial time by creating 
the Euromissile consortium rather than running two national teams in parallel. A guided 
missile and a main battle tank are obviously very different development prospects, yet 
MILAN stands as an example of how complex international defence collaboration can 
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succeed, perhaps suggesting how possible future main battle tank collaborations could 
improve their chances of success by forming a single management structure. 
Brimstone Air-to-Ground Anti-Armour Missile 
The Brimstone missile is an aircraft-launched, multi-purpose, anti-armour weapon which has 
been developed by the multinational defence consortium, MBDA. To quote from MBDA’s 
website: 
 
Brimstone provides a combat proven, low collateral, close air 
support weapon offering to the fast jet operator the unique capability of 
engaging a wide range of target types, including fast moving vehicles/vessels 
in both land and naval environments and in both direct and indirect modes.86 
 
 
Originally based on the US Hellfire missile but with so extensive a redesign that it is 
essentially a new weapon, the missile came from a development and production contract 
awarded by the British Ministry of Defence in December 1996, and entered service with the 
RAF nine years later.87 With Brimstone 2 already in service and Brimstone 3 in development, 
the missile is undoubtedly a successful multinational collaboration.88 
The origins of the MBDA group are, like many such modern consortia, a history of 
takeovers and mergers that encompass some well-known companies of several European 
nations. Now represented by Airbus (37% share), BAE Systems (37%) and Leonardo (25%), 
firms such as BAE Dynamics, EADS Aerospatiale, GEC-Marconi Radar and Defence, and 
Matra Defence have merged or joined to create the consortium, giving MBDA a 
multinational background which has drawn upon the expertise and experience of established 
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defence companies.89 Necessarily working closely with the governments and armed forces of 
potential customer nations, MBDA is nonetheless a multinational commercial concern and 
thus its priorities are profits and reputation rather than international diplomacy.  
The contract for an advanced anti-armour missile had been awarded to MBDA by the 
British Government in 1996, but the origins of the requirement can reasonably be traced back 
to 1978. In that year, at the height of the Cold War, the VJ291 steerable cluster bomb project 
was cancelled. This project had been intended to provide the RAF with a more efficient 
stand-off anti-armour weapon that gave aircraft a more effective capability against Soviet 
tanks and IFVs than existing bombs or unguided rockets.90 On cancelling VJ291, the options 
for the British MoD were to purchase the US Maverick missile system or to improve the 
existing BL755 unguided cluster bomb. The decision was taken to improve the BL755 as an 
interim measure and to pursue development of a stand-off missile under Staff Requirement 
(Air) 1238. SR(A) 1238 commenced in 1982, but it was not until 1988 that the MoD 
narrowed down the contenders to Brimstone (at that date a Marconi/Rockwell tender) and the 
Hunting/Honeywell Smart Weapon Anti-Armour Missile (SWAARM).91 
In 1990, with all the signs suggesting that the Cold War was over and that NATO 
would no longer be required to face massed Soviet armour, Britain’s ‘Options for Change’ 
Defence White Paper cancelled SR(A) 1238, thus wasting a great deal of both government 
and industry funding that had been invested to this point. The 1991 Gulf War, however, 
showed that, while any threat of the Soviet Union invading Europe may have been (at least 
temporarily) nullified, unstable global geopolitics and potential future opponents meant that 
air-launched precision anti-armour missiles were still needed in the RAF’s inventory. Thus, 
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in 1994, SR(A) 1238 was resurrected as a requirement for an Advanced Anti-Armour 
Weapon (AAAW).92 
In 1996, the AAAW contract was awarded to the Brimstone missile programme, 
which had by then become the product of GEC-Marconi. As noted above, this missile was 
originally a development of the US laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire missile, but the 
redevelopment and changes to the original were so extensive as to make Brimstone a 
completely new weapon system. The primary change to the Hellfire was in the guidance 
system. Whereas the laser-guidance of the AGM-114 required both line-of-sight and for the 
operator to keep the aiming crosshairs on the target until impact, Brimstone used a 
millimetric wave (MMW) radar and a digital autopilot to seek out and destroy targets within 
its programmed area of activation. This enables Brimstone to act in a ‘fire-and-forget’ role, 
with sophisticated algorithms allowing the operator to specify a limited area within which the 
missile seeks targets whilst ignoring those outside of this zone. To reduce the danger of 
collateral damage, especially in a counter-insurgency role, an alternative and complementary 
guidance was fitted. This is semi-active laser (SAL) guidance, where an operator 
‘illuminates’ the target with a laser and the missile homes in on the beam, in a similar fashion 
to the original AGM-114 Hellfire.93 The advantage of using both systems in parallel is that 
Brimstone may be used either against targets in the vicinity of neutral or friendly forces with 
less risk of ‘friendly fire’ or ‘collateral damage’, or as a fire-and-forget missile against peer 
enemy armoured formations in a more conventional ‘free-fire’ battlefield. 
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As a successful missile, with MBDA receiving in 2018 a £400m contract to develop 
Brimstone 3,94 built by a multinational commercial coalition, Brimstone has distinct 
similarities to the MILAN project examined above. Where Brimstone differs significantly, 
however, is in the overt involvement of the British Government with delays and cancellations 
that came from vacillation over policy. It is interesting to note that MBDA’s own 
involvement appears to have been relatively trouble-free once the MoD decided to once again 
procure the missile after initially cancelling its development. The political dimension appears 
to have been far more significant in the final length and cost of the programme than any 
commercial or technical concerns, something that might be of interest in comparisons with 
other collaborative programmes. 
FH-70 155mm Artillery System 
The FH-70 155mm towed howitzer was the result of a collaborative agreement between 
Britain and the FRG in the early 1960s. Italy later joined the collaboration, making the FH-70 
programme the first of a series of trilateral programme between those three countries, later 
examples being the SP-70 self-propelled howitzer (examined above) and the Tornado Multi-
Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). The FH-70 programme resulted in a successful product, with 
over a thousand howitzers built and seeing service with the militaries of eleven nations, 
including several outside of NATO.95 It also formed the basis for the self-propelled howitzer, 
SP-70, although, as noted above, that project did not succeed. 
In the early 1960s, the USA, FRG and Britain were looking to replace their existing 
towed medium howitzers, these being the venerable US M-114 155mm in the case of the 
USA and Federal Republic, and the equally venerable Ordnance 5.5” gun (140mm) in the 
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case of Britain.96 In 1963, NATO’s ‘Basic Military Requirement 39’ had agreed a 
standardised NATO medium artillery calibre of 155mm, this giving the optimum balance of 
firepower to range.97 The USA decided upon an indigenously developed product and 
eventually produced their M-198 howitzer, but in 1967 the Federal Republic and Britain 
instead took the decision to cooperate on a multinational design, with a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) signed in 1968. The British firm Vickers Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Ltd. (VSEL), and Germany’s Rheinmetall both had many decades of experience 
in artillery design and quickly produced six prototypes for evaluation by 1970.98 
At this point, Italy’s OTO Melara joined the collaboration and a further eight 
prototypes were produced by 1973. Italy agreed to accept a quarter-share of project expenses 
from that point, changing the balance of financial responsibility to 50% for the FRG and 25% 
each for Britain and Italy.99 Italy’s inclusion was also politically significant because it marked 
a departure from the Italian military dependency on the USA for its equipment, and instead 
signalled a move towards stronger intra-European ties. In spite of frequent periods of 
domestic political instability, Italy offered the alliance a strong industrial base and, like 
Vickers and Rheinmetall, OTO Melara had a long history of designing and producing 
successful artillery pieces.100 
The new MOU to develop the FH-70 in light of Italian participation divided the 
project responsibility between the three countries. The Germans developed the ammunition 
                                                
96 The M-114 dates from 1942 and the 5.5” gun from 1941. Both had seen extensive service during the Second 
World War and later, with the M-114 still in service with some militaries at the time of writing. See, for 
example; Military Factory, ‘M114 155mm (155mm Howitzer M1)’, 
<https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=439>, accessed 4 December 2018; Military 
Factory, ‘Ordnance BL 5.5-inch’, <https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=412>, accessed 
4 December 2018. 
97 Military Factory, ‘FH-70 (Field Howitzer 1970)’, 
<https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=1090>, accessed 2 December 2018. 
98 Pierre Dussauge& Bernard Garrette, ‘Determinants of Success in International Strategic Alliances: Evidence 
from the Global Aerospace Industry’, Journal of International Business Studies, 26:3 (1995), p. 511. 
99 Military Today, ‘FH-70’ <http://www.military-today.com/artillery/fh_70.htm>, accessed 10 September 2018. 
100 Alan G. Draper, European Defence Equipment Collaboration: Britain’s Involvement, 1957-87, RUSI 
Defence Studies (London, 1990), pp. 59-60.  
283 
 
primers, the loading system, auxiliary propulsion system, suspension, and the sights and 
associated aiming system. Britain developed the carriage and traversing gear, and Italy took 
responsibility for the gun cradle, the recoil system, sights bracket and elevating gear. All 
three countries shared responsibility for the ammunition except that, as noted, Germany 
produced the primers.101 
The final design was intended to be towed by a tractor unit, but had an Auxiliary 
Power Unit (APU), an 1800cc small auxiliary engine which provided hydraulic and electrical 
power and also allowed the gun to be independently driven at up to 16.5kph by its crew for 
short distances in emergencies.102 In fact, it was the early requirement for this APU that 
helped dissuade the USA from participation in the FH-70 programme in 1965. The US 
wanted their new howitzer to be transportable by helicopter and the APU added considerable 
weight and was seen by the US as unnecessary.103 
Officially entering service with Britain, the FRG and Italy in 1978, numerous minor 
problems meant that the FH-70 did not actually become operational until 1980.104 Even after 
this time there were a plethora of reliability issues with the FH-70, with some commentators 
suggesting that there had been too little testing in order to meet the operational deadline. 
Many problems were found to be as a result of inappropriate operation by its crews, and were 
consequently solved by updating the operator’s technical manual. The howitzer has been 
commercially successful, having been accepted for service by Estonia, the Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Norway, the Netherlands, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, as well by as Britain 
(where it is known as the L121), the FRG and Italy. Even Japan adopted the FH-70, 
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becoming the largest single user, and licence-built the design locally. Nonetheless, the FH-70 
attracted criticism for minor design flaws and problems throughout its career.105 
With over 1,000 units built before production ended in 1989, as an international 
weapons collaboration the FH-70 must be viewed as a success. The US disagreement over the 
inclusion of the APU showed how an international collaboration can fail due to differing 
requirements, but in this instance the disagreement came before the project really began in 
earnest and the withdrawal of US interest did not hinder the FH-70’s development. Italy’s 
late involvement signalled a diplomatic move away from reliance on the USA and towards 
Europe, something that highlights the political significance of such alliances for any study of 
international collaborations. 
5.4. Other Technology Transfer Projects 
The final section in this chapter looks at two projects involving technology transfer which do 
not fit so easily into this study’s defined concept of collaboration. As has been noted during 
this study, international collaborations potentially offer diplomatic advantages which make 
them attractive to politicians wishing to demonstrate the strength of international diplomatic 
ties. This can lead to projects being announced as ‘collaborations’ when they might more  fit 
more naturally or obviously into a different definition of technology transfer. Other forms of 
technology transfer usually emphasise the commercial or technological aspects of 
international cooperation over the political although, as this section will demonstrate, the 
boundary between the different forms of technology transfer may be ill-defined in practice. 
Two short case studies, the Sino-Pakistani MBT-2000/Al-Khalid and the US F-16 aircraft, 
will be covered here. Whilst necessarily brief overviews of only two examples, these studies 
will serve to demonstrate how not all projects described as collaborations fit within the 
                                                
105 Military Today, ‘FH-70’ <http://www.military-today.com/artillery/fh_70.htm>, accessed 10 September 2018. 
285 
 
definitions established. This will reinforce the rarity of the main MBT case studies examined 
in the chapters above, and show how future projects publicly described as collaborations 
should be examined carefully to determine just how much actual design collaboration is 
involved. Such ‘collaborations’ might be more accurately described as, for example, licensed 
or cooperative production. 
MBT-2000 / VT-1/Al-Khalid 
The main battle tank known variously as MBT-2000, VT-1 or Al-Khalid (‘eternal’), is a 
modern MBT developed by China and Pakistan and currently in service with the 
Bangladeshi, Moroccan, Myanmar, Sri Lankan, and Pakistani armies. China does use the 
MBT-2000 but only for training purposes.106 The project has been described as a joint 
development but, as will be seen, it does not fit our definition of a collaboration in the sense 
of co-development throughout the programme. The tank is known as MBT-2000 or VT-1 in 
China, with both names referring to very similar designs, both marketed for export. In 
Pakistani service, the tank is called the Al-Khalid after various historical figures of the same 
name.107 
The project can be traced back to January 1990 when Pakistan and China signed an 
agreement to develop a new MBT to meet Pakistan’s requirements.108 Pakistan had had 
experience of armoured warfare from its conflicts with India and consequently had a good 
idea of the qualities it wanted in a new tank. With Chinese help, Pakistan had set up Heavy 
Industries Taxila (HIT) which licence-built the Chinese Type 85-IIAP MBT and was 
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therefore the obvious choice to be involved in any new tank programme.109 The basis of the 
new tank was to be the new China Ordnance Industries Group Corporation Limited 
(NORINCO) Type 90-II, itself a linear development in a series of Chinese MBTs that can be 
traced back to the Type 59, a Chinese copy of the Soviet T-54A and first produced in 1958.110 
The Type 90-II appeared to mark a change in Chinese military tank doctrine and was 
markedly heavier and better protected than its predecessors, but was nonetheless rejected for 
Chinese service.111 
The new MBT-2000/Al-Khalid was tailored to Pakistan’s particular requirements, 
although publicly available information is vague as to the exact alterations made to the Type 
90-II. However, at least two improvements were demanded by Pakistan, an improved fire-
control system and a more reliable engine than the Chinese-built diesel. Power was initially 
going to be supplied by a British Perkins CV12, as installed in Challenger II, with the French 
supplying a SESM ESM500 transmission, as used in the Leclerc. However, when in 1998 
Britain and France joined the arms embargo imposed upon Pakistan for its nuclear testing, 
plans were changed, and the final design used a Ukrainian 6TD-2 engine, as used in 
Ukraine’s own T-84 MBT. Production of the Al-Khalid tank was licensed to HIT in Pakistan 
although the engines were imported directly from the Ukraine. The MBT-2000, which 
differed little from the Al-Khalid in most respects, was built in China and offered for export. 
The VT-1 was similarly built in China for export but was specifically tailored to allow it to be 
more easily customised to a potential customer’s requirements.112 
MBT-2000/Al-Khalid was not a collaboration in the sense that we have established for 
this study. Whilst Pakistan certainly specified what it wanted from the new tank, no Pakistani 
                                                
109 Military Factory, ‘HIT Al Khalid (MBT 2000) Main Battle Tank (MBT)’, 
<http://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=181>, accessed 23 July 2016. 
110 Rolf Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945,trans. Richard Simpkin (London, 
1987), p. 14; and, Wolfgang Schneider (ed.), Tanks of the World (Koblenz, 7th edn, 1990), pp. 74-75. 
111 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2011-2012, p. 88. 
112 Sino Defence, ‘MBT-2000/VT-1’, <http://sinodefence.com/mbt-2000-vt1/>, accessed 20 December 2018. 
287 
 
developers were involved in the fundamental design. The tank was a NORINCO Type 90-II 
with minor modifications and a Ukrainian engine; no significant Pakistan-designed 
components formed the final model. Therefore, the MBT-2000/Al-Khalid should perhaps be 
viewed as an existing Chinese tank slightly modified to meet an export customer’s 
requirements and license-built in Pakistan. By building the Al-Khalid, Pakistan received 
valuable experience in manufacturing and constructing tanks, but little or none in developing 
them. However, with no domestic tank industry from which to build, expecting Pakistan to be 
any more involved in the development would perhaps have been unrealistic. Instead, with 
Chinese help, HIT has formed the basis of an emergent Pakistani tank industry that may, in 
future, look to develop its own designs. 
F-16 Aircraft 
In Cornell’s International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and 
Production by the NATO Allies, he describes the F-16 as a ‘stellar example of a multi-
national consortium set up to pursue selection and production of a replacement aircraft on a 
multi-national basis.’113 Examination of this project suggests that it is by no means a co-
developmental collaboration and instead shows an asymmetric partnership with licensed 
production. Whilst the political significance for NATO standardisation is undeniable, the 
ramifications of the F-16 for the European combat aircraft industry were at least as 
significant. As with other US partnerships such as the F-35, the F-16 stands as a good 
example of how the USA’s reluctance to share technology or involve other nations, even 
allies, in developmental work makes any cooperation with them highly asymmetric at best.114 
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 By the 1970s, fighter aircraft had become less agile as a result of military planners 
predicting that missiles alone would determine future air conflicts. Early Cold War fighter 
aircraft designs, relying mainly on short-range missiles, emphasised speed over agility and 
were typified by such aircraft as the English Electric Lightning (first flight 1957), MiG-21 
(first flight 1955) and F-104 Starfighter (first flight 1956). Experience of air-to-air combat in 
Vietnam and the Middle East showed that agility and ‘dog-fighting’ had not been entirely 
eclipsed by aircraft loosing volleys of missiles, and so a group of US designers and analysts 
pressed for a more agile aircraft that would be smaller and cheaper than the large and very 
capable F-15 Eagle, then in development to be the US interceptor replacement. This 
requirement for a small and affordable dogfighter led to General Dynamics designing the F-
16 in 1975.115 
In the 1970s, NATO nations in Europe were primarily using US aircraft such as the F-
4 Phantom, F-104 Starfighter and F-5 Freedom Fighter. Modern combat aircraft were highly 
technical and expensive to both develop and produce, and it was easier for countries without 
indigenous combat aircraft industries to buy ‘off the shelf’ than to develop their own. Only 
France was still using fighters of its own design, with even Britain replacing their English 
Electric Lightnings with F-4 Phantoms in the late 1960s. However, NATO’s stated goal was 
interoperability and standardisation, and having so many different aircraft models, whatever 
their common national origin, clearly ran counter to this ideal.116 
A competition was run to determine which aircraft would replace the myriad of 
models as a NATO standard. Dassault entered the Mirage III and Saab-Scandia the Viggen, 
but the General Dynamics F-16 won in what was described then as a ‘tempestuous contest 
[...] marked by political pressure, economic one‐upmanship, promotional hoopla, some 
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influence peddling and, at least in the early stages, financial skulduggery.’117 Consequently, 
the USA pressed its European allies to adopt the F-16 and, in what was described as the 
‘contract of the century’, offered an arrangement in 1975 whereby European NATO nations 
could share the production of the F-16 as well as purchase aircraft. A consortium was formed, 
described by Cornell as ‘a partnership in the truest sense of the term.’ In fact, the 
‘partnership’ of European Participating Governments (EPG) merely gave limited production 
rights to the participants in return for those in the EPG not only having the right to buy the F-
16, but additionally paying the US a ‘significant portion’ of the research and development 
costs involved in designing it, costs that would normally have been recouped through the 
normal sales process.118 
The adoption of the F-16 was not universal throughout NATO and it was criticised, 
especially by French observers who had long resented what they saw as excessive US 
influence within NATO. Although creating a limited level of standardisation, the F-16’s fuel 
was incompatible with existing NATO aircraft fuel and thus ran counter to NATO’s aim of 
interoperability, the very reason that the competition for a standard NATO aircraft had been 
held in the first place.119 The Belgian Senator, Etienne Duvieusart, described the decision to 
adopt the F-16 as, ‘not only to renounce all advance technology in aeronautical matters, but 
also to found security on an American “mirage”.’ Such criticisms were not in any way 
countered by the US insinuation that a refusal to adopt the F-16 might be seen as ‘lack of 
gratitude’ for US investment in Europe and might lead to a reduction in the US military 
presence.120 
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Although Cornell includes the F-16 as a successful collaborative project, even a 
casual examination of the US contract with the EPG highlights that any ‘collaboration’ was 
extremely asymmetric. General Dynamics developed the aircraft without input from external 
partners and designed it to a specification that owed nothing to any explicitly stated 
requirements from their final customers. Instead, an indigenous fully-developed US aircraft 
was offered for sale with strong political influence and implied threats encouraging its 
adoption. In return for granting licensed production agreements, General Dynamics ensured 
that the partners not only bought its product but also separately reimbursed a large part of the 
development costs, whilst not gaining access to potential future technological benefits of that 
development, a fairly common feature of US defence partnership agreements.121 In return, 
however, the partner countries gained a ready-made capable combat aircraft at a fraction of 
the cost of developing one by themselves, as well as reinforcing diplomatic ties to NATO’s 
largest member nation. 
5.5. Mk.VIII International/Liberty Tank 
The Mark VIII ‘International’, or ‘Liberty’ tank was, as been mentioned above, the first and, 
to date, the only example of a successful international MBT collaboration. Consequently, 
although outside this study’s post-1945 time period, no study of collaborative tank 
development is complete without an examination of the Anglo-American Mk.VIII 
International/Liberty. The particular circumstances surrounding the Mark VIII project’s 
initiation are perhaps too specific to their time to draw broad conclusions for future projects, 
but nonetheless there are lessons to be learned. As the only successful collaborative tank 
project to date, the Mark VIII will be examined in some detail, as it may throw some light on 
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why later projects failed to achieve their declared goals. In fact, for any comparative study of 
international tank collaboration it would be peculiar if it were excluded 
When the USA entered the First World War by declaring war on Germany on 6 April 
1917 it had no armour of its own. In June of that year, the commander of the American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General John J. Pershing, read a report on the use of tanks by 
the British and French Armies. He was sufficiently impressed to establish a board of officers 
to study the viability of setting up a US Tank Corps, the board recommending on 1 
September 1917 that a new and separate Tank Department be established, equipped with 
more than two thousand tanks with a 10-to-1 mix of light to heavy tanks.122 
AEF tank crews received training in two separate tank schools: the Light Tank School 
in France, and a training camp in Britain for training in heavy tanks. Initially, instructors were 
provided from the respective countries, France and Britain, but US personnel increasingly 
became involved. Whilst the UK-based heavy tank training camp concentrated on training 
US crews to operate the heavy British tanks, the Light Tank School had the advantage of 
being situated close to both an AEF infantry training centre and to the fighting front itself. As 
a consequence, the US crews trained at the Light Tank School not only learnt how to operate 
the FT-17 tanks, but also the rudiments of tank tactics and operations in something 
approaching real battle conditions. Whereas the light tanks operated with the AEF, the British 
felt that they were too short of heavy tanks in their own army to freely allocate tanks to the 
Americans. In consequence, whilst the AEF formed four heavy tank battalions before the end 
of the war, only one was used in combat and this was kept under the control of British 
commanders in the British sector. This was significant for US post-war military thinking 
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which concentrated on those offensives where the AEF dominated, such as St. Mihiel and 
Meuse-Argonne.123 
In September of 1917, the sources of either heavy or light tanks for the USA were 
limited. Britain and France between them were producing only five tank models; the British 
Mark IV and Mark V heavy tanks, the French Schneider and St.-Chamond heavies, and the 
Renault FT-17 light tank. Having secured French permission to construct the light FT-17 
under licence, a US evaluation team, Majors James A. Drain and Herbert W. Alden, reported 
to the Chief of Ordnance that none of the current heavy tanks were suitable for adoption and 
recommended that a new joint US-British design be considered instead.124 
As Britain had, by this stage, two years’ experience of designing and producing heavy 
tanks of the lozenge shape with sponson guns, they took responsibility for the hull and 
armament of the proposed new tank. Meanwhile, the USA had more experience with 
gasoline-powered engines and took responsibility for the tracks, engine and transmission 
gear. At that time, the US ‘Liberty’ V-12 aero-engine that the US intended to install in their 
own tanks and which gave their tank version its name, was reported to be the most powerful 
engine in the world for its weight at the time.125 With an historical reliance on steam power 
for its heavy haulage, including road haulage, Britain at the time of the First World War had 
struggled to develop a petrol engine of sufficient power to give its tanks a speed much greater 
than a man could walk. Indeed, the 14-ton Medium A ‘Whippet’ tank, specifically designed 
to offer improved speed and mobility, used two British 4-cylinder Tylor 45hp engines 
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originally developed for double-decker omnibuses, yet still only reached 8mph.126 For the 
Mark VIII, Britain turned to the new 150hp engine designed by Harry Ricardo and used in 
the 1918 Mark V tank, the Ricardo engine having recently replaced the less efficient Daimler 
engines that had powered British heavy tank models to date.127 The estimated cost of this new 
tank was £6,920 per unit. With shipping of components across the Atlantic included, the 
financial shares were about equal, with the USA responsible for £3,150 and the UK for 
£3,770.128 
In Britain, the diversion of work to develop the Mark VIII disrupted development the 
Mark V, Mark V* and Medium B tanks, which work was consequently moved to the 
Metropolitan company in Birmingham. Sir Albert Stern, the new Commissioner for 
Mechanical Warfare (Overseas and Allies Department), Ministry of Munitions, identified in 
October 1917 that Britain’s mechanical warfare readiness for the 1918 fighting season was 
wholly inadequate. Stern, a man described by Harry Ricardo, the engine designer, as a 
‘difficult man’ but ‘a most superb organiser and team leader’, had been the head of the 
Mechanical Warfare Supply Department within the Ministry of Munitions, which had been 
led from July 1917 by Winston Churchill. Stern had been sacked from that post after 
becoming involved with one fight and one argument too many within the department.129 
The USA in 1917 was still in the process of increasing its industrial output and the 
sudden increase in demand as a result of the USA’s rapid armament programme inevitably 
meant that output targets were not always met. In February 1918, delivery of the first two 
hundred Liberty V-12 engines for the new tanks was delayed until May of that year. Part of 
the problem was that the Liberty engine was only manufactured by one supplier, Trego 
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Motors, and the Mark VIII had to share the engine production run with the aircraft that were 
the Liberty’s original intended recipients. Altering the aero-engine for use in tanks also 
caused delays, with the designers encountering many unforeseen problems with a conversion 
that had appeared to be simple in theory.130 The engines intended for tanks, for example, used 
cast-iron cylinders rather than the steel ones in the aero-engines and thus the two engines 
were not interchangeable and required slightly different production facilities.131 Due to the 
delays the May delivery date was extended, in April the projected figures were altered to 365 
engines to be delivered by the end of August. Two months later, in June, the delivery date 
was again put back until October, and then only one hundred engines were expected to be 
ready.132 
Britain’s manufacture of the Mark VIII was similarly delayed. In fact, the only 
production tank that left British factories before the war’s end rolled out from the British 
Locomotive Works in October 1918. The delays on both sides of the Atlantic meant that no 
Mark VIII saw action in the First World War, although they remained in US service, for the 
want of a suitable replacement, until 1932, when they were placed in reserve.133 
Despite finally resulting in a working tank, therefore, the Mark VIII collaboration was 
not an unqualified success. It certainly gave the USA valuable experience of tank design and 
cemented closer ties between the US and Britain, but the aim had been to produce a single 
model heavy tank for the armies of Britain, France and the US to fight Imperial Germany. In 
this respect it failed and also caused diplomatic friction with France, with the agreed 
allocation of Mark VIII tanks favouring the other two allies at France’s expense.134 The Mark 
VIII collaboration must be seen in the context of its time. In 1917, very few countries had any 
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experience or expertise in tank design or possessed any suitable production facilities. The 
new tank was required urgently, with the war predicted to last into 1919. These circumstances 
were unique and so the Mark VIII offers only limited insights into modern tank 
collaborations. Yet Britain’s dominance of the design process did help avoid design 
disagreements, even if this made the collaboration somewhat one-sided. It is interesting to 
compare the Mark VIII collaboration with later defence projects involving the USA, where 
the US generally held a monopoly on design and any collaboration was limited to financial 
investment and licensed production facilities.135 
5.6. Summary 
Clearly, the lines between collaboration and other forms of technology transfer are poorly 
defined both theoretically and in practice. Many commentators agree that cooperation is 
required, but few suggest at which stage of the project such cooperation needs to occur, nor 
what the relative weighting of effort needs to be. Some projects, such as the F-16, are 
obviously asymmetrically weighted in favour of a single partner (the USA in this case), with 
the other partners only involved after all research and development was complete. Whilst a 
collaboration in so much as the US granted licensed co-production rights to its partners, there 
was no co-development and no full sharing of US technological research. The MBT-2000/Al-
Khalid project shows that Pakistan had an influence on the final tank design, but that their 
input was minor on a tank design that had, in essence, already been developed by China. 
However, while Britain also undoubtedly dominated the Mark VIII International/Liberty tank 
project due to its previous experience, the programme also involved US personnel at the 
earliest development stages. This can usefully be contrasted to the US producing the French 
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FT-17 under licence, a technology transfer of a very different type and one which gave the 
USA nothing in the way of design input or experience.136 
Bitzinger has identified that NATO has suffered continuous setbacks in its drive for 
weapons collaboration. Whilst some successful international projects stand out as exceptions, 
he suggests that the general trend shows that collaborative development ventures are likely to 
fail.137 Even some projects held up as successful examples of international collaboration 
show that the partners and contributions are not equal; the F-35 programme, for example, was 
developed largely by Lockheed Martin in the USA, with various other nations contributing 
research and development (R&D) funding under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
but not participating in the actual R&D.138 Bitzinger notes that transatlantic arms 
collaboration has its own particular problems, citing the USA’s disproportionate defence and 
R&D budget, as well as the protectionist natures of governments dealing with security 
technology. He suggests, however, that these problems may be over-emphasised and that the 
real problems lies in the fact that, ‘US corporate indifference to the defence industry 
globalisation process in general and to transatlantic arms collaboration in particular has been 
matched by a general lack of responsiveness and commitment on the part of the US 
government.’139 
Each partner within a collaboration is seeking an advantage, what Moravsik calls the 
‘win-set’.140 The size of this win-set is the key to how successful each partner feels a given 
collaboration has been, and thus how likely it is that the project will succeed. Sometimes this 
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win-set might simply be a lack of alternatives, a partnership of necessity.141 By studying and 
comparing the projects illustrated here, three major conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, it 
becomes obvious that governmental politics is a major force in international collaborations, 
often at the expense of economic prudence. In their guide to project management, Morris, et 
al., state that: 
 
Politicians, or others intimately involved with and investing political capital 
in a project, have a tendency to overestimate results and benefits, whilst 
simultaneously underestimating potential problems or costs. This optimism 
bias has the effect of increasing support for a project.142 
 
 
FH-70, SP-70, Eurofighter Typhoon and A400M are good examples of international projects 
championed to further coalition politics. Concorde was likewise primarily a political 
ambition, but in this case Britain and France were at least as interested in promoting the 
‘superiority’ of their civilian aviation as demonstrating any diplomatic alliance. 
An interesting development in the field of international defence collaboration is the 
commercial multinational group, with good examples being the MBDA and KNDS groups, 
suggesting that establishing an international project on purely commercial grounds might 
improve the chances of success for any future international weapon system. While even 
indigenous industrial projects can fail, run over budget, or be delayed, the factors contributing 
to friction and failure are multiplied when the number of partners increases.143 When the 
partners are from different countries and have different native languages, industrial standards 
and expectations, such problems are inevitably compounded. The study by Frinsdorf, et al., 
on the subject suggests that maximising the success of collaborations depends on factors that 
                                                
141 Dean, ‘The Future of Collaborative Weapons Acquisition’, p. 160. 
142 Peter W. G. Morris, Jeffrey K. Pinto, and Jonas Söderlund (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Project 
Management (Oxford, 2012), p. 328. 
143 Mawdsley, ‘The A400M Project’, p. 29. 
298 
 
are associated with single management and corporate structures.144 This is certainly borne out 
by the evidence of studying collaborative projects, and may well be the key to any successful 
future MBT collaborations, with the fate of the KNDS EMBT programme being of particular 
interest for those hoping to establish any new international MBT collaboration.  
 
                                                




This study has investigated four specific case studies in failed international main battle tank 
collaborative projects: the NATO ‘Standard Tank’ (1957-63), ‘Tank 90’ (1977-83), the 
MBT-70 (1963-70), and the FMBT/KPz3 (1971-77). It has also included some consideration 
of projects which do not quite fulfil the definition of international MBT collaboration 
projects: the Franco-German KNDS EMBT (a tank demonstrator), the Italian-German-British 
SP-70 (a self-propelled artillery system) and the MBT-2000/Al-Khalid (a Sino-Pakistan 
cooperation, falling therefore outside the focus on the leading European/Western NATO 
nations). If each of the main case study projects had, arguably, some positive outcomes, as 
was to be anticipated, each project – in terms of its stated goal, the creation of a jointly 
designed and manufactured MBT, quite clearly failed. That these projects failed 
spectacularly, unlike a number of other high-profile collaborative weapons projects between 
NATO nations, is well documented. The research question under investigation in this thesis 
was, however, why these collaborative MBT projects, undertaken in pursuit of a standard 
European tank, failed. 
 The reasons for failure were, needless to say, many, often predictable, and sometimes 
more complex than the initiators originally anticipated. The four main case studies were 
drawn, however, from the period of the Cold War (1949-1989), which raises the question as 
to whether changed international, financial and other circumstances in the post-Cold War and 
post-9/11 world may have changed the dynamics governing collaborative US and European 
defence technology projects. But before considering this question, it is necessary (1) to reflect 
on the main and peripheral case studies, (2) draw some general conclusions as to what they 
reveal about collaborative MBT projects, (3) discuss where these conclusions leave the 
hypotheses reached hitherto in the academic and professional literature and, finally, (4) 
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reflect on what these conclusions might tell us about the future for international MBT 
collaboration. 
Observations on the Case Studies 
To identify what lessons might be drawn from the four main case studies and three 
‘peripheral’ case studies, a summary of five key areas affecting the projects will be 
undertaken: political, technical, military, industrial/economic, and strategic. Each of the 
summaries will include reference to each of these five factors. The following section will 
then seek to create a ‘matrix’ which conveys the distilled experience of why MBT joint 
projects fail, but then identifying those factors which are the major prerequisites for success. 
The initial 1957 European Standard Tank project emerged from the FINABEL group 
concept of a standardised European tank and was pushed politically by René Coty and 
Konrad Adenauer as a tool to reinforce Franco-German relationships. Coty was looking to 
distance France from reliance on the US while Adenauer sought to re-establish German 
influence within Europe and in NATO. When de Gaulle took power in France following the 
collapse of the Fourth Republic, and Ludwig Erhard was elected Chancellor after Adenauer 
was forced to step down following a number of political miscalculations and scandals, the 
Standard Tank project was wound up. De Gaulle did not wish France to be involved in 
collaborations and Erhard was looking for a new political direction elsewhere.1 Whilst the 
official reason for the project’s failure was stated to be a difference in specification, even a 
                                                
1 Adenauer was eventually forced to step down following his part in supporting Franz-Josef Strauß, his Defence 
Minister, throughout the ‘Spiegel Affairʼ. See, for example: Gert Bergner, Rudolf Augstein und die “Spiegel” 
Affäre (Berlin, 1964); and, Stefan Finger, Franz Josef Strauß: Ein politisches Leben (Munich, 2005), pp. 170-
245. Meanwhile, de Gaulle had taken power after the collapse of the Fourth Republic and believed that France 
should maintain a political independence which defence collaborations threatened. See: Andrew Shannan, De 
Gaulle (London, 1993); Douglas Johnson, ‘De Gaulle and France’s Role in the World’, and Serge Berstein, ‘De 
Gaulle and Gaullism in the Fifth Republic’, in Hugh Gough and John Horne (eds.), De Gaulle and Twentieth 
Century France (New York, 1994), pp. 93-94, 114, 117. 
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casual look at the prototypes and, indeed, the two sovereign designs that followed, Leopard 
and AMX-30, shows that the national concepts were almost indistinguishable.  
The proposed designs for the Standard Tank should not have proved to be a challenge 
for the standards in the contemporary technology of the time. It is true that the main gun was 
to be new, and hence unproven, but the basic vehicle design required little in the way of 
major new technology. The 90-105mm gun calibre was in common use, or in development, at 
that time and the only real question was who would supply it, with France favouring their 
own design and the Federal Republic looking elsewhere. German requirements for well-
sloped RHA armour were no more challenging than what could be seen on contemporary 
tanks, such as the British Centurion or US Patton series and, indeed, could be seen in the 
design of the old Soviet T-34.2 The call for spaced armour, rejected by France, was not 
anything which was not already in use on armour design. 
The main military needs for both the German and French armies in 1957 were for a 
main battle tank to replace those then supplied by the USA; both countries agreed that the 
tank should rely on firepower and mobility over direct armour protection; both required that 
the weight be kept to a minimum. Indeed, aside from minor disagreement over the maximum 
weight, the specifications for the Standard Tank from each nation were remarkably similar, as 
the similarity in design of the subsequent Leopard 1 and AMX-30 demonstrated. Possibly the 
weight disagreement made any final agreement less likely, yet the requirements of the two 
countries were so close that it is difficult to see how compromise could not have been reached 
had the military specification been the only, or at least a major, hurdle. 
The economic ramifications surrounding the Standard Tank were in no way as 
significant as the issues seen in the case of the second Franco-German project, the Tank 90, 
                                                
2 The development of armour had seen rolled homogenous armour (RHA) replace face-hardened armour in the 
1930s, but cast armour became an alternative as it was easier to produce complex shapes, such as turrets, 
without requiring welding or riveting. See on this subject, Richard Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, 
(Oxford, 2015), pp. 266-267. 
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or Napoleon Tank. The Federal Republic had, in 1957, no tank-building industry and France 
had only just begun to rebuild its own. Unlike the later programme, therefore, while France 
did have the infrastructure in place, neither country had established industry or available 
designs that would be aided or threatened by collaboration. In fact, the FRG recognised that 
France at that time had more recent experience with tank building and would, therefore, take 
the lead. They also believed that a collaborative MBT project was going to benefit the 
Bundeswehr more than it would the French armed forces and so agreed to invest the bulk of 
the funds. There was some confusion over where the final tank would be built, but this was 
an issue which could have been discussed later and was certainly not significant during the 
project’s lifetime. 
The strategic aim of both France and the Federal Republic at the time of the Standard 
Tank project was simply for a locally-produced tank to equip their armed forces. In the case 
of the FRG this was to replace the recently delivered US M-47 and M-48 tanks that had been 
imported following the US-led decision to rearm the West German military in the face of the 
perceived threat of European invasion from the Soviet Union. France’s army was also largely 
equipped with US tanks, the venerable M4 Sherman in this case, and both countries initially 
wished to break their military reliance on the United States. The strategic goals of both 
nations were therefore in alignment in looking for a new, at least partly indigenous, tank to 
enter service as soon as possible. 
In the case of the 1963 MBT-70, once again politics was a driving force, this time in 
the face of military and industrial advice. Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, 
initiated, drove and championed the project, even if his underlying intentions were almost 
certainly as much economic as political, with the deal potentially cheaper than a sovereign 
development. A further intention was to redress an uneven balance of payments by forcing 
the Federal Republic to buy US components for the new tank. Nonetheless, the Federal 
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Republic and Franz-Josef Strauß, the Defence Minister, had to be persuaded to enter the 
collaboration rather than simply to sell the USA their own Leopard tank; at the same time, 
senior officers and representatives of the defence industries of each nation believed they were 
simply sharing ideas and concepts until told that a collaboration would be commenced. 
Throughout the MBT-70 programme, McNamara’s influence is plainly visible, even over-
riding reservations from the two armies and a lack of control over industry. But a poor 
management structure combined with communication problems conspired to waste millions 
of dollars in fruitless duplication of development efforts. Following McNamara’s departure in 
February 1968, US political support for MBT-70 weakened considerably and the Germans, 
never as committed to the project as the US had been, did not take long to reduce funding for, 
and eventually cancel, the programme. 
Coupled with the influence of political figures was the confused and disjointed 
management structure which was created for the MBT-70. The Program Management Board 
(PMB) was, in effect, two separate management teams that had some interaction with their 
opposite numbers, but fundamentally each team was concerned with its own national 
programme. That two separate design paths subsequently emerged should have been a 
surprise to nobody, but the political desire to keep the project going meant that higher 
authority stepped in to bring the two teams together by forcing a compromise over their 
respective ideas. 
 The technological issues with MBT-70 are the most pronounced in any of the case 
studies. Hilmes, for example, concludes that the complexity and over-optimistic specification 
of the MBT-70 design led to its failure.3 From the outset, the USA wanted the tank to be 
better in all areas than anything else in service and was consequently eager to use any new 
technology, technology that had yet to be properly developed. The US industrial lobby 
                                                




pressed for the management team to adopt innovation in vital components such as the engine, 
suspension, and crew protection, while the US Army was committed to a programme of using 
the troubled ‘Shillelagh’ ATGM instead of a direct-fire main gun. Not only did demanding 
untried and undeveloped technology add to the delays and cost of MBT-70, there was no 
guarantee that the technology would function. The case of the proposed diesel engine is a 
case in point; a US diesel could not be developed to produce the required power and so 
untested gas turbine technology was to be adopted instead of using the German diesel engine 
which did meet requirements but was, of course, not American. 
 A major military disagreement over MBT-70’s direction was in the main armament. 
The USA was, at that time, eager to use ATGMs as the primary anti-tank weapon on the new 
tank, whilst the FRG was unconvinced by this and preferred to keep using direct-fire guns. 
Even supposing the rest of the project had gone smoothly, the fact that each country was 
intending to mount a completely separate weapon system (with resulting changes to the 
interior of the turret and ancillary systems) meant that the MBT-70 would not have 
represented either standardisation or interoperability, primary goals of NATO generally and 
the collaboration in particular.  
The lack of industrial standardisation between the two countries meant that even more 
mundane construction and development encountered hurdles. The German half of the project 
did not believe that the US-made components were satisfactory, while the American side 
believed the same of the German components. A sense of national pride, combined with a 
desire to protect the reputation of its industrial expertise, means that any tank-building nation 
is understandably reluctant to adopt a foreign design – a move that would imply 
acknowledgement that potential competitors are producing a superior vehicle. A general 
reluctance by the USA to accept foreign designs could not have helped any form of 
collaboration and, coupled with the division of the management team into two parallel, 
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national teams, it was perhaps inevitable that each country would follow its own path and 
hence make compromise less likely. The failure to agree on a universal standard for screw 
threads is indicative of how these two established industrial nations were reluctant to 
compromise their own industrial culture and standards. Possibly even more serious, because 
US firms saw opportunities for lucrative defence contracts they tried to push emerging and 
even as-yet undeveloped technology, leading to additional delays and cost overruns that 
adopting tried and tested ideas might have avoided, as well preventing disagreement between 
the partners as to the advisability of such untried technology. 
As far as the strategic ramifications are concerned, whilst neither the USA nor 
Germany ended up with a production-ready tank from the project, both sides subsequently 
went on to develop sovereign designs that are still in use, the M1 Abrams and the Leopard 2. 
The two countries also entered a technology-sharing programme with the intention of 
improving interoperability between the two new tanks. In fact, the USA ended up buying the 
German smoothbore 120mm gun but on the other hand chose to adopt its own newly-
developed gas turbine engine, thus improving interoperability in gun ammunition but not in 
either fuel or automotive components. McNaugher notes of the MBT-70 programme that: 
 
Part of the problem was political: the initial requirement had become the 
basis for work-sharing arrangements whose renegotiation would likely have 
involved high-level officials, public scrutiny, and possible diplomatic 
embarrassment. Part was organizational: there was no unity command, no 
way to enforce clear-cut trade-offs. But behind both problems lay the 
differing tank concepts each army had originally brought to the project. 




                                                
4 Thomas L. McNaugher, ‘Problem of Collaborative Weapons Development: The MBT-70’, Armed Forces and 
Society, 10:1 (Autumn 1983), p. 141. 
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The political situation surrounding the 1971 Anglo-German FMBT was, once again, 
that of politicians driving the collaboration forward despite reservations from both industry 
and the military. In the case of FMBT it was the UK’s Defence Minister, Lord Carrington, 
who decreed that the collaboration with Germany was the only option for a new MBT for the 
British Army, the UK at that time being eager to join the EEC and thus wanting to establish 
its credentials as a European partner. At the same time, the Germans were in negotiation with 
the USA over integrating their XM-1 and Leopard 2 tank programmes which effectively 
precluded development of an Anglo-German MBT unless this was somehow incorporated 
into that programme. The political priorities of the Federal Republic were to work with the 
US and this overshadowed any genuine enthusiasm for FMBT that they might have had. 
MBT-70 had shown that German tank designers were committed to their own designs, even 
though they might be willing to test other technologies in collaboration with other NATO 
members. Regardless of any other problems that the FMBT programme encountered, the fact 
that the FRG was never fully committed to developing a new tank in partnership with the UK 
was a major handicap from the start. 
Rather than seriously looking to FMBT to produce a new tank, it appears more likely 
that the FRG saw the programme as an exercise in technical experimentation. For the failure 
of FMBT, Hilmes puts the blame on disagreements over weight, protection, logistical 
support, and cost, noting that Britain insisted on a turreted design in the face of various 
innovative German turretless concepts.5 Certainly, a wide range of different designs were 
examined within the project, notably in the potential for future turretless tanks, although 
British tests suggested that more traditional designs were still superior at that time, and the 
British were consequently still in favour of pursuing conventional turreted designs. FMBT 
                                                
5 Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, pp. 18-20. 
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also highlighted the contemporary debate over rifled guns verses smoothbore, a debate that 
severely hindered any real chance of collaboration. 
The armies of both countries were certainly looking towards a future replacement tank 
when they entered the FMBT programme. Yet, while thanks to Lord Carrington’s 
pronouncement, Britain had invested a great deal in the FMBT programme, eventually 
producing their new tank, the Federal Republic were already developing Leopard 2 and was 
unlikely to wish to pursue the two designs in parallel. The Bundeswehr was also committed to 
a lighter and more manoeuvrable tank design than the one sought by the British Army, not to 
mention using a smoothbore gun as opposed to the rifled bored gun that was the favoured 
option of the British. Thus, for the project to have succeeded, one nation or the other would 
have had to buy into an MBT that did not meet the stated needs of its end user. 
The economic, or more accurately, the commercial competition between the British 
rifled bore and German smoothbore gun is a key factor as to why the collaboration failed. 
Quite aside from any military preference and political ramifications, each country was 
expecting their gun to become an important export. Losing the argument over which would 
be fitted to a new Anglo-German MBT would have effectively been an admission that the 
other design was better, with obvious consequences for the export market. This single factor, 
therefore, made it highly unlikely that any agreement or compromise would have been made 
on the main gun, and so any final design would have failed to further interoperability, let 
alone standardisation, within these two major NATO members and for any countries adopting 
their MBT design. 
Both Britain and the FRG were major exporters of main battle tanks at the time when 
the FMBT programme commenced and future exports were a strategic consideration. 
Leopard 1 had proved a successful export for the Federal Republic, and Britain’s recent 
export history included both Centurion and, to a lesser extent, Chieftain. Britain was 
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undoubtedly dominant in exporting tank guns, with the 105mm L7 being used even in 
Leopard 1. However, the consequences for a successful FMBT were that future MBT exports 
would be shared with the collaboration partner, with the question of which gun was adopted 
resulting in either further export success for Britain or a new export market for Germany. A 
jointly developed gun would have somewhat alleviated this problem but neither country was 
prepared to compromise on the relative advantages of smoothbore over rifled. With an eye to 
future exports, therefore, it is hard to see how either country could have been satisfied with a 
jointly developed tank. 
The 1977 Tank 90, or ‘Napoleon’, project was the result of both France and the FRG 
needing to replace or upgrade their existing main battle tanks. France’s Minister of Defence, 
Yvon Bourges, saw the collaboration as a means to reaffirm France’s political commitment to 
cooperation with France’s European allies as opposed to the wider NATO Alliance, while 
Germany’s Defence Minister, Georg Leber, also used it as an opportunity to strengthen the 
Germany’s political ties within Europe. Although the political personalities changed, the 
leaders of both France and Germany championed the Tank 90 collaboration throughout its 
lifetime, despite political dissent within Germany, notably from the Bundestag Defence 
Committee and Hans Apel, who became the new German Defence Minister in February 
1978. In October 1982, both the Federal Republic and France had seen a change of leadership 
and, with industry in both nations raising concerns about work sharing, enthusiasm for the 
Tank 90 project effectively ended. 
It is difficult to identify any major technological hurdles to the Tank 90 programme, 
but it should be pointed out that the French were looking for innovation where the Germans 
were simply seeking an upgraded Leopard 2. This alone caused problems for the 
collaboration, with France unwilling to become simply a partner in the development of what 
would have essentially been a new German tank. Towards the end of the project it became 
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likely that the collaboration was to become simply a programme to develop a new turret for 
Leopard 2, something the French politicians agreed with but which upset French industry and 
the military, both of whom had been expecting a completely new tank to be developed. 
The military needs of the two partner nations differed slightly, as they had in 1957, on 
the weight of the final vehicle. Germany was, by this stage, designing the Leopard 2 with 
more of an emphasis on direct protection than it had been seeking in 1957, while France was 
still unwilling to compromise weight for this additional protection. Hilmes argues that the 
Franco-German Tank 90 programme collapsed due a failure to agree on weight and cost, but 
also points out that Germany was already largely satisfied that its Leopard 2 design and was 
seeking a linear development in its tanks rather than a radical new design.6 It is interesting to 
compare the Tank 90 debate with that of the Standard Tank because the weight difference 
was once more the only real military disagreement, with both sides happy to use a 120mm 
smoothbore main gun. However, Tank 90 experienced far more industrial and political 
objections than had its predecessor; perhaps this is why the later programme stalled at an 
earlier stage than the 1957 project. 
The economic and industrial ramifications of Tank 90 caused at least as much trouble 
for the programme as did the political background. The influential French industrial unions 
did not want be a junior partner to German tank building and the French were determined that 
a new tank would be a completely new design rather than an upgraded Leopard 2. The 
German firms, by contrast, believed that they were allowing inferior French tank-building 
expertise to benefit from that of the Germans, and appeared to believe that the new tank 
would essentially be a Leopard 2 with some improvements. French industry struggled to be a 
greater part of the collaboration, but the Federal Republic had established a self-belief that it 
was superior in just about every field of tank building, something that was borne out by the 
                                                
6 Hilmes, ‘Modern German Tank Development, 1956-2000’, pp. 18-20. 
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comparison between the eventual French sovereign design, the Leclerc, and the Leopard 2. 
Such uncertainty and unrest from the firms that were expected to design and build the new 
tank did nothing to improve the Tank 90 programme’s chances of succeeding. 
At the strategic level, the strict Federal Republic export laws were always going to 
cause problems for any arms collaboration with a country with a more open policy. However, 
this was partly side-stepped by an agreement that any exports by France would be submitted 
to the Germans for prior agreement and discussion. The ramifications, however, would 
inevitably have had a deleterious effect on German tank exports, with shared MBT exports to 
NATO nations reducing exports that Germany’s Leopard 2 enjoyed at that time, while the 
French would have been able to exploit a larger market, given the countries for which the 
FRG refused to authorise exports. Having established themselves as major exporter of MBTs, 
neither nation was likely to compromise over lucrative markets by sharing them with an 
economic competitor. 
Given these observations on each of the case studies, the table below summarises the 
difficulties faced by each MBT project. Although this conveniently highlights the major 
factors that led to each project’s failure, there were minor areas of dispute which have not 






As can be concluded from the table, the major areas which have caused problems for 
MBT collaboration have been: changes of political leadership or direction (such as the FRG 
choosing to work more closely with the USA at the expense of the UK); differing military 
requirements over the design philosophy of MBTs; a lack of strong management and/or an 
agreed design specification; commercial disputes over either work sharing or components; 
and, strategic, national considerations over future tank exports. 
Finally, and in light of the above, it is useful to refer briefly to the three peripheral 
case studies: the Sino-Pakistani MBT-2000, KNDS Demonstrator, and SP-70 self-propelled 
artillery system. MBT-2000 was essentially a tank design built by the Chinese, modified to 
better suit Pakistani specifications and licence-built in Chinese-funded Pakistani factories. 
This approach clearly favours the originating nation in terms of political influence, industry 













Political     
Politically driven    
Separate management structure    
Failure coincides with change of 
political leadership or direction 
   
Technical     
Early lack of specification     
Over-ambitious expectations     
Military     
Different tank philosophy    
Differing priority for new tank    
Industry/Economic    
Lack of work-sharing agreement    
Different industrial standards    
Commercial competition 
(components) 
   
Strategic    
Competition for export market 
(finished MBTs) 
   
Incompatible In-Service Date    
Number of Identified Factors 4 11 9 7 
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and innovation, but does nonetheless provide the buyer with an MBT without having to 
develop tank-building infrastructure and research. This approach has been used by non-tank 
building nations since the invention of the tank itself, but it cannot be said to be a 
collaboration in the sense that we have established for this study. Pakistan may have been 
able to specify its own requirements, but it had no influence in the design of the vehicle and 
was thus merely modifying an existing MBT design, the Type 90-IIM.  
The KNDS Demonstrator was built by an international consortium to demonstrate that 
those involved were capable of producing a next-generation MBT. Such consortia have, of 
course, long been established in the fields of military and civil aircraft, missile and other 
weapons systems. In this way, the major hurdles to MBT collaboration such as reliance on 
national government support, divided design philosophies, disjointed management structures, 
and questions over exports are largely avoided. Whilst such consortia still require nations to 
invest in development and to buy the completed vehicles, they are not as tied to individual 
governments or political figures as are national projects. Instead, they operate as commercial 
interest groups and may seek customers globally, or represent the future for MBT 
development. 
SP-70 saw Britain, West Germany and Italy working together to develop a self-
propelled artillery system based on a successful howitzer which had been developed and built 
by those same three countries. Given that there were no obvious differences of opinion over 
what SP-70 was expected to achieve in the field, such a joint development seems to have 
been, on the surface, a relatively easy goal. Yet technical issues led to cost and time overruns 
which persuaded the Federal Republic to abandon the programme. Given that the FRG had 
been SP-70’s major investor, the remaining countries had little choice but to discontinue the 
project. This case study demonstrates a key factor in joint tracked vehicle projects – all 
partners within the collaboration are dependent on the others; so, the project is likely to 
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succeed or fail according to the unity of purpose of each member. This dependency, and thus 
the fragility of the project, increases the more the number of partners involved.  
The Case Studies: What Lessons Can Be Learned? 
What do these case studies tell us, then about MBT collaboration? In the first instance, the 
most obvious conclusion is that success will require certain basic prerequisites. These can be 
considered to be as follows: political/management support throughout the project; an 
understanding and agreement of the project scope or requirements; good communication 
throughout the project; and, that sufficient resources be made available.7 While adhering to 
theoretical project management guidelines may appear straightforward in principle, when 
dealing with large international industrial projects, many different and often conflicting 
influences make it unlikely that the theory will survive contact with two national partners.  
Governmental politics within a democracy is notoriously fickle. The very power a 
politician holds, the power that enables him or her to initiate and support a collaborative 
project, is dependent on the popular support of the electorate. It is understandable, therefore, 
that politicians are more eager to lend support to projects which offer short-term political 
advantage. Politicians, or others intimately involved with and investing political capital in a 
project, have a tendency to overestimate the probable results and benefits, while 
simultaneously underestimating potential problems or costs. This ‘optimism bias’ has the 
effect of increasing support for a project.8 Yet, projects that look attractive from a political 
viewpoint might not be as attractive to the military end-user, or the engineers and designers 
                                                
7 See, for example, Olivia Frinsdorf, Jian Zuo, and Bo Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence 
Environment’, International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 813; TNA, DEFE 70/586, Future 
Main Battle Tank (FBMT), equipment, future tank policy study, possible collaboration, Note from VCGS to 
CGS, Tank Collaboration, 12 September 1980. 
8 Peter W. G. Morris, Jeffrey K. Pinto and Jonas Söderlund (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Project 
Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 328. It should be noted that, when discussing military 
procurement, there is a significant difference between the governmental politics and military procurement 
executive phases of the process.   
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who are faced with the problems of agreeing on a single concept. The MBT-70 and FMBT 
projects offer good examples of how conceptual differences hinder collaborations despite 
strong political support, while the Standard Tank and Tank 90 show that a change in domestic 
politics may end even a project that otherwise has a good chance of success. The partners in 
any future European MBT collaboration are likely to remain democratic governments in the 
future; hence the problem of changing political personalities and priorities is unlikely to 
disappear. However, if lessons of past history are to be learned, support for future 
collaborative tank projects should be shared among the government or national parliament as 
a whole rather than being maintained by a single party or politician. 
National differences in design philosophy have been major hindrances to a successful 
collaboration in the past. Arguments over the optimal balance of the firepower-mobility-
protection triangle have meant that nations would have had to compromise their own military 
requirements in order to develop jointly a new MBT. To a large extent this issue seems to be 
no longer as significant in modern tank design, with advances in technology and the 
experience of modern armoured warfare refining and defining what the optimum MBT design 
should be. While some differences still exist at the time of writing, the debate over rifled 
versus smoothbore guns being an example, it is less likely that such differences should be a 
major factor in any future collaboration. 
While it is not easy to make predictions, the rise of multinational conglomerates 
within the defence industry is very likely to solve the problem of export and industrial 
arguments. Previous projects saw difficulties both in maintaining domestic industrial 
advantage for the involved nations, as well as arguments over responsibility for components. 
Decisions as to who, for example, takes responsibility for the main gun, or who may export 
the final product, are somewhat moot when the developer is a multinational conglomerate. In 
addition, such an infrastructure allows for a defined and agreed project scope and 
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requirements, in other words an agreement on exactly what is to be built. The case studies 
examined in this thesis show that not one of the four reached agreement because sovereign 
states were backing the projects. 
 Examination of the case study projects allows the identification of essential 
requirements, the absence of which reduced the chances of success for any potential 
international MBT collaboration project: 
 Continued Political Backing. International defence projects, by their nature, involve 
governments and diplomatic agreement. Government funds are required to fund such 
projects, and a measure of diplomatic cooperation is essential for any sort of 
agreement to be reached. It is advisable, however, that such agreements are not tied to 
a single political entity, be that a politician or government in power, but are supported 
and governed independently once the initial agreement has been reached. 
 Agreed Military Specification.An established specification gives a project needed 
focus, but that specification must be drawn up through military studies in consultation 
with the end-user, in this case the national armed forces, in most cases the army. 
Tanks are an integral part of military organisations and doctrine, and the military user 
might expect any new MBT to be designed to their own requirements. While it is true 
that a compromised design is better than no new tank at all, an MBT project is a 
multi-billion pound investment in a nation’s future military effectiveness and should 
not simply be viewed as a means to political or diplomatic gain. After all, national 
security and the lives of soldiers may be dependent upon having an optimal MBT 
design every bit as much, or more so, as an advanced MBT enhances national or 
governmental prestige. 
 A Single Management Structure. Should each partner run their own management team 
in isolation, as was seen in the cases of MBT-70 and FMBT, then the likelihood of 
316 
 
developing a single unified design becomes more improbable. Efficient and effective 
management must be in place to ensure that an agreed specification is adhered to, or 
that any required changes to it are made as efficiently and effectively as possible. This 
also encompasses having a clear and effective system of communication, both from 
the top down and also in the other direction. 
 A Realistic Goal and Sufficient Resources.When setting project targets it is essential 
that those targets are realistically achievable with the resources and capability 
available. Overruns in collaborative projects, and complex defence projects in 
particular, appear to be unavoidable. This fundamental fact needs to be taken into 
account when establishing completion dates and budgets, with some agreed system in 
place to encourage both contractors and management to keep such overruns to a 
minimum. 
 Awareness of Commercial and Strategic Concerns. Export of MBTs and their 
components is both lucrative and politically advantageous, especially should that 
model become the standard MBT with an alliance such as NATO. Exporting MBTs is 
not only a business decision but also a diplomatic one, and many export deals are 
made for political rather than military reasons. Established tank-exporting nations are 
going to view with concern any compromise to their existing market share by jointly 
producing an MBT with another country: this must be taken into consideration either 
before a collaborative deal is sought, or before any investment in development is 
made. Strategic concerns involve the ‘soft’ power diplomatic prestige held by a nation 
as well as the ‘hard’ power capability and potential of its armed forces. By choosing 
to buy a foreign design, or even allowing a collaborator to dominate a deal, a nation 
risks compromising their prestige by acknowledging that the other design is better 
than their own. 
317 
 
Revisiting Contemporary Theories of International Collaboration 
In the light of the conclusions reached as regards the case studies as to why collaborative 
international MBT projects have largely failed to date, it is useful to examine the hypotheses 
and conclusions of previously published works on the subject. Very little of the existing 
material deals exclusively with MBT projects, so this study may allow for some adjustments 
to existing thinking on international collaborative projects. 
Alexander Cornell is in favour of integration of systems within the Alliance, and uses 
three major case studies to reach his conclusion that collaboration and integration is the most 
beneficial way for member states to develop new weapon systems.9 His choice of case 
studies, the E3A-based Airborne Early Warning and Controls System (AWACS), the Roland 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) and the F-16 fighter aircraft, do not include a main battle tank, 
or even a ground vehicle, and the extent of true cooperative development in either the 
AWACS or F-16 projects is highly debatable. In addition, he does not consider the military 
benefits of having a broad range of weapon systems within an alliance, nor the benefits to the 
countries themselves of developing their own weapons. His politically-focussed approach is 
interesting to note in light of the conclusion that international MBT collaborations often fall 
victim to political ambitions which mask practical obstacles to success such as failure to meet 
military requirements.  
Marc DeVore suggests that whilst – in theory – weapons development collaboration 
ought to provide economic and military benefits, in practice these theoretical advantages are 
rarely achieved. The inherent problems of private industry working with an international 
competitor evidently do not prevent other armaments collaboration projects from succeeding, 
examples of joint weapons development include the Panavia Tornado, Milan anti-tank missile 
and Eurofighter Typhoon, but DeVore argues that the international aspect of such projects 
                                                
9 Alexander H. Cornell, International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production 
by the NATO Allies: Ten Years Later - And Beyond (The Hague, 1981), pp. 30-34. 
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mitigates against the theoretical financial savings and technological advancement that a 
collaborative model suggests. Indeed, he suggests that joint international projects often cost 
more in absolute terms and take longer to mature due to their inherent additional bureaucracy, 
casting considerable doubt on the wisdom of collaboration on larger projects: 
 
Thus, intrinsic limits to the extent to which the arms collaboration process 
can be reformed exist. This renders it improbable that collaborative projects 
will ever achieve more than a small proportion of the economic and military 
benefits anticipated by collaboration’s proponents. In fact, modest R&D 
savings and improvements to partners’ interoperability are most likely the 
only benefits that states can realistically hope to achieve. Moreover, even 
these benefits come at the price of a slow and inflexible decision-making 
process. Equipped with a better understanding of the limited benefits and 
trade-offs inherent in collaboration, scholars and policy-makers can examine 
when it is in states’ interest to collaborate and when they would be better 
served by other policy options.10 
 
 
DeVore believes that economic factors hinder international defence cooperation, pointing out 
that: ‘As with international cooperation in other domains, fear of suffering losses relative to 
one’s partners provides a powerful deterrent to states or firms investing in the specific assets 
needed to render collaboration efficient.’11 
DeVore’s conclusions are certainly borne out by studying MBT collaborations, where 
national economic and strategic considerations were significant in the failure of three of the 
four case studies, with only the 1957 Standard Panzer avoiding these problems, probably 
because neither France nor the FRG had, at the time, invested heavily in their domestic tank 
industry and had no existing export expectations. By contrast, the other three case studies saw 
                                                
10 Marc R. DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, Defence and Peace 
Economics, 25:4 (2014), p. 416. 
11 Marc R. DeVore, ‘The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective 
Action Problems’, Security Studies, 20:4(2011), pp. 625-626. 
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national tank industries reluctant to compromise their own established designs and export 
markets in favour of an international collaboration. 
This factor of national self-interest on the part of existing industry is reinforced by 
Moravcsik, who suggests that the most widely encountered explanation for the failure of 
collaborative weapons projects is national interest, quoting Kenneth Waltz in stating that 
‘States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence’. He notes 
that those running national governments rarely have the power to interfere significantly in 
economic decisions made by private firms and it is domestic private industry that often 
determines the success or failure of co-operative arms development.12 
Any collaborative project must overcome organisational hurdles, and when such 
collaboration is on an international level those hurdles are multiplied. DeVore notes, for 
example, that ‘many empirical examinations of collaborative programs reveal gross 
inefficiencies’, but adds that identifying the causes of these inefficiencies is more 
problematic.13 Morris, et al., note that any collaboration faces the problem of communication 
and interpretation, even if all stakeholders share a common language, stating that ‘As project 
stakeholders (including the firm’s local units) in different institutional settings interpret the 
projects’ goals and business objectives differently, the communication in such organisational 
structures is challenging.’ 14 These management problems can be seen in all of the MBT case 
studies but are most noticeable in the MBT-70 and FMBT projects. In these two studies, a 
lack of communication and duplication of effort made any final agreement on a single 
compromised design highly unlikely, with both MBT-70 and FMBT leading to parallel 
design efforts that would have given little interoperability advantage, let alone 
                                                
12 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Armaments among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975-1985’, in Peter 
Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (eds.), International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-
Edged Diplomacy (London, 1993), pp. 129-130, 155-156,160. 
13 DeVore, ‘International Armaments Collaboration and the Limits of Reform’, p. 416. 
14 Morris, Pinto and Söderlund (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Project Management, p.144. 
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standardisation, had the tanks entered production. Indeed, the two FMBT design paths bore 
so little resemblance to each other that the casual observer would have been unlikely to guess 
their ‘common’ origins. 
The study by Frinsdorf, et al., notes that defence projects tend to comprise large value 
multi-disciplinary contracts with many sub-contracted component projects, and thus their 
very complexity makes any judgment of effectiveness or efficiency problematic.15 Stephen B. 
Johnson also investigates the subject of complexity and notes that novel and complex 
technology development historically leads to cost and time overruns. He points out that a 
technology that is complex but established has already become familiar enough to the design 
teams that the complexity is less of a hurdle, and a technology that is novel but simple is 
easily understood and developed.  
The combination, however, of complexity and novelty means that it is not easy to 
understand and there are few, if any, historical precedents to enable developers to follow a 
recognisedmodel.16 Philip Scranton puts this in perspective regarding defence projects during 
the Cold War, citing the continuous redesign and uncertainty attached to new technology 
which led to both cost and schedule targets frequently being overrun as a matter of course. As 
any innovative design alters according to both technological necessity and customer revisions 
of requirement, it leads to dislocating changes in production and consequent changes to the 
requirements of all the affected components. Scranton quotes the apocryphal defence 
engineer defending a project’s delays by telling a complaining air force general that, ‘If you 
want it bad, you’ll get it bad.’17 While most of the MBT case studies do not obviously show 
overly complex technology to be a major influence in the failure of projects, it was a 
                                                
15 Frinsdorf, Zuo and Xia, ‘Critical Factors for Project Efficiency in a Defence Environment’, p. 803. 
16 Stephen B. Johnson, ‘Technical and Institutional Factors in the Emergence of Project Management’, 
International Journal of Project Management, 31 (2013), p. 678. 




significant factor in the case of the MBT-70. Over-ambitious technology brought uncertainty, 
time delays and additional expense to the programme, which undoubtedly contributed 
significantly to the eventual disillusionment of the national governments.  
Mazur, et al., suggest that the improvement of a project’s chances of success can be 
directly concomitant to the relationship between the project stakeholders, noting there is an 
improvement in a project’s outcome if the stakeholders are both committed to the project goal 
and mission, and are thus involved in the decision-making at all stages.18 Dirk Klimkeit also 
points to a collaborative project’s success being dependent on ‘drivers for collaboration’, and 
elaborates by citing interdependency and an interest in the project being successful as among 
such drivers. Klimkeit argues that sufficiently robust informal drivers for the success of a 
collaborative project may even overcome the absence of established institutional and formal 
mechanisms.19 In many ways, it was these ‘commitment drivers’, in the form of national 
political will, that finally contributed to the end of the MBT projects explored in the case 
studies. Although political drivers are essential to any international defence project, Western 
democracies provide relatively unstable political bedrock for long-term projects because they 
are subject to changes both of personnel and political parties. Every one of the case studies 
saw their political support shrivel and die as their initial champions were replaced, suggesting 
that such support must have a broader political support than simply the party leader or 
defence minister in post at the time. 
Meyer pointed out in 1988 that, despite NATO managing to collaborate successfully 
on other weapons projects, the successful collaborative main battle tank project had so far 
eluded them. He suggested three reasons for this failure in relation to projects in and before 
the 1970s: differing military priorities in regards to the balance between firepower, mobility 
                                                
18 Alicia Mazur, et al., ‘Rating Defence Major Project Success: The Role of Personal Attributes and Stakeholder 
Relationships’, International Journal of Project Management, 32 (2014), p. 953. 
19 Dirk Klimkeit, ‘Organizational Context and Collaboration on International Projects: The Case of a 
Professional Service Film’, International Journal of Project Management, 31 (2013), p. 376. 
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and protection; a lack of political will; and, concerns about national prestige surrounding the 
abandonment of sovereign tank designs.20 Keith Hartley defines the process of defence 
collaboration as the establishment of an exclusive club of member governments who create a 
‘protected market for one or more items of defence equipment’, but who remain part of that 
club only as long as they believe it to be worthwhile. His conclusion as to the failure of joint 
tank projects is that they are due to ‘a political preference for national domestic interests ... 
distinctively different tank philosophies ... industrial and technology considerations, and 
because of domestic electoral factors.’21 
This study’s conclusions broadly do at one level support those found within published 
works on the subject of international defence collaboration. Political drivers were the major 
factor in the failure of the case study projects, with support for collaboration dwindling as 
costs rose and political figures moved from office. All the projects examined, with the 
exception of the 1957 Standard Panzer, saw the domestic national tank industries reluctant to 
compromise their own potential exports by sharing with those of another country, this 
phenomenon being particularly significant in the case of the battle for the FMBT’s main 
armament. Each project also struggled to overcome the basic fact that the military of the 
nations involved wanted different qualities in their new tanks, usually manifesting as 
differences of opinion over weight and manoeuvrability versus armour protection but being 
most obvious in the debate over ATGM or gun for the MBT-70’s armament. Confused 
project management and a lack of agreement over a single specification were compounded by 
the political prevarication and national differences in tank philosophies, which amplified the 
usual project cost and time overruns. As the projects threatened to cost more and miss their 
deadlines, political support was withdrawn and each project was cancelled. 
                                                
20 Timm R. Meyer, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A German View’, in Karl Kaiser and John Roper (eds.), 
British-German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance (London, 1988), p. 252. 
21 Keith Hartley, ‘Collaboration in Arms Production: A British View’, in Kaiser and Roper (eds.), British-
German Defence Co-operation, pp. 265, 282. 
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However, few of the published works deal with the requirements of the armed forces, 
focussing instead on the economic and logistical advantages of collaboration and 
standardisation. The military is the organisation which dedicates itself to studying and 
analysing how MBTs are used in practice, and thus we can assume that they are the 
organisation best placed to decide what they need any new MBT to do. As the end-user, the 
military ought to be the best judge of what they require from a new MBT and, while a 
compromised new tank design is certainly better than no new tank at all, the whole point of 
developing and supplying any national army with modern MBTs is to increase their 
effectiveness. Supplying MBTs that do not suit an army’s doctrine is clearly going to 
compromise this effectiveness. 
The main battle tank is fundamentally different to the aircraft and missiles that have 
formed the basis of previous, successful, international collaborations. Most military thinkers 
agree on the role of a particular missile or aircraft, albeit the Eurofighter Typhoon saw some 
disagreement over whether the aircraft was to be a pure fighter or a multi-role fighter-
bomber.22 The most effective way to employs tanks, though, has been the subject of debate 
since the tank’s early days, suggesting that there is no single ‘best’ tank philosophy, or at 
least not one that has been identified to date. With NATO nations previously divided over 
their tank philosophy, a split that appears to be narrowing with modern NATO-nation MBT 
models now being more similar,23 it might be unsurprising that any previous collaborative 
design would need to overcome significant hurdles in persuading the involved parties to 
compromise their own ideas of where the balance between firepower, mobility and protection 
                                                
22 The Eurofighter Typhoon project is covered in Chapter 5, above. 
23 Exact data for modern MBTs is, of course, classified, but the US M1A3 Abrams upgrade (still under 
development at the time of writing), Germany’s Leopard 2A6 and the UK’s Challenger 2 are all very similar in 
design and shape, use diesel engines and 120mm main guns. Although Challenger 2 uses a rifled-bore gun, the 
possibility of moving to smoothbore was suggested as part of the LEP upgrade package although this was 
subsequently dropped for financial reasons. Global Security, ‘M1A3 Future Tank’, 
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m1a3.htm>, accessed 5 April 2019;  Defense News, 
UK Surges Ahead with Challenger 2 Upgrade, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2016/01/16/uk-surges-
ahead-with-challenger-2-upgrade/>, accessed 7 February 2017. 
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should lie. Only by solving this fundamental issue of a new MBT’s basic specification will 
any collaboration hope to overcome all the other hurdles associated with complex multi-
national defence collaborative projects.  
The Future for MBT Collaboration 
How future programmes might succeed is, after all, at least part of the reason for studying 
past examples. It is unlikely that Western politicians or political systems will change to the 
point that they are no longer attracted to potential savings in the cost of development or in 
securing diplomatic advantages through initiating collaborative projects. With the end of 
Tank 90 in 1982, the international situation has advanced considerably in many key areas that 
may affect the chances of success in the case of a new MBT collaborative project. Advances 
in communications technology, a rise in ‘globalism’24 and the formation of multi-national 
defence conglomerates appear to have increased the chances of success for any new 
international collaboration within NATO (or at least within the nations that comprise the 
Alliance), while new military threats (or possibly the rebirth of old ones), and increased 
pressure on national defence budgets, coupled with a reduction in national tank-building 
capacity within many European NATO member nations, now increase the attraction of the 
potential benefits of collaboration over sovereign tank design. 
Recent conflicts in the Middle East, the Ukraine and other current global tensions 
suggest that the potential for peer conflict redolent of the Cold War did not vanish with the 
fall of the Soviet Union, and that MBTs are by no means obsolete in the modern world. 
Meanwhile, Europe is seeking greater integration of its members states, with the European 
                                                
24 At the time of writing the UK is planning to leave the EU, which might be seen as something of a reversal of 
the wider move towards globalisation. However, whilst the UK may have chosen to withdraw from close 
political union with the EU, this is, at best, a minor diversion from the more general move towards closer 
international collaborations on large and complex commercial projects. 
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Union (EU) established as a continental legislative power. While not all European nations 
agree with this quest for greater integration, it is impossible to ignore the military, strategic 
and industrial implications of a move towards European unity. In particular, there have been 
calls for a ‘European Army’ with greater integration of command and equipment.25 Such 
increased integration, especially in light of signs of diplomatic fracture between NATO 
members and most significantly between the USA and other NATO countries,26 increases the 
possibility of the European NATO nations agreeing on a single, European, MBT design: this 
raises the chances of success for a future European MBT collaboration, which would almost 
certainly involve Germany. 
As mentioned above, it is in the field of communications that there have arguably 
been the greatest advances since the most recent failed joint MBT projects. The use of 
English as an international language of business has become more widespread.27 The internet 
and digital communication networks have made it far easier to form and run international 
collaborations. International data-sharing is now possible almost as fast as voice 
communication, with translations easy to access even if language barriers still exist. The only 
barrier to such communication is imposed by companies or governments themselves, and not 
the available technology. Internationalism, aided by easier communication, has made possible 
the formation of large international consortia such as BAE Systems, KNDS, MBDA and 
Airbus. It is perhaps these commercial organisations rather than governments which hold the 
key to future international MBT development although, as the Eurofighter and Airbus 
380/400M projects demonstrate, international consortia are not immune to the delays and cost 
                                                
25 Modern Diplomacy, ‘Defence: Is the EU Creating a European Army?’, 
<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/06/24/defence-is-the-eu-creating-a-european-army/>, accessed 24 June 
2019. 
26 New York Times, ‘Trump Discussed Pulling US from NATO, Aides Say amid New Concerns over Russia’, 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html>, accessed 23 June 2019. See also, 
for example, BBC, ‘Turkey defies US as Russian S-400 missile defence arrives’, 12 July 2019, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48962885>, accessed 12 July 2019. 
27 Sandra Lee McKay, ‘English As An International Language: What Is It and What It Means for Pedagogy’, 
RELC Journal, 49:1 (2018), pp. 9-23. 
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overruns that plague almost every joint project.28 Interested parties should take such overruns 
as unfortunate but almost inevitable aspects of complex projects, and make decisions as to 
how much overrun can be tolerated before cancelling a project, absorbing all costs up to that 
point.29 
The Future of the Main Battle Tank 
It is a fact that not every defence commentator or government official views main battle tanks 
as either a priority or, indeed, a necessity for modern warfare. Indeed, in conversation with a 
senior member of staff from Britain’s Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), the author 
was asked whether tanks were still necessary in the age of nuclear weapons, ‘drones’ and 
precision-guided air-launched munitions.30 Most military thinkers, however, agree that tanks, 
perhaps in a slightly different form,31 are still the best weapon system to perform the role of 
land-based highly mobile tactical shock engagement; no other single vehicle can yet do all 
that a main battle tank can do, and so far no alternative has been developed that is cheaper yet 
is as effective in the primary battlefield role of bringing armoured and mobile firepower 
directly to the point of decision. Until and unless such a replacement can be found or 
                                                
28 Mawdsley, for example, makes this point in relation to the A400M project. Jocelyn Mawdsley, ‘The A400M 
Project: From Flagship Project to Warning for European Defence Cooperation’, Defence Studies, 13:1 (2013), p. 
29. The Eurofighter, A380 and A400M projects are discussed in Ch. 5, above. 
29 When MBT-70 was cancelled, for example, it is estimated that the project had cost $213 million, money that 
ultimately saw no tangible benefit for either nation. TMARL, E2014.3220, copy of article, Jacques Baud, 
‘MBT-70/Kpz-70: Revolutionary but Luckless’, Armies and Weapons, year not identifiable but possibly 1975, 
p. 39. 
30 This conversation took place in 2018 at the Shrivenham Defence and Security Doctoral Symposium. It should 
be noted that questioner was not, in fact, in a directly defence-related role. 
31 Possible future developments for a revolutionary MBT design are presented by Rahman et. al., suggesting that 
the future MBT may need to address improved ‘survivability, cruising range, ISTAR, tactical mobility, 
trafficability and ease of adaptability.’ See here A. Hafeezur Rahman, Ameer Malik Shaik, J. Rajesh Kumar,V. 
Balaguru and P. Sivakumar, ‘Design Configuration of a Generation Next Main Battle Tank for Future Combat’, 
Defence Science Journal, 67:4 (July 2017), pp. 343-353. 
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developed, the MBT will continue to be a vital part of NATO armies for the foreseeable 
future.32 
The tank as an armoured vehicle to bring firepower to the point of contact is unlikely 
to change soon. However, the form that such an AFV may take in the future is the subject of 
much debate and radical thinking. The idea of a turretless tank allows for a cheaper vehicle 
that may be easier and faster to build, whilst also allowing for the mounting of a larger main 
gun than a rotating turret would accommodate. This concept was thoroughly tested by 
Germany during the Second World War with their range of both tank destroyers and assault 
guns. The turretless tank destroyer concept lasted beyond 1945 and saw its final practical 
application in the Swedish Stridsvagn 103‘S Tank’, designed in 1950s, and the West German 
Kanonenjagdpanzer JPK-90, first produced in 1965.33 The Anglo-German FMBT project of 
1971 also toyed with the idea of mounting the gun directly in the hull or on a pedestal, but 
eventually discarded the turretless idea as not being fit for the modern battlefield tank.34 
Another popular suggestion is using wheels instead of tracks, creating the ‘wheeled 
tank’ alternative.35 Tracked vehicles are expensive and difficult to maintain, and are usually 
                                                
32 Debates and arguments surrounding the future of the main battle tank may be found in, for example: Sir 
Richard Swinburn, ‘Future Armoured Warfare: The Case for the Tank’, The RUSI Journal, 137:3 (1992), pp. 
35-37; Clinton J. Ancker III, ‘Whither Armor’, The Journal of Military Operations, 1:2 (Autumn 2012), pp. 4-8; 
Richard P. Geier, ‘A View of a Future Tank’ (letters page),  Armor, 44:2 (Mar-Apr 1985), pp. 44-45; Jane’s 
360, ‘Heavy armour heritage: The evolution of the MBT and the search for its successor’, 
<https://www.janes.com/images/assets/280/82280/Heavy_armour_heritage_The_evolution_of_the_MBT_and_t
he_search_for_its_successor.pdf>, accessed 26 May 2019. 
33 Hilmes, Main Battle Tanks: Developments in Design Since 1945), pp. 79 81; Christopher F.Foss, Jane’s Main 
Battle Tanks (Second Edition) (London, 1986), pp. 70-73; Wolfgang Schneider (ed.), Tanks of the World, 7th 
Edition (Koblenz, 1990), pp. 214-218. 
34 Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, ‘Tank Test Beds’, Armor, 43:2 (Mar-Apr 1984), pp. 16-19; TMARL, E2005.1079.4  
Technical Assessment of All UK and FRG Concepts from ‘72 to ‘76 Inclusive, 6th Steering Group Meeting, 14 
November 1975, p. 2:55; William Suttie, The Tank Factory: British Military Vehicle Development and the 
Chobham Establishment (Stroud, 2015), pp. 152-155; Robin Fletcher, ‘Trunnions on the Move: Advantages and 
Disadvantages of the Tank Turret’, Armor, 45:1 (Jan-Feb 1986), pp. 33-43. 
35 Wheels have, of course, been used for armoured cars almost since the birth of the motor vehicle. Where a 
heavy armoured car becomes a ‘wheeled tank’ is subjective but most easily lies with the use for which it is 
intended. If an AFV is designed, built and employed in the role of main battle tank then it might be viewed as a 
‘wheeled tank’. Examples of wheeled AFVs that carry medium calibre main guns (in the 90mm to 120mm 
range) include the Cadillac Gage LAV-300, Consortium IVECO-OTOBREDA Centauro B1 Tank Destroyer, 
and the Reumech OMC Rooikat Armoured Car. It should be noted that no current wheeled AFV has the same 
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slower and more expensive to run than an equivalent-weight wheeled AFV. As Ogorkiewicz 
points out, however, although wheeled AFVs offer increased mobility on roads and flat firm 
terrain, once off-road the tactical mobility of wheeled vehicles is inferior to that of tracks. 
Advanced wheel and suspension arrangements allow improved off-road mobility but the 
vehicle weight must be kept lower than that of a tracked AFV, compromising protection and 
possibly firepower.36 While mounting a direct-fire gun of 90-120mm on a wheeled armoured 
vehicle offers many of the benefits of a tank at a fraction of the cost and offering more 
operational mobility than a tracked vehicle, such AFVs are generally described as fire-
support vehicles or tank destroyers and there is an acknowledgement that their lesser 
protection means that, limited and counter-insurgency conflicts aside, such ‘wheeled tanks’ 
cannot operate on the front line of a modern war in the same way as an MBT can. 
Unmanned fighting vehicles can save on crew spaces and remove most of the danger 
to the operator, an important consideration in modern defence thinking where the public’s 
acceptance of casualties is apparently much lower than it once was. Unmanned Ground 
Vehicles (UGVs) are in use or in current trials for investigating and tackling explosive 
devices such as IEDs, bringing logistical supplies to the front lines, in infantry support roles 
such as mounting and carrying heavy weapons, demolitions engineering, and in urban 
reconnaissance and combat.37 It is, of course, important to note that ‘unmanned’ is not the 
same as ‘autonomous’ and the vast majority of UGVs have a human controller. It is this 
controller that limits the effectiveness of UGVs in an MBT-like battlefield combat role; the 
                                                                                                                                                  
firepower or protection levels as modern MBTs. See here; Christopher F. Foss,Jane’s Tank Recognition Guide, 
(Glasgow, 1996), pp. 372-373, 384-385; pp. 398-399. 
36Ogorkiewicz, Tanks: 100 Years of Evolution, p. 282. 
37 Jane’s 360, ‘Follow the Leader: US Army Unmanned Ground Vehicle Programmes’, 
<https://www.janes.com/images/assets/925/87925/Follow_the_leader_US_Army_unmanned_ground_vehicle_p
rogrammes.pdf> accessed 26 May 2019; UK Defence Journal, ‘Robot Wars Becomes Reality as MBDA and 
Milrem Robotics to Develop Anti-Tank Unmanned Ground Vehicle’, <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/robot-
wars-becomes-reality-as-mbda-and-milrem-robotics-to-develop-anti-tank-unmanned-ground-vehicle/>, accessed 
10 August 2018; UK Defence Journal, ‘UK to Explore Unmanned Logistics Vehicle Use’, 
<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-explore-unmanned-logistics-vehicle-use/>, accessed 15 April 2018. 
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effective range of control in anything but open areas is limited by line of sight or the length 
and vulnerability of a control wire. Remote wireless control works well for UAVs 
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) because the sky does not block signals as do trees, buildings and 
terrain fluctuations. For a ground battlefield, the controller would have to remain close 
enough to the vehicle that any advantages of removing the crew from a frontline AFV would 
be largely negated and might possibly require a second armoured vehicle for the remote 
crewmen if he is to remain in an area close to the combat zone. In addition, there are potential 
tactical problems from failed or delayed signals, slowing firing or reaction in the often split-
second decision-making of the battlefield of modern ground-based close combat. Indeed, 
Russia encountered just these problems when it combat-tested its Ural-9 unmanned ground 
combat vehicle (UGC) in Syria, where, as well as delays and failure of the 30mm autocannon 
armament, and problems with the suspension and optical sensors: 
 
in carrying out of combat missions, the average range of sustainable 
management from the advanced control point was 300-500 m in the 
conditions of the settlement with low-rise buildings, […] while also were 
recorded 17 cases of short-term (up to 1 min) and 2 cases of long (up to 1.5 
hours) loss of Uran-9 control.38 
 
 
Richard Greier predicted in 1985 that the future of tank armament would be a highly 
computerised (although still human-crewed) future tank armed with an electro-magnetic 
(EM) gun, firing hyper-velocity rounds, backed up by two lasers for engaging personnel and 
softer targets.39 Ogorkiewicz suggests that the main drawback with EM guns is the large 
power pack required, although he acknowledges that it is possible that future EM gun 
                                                
38 Defence Blog, ‘Combat Tests in Syria Brought to Light Deficiencies of Russian Mini-Tank’, <https://defence-
blog.com/army/combat-tests-syria-brought-light-deficiencies-russian-unmanned-mini-tank.html>, accessed 10 
December 2018; Popular Mechanics, ‘Russia’s Tank Drone Performed Poorly in Syria’, 
<https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a21602657/russias-tank-drone-performed-poorly-in-
syria/>, accessed 16 May 2019. 
39 Richard Greier, ‘A View of a Future Tank’ (letters page), Armor, 44:2 (Mar-Apr, 1985), pp. 44-45. 
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systems may reduce the size of power pack required or use a more compact energy source.40 
He concludes that current EM technology means that they are not as efficient as a 
conventional 140mm high velocity gun, as well as being unproven technology.41 However, 
Ogorkiewicz does accept that conventional guns have reached a design plateau where 
technology has made them as effective as they are going to be without increasing calibre once 
more, but that increasing calibre will force designers into equipping tanks with autoloaders as 
larger rounds will be too heavy for a human to load efficiently.42 
While these new technological possibilities continue to offer opportunities to 
significantly adjust the standard configuration of the main battle tank, experience cautions 
that the trade-offs required may well reduce the positive advantages offered by the traditional 
MBT. 
 
* * * 
 
Tanks remain a vitally important part of the armies of most countries of the world, and all the 
indications are that they will remain to be vital for conducting warfare on the modern 
battlefield. The cost of tanks is escalating as new technology is developed to make them 
safer, faster and more potent fighting vehicles, potentially making developing new tanks too 
expensive for nations with restricted defence budgets. It is easy to create the ‘ultimate tank’ 
by investing in all the latest technology, but the cost of producing and maintaining enough 
models to equip an army, and to allow for losses through mechanical failure or combat, 
makes it necessary to compromise what could be built for what can be afforded. 
Collaboration between tank-building nations offers one solution, albeit one beset by the 
                                                
40 Ogorkiewicz, Technology of Tanks, pp. 92-94. 
41 Ogorkiewicz, Tanks; 100 Years of Evolution, pp. 263-265. 
42 Ibid., pp. 259-260.  
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problems detailed in this study. Decisions must be made as to whether a government wants to 
gamble national security and the lives of its military personnel by clinging to outdated 
technology, invest a significant amount of resources into developing a new sovereign design, 
or potentially compromising what its military want from a new tank in order to save money 
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APPENDIX 1: Tank Ammunition 
1.1 APDS round showing the core penetrator within its sabot.  
 
Image reproduced from Norfolk Tank Museum website: <http://norfolktankmuseum.co.uk/types-of-
ammunition/>, accessed 03 April 2017. 
 
 
1.2 APFSDS round showing the sabot being discarded after firing.  
 
Image reproduced from Deagel website: <http://www.deagel.com/library/M829-APFSDS-
T_m02006120700244.aspx>, accessed 03 April 2017. 
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Graphical illustration of effects from HEAT, HESH and APDSFS. Note that the secondary 
spalling effect is not shown (see below). 
 
Image reproduced from Military Engineering Overviews Tumblr website: 
<https://militaryengineeringoverviews.tumblr.com>, accessed 03 April 2017. 
 
 
1.3 Spalling and molten jet caused by HEAT round striking from left to right. 
 
Image reproduced from Defence Update website: <http://defense-update.com/features/du-2-05/IED-1.htm>, 




APPENDIX 2: ARMOUR 
2.1 Effect of sloping of armour 
 
 
Image reproduced from Gerald A. Halbert, ‘Elements of Tank Design’, Armor, 42:6 (Nov-Dec 1983), p. 38. 
 
 
2.2 The effect of explosive reactive armour (ERA) on shaped charge jet 
 
Image reproduced from Google Patents, ‘Protective arrangement against projectiles, particularly hollow 





2.3 Effect of spall liner on spalling 
 
 
Image reproduced from Think Defence website, ‘Vehicle 
Protection’,<http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2012/02/vehicle-protection/>, accessed 22 September 2017. 
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APPENDIX 3: MBT-70 PROJECT HIERARCHY 
 
Table extrapolated from BOV, E2014.3247, Armed Forces Management Journal. ‘How is the West German-
American Main Battle Tank Development Program Coming Along,’ January 1965, pp. 42-45, and;Thomas L. 
McNaugher, ‘Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks: Lessons from the U.S.-German Experience, 
1963-1978’, Rand Note (Rand Corporation, August 1981), Figure 1, p. 9. 
  
































APPENDIX 4: FMBT Anglo-German Steering Committee 
 




APPENDIX 5: FMBT Design Concepts For 1975 Assessment 
 
Reproduced from BOV, E2005.1079.4  Technical Assessment of all UK And FRG Concepts 




APPENDIX 6: Major MBTs used by UK, USA, FRG and France, 
1950-2000 
Note that these tables only represent main battle tanks used in the gun tank role; that is, 
excluding tanks retained as the basis for self-propelled artillery, engineering, training or other 
ancillary roles. The date range chosen ends in 2000. In most cases (exceptions being the FRG 
Leopard 1 and UK Challenger 1), the MBTs in service as gun tanks in 2000 remain in front-
line service at the time of writing. When referring to MBTs, this category includes tanks 
designated ‘medium’ in the early part of the period covered, and excludes heavy tanks such 
as the British Conqueror and US M-103. 
Data compiled from various sources listed in the bibliography. Note that different sources 
are often vague, unclear or contradictory on years of service, listing dates which include, for 
example, dates expressed as ‘late 1950s’, or service by non-MBT AFVs built on MBT chassis 
(such as armoured recovery vehicles or self-propelled artillery) or use as training vehicles or 
range targets. 
To save space and retain clarity, no attempt has been made to divide basic MBT models 
by versions. The British Centurion, for example, ran from the Centurion I through to the final 
















1Although originally designed as and designated a heavy tank, the M-26 was re-designated as a medium in May 
1946. 
2 Although widely known as the M-47 'Patton' or 'Patton II', the M-47 was never officially given that name, 
unlike the others of the M-4x series. 
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APPENDIX 7: Britain’s Future Options for a New MBT in 1980 
Future options considered in 1980 for a new MBT to replace Challenger and its likely 
immediate linear successor (Challenger 2). All information collated from, TNA, FCO 
46/2220, NATO: collaboration on tanks, tank guns and ammunition. DPN081/6. Note. Future 
Tank Policy, 28 October 1980. 
1. UK Development of Challenger 3. 
 Cheapest option. 
 All work would go to UK industry. 
 Financial gains from parity with Challenger 2. 
 No gain to NATO standardisation. 
 Probable poor sales. 
 Reduction of BAOR would result in higher unit cost due to reduced economy of scale. 
 
2. Cooperative development with France and Germany 
 Political boost. 
 A trilateral tank would probably become the standard in much of NATO. 
 UK would have a share in world sales. Especially valuable in Europe where the UK 
had lost many sales to the FRG. 
 Possible future joint projects and more stable future for the Royal Ordnance Factories. 
 Probably not a Franco-German tank, let alone a France/German/UK one. 
 Germany looking at a linear development of Leopard 2. 
 UK would struggle to get an acceptable share if it joins the project late. 
 The unit cost would probably be ‘substantially’ higher than a national tank, 
aggravated by a need for a whole new logistics structure. 
 
3. Cooperative development with France. 
 It would be a partnership of equals. 
 A design would be built from scratch and therefore has greater scope for UK 
components than a UK/FRG collaboration. 
 French described as being ‘not best partners’. 
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 The French and UK requirements were different. 
 It was unlikely that agreements would be reached where the France/FRG deal failed. 
 The result would be a brand new tank with a small market. 
 It would be more expensive than a national tank. 
 
4. Cooperative development with USA. 
 The vast US domestic requirement and industrial reserves would ensure a 
technologically advanced and cheap tank. 
 A potentially large world market. 
 The difference in required numbers would make the UK very junior partners. 
 The UK’s small development contribution would mean the end of UK tank 
production. 
 The US described as ‘extremely unreliable partners’, with examples such as the 
JP233, the 81mm mortar and attempts to negotiate licenced production of the Bradley 
IFV. 
 US vested interests and Congress were too powerful to ensure that the US would stick 
to any deal. 
 
5. Cooperative development with USA, French and FRG. 
 It would mean maximum standardisation within NATO. 
 Unlikely to be attractive to the French or Germans who would see little prospect of 
getting good shares of high-tech research and development. 
 France and Germany prioritised European defence industrial base. 
 No attraction for the US who would continue to develop the XM-1. 
 It would represent a small UK share. 




APPENDIX 8: NATO European Members Defence Organisations 
Name Year Founded Remit Members 
Western European 
Union (WEU) 
1948 Defence cooperation 
and mutual military 
aid. Promotion of 
economic and political 





Kingdom. FRG and 
Italy joined 1954.  
FINABEL 1953 Promote military 
cooperation. 
France, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom (1956), FRG 
(1973). 













1976 Promote defence 
standardisation and 
interoperability, 
maintain the European 
defence industry, unity 
in negotiation with 
USA. 
Belgium, Denmark, 









A subsidiary of the 
WEU. 
1993 Greater European arms 
cooperation with the 
aim of creating a 
European arms agency. 
Belgium, France, FRG, 
Italy, Luxembourg, 
The Netherlands, 
United Kingdom. (All 
of the WEU members). 
 
Information taken from: Robert Zweerts and Kelly Campbell, ‘The Search for Integrated 
European Programme Management’, in Jane Davis Drown; Clifford Drown; and Kelly 
Campbell (eds.), A Single European Arms Industry: European Defence Industries in the 
1990s (London 1990), pp. 75-89; UIA Website, ‘Independent European Programme Group 
(IEPG)’ <https://uia.org/s/or/en/1100006524>, accessed 18 March 2019; and, TNA, DEFE 
13/1167, Interoperability and standardisation of equipment in NATO. VCGS 100-1, Memo 
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